The first Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) cases in the 2021 Ebola outbreak were reported by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Ministry of Health in February. However, 1 week later, the Guinea Ministry of Health reported its first EVD outbreak since April 2016. U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in-country operational and workforce capacity were built during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak response in West Africa and leveraged during the 2021 EVD outbreaks. During the 2014-2016 West Africa response and the 2021 EVD outbreaks, capacity and capability improvements in laboratory systems, risk communication, surveillance, epidemiology, infection prevention, and control were needed for a successful response. The overarching goal of CDC's operational and workforce capacity improvements was to strengthen countries' abilities to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks quickly. The Ebola outbreaks are examples of enhanced public health interventions where CDC has contributed as a partner with in-country ministries of health to save lives and control disease outbreaks. Lessons learned from the recent Ebola outbreaks indicate that a capacity-building approach has the potential application to other public health emergencies and contributes to strengthening global health security.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) responds to public health emergencies at various levels within its organization. Overtime, CDC's response capabilities have matured across the organization due to years of emergency management investment and experience across the agency. In 2019, CDC began to implement the Graduated Response Framework to formalize an approach for managing public health emergencies that recognizes its response capabilities and meets the evolving needs of the country. This brief report summarizes CDC's Graduated Response Framework structure, and how response management escalates and de-escalates according to resource needs and complexity.

Clade I monkeypox virus (MPXV), which can cause severe illness in more people than clade II MPXVs, is endemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but the country has experienced an increase in suspected cases during 2023-2024. In light of the 2022 global outbreak of clade II mpox, the increase in suspected clade I cases in DRC raises concerns that the virus could spread to other countries and underscores the importance of coordinated, urgent global action to support DRC's efforts to contain the virus. To date, no cases of clade I mpox have been detected outside of countries in Central Africa where the virus is endemic. CDC and other partners are working to support DRC's response. In addition, CDC is enhancing U.S. preparedness by raising awareness, strengthening surveillance, expanding diagnostic testing capacity for clade I MPXV, ensuring appropriate specimen handling and waste management, emphasizing the importance of appropriate medical treatment, and communicating guidance on the recommended contact tracing, containment, behavior modification, and vaccination strategies.

In recognition of an increasing number of high-consequence infectious disease events, a group of subject-matter experts identified core safety principles that can be applied across all donning and doffing protocols for personal protective equipment.

Since 2013, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has offered the Public Health Emergency Management Fellowship to health professionals from around the world. The goal of this program is to build an international workforce to establish public health emergency management programs and operations centers in participating countries. In March 2021, all 141 graduates of the fellowship program were invited to complete a web survey designed to examine their job roles and functions, assess their contributions to their country's COVID-19 response, and identify needs for technical assistance to strengthen national preparedness and response systems. Of 141 fellows, 89 successfully completed the survey. Findings showed that fellowship graduates served key roles in COVID-19 response in many countries, used skills they gained from the fellowship, and desired continuing engagement between the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and fellowship alumni to strengthen the community of practice for international public health emergency management.

BACKGROUND: The B.1.167.2 (Delta) variant quickly became the predominant circulating SARS-CoV-2 strain in the United States during Summer 2021. Missouri identified a high number of outbreaks in long-term care facilities (LTCF) across the state with low vaccination rates among LTCF staff members and poor adherence to mitigation measures within local communities. AIM: This report aims to describe COVID-19 outbreaks that occurred in Missouri LTCFs impacting staff and residents during the surge of the Delta variant. METHODS: Outbreaks of COVID-19 in 178 LTCFs were identified by the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Case data from LTCFs with the highest burden of disease were analyzed to assess disease transmission, vaccination status, and outcomes among residents and staff. Additional investigational measures included onsite visits to facilities with recent COVID-19 outbreaks in communities with substantial transmission to assess mitigation measures. FINDINGS: During 22(nd) April - 29(th) July 2021, 159 COVID-19 cases among 72 staff members and 87 residents, were identified in 10 LTCFs. Over 74.7% of resident cases were vaccinated compared to 23.6% of staff cases. Vaccinated residents had a lower proportion of hospitalizations and deaths reported compared to unvaccinated residents. Data analysis and contact tracing efforts from a sample of the facilities suggest staff members were likely a major factor in introducing SARS-CoV-2 virus into the facilities. Adherence to COVID-19 mitigation measures varied at the visited facilities. CONCLUSION: Data showed that vaccination rates varied between staff cases and resident cases in facilities with high burden outbreaks. Differences were identified in mitigation practices in at least two facilities.

With the increasing number of highly infectious disease incidents, outbreaks, and pandemics in our society (e.g., Ebola virus disease, Lassa fever, coronavirus diseases), the need for consensus and best practices on highly infectious decedent management is critical. In January 2020, a workshop of subject matter experts from across the world convened to discuss highly infectious live patient transport and highly infectious decedent management best practices. This commentary focuses on the highly infectious decedent management component of the workshop. The absence of guidance or disparate guidance on highly infectious decedent management can increase occupational safety and health risks for death care sector workers. To address this issue, the authorship presents these consensus recommendations on best practices in highly infectious decedent management, including discussion of what is considered a highly infectious decedent; scalability and storage for casualty events; integration of key stakeholders; infection control and facility considerations; transport; care and autopsy; psychological, ethical, and cultural considerations as well as multi-national care perspectives. These consensus recommendations are not intended to be exhaustive but rather to underscore this overlooked area and serve as a starting point for much-needed conversations.

Since at least 2015, a major Zika virus epidemic has impacted the Americas and the Caribbean. There is an ongoing risk of Aedes mosquito-borne transmission in more than 90 countries and territories worldwide. In these areas, as well as in places that are not experiencing active outbreaks, workers in a variety of jobs may be exposed to the virus. In addition to outdoor workers in places with ongoing, vector-borne transmission who may be exposed when bitten by Zika-infected mosquitoes, biomedical researchers studying the virus and health care workers and staff in clinical laboratories may encounter blood and infectious body fluids from infected individuals, including travelers from Zika virus-affected areas. Because of potentially serious health outcomes, including reproductive effects, sometimes associated with Zika, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health previously issued guidance to help US employers protect workers from exposure to the virus on the job. This commentary summarizes the details of these recommendations and explains their rationale, which is important to understand when adapting and implementing workplace controls to prevent occupational Zika virus exposures and infections at individual worksites. The industrial hygiene hierarchy of controls, including elimination and substitution, engineering controls, administrative controls, and safe work practices, and personal protective equipment, serves as a framework for infection prevention practices for at-risk workers discussed here.

Since 2015, the most recent Zika virus (ZIKV) epidemic has spread to more than 80 countries and territories.1-3 More than 42,000 cases have been identified in the United States to date, including at least 37,000 in the US territories (mostly in Puerto Rico and attributable to local transmission).4 As the frequency of new cases has decreased, concern over the situation has waned. However, laboratory and biomedical research workers remain at risk of infection. | | The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) received reports of 3 ZIKV exposure incidents among such workers, each with clear links to work tasks, during the recent epidemic. However, we are not aware that they have been described in the literature yet.