Last data update: Jun 17, 2024. (Total: 47034 publications since 2009)
Records 1-12 (of 12 Records) |
Query Trace: Kirby AE [original query] |
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U.S. preparedness and response to increasing clade I mpox cases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - United States, 2024
McQuiston JH , Luce R , Kazadi DM , Bwangandu CN , Mbala-Kingebeni P , Anderson M , Prasher JM , Williams IT , Phan A , Shelus V , Bratcher A , Soke GN , Fonjungo PN , Kabamba J , McCollum AM , Perry R , Rao AK , Doty J , Christensen B , Fuller JA , Baird N , Chaitram J , Brown CK , Kirby AE , Fitter D , Folster JM , Dualeh M , Hartman R , Bart SM , Hughes CM , Nakazawa Y , Sims E , Christie A , Hutson CL . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024 73 (19) 435-440 ![]() ![]() Clade I monkeypox virus (MPXV), which can cause severe illness in more people than clade II MPXVs, is endemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but the country has experienced an increase in suspected cases during 2023-2024. In light of the 2022 global outbreak of clade II mpox, the increase in suspected clade I cases in DRC raises concerns that the virus could spread to other countries and underscores the importance of coordinated, urgent global action to support DRC's efforts to contain the virus. To date, no cases of clade I mpox have been detected outside of countries in Central Africa where the virus is endemic. CDC and other partners are working to support DRC's response. In addition, CDC is enhancing U.S. preparedness by raising awareness, strengthening surveillance, expanding diagnostic testing capacity for clade I MPXV, ensuring appropriate specimen handling and waste management, emphasizing the importance of appropriate medical treatment, and communicating guidance on the recommended contact tracing, containment, behavior modification, and vaccination strategies. |
Detecting Mpox cases through wastewater surveillance - United States, August 2022-May 2023
Adams C , Kirby AE , Bias M , Riser A , Wong KK , Mercante JW , Reese H . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024 73 (2) 37-43 ![]() ![]() In October 2022, CDC's National Wastewater Surveillance System began routine testing of U.S. wastewater for Monkeypox virus. Wastewater surveillance sensitivity, positive predictive value (PPV), and negative predictive value (NPV) for Monkeypox virus were evaluated by comparing wastewater detections (Monkeypox virus detected versus not detected) to numbers of persons with mpox in a county who were shedding virus. Case ascertainment was assumed to be complete, and persons with mpox were assumed to shed virus for 25 days after symptom onset. A total of 281 cases and 3,492 wastewater samples from 89 sites in 26 counties were included in the analysis. Wastewater surveillance in a single week, from samples representing thousands to millions of persons, had a sensitivity of 32% for detecting one or more persons shedding Monkeypox virus, 49% for detecting five or more persons shedding virus, and 77% for detecting 15 or more persons shedding virus. Weekly PPV and NPV for detecting persons shedding Monkeypox virus in a county were 62% and 80%, respectively. An absence of detections in counties with wastewater surveillance signified a high probability that a large number of cases were not present. Results can help to guide the public health response to Monkeypox virus wastewater detections. A single, isolated detection likely warrants a limited public health response. An absence of detections, in combination with no reported cases, can give public health officials greater confidence that no cases are present. Wastewater surveillance can serve as a useful complement to case surveillance for guiding the public health response to an mpox outbreak. |
Early detection and surveillance of the SARS-CoV-2 variant BA.2.86 - Worldwide, July-October 2023
Lambrou AS , South E , Ballou ES , Paden CR , Fuller JA , Bart SM , Butryn DM , Novak RT , Browning SD , Kirby AE , Welsh RM , Cornforth DM , MacCannell DR , Friedman CR , Thornburg NJ , Hall AJ , Hughes LJ , Mahon BE , Daskalakis DC , Shah ND , Jackson BR , Kirking HL . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2023 72 (43) 1162-1167 ![]() ![]() Early detection of emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants is critical to guiding rapid risk assessments, providing clear and timely communication messages, and coordinating public health action. CDC identifies and monitors novel SARS-CoV-2 variants through diverse surveillance approaches, including genomic, wastewater, traveler-based, and digital public health surveillance (e.g., global data repositories, news, and social media). The SARS-CoV-2 variant BA.2.86 was first sequenced in Israel and reported on August 13, 2023. The first U.S. COVID-19 case caused by this variant was reported on August 17, 2023, after a patient received testing for SARS-CoV-2 at a health care facility on August 3. In the following month, eight additional U.S. states detected BA.2.86 across various surveillance systems, including specimens from health care settings, wastewater surveillance, and traveler-based genomic surveillance. As of October 23, 2023, sequences have been reported from at least 32 countries. Continued variant tracking and further evidence are needed to evaluate the full public health impact of BA.2.86. Timely genomic sequence submissions to global public databases aided early detection of BA.2.86 despite the decline in the number of specimens being sequenced during the past year. This report describes how multicomponent surveillance and genomic sequencing were used in real time to track the emergence and transmission of the BA.2.86 variant. This surveillance approach provides valuable information regarding implementing and sustaining comprehensive surveillance not only for novel SARS-CoV-2 variants but also for future pathogen threats. |
COVID-19 surveillance after expiration of the public health emergency declaration - United States, May 11, 2023
Silk BJ , Scobie HM , Duck WM , Palmer T , Ahmad FB , Binder AM , Cisewski JA , Kroop S , Soetebier K , Park M , Kite-Powell A , Cool A , Connelly E , Dietz S , Kirby AE , Hartnett K , Johnston J , Khan D , Stokley S , Paden CR , Sheppard M , Sutton P , Razzaghi H , Anderson RN , Thornburg N , Meyer S , Womack C , Weakland AP , McMorrow M , Broeker LR , Winn A , Hall AJ , Jackson B , Mahon BE , Ritchey MD . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2023 72 (19) 523-528 On January 31, 2020, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) declared, under Section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, a U.S. public health emergency because of the emergence of a novel virus, SARS-CoV-2.* After 13 renewals, the public health emergency will expire on May 11, 2023. Authorizations to collect certain public health data will expire on that date as well. Monitoring the impact of COVID-19 and the effectiveness of prevention and control strategies remains a public health priority, and a number of surveillance indicators have been identified to facilitate ongoing monitoring. After expiration of the public health emergency, COVID-19-associated hospital admission levels will be the primary indicator of COVID-19 trends to help guide community and personal decisions related to risk and prevention behaviors; the percentage of COVID-19-associated deaths among all reported deaths, based on provisional death certificate data, will be the primary indicator used to monitor COVID-19 mortality. Emergency department (ED) visits with a COVID-19 diagnosis and the percentage of positive SARS-CoV-2 test results, derived from an established sentinel network, will help detect early changes in trends. National genomic surveillance will continue to be used to estimate SARS-CoV-2 variant proportions; wastewater surveillance and traveler-based genomic surveillance will also continue to be used to monitor SARS-CoV-2 variants. Disease severity and hospitalization-related outcomes are monitored via sentinel surveillance and large health care databases. Monitoring of COVID-19 vaccination coverage, vaccine effectiveness (VE), and vaccine safety will also continue. Integrated strategies for surveillance of COVID-19 and other respiratory viruses can further guide prevention efforts. COVID-19-associated hospitalizations and deaths are largely preventable through receipt of updated vaccines and timely administration of therapeutics (1-4). |
Fecal indicators and antibiotic resistance genes exhibit diurnal trends in the Chattahoochee River: Implications for water quality monitoring.
Nguyen KH , Smith S , Roundtree A , Feistel DJ , Kirby AE , Levy K , Mattioli MC . Front Microbiol 2022 13 1029176 ![]() ![]() Water bodies that serve as sources of drinking or recreational water are routinely monitored for fecal indicator bacteria (FIB) by state and local agencies. Exceedances of monitoring thresholds set by those agencies signal likely elevated human health risk from exposure, but FIB give little information about the potential source of contamination. To improve our understanding of how within-day variation could impact monitoring data interpretation, we conducted a study at two sites along the Chattahoochee River that varied in their recreational usage and adjacent land-use (natural versus urban), collecting samples every 30 min over one 24-h period. We assayed for three types of microbial indicators: FIB (total coliforms and Escherichia coli); human fecal-associated microbial source tracking (MST) markers (crAssphage and HF183/BacR287); and a suite of clinically relevant antibiotic resistance genes (ARGs; blaCTX-M, blaCMY, MCR, KPC, VIM, NDM) and a gene associated with antibiotic resistance (intl1). Mean levels of FIB and clinically relevant ARGs (blaCMY and KPC) were similar across sites, while MST markers and intI1 occurred at higher mean levels at the natural site. The human-associated MST markers positively correlated with antibiotic resistant-associated genes at both sites, but no consistent associations were detected between culturable FIB and any molecular markers. For all microbial indicators, generalized additive mixed models were used to examine diurnal variability and whether this variability was associated with environmental factors (water temperature, turbidity, pH, and sunlight). We found that FIB peaked during morning and early afternoon hours and were not associated with environmental factors. With the exception of HF183/BacR287 at the urban site, molecular MST markers and intI1 exhibited diurnal variability, and water temperature, pH, and turbidity were significantly associated with this variability. For blaCMY and KPC, diurnal variability was present but was not correlated with environmental factors. These results suggest that differences in land use (natural or urban) both adjacent and upstream may impact overall levels of microbial contamination. Monitoring agencies should consider matching sample collection times with peak levels of target microbial indicators, which would be in the morning or early afternoon for the fecal associated indicators. Measuring multiple microbial indicators can lead to clearer interpretations of human health risk associated with exposure to contaminated water. |
Rapid implementation of high-frequency wastewater surveillance of SARS-CoV-2
Holst MM , Person J , Jennings W , Welsh RM , Focazio MJ , Bradley PM , Schill WB , Kirby AE , Marsh ZA . ACS ES T Water 2022 2 (11) 2201-2210 There have been over 507 million cases of COVID-19, the disease caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), resulting in 6 million deaths globally. Wastewater surveillance has emerged as a valuable tool in understanding SARS-CoV-2 burden in communities. The National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS) partnered with the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to implement a high-frequency sampling program. This report describes basic surveillance and sampling statistics as well as a comparison of SARS-CoV-2 trends between high-frequency sampling 3-5 times per week, referred to as USGS samples, and routine sampling 1-2 times per week, referred to as NWSS samples. USGS samples provided a more nuanced impression of the changes in wastewater trends, which could be important in emergency response situations. Despite the rapid implementation time frame, USGS samples had similar data quality and testing turnaround times as NWSS samples. Ensuring there is a reliable sample collection and testing plan before an emergency arises will aid in the rapid implementation of a high-frequency sampling approach. High-frequency sampling requires a constant flow of information and supplies throughout sample collection, testing, analysis, and data sharing. High-frequency sampling may be a useful approach for increased resolution of disease trends in emergency response. © 2022 American Chemical Society. All rights reserved. |
Notes from the Field: Early Evidence of the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) Variant in Community Wastewater - United States, November-December 2021.
Kirby AE , Welsh RM , Marsh ZA , Yu AT , Vugia DJ , Boehm AB , Wolfe MK , White BJ , Matzinger SR , Wheeler A , Bankers L , Andresen K , Salatas C , Gregory DA , Johnson MC , Trujillo M , Kannoly S , Smyth DS , Dennehy JJ , Sapoval N , Ensor K , Treangen T , Stadler LB , Hopkins L . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2022 71 (3) 103-105 ![]() The United States designated the B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant of SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19) a variant of concern on November 30, 2021, and the first U.S. Omicron COVID-19 case was reported on December 1 (1). By December 18, Omicron was estimated to account for 37.9% of U.S. COVID-19 cases.* Early warning systems, such as sewage (wastewater) surveillance,† can help track the spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants across communities (2). | | The National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS) comprises 43 health departments funded by CDC to provide data on presence of and trends in SARS-CoV-2 infections that are independent of clinical testing. In addition to total SARS-CoV-2 testing, some health departments track SARS-CoV-2 variants by detecting variant-associated mutations in wastewater. Health departments in four states (California, Colorado, New York, and Texas) were the first wastewater surveillance programs to detect evidence of Omicron in community wastewater. This report describes the initial detections in wastewater during November 21–December 16, 2021, and the interpretative framework for these types of data. This activity was reviewed by CDC and was conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy.§ |
Using Wastewater Surveillance Data to Support the COVID-19 Response - United States, 2020-2021.
Kirby AE , Walters MS , Jennings WC , Fugitt R , LaCross N , Mattioli M , Marsh ZA , Roberts VA , Mercante JW , Yoder J , Hill VR . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021 70 (36) 1242-1244 ![]() Wastewater surveillance, the measurement of pathogen levels in wastewater, is used to evaluate community-level infection trends, augment traditional surveillance that leverages clinical tests and services (e.g., case reporting), and monitor public health interventions (1). Approximately 40% of persons infected with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, shed virus RNA in their stool (2); therefore, community-level trends in SARS-CoV-2 infections, both symptomatic and asymptomatic (2) can be tracked through wastewater testing (3-6). CDC launched the National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS) in September 2020 to coordinate wastewater surveillance programs implemented by state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments to support the COVID-19 pandemic response. In the United States, wastewater surveillance was not previously implemented at the national level. As of August 2021, NWSS includes 37 states, four cities, and two territories. This report summarizes NWSS activities and describes innovative applications of wastewater surveillance data by two states, which have included generating alerts to local jurisdictions, allocating mobile testing resources, evaluating irregularities in traditional surveillance, refining health messaging, and forecasting clinical resource needs. NWSS complements traditional surveillance and enables health departments to intervene earlier with focused support in communities experiencing increasing concentrations of SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater. The ability to conduct wastewater surveillance is not affected by access to health care or the clinical testing capacity in the community. Robust, sustainable implementation of wastewater surveillance requires public health capacity for wastewater testing, analysis, and interpretation. Partnerships between wastewater utilities and public health departments are needed to leverage wastewater surveillance data for the COVID-19 response for rapid assessment of emerging threats and preparedness for future pandemics. |
Adoption of Strategies to Mitigate Transmission of COVID-19 During a Statewide Primary Election - Delaware, September 2020.
Leidman E , Hall NB , Kirby AE , Garcia-Williams AG , Aponte J , Yoder JS , Hong R , Albence A , Coronado F , Massetti GM . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020 69 (43) 1571-1575 Elections occurring during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have been affected by notable changes in the methods of voting, the number and type of polling locations, and in-person voting procedures (1). To mitigate transmission of COVID-19 at polling locations, jurisdictions have adopted changes to protocols and procedures, informed by CDC's interim guidance, developed in collaboration with the Election Assistance Commission (2). The driving principle for this guidance is that voting practices with lower infection risk will be those which reduce the number of voters who congregate indoors in polling locations by offering a variety of methods for voting and longer voting periods. The guidance for in-person voting includes considerations for election officials, poll workers, and voters to maintain healthy environments and operations. To assess knowledge and adoption of mitigation strategies, CDC collaborated with the Delaware Department of Health and Social Services and the Delaware State Election Commission on a survey of poll workers who served during the statewide primary election on September 15, 2020. Among 522 eligible poll workers, 93% correctly answered all three survey questions about COVID-19 transmission. Respondents noted that most voters and poll workers wore masks. However, masks were not always worn correctly (i.e., covering both the nose and mouth). Responses suggest that mitigation measures recommended for both poll workers and voters were widely adopted and feasible, but also highlighted gaps in infection prevention control efforts. Strengthening of measures intended to minimize the risk of poll workers acquiring COVID-19 from ill voters, such as additional training and necessary personal protective equipment (PPE), as well as support for alternative voting options for ill voters, are needed. Adherence to mitigation measures is important not only to protect voters but also to protect poll workers, many of whom are older adults, and thus at higher risk for severe COVID-19-associated illness. Enhanced attention to reducing congregation in polling locations, correct mask use, and providing safe voting options for ill voters are critical considerations to minimize risk to voters and poll workers. Evidence from the Delaware election supports the feasibility and acceptability of implementing current CDC guidance for election officials, poll workers, and voters for mitigating COVID-19 transmission at polling locations (2). |
Knowledge and Practices Regarding Safe Household Cleaning and Disinfection for COVID-19 Prevention - United States, May 2020.
Gharpure R , Hunter CM , Schnall AH , Barrett CE , Kirby AE , Kunz J , Berling K , Mercante JW , Murphy JL , Garcia-Williams AG . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020 69 (23) 705-709 A recent report described a sharp increase in calls to poison centers related to exposures to cleaners and disinfectants since the onset of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic (1). However, data describing cleaning and disinfection practices within household settings in the United States are limited, particularly concerning those practices intended to prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. To provide contextual and behavioral insight into the reported increase in poison center calls and to inform timely and relevant prevention strategies, an opt-in Internet panel survey of 502 U.S. adults was conducted in May 2020 to characterize knowledge and practices regarding household cleaning and disinfection during the COVID-19 pandemic. Knowledge gaps were identified in several areas, including safe preparation of cleaning and disinfectant solutions, use of recommended personal protective equipment when using cleaners and disinfectants, and safe storage of hand sanitizers, cleaners, and disinfectants. Thirty-nine percent of respondents reported engaging in nonrecommended high-risk practices with the intent of preventing SARS-CoV-2 transmission, such as washing food products with bleach, applying household cleaning or disinfectant products to bare skin, and intentionally inhaling or ingesting these products. Respondents who engaged in high-risk practices more frequently reported an adverse health effect that they believed was a result of using cleaners or disinfectants than did those who did not report engaging in these practices. Public messaging should continue to emphasize evidence-based, safe practices such as hand hygiene and recommended cleaning and disinfection of high-touch surfaces to prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in household settings (2). Messaging should also emphasize avoidance of high-risk practices such as unsafe preparation of cleaning and disinfectant solutions, use of bleach on food products, application of household cleaning and disinfectant products to skin, and inhalation or ingestion of cleaners and disinfectants. |
Norovirus seroprevalence among adults in the United States: Analysis of NHANES serum specimens from 1999-2000 and 2003-2004
Kirby AE , Kienast Y , Zhu W , Barton J , Anderson E , Sizemore M , Vinje J , Moe CL . Viruses 2020 12 (2) Norovirus is the most common cause of epidemic and endemic acute gastroenteritis. However, national estimates of the infection burden are challenging. This study used a nationally representative serum bank to estimate the seroprevalence to five norovirus genotypes including three GII variants: GI.1 Norwalk, GI.4, GII.3, GII.4 US95/96, GII.4 Farmington Hills, GII.4 New Orleans, and GIV.1 in the USA population (aged 16 to 49 years). Changes in seroprevalence to the three norovirus GII.4 variants between 1999 and 2000, as well as 2003 and 2004, were measured to examine the role of population immunity in the emergence of pandemic GII.4 noroviruses. The overall population-adjusted seroprevalence to any norovirus was 90.0% (1999 to 2000) and 95.9% (2003 to 2004). Seroprevalence was highest to GI.1 Norwalk, GII.3, and the three GII.4 noroviruses. Seroprevalence to GII.4 Farmington Hills increased significantly between the 1999 and 2000, as well as the 2003 and 2004, study cycles, consistent with the emergence of this pandemic strain. Seroprevalence to GII.4 New Orleans also increased over time, but to a lesser degree. Antibodies against the GIV.1 norovirus were consistently detected (population-adjusted seroprevalence 19.1% to 25.9%), with rates increasing with age. This study confirms the high burden of norovirus infection in US adults, with most adults having multiple norovirus infections over their lifetime. |
Variation in E. coli concentrations in open drains across neighborhoods in Accra, Ghana: The influence of onsite sanitation coverage and interconnectedness of urban environments
Berendes DM , de Mondesert L , Kirby AE , Yakubu H , Adomako L , Michiel J , Raj S , Robb K , Wang Y , Doe B , Ampofo J , Moe CL . Int J Hyg Environ Health 2020 224 113433 Alongside efforts to improve safe management of feces along the entire sanitation chain, including after the toilet, global sanitation efforts are focusing on universal access ‘basic’ services: onsite facilities that safely contain excreta away from human contact. Although fecal sludge management is improving in urban areas, open drains remain a common fate for feces in these often densely-populated neighborhoods in low-income countries. To-date, it is unclear to what extent complete coverage of onsite sanitation reduces fecal contamination in the urban environment and how fecal contamination varies within urban drains across neighborhoods by sanitation status within a city. We assessed how neighborhood levels of environmental fecal contamination (via spatially-representative sampling of open drains for E. coli) varied across four neighborhoods with varying income, type and coverage of household sanitation facilities, and population density in Accra, Ghana. Neighborhoods with very high sanitation coverage (≥89%) still had high (>4 log10 CFU/100 mL) E. coli concentrations in drains. Between-neighborhood variation in E. coli levels among the high coverage neighborhoods was significant: drain concentrations in neighborhoods with 93% and 89% coverage (4.7 (95% CI: 4.5, 4.9) & 4.9 (95% CI: 4.5, 5.3) log10 CFU/100 mL, respectively) were higher than in the neighborhood with 97% coverage (4.1 log10 CFU/100 mL, 95% CI: 3.8, 4.4 log10 CFU/100 mL). Compared with the highest coverage neighborhood, the neighborhood with lowest coverage (48%) also had higher E. coli concentrations (5.6 log10 CFU/100 mL, 95% CI: 5.3, 5.9 log10 CFU/100 mL). Although fecal contamination in open drains appeared lower in neighborhoods with higher onsite sanitation coverage (and vice versa), other factors (e.g. fecal sludge management, animals, population density) may affect drain concentrations. These results underscore that neighborhood-level onsite sanitation improvements alone may not sufficiently reduce fecal hazards to public health from open drains. These findings supporting the need for integrated, city-level fecal sludge management alongside multifaceted interventions to reduce fecal contamination levels and human exposure. |
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- Page last updated:Jun 17, 2024
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