Households in the United States Virgin Islands (USVI) heavily rely on roof-harvested rainwater stored in cisterns for their daily activities. However, there are insufficient data on cistern water microbiological and physicochemical characteristics to inform appropriate cistern water management. Cistern and kitchen tap water samples were collected from 399 geographically representative households across St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John and an administered survey captured household site and cistern characteristics and water use behaviors. Water samples were analyzed for Escherichia coli by culture, and a subset of cistern water samples (N = 47) were analyzed for Salmonella, Naegleria fowleri, pathogenic Leptospira, Cryptosporidium, Giardia, and human-specific fecal contamination using real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR). Associations between E. coli cistern contamination and cistern and site characteristics were evaluated to better understand possible mechanisms of contamination. E. coli was detected in 80% of cistern water samples and in 58% of kitchen tap samples. For the subset of samples tested by PCR, at least one of the pathogens was detected in 66% of cisterns. Our results suggest that covering overflow pipes with screens, decreasing animal presence at the household, and preventing animals or insects from entering the cisterns can decrease the likelihood of E. coli contamination in USVI cistern water.

Hand drying is the critical, final step of handwashing. A cross-sectional survey of U.S. adults assessed self-reported hand drying practices in public bathrooms and found increased preference for using electric hand dryers, wiping hands on clothing, and shaking hands and decreased preference for using paper towels during the COVID-19 pandemic relative to before. Respondents expressed concerns about contacting SARS-CoV-2 when touching surfaces in public bathrooms which may be influencing self-reported drying method preference.

Elections occurring during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have been affected by notable changes in the methods of voting, the number and type of polling locations, and in-person voting procedures (1). To mitigate transmission of COVID-19 at polling locations, jurisdictions have adopted changes to protocols and procedures, informed by CDC's interim guidance, developed in collaboration with the Election Assistance Commission (2). The driving principle for this guidance is that voting practices with lower infection risk will be those which reduce the number of voters who congregate indoors in polling locations by offering a variety of methods for voting and longer voting periods. The guidance for in-person voting includes considerations for election officials, poll workers, and voters to maintain healthy environments and operations. To assess knowledge and adoption of mitigation strategies, CDC collaborated with the Delaware Department of Health and Social Services and the Delaware State Election Commission on a survey of poll workers who served during the statewide primary election on September 15, 2020. Among 522 eligible poll workers, 93% correctly answered all three survey questions about COVID-19 transmission. Respondents noted that most voters and poll workers wore masks. However, masks were not always worn correctly (i.e., covering both the nose and mouth). Responses suggest that mitigation measures recommended for both poll workers and voters were widely adopted and feasible, but also highlighted gaps in infection prevention control efforts. Strengthening of measures intended to minimize the risk of poll workers acquiring COVID-19 from ill voters, such as additional training and necessary personal protective equipment (PPE), as well as support for alternative voting options for ill voters, are needed. Adherence to mitigation measures is important not only to protect voters but also to protect poll workers, many of whom are older adults, and thus at higher risk for severe COVID-19-associated illness. Enhanced attention to reducing congregation in polling locations, correct mask use, and providing safe voting options for ill voters are critical considerations to minimize risk to voters and poll workers. Evidence from the Delaware election supports the feasibility and acceptability of implementing current CDC guidance for election officials, poll workers, and voters for mitigating COVID-19 transmission at polling locations (2).

Congregate work and residential locations are at increased risk for infectious disease transmission including respiratory illness outbreaks. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is primarily spread person to person through respiratory droplets. Nationwide, the meat and poultry processing industry, an essential component of the U.S. food infrastructure, employs approximately 500,000 persons, many of whom work in proximity to other workers (1). Because of reports of initial cases of COVID-19, in some meat processing facilities, states were asked to provide aggregated data concerning the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19 and the number of workers with COVID-19 in these facilities, including COVID-19-related deaths. Qualitative data gathered by CDC during on-site and remote assessments were analyzed and summarized. During April 9-27, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases among 115 meat or poultry processing facilities in 19 states were reported to CDC. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,913 (approximately 3%) workers, and 20 COVID-19-related deaths were reported. Facility barriers to effective prevention and control of COVID-19 included difficulty distancing workers at least 6 feet (2 meters) from one another (2) and in implementing COVID-19-specific disinfection guidelines.* Among workers, socioeconomic challenges might contribute to working while feeling ill, particularly if there are management practices such as bonuses that incentivize attendance. Methods to decrease transmission within the facility include worker symptom screening programs, policies to discourage working while experiencing symptoms compatible with COVID-19, and social distancing by workers. Source control measures (e.g., the use of cloth face covers) as well as increased disinfection of high-touch surfaces are also important means of preventing SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Mitigation efforts to reduce transmission in the community should also be considered. Many of these measures might also reduce asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission (3). Implementation of these public health strategies will help protect workers from COVID-19 in this industry and assist in preserving the critical meat and poultry production infrastructure (4).

Objectives. To investigate a shigellosis outbreak in Genesee County, Michigan (including the City of Flint), and Saginaw County, Michigan, in 2016 and address community concerns about the role of the Flint water system.Methods. We met frequently with community members to understand concerns and develop the investigation. We surveyed households affected by the outbreak, analyzed Shigella isolate data, examined the geospatial distribution of cases, and reviewed available water quality data.Results. We surveyed 83 households containing 158 cases; median age was 10 years. Index case-patients from 55 of 83 households (66%) reported contact with a person outside their household who wore diapers or who had diarrhea in the week before becoming ill; results were similar regardless of household drinking water source. Genomic diversity was not consistent with a point source. In Flint, no space-time clustering was identified, and average free chlorine residual values remained above recommended levels throughout the outbreak period.Conclusions. The outbreak was most likely caused by person-to-person contact and not by the Flint water system. Consistent community engagement was essential to the design and implementation of the investigation. (Am J Public Health. Published online ahead of print April 16, 2020: e1-e8. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2020.305577).