A global outbreak of clade II mpox associated with sexual contact, disproportionately affecting gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (MSM), has been ongoing since May 2022. Information on types of contact most associated with transmission is limited. This report used data from a multijurisdictional vaccine effectiveness case-control study of sexually active persons aged 18-49 years who identified as MSM or transgender, collected during August 2022-July 2023. Odds of mpox associated with selected types of intimate and nonintimate close contact with a person with mpox were estimated. Among 457 case-patients and 1,030 control patients who met minimum data requirements, 150 (32.8%) case-patients and 57 (5.5%) control patients reported close contact with a person with mpox and were included in this analysis. Adjusted odds of mpox were 5.4 times as high among those who reported having condomless receptive anal sex with a person with mpox, compared with participants who reported close contact with a person with mpox and no condomless receptive anal sex with that person (OR = 5.4; p = 0.031). Although the mpox vaccine is highly effective, vaccination coverage remains low; a multifaceted approach to prevention remains important and should include vaccination promotion, safer sex practices, and increasing awareness that mpox continues to circulate.

Invasive meningococcal disease (IMD), caused by infection with the bacterium Neisseria meningitidis, usually manifests as meningitis or septicemia and can be severe and life-threatening (1). Six serogroups (A, B, C, W, X, and Y) account for most cases (2). N. meningitidis is transmitted person-to-person via respiratory droplets and oropharyngeal secretions. Asymptomatic persons can carry N. meningitidis and transmit the bacteria to others, potentially causing illness among susceptible persons. Outbreaks can occur in conjunction with large gatherings (3,4). Vaccines are available to prevent meningococcal disease. Antibiotic prophylaxis for close contacts of infected persons is critical to preventing secondary cases (2).

OBJECTIVES: To examine disparities by sex, age group, and race and ethnicity in COVID-19 confirmed cases, hospitalizations, and deaths among incarcerated people and staff in correctional facilities. METHODS: Six U.S. jurisdictions reported data on COVID-19 confirmed cases, hospitalizations, and deaths stratified by sex, age group, and race and ethnicity for incarcerated people and staff in correctional facilities during March 1- July 31, 2020. We calculated incidence rates and rate ratios (RR) and absolute rate differences (RD) by sex, age group, and race and ethnicity, and made comparisons to the U.S. general population. RESULTS: Compared with the U.S. general population, incarcerated people and staff had higher COVID-19 case incidence (RR = 14.1, 95% CI = 13.9-14.3; RD = 6,692.2, CI = 6,598.8-6,785.5; RR = 6.0, CI = 5.7-6.3; RD = 2523.0, CI = 2368.1-2677.9, respectively); incarcerated people also had higher rates of COVID-19-related deaths (RR = 1.6, CI = 1.4-1.9; RD = 23.6, CI = 14.9-32.2). Rates of COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths among incarcerated people and corrections staff differed by sex, age group, and race and ethnicity. The COVID-19 hospitalization (RR = 0.9, CI = 0.8-1.0; RD = -48.0, CI = -79.1- -16.8) and death rates (RR = 0.8, CI = 0.6-1.0; RD = -11.8, CI = -23.5- -0.1) for Black incarcerated people were lower than those for Black people in the general population. COVID-19 case incidence, hospitalizations, and deaths were higher among older incarcerated people, but not among staff. CONCLUSIONS: With a few exceptions, living or working in a correctional setting was associated with higher risk of COVID-19 infection and resulted in worse health outcomes compared with the general population; however, Black incarcerated people fared better than their U.S. general population counterparts.

Congregate settings and high-density workplaces have endured a disproportionate impact from COVID-19. In order to provide further understanding of the transmission patterns of SARS-CoV-2 in these settings, whole genome sequencing (WGS) was performed on samples obtained from 8 selected outbreaks in Minnesota from March – June, 2020. WGS and phylogenetic analysis was conducted on 319 samples, constituting 14.4% of the 2,222 total SARS-CoV-2-positive individuals associated with these outbreaks. Among the sequenced specimens, three LTCFs and both correctional facilities had spread associated with a single genetic sequence. A fourth LTCF had outbreak cases associated with two distinct sequences. In contrast, cases associated with outbreaks in the two meat processing plants represented multiple SARS-CoV-2 sequences. These results suggest that a single introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into a facility can result in a widespread outbreak, and early identification and cohorting of cases, along with continued vigilance with infection prevention and control measures is imperative.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.Funding StatementStudy was supported by the ELC Cares grant from CDC.Author DeclarationsI confirm all relevant ethical guidelines have been followed, and any necessary IRB and/or ethics committee approvals have been obtained.YesThe details of the IRB/oversight body that provided approval or exemption for the research described are given below:The manuscript was reviewed in accordance with standard CDC protocol, in which the approved CDC chain of command in the COVID 19 response division reviewed the manuscript and determined that it was non-research, public health response. As such, it was determined by CDC review to be exempt from further institutional review board evaluation. In summary, this manuscript and activity was reviewed by CDC and was conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy (see e.g., 45 C.F.R. part 46, 21 C.F.R. part 56; 42 U.S.C. 241(d); 5 U.S.C 552a; 44 U.S.C. 351 et seq.).All necessary patient/participant consent has been obtained and the appropriate institutional forms have been archived.YesI understand that all clinical trials and any other prospective interventional studies must be registered with an ICMJE-approved registry, such as ClinicalTrials.gov. I confirm that any such study reported in the manuscript has been registered and the trial registration ID is provided (note: if posting a prospective study registered retrospectively, please provide a statement in the trial ID field explaining why the study was not registered in advance).YesI have followed all appropriate research reporting guidelines and uploaded the relevant EQUATOR Network research reporting checklist(s) and other pertinent material as supplementary files, if applicable.YesThere is no referred data.

As of March 31, 2023, more than 30,000 monkeypox (mpox) cases had been reported in the United States in an outbreak that has disproportionately affected gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (MSM) and transgender persons (1). JYNNEOS vaccine (Modified Vaccinia Ankara vaccine, Bavarian Nordic) was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2019 for the prevention of smallpox and mpox via subcutaneous injection as a 2-dose series (0.5 mL per dose, administered 4 weeks apart) (2). To expand vaccine access, an Emergency Use Authorization was issued by FDA on August 9, 2022, for dose-sparing intradermal injection of JYNNEOS as a 2-dose series (0.1 mL per dose, administered 4 weeks apart) (3). Vaccination was available to persons with known or presumed exposure to a person with mpox (postexposure prophylaxis [PEP]), as well as persons at increased risk for mpox or who might benefit from vaccination (preexposure mpox prophylaxis [PrEP]) (4). Because information on JYNNEOS vaccine effectiveness (VE) is limited, a matched case-control study was conducted in 12 U.S. jurisdictions,(†) including nine Emerging Infections Program sites and three Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity sites,(§) to evaluate VE against mpox among MSM and transgender adults aged 18-49 years. During August 19, 2022-March 31, 2023, a total of 309 case-patients were matched to 608 control patients. Adjusted VE was 75.2% (95% CI = 61.2% to 84.2%) for partial vaccination (1 dose) and 85.9% (95% CI = 73.8% to 92.4%) for full vaccination (2 doses). Adjusted VE for full vaccination by subcutaneous, intradermal, and heterologous routes of administration was 88.9% (95% CI = 56.0% to 97.2%), 80.3% (95% CI = 22.9% to 95.0%), and 86.9% (95% CI = 69.1% to 94.5%), respectively. Adjusted VE for full vaccination among immunocompromised participants was 70.2% (95% CI = -37.9% to 93.6%) and among immunocompetent participants was 87.8% (95% CI = 57.5% to 96.5%). JYNNEOS is effective at reducing the risk for mpox. Because duration of protection of 1 versus 2 doses remains unknown, persons at increased risk for mpox exposure should receive the 2-dose series as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP),(¶) regardless of administration route or immunocompromise status.

Coronavirus disease has disproportionately affected persons in congregate settings and high-density workplaces. To determine more about the transmission patterns of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in these settings, we performed whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis on 319 (14.4%) samples from 2,222 SARS-CoV-2-positive persons associated with 8 outbreaks in Minnesota, USA, during March-June 2020. Sequencing indicated that virus spread in 3 long-term care facilities and 2 correctional facilities was associated with a single genetic sequence and that in a fourth long-term care facility, outbreak cases were associated with 2 distinct sequences. In contrast, cases associated with outbreaks in 2 meat-processing plants were associated with multiple SARS-CoV-2 sequences. These results suggest that a single introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into a facility can result in a widespread outbreak. Early identification and cohorting (segregating) of virus-positive persons in these settings, along with continued vigilance with infection prevention and control measures, is imperative.

During 1995-2011, the overall incidence of hepatitis A decreased by 95% in the United States from 12 cases per 100,000 population during 1995 to 0.4 cases per 100,000 population during 2011, and then plateaued during 2012─2015. The incidence increased by 294% during 2016-2018 compared with the incidence during 2013-2015, with most cases occurring among populations at high risk for hepatitis A infection, including persons who use illicit drugs (injection and noninjection), persons who experience homelessness, and men who have sex with men (MSM) (1-3). Previous outbreaks among persons who use illicit drugs and MSM led to recommendations issued in 1996 by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) for routine hepatitis A vaccination of persons in these populations (4). Despite these long-standing recommendations, vaccination coverage rates among MSM remain low (5). In 2017, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene contacted CDC after public health officials noted an increase in hepatitis A infections among MSM. Laboratory testing* of clinical specimens identified strains of the hepatitis A virus (HAV) that subsequently matched strains recovered from MSM in other states. During January 1, 2017-October 31, 2018, CDC received reports of 260 cases of hepatitis A among MSM from health departments in eight states, a substantial increase from the 16 cases reported from all 50 states during 2013-2015. Forty-eight percent (124 of 258) of MSM patients were hospitalized for a median of 3 days. No deaths were reported. In response to these cases, CDC supported state and local health departments with public health intervention efforts to decrease HAV transmission among MSM populations. These efforts included organizing multistate calls among health departments to share information, providing guidance on developing targeted outreach and managing supplies for vaccine campaigns, and conducting laboratory testing of clinical specimens. Targeted outreach for MSM to increase awareness about hepatitis A infection and improve access to vaccination services, such as providing convenient locations for vaccination, are needed to prevent outbreaks among MSM.

On January 31, 2016, the Santa Clara County Public Health Department (SCCPHD) was notified of a suspected case of meningococcal disease in a university undergraduate student. By February 2, two additional suspected cases had been reported in undergraduate students living on the same campus. The index patient (patient A) required intensive care, whereas patients B and C had milder illness; there were no deaths. All three patients were part of overlapping social networks and had attended the same events during the week before the onset of patient A's symptoms, but whether they had direct contact with one another could not be verified. Serogroup B Neisseria meningitidis was identified in cerebrospinal fluid and blood from patient A and in blood from patient B. Serogroup B has been responsible for all U.S. college outbreaks of meningococcal disease since 2011 (1). Laboratory results for patient C were inconclusive.

BACKGROUND: A routine 2-dose varicella vaccination program was adopted in 2007 in the United States to help further decrease varicella disease and prevent varicella outbreaks. We describe trends and characteristics of varicella outbreaks reported to CDC during 2005-2012 from 9 states. METHODS: Data on varicella outbreaks collected by 9 state health departments were submitted to CDC using the CDC outbreak reporting worksheet. Information was collected on dates of the outbreak, outbreak setting, and number of cases by outbreak; aggregate data was provided on the numbers of outbreak-related cases by age group, vaccination status, and laboratory confirmation. RESULTS: Nine hundred and twenty-nine outbreaks were reported from the 6 states which provided data for each year during 2005-2012. Based on data from these 6 states, the number of outbreaks declined by 78%, decreasing from 147 in 2005 to 33 outbreaks in 2012 (p=0.0001). There were a total of 1,015 varicella outbreaks involving 13,595 cases reported by the 9 states from 2005-2012. The size and duration of outbreaks declined significantly over time (p<0.001). The median size of outbreaks was 12, 9, and 7 cases and median duration of outbreaks was 38, 35, and 26 days during 2005-2006, 2007-2009, and 2010-2012 respectively. Majority of outbreaks (95%) were reported from schools, declining from 97% in 2005-2006 to 89% in 2010-2012. Sixty-fivepercent of outbreak-related casesoccurred among 5-9 year olds, with the proportion declining from 76% in 2005-2006 to 45% during 2010-2012. CONCLUSIONS: The routine 2-dose varicella vaccination program appears to have significantly reduced the number, size, and duration of varicella outbreaks in the U.S.

Occupationally acquired meningococcal disease is rare. Adherence to recommendations for safe handling of Neisseria meningitidis in the laboratory greatly reduces the risk for transmission to laboratory workers. A California microbiologist developed fatal serogroup B meningococcal disease after working with N. meningitidis patient isolates in a research laboratory (laboratory A). The California Department of Public Health (CDPH), the local health department, the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (CalOSHA), and the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) collaborated on an investigation of laboratory A, which revealed several breaches in recommended laboratory practice for safe handling of N. meningitidis, including manipulating cultures on the bench top. Additionally, laboratory workers had not been offered meningococcal vaccine in accordance with Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommendations and CalOSHA Aerosol Transmissible Diseases Standard requirements. In accordance with OSHA and CalOSHA regulations, laboratory staff members must receive laboratory biosafety training and use appropriate personal protective equipment, and those who routinely work with N. meningitidis isolates should receive meningococcal vaccine.

The California Department of Public Health (CDPH) conducts surveillance on severe influenza illness among California residents aged <65 years. Severe cases are defined as those resulting in admission to an intensive care unit (ICU) or death; reporting of ICU cases is voluntary, and reporting of fatal cases is mandatory. This report describes the epidemiologic, laboratory, and clinical characteristics of ICU and fatal influenza cases with symptom onset on or after September 29, 2013, and reported by January 18, 2014 of the 2013-14 influenza season. At the time of this report, local health jurisdictions (LHJs) in California had reported 94 deaths and 311 ICU admissions of patients with a positive influenza test result. The 405 reports of severe cases (i.e., fatal and ICU cases combined) were more than in any season since the 2009 pandemic caused by the influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 (pH1N1) virus. The pH1N1 virus is the predominant circulating influenza virus this season. Of 405 ICU and fatal influenza cases, 266 (66%) occurred among patients aged 41-64 years; 39 (10%) severe influenza illnesses occurred among children aged <18 years. Only six (21%) of 28 patients with fatal illness whose vaccination status was known had received 2013-14 seasonal influenza vaccine ≥2 weeks before symptom onset. Of 80 patients who died for whom sufficient information was available, 74 (93%) had underlying medical conditions known to increase the risk for severe influenza, as defined by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Of 47 hospitalized patients with fatal illness and known symptom onset and antiviral therapy dates, only eight (17%) received neuraminidase inhibitors within 48 hours of symptom onset. This report supports previous recommendations that vaccination is important to prevent influenza virus infections that can result in ICU admission or death, particularly in high-risk populations, and that empiric antiviral treatment should be promptly initiated when influenza virus infection is suspected in hospitalized patients, despite negative results from rapid diagnostic tests.

BACKGROUND: Emergence of the novel 2009 influenza A H1N1 virus in California led to an evaluation of hospital respiratory protection programs (RPPs) and practices by the California Department of Public Health during the 2009-2010 influenza season. METHODS: Onsite evaluation of 16 hospitals consisted of interviews with managers and health care workers about RPPs and practices, review of written RPPs, and limited observations of personnel using respirators. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics. RESULTS: All hospitals had implemented policies requiring the minimum use of N95 filtering facepiece respirators when working with patients with H1N1 virus infection; 95.5% of health care workers (n = 199) reported they would wear at least this level of protection when in close contact with a patient with confirmed or suspected H1N1 virus infection. However, evaluation of written RPPs indicated deficiencies in required areas, most commonly in recordkeeping, designation of a program administrator, program evaluation, employee training, and fit testing procedures. CONCLUSIONS: Health care workers were aware of respiratory protection required when providing care for patients with confirmed or suspected H1N1 virus infection. Hospitals should improve written RPPs, fully implement written procedures, and conduct periodic program evaluation to ensure effectiveness of respirator use for health care worker protection. Increased accessibility of resources tailored for hospital respirator program administrators may be helpful.

BACKGROUND: Following detection of pandemic influenza A H1N1 (pH1N1) in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas, a school district (intervention community, [IC]) closed all public schools for eight days to reduce transmission. Nearby school districts (control community [CC]) mostly remained open. METHODS: We collected household data to measure self-reported acute respiratory illness (ARI), before, during, and after school closures. We also collected influenza-related visits to emergency departments (ED(flu)). RESULTS: In both communities, self-reported ARIs and ED(flu) visits increased from before to during the school closure, but the increase in ARI rates was 45% lower in the IC,0.6% before to 1.2% during, than in the CC, 0.4% before to 1.5% during (RR(During/Before)=0.55, p=0.001; aOR(During/Before)=0.49, p<.03). For households with school age children only (no children 0-5 years), IC had even lower increases in adjusted ARI than in the CC (aOR(During/Before)=0.28, p<.001). The relative increase of total ED(flu) visits in the IC was 27% lower (2.8% before to 4.4% during) compared to the CC (2.9% before to 6.2% during). Among children 6-18 years old, the percentage of ED(flu) in IC remained constant (5.1% before vs. 5.2% during), while in the CC it more than doubled (5.2% before vs. 10.9% during). After schools re-opened, ARI rates and ED(flu) visits decreased in both communities. CONCLUSIONS: Our study documents a reduction in ARI and ED(flu) visits in the intervention community. Our findings can be used to assess the potential benefit of school closures during pandemics.