Last data update: May 20, 2024. (Total: 46824 publications since 2009)
Records 1-3 (of 3 Records) |
Query Trace: Mitruka Kiren [original query] |
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COVID-19 Vaccine Breakthrough Infections Reported to CDC - United States, January 1-April 30, 2021.
CDC COVID-19 Vaccine Breakthrough Case Investigations Team , Birhane Meseret , Bressler Sara , Chang Gregory , Clark Thomas , Dorough Layne , Fischer Marc , Watkins Louise Francois , Goldstein Jason M , Kugeler Kiersten , Langley Gayle , Lecy Kristin , Martin Stacey , Medalla Felicita , Mitruka Kiren , Nolen Leisha , Sadigh Katrin , Spratling Robin , Thompson Gail , Trujillo Alma . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021 70 (21) 792-793 COVID-19 vaccines are a critical tool for controlling the ongoing global pandemic. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has issued Emergency Use Authorizations for three COVID-19 vaccines for use in the United States.* In large, randomized-controlled trials, each vaccine was found to be safe and efficacious in preventing symptomatic, laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 (1-3). Despite the high level of vaccine efficacy, a small percentage of fully vaccinated persons (i.e. received all recommended doses of an FDA-authorized COVID-19 vaccine) will develop symptomatic or asymptomatic infections with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19 (2-8). |
SARS-CoV-2 transmission in a Georgia school district - United States, December 2020-January 2021.
Gettings JR , Gold JAW , Kimball A , Forsberg K , Scott C , Uehara A , Tong S , Hast M , Swanson MR , Morris E , Oraka E , Almendares O , Thomas ES , Mehari L , McCloud J , Roberts G , Crosby D , Balajee A , Burnett E , Chancey RJ , Cook P , Donadel M , Espinosa C , Evans ME , Fleming-Dutra KE , Forero C , Kukielka EA , Li Y , Marcet PL , Mitruka K , Nakayama JY , Nakazawa Y , O'Hegarty M , Pratt C , Rice ME , Rodriguez Stewart RM , Sabogal R , Sanchez E , Velasco-Villa A , Weng MK , Zhang J , Rivera G , Parrott T , Franklin R , Memark J , Drenzek C , Hall AJ , Kirking HL , Tate JE , Vallabhaneni S . Clin Infect Dis 2021 74 (2) 319-326 BACKGROUND: To inform prevention strategies, we assessed the extent of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and settings in which transmission occurred in a Georgia public school district. METHODS: During December 1, 2020-January 22, 2021, SARS-CoV-2-infected index cases and their close contacts in schools were identified by school and public health officials. For in-school contacts, we assessed symptoms and offered SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR testing; performed epidemiologic investigations and whole-genome sequencing to identify in-school transmission; and calculated secondary attack rate (SAR) by school setting (e.g., sports, elementary school classroom), index case role (i.e., staff, student), and index case symptomatic status. RESULTS: We identified 86 index cases and 1,119 contacts, 688 (63.1%) of whom received testing. Fifty-nine (8.7%) of 679 contacts tested positive; 15 (17.4%) of 86 index cases resulted in ≥2 positive contacts. Among 55 persons testing positive with available symptom data, 31 (56.4%) were asymptomatic. Highest SAR were in indoor, high-contact sports settings (23.8%, 95% confidence interval [CI] 12.7, 33.3), staff meetings/lunches (18.2%, CI 4.5-31.8), and elementary school classrooms (9.5%, CI 6.5-12.5). SAR was higher for staff (13.1%, CI 9.0-17.2) versus student index cases (5.8%, CI 3.6-8.0) and for symptomatic (10.9%, CI 8.1-13.9) versus asymptomatic index cases (3.0%, CI 1.0-5.5). CONCLUSIONS: Indoor sports may pose a risk to the safe operation of in-person learning. Preventing infection in staff members, through measures that include COVID-19 vaccination, is critical to reducing in-school transmission. Because many positive contacts were asymptomatic, contact tracing should be paired with testing, regardless of symptoms. |
Clinical and Laboratory Findings in Patients with Potential SARS-CoV-2 Reinfection, May-July 2020.
Lee JT , Hesse EM , Paulin HN , Datta D , Katz LS , Talwar A , Chang G , Galang RR , Harcourt JL , Tamin A , Thornburg NJ , Wong KK , Stevens V , Kim K , Tong S , Zhou B , Queen K , Drobeniuc J , Folster JM , Sexton DJ , Ramachandran S , Browne H , Iskander J , Mitruka K . Clin Infect Dis 2021 73 (12) 2217-2225 BACKGROUND: We investigated patients with potential SARS-CoV-2 reinfection in the United States during May-July 2020. METHODS: We conducted case finding for patients with potential SARS-CoV-2 reinfection through the Emerging Infections Network. Cases reported were screened for laboratory and clinical findings of potential reinfection followed by requests for medical records and laboratory specimens. Available medical records were abstracted to characterize patient demographics, comorbidities, clinical course, and laboratory test results. Submitted specimens underwent further testing, including RT-PCR, viral culture, whole genome sequencing, subgenomic RNA PCR, and testing for anti-SARS-CoV-2 total antibody. RESULTS: Among 73 potential reinfection patients with available records, 30 patients had recurrent COVID-19 symptoms explained by alternative diagnoses with concurrent SARS-CoV-2 positive RT-PCR, 24 patients remained asymptomatic after recovery but had recurrent or persistent RT-PCR, and 19 patients had recurrent COVID-19 symptoms with concurrent SARS-CoV-2 positive RT-PCR but no alternative diagnoses. These 19 patients had symptom recurrence a median of 57 days after initial symptom onset (interquartile range: 47 - 76). Six of these patients had paired specimens available for further testing, but none had laboratory findings confirming reinfections. Testing of an additional three patients with recurrent symptoms and alternative diagnoses also did not confirm reinfection. CONCLUSIONS: We did not confirm SARS-CoV-2 reinfection within 90 days of the initial infection based on the clinical and laboratory characteristics of cases in this investigation. Our findings support current CDC guidance around quarantine and testing for patients who have recovered from COVID-19. |
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