Background: In April 2014, a 46-year-old returning traveler from Liberia was transported by emergency medical services to a community hospital in Minnesota with fever and altered mental status. Twenty-four hours later, he developed gingival bleeding. Blood samples tested positive for Lassa fever RNA by reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction. Methods: Blood and urine samples were obtained from the patient and tested for evidence of Lassa fever virus infection. Hospital infection control personnel and health department personnel reviewed infection control practices with health care personnel. In addition to standard precautions, infection control measures were upgraded to include contact, droplet, and airborne precautions. State and federal public health officials conducted contract tracing activities among family contacts, health care personnel, and fellow airline travelers. Results: The patient was discharged from the hospital after 14 days. However, his recovery was complicated by the development of near complete bilateral sensorineural hearing loss. Lassa virus RNA continued to be detected in his urine for several weeks after hospital discharge. State and federal public health authorities identified and monitored individuals who had contact with the patient while he was ill. No secondary cases of Lassa fever were identified among 75 contacts. Conclusions: Given the nonspecific presentation of viral hemorrhagic fevers, isolation of ill travelers and consistent implementation of basic infection control measures are key to preventing secondary transmission. When consistently applied, these measures can prevent secondary transmission even if travel history information is not obtained, not immediately available, or the diagnosis of a viral hemorrhagic fever is delayed.

BACKGROUND: Deaths and certain illnesses onboard ships arriving at US ports are required to be reported to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and notifications of certain illnesses are requested. METHODS: We performed a descriptive analysis of required maritime illness and death reports of presumptive diagnoses and requested notifications to CDC's Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, which manages CDC's Quarantine Stations, from January 2010 to December 2014. RESULTS: CDC Quarantine Stations received 2891 individual maritime case reports: 76.8% (2221/2891) illness reports, and 23.2% (670/2891) death reports. The most frequent individual illness reported was varicella (35.9%, 797/2221) and the most frequently reported causes of death were cardiovascular- or pulmonary-related conditions (79.6%, 533/670). There were 7695 cases of influenza-like illness received within aggregate notifications. CDC coordinated 63 contact investigations with partners to identify 972 contacts; 88.0% (855/972) were notified. There was documentation of 6.5% (19/293) receiving post-exposure prophylaxis. Three pertussis contacts were identified as secondary cases; and one tuberculosis contact was diagnosed with active tuberculosis. CONCLUSION: These data provide a picture of US maritime illness and death reporting and response. Varicella reports are the most frequent individual disease reports received. Contact investigations identified few cases of disease transmission.

In 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducted conveyance contact investigations for 2 Middle East respiratory syndrome cases imported into the United States, comprising all passengers and crew on 4 international and domestic flights and 1 bus. Of 655 contacts, 78% were interviewed; 33% had serologic testing. No secondary cases were identified.

BACKGROUND: Individuals with certain communicable diseases may pose risks to the health of the traveling public; there has been documented transmission on commercial aircraft of tuberculosis (TB), measles, and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Federal public health travel restrictions (PHTR) prevent commercial air or international travel of persons with communicable diseases that pose a public health threat. METHODS: We described demographics and clinical characteristics of all cases considered for PHTR because of suspected or confirmed communicable disease from May 22, 2007, to December 31, 2015. RESULTS: We reviewed 682 requests for PHTR; 414 (61%) actions were completed to place 396 individuals on PHTR. The majority (>99%) had suspected (n = 27) or confirmed (n = 367) infectious pulmonary TB; 58 (16%) had multidrug-resistant-TB. There were 128 (85%) interceptions that prevented the initiation or continuation of travel. PHTR were removed for 310 (78%) individuals after attaining noninfectious status and 86 (22%) remained on PHTR at the end of the analysis period. CONCLUSIONS: PHTR effectively prevent exposure during commercial air travel to persons with potentially infectious diseases. In addition, they are effective tools available to public health agencies to prevent commercial travel of individuals with certain communicable diseases and possibly reconnect them with public health authorities.

Objective. CDC routinely conducts contact investigations involving travelers on commercial conveyances, such as aircrafts, cargo vessels, and cruise ships. Methods. The agency used established systems of communication and partnerships with other federal agencies to quickly provide accurate traveler contact information to states and jurisdictions to alert contacts of potential exposure to two travelers with Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) who had entered the United States on commercial flights in April and May 2014. Results. Applying the same process used to trace and notify travelers during routine investigations, such as those for tuberculosis or measles, CDC was able to notify most travelers of their potential exposure to MERS-CoV during the first few days of each investigation. Conclusion. To prevent the introduction and spread of newly emerging infectious diseases, travelers need to be located and contacted quickly. © 2016, Association of Schools of Public Health. All rights reserved.

On January 14, 2016, the Sierra Leone Ministry of Health and Sanitation was notified that a buccal swab collected on January 12 from a deceased female aged 22 years (patient A) in Tonkolili District had tested positive for Ebola virus by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). The most recent case of Ebola virus disease (Ebola) in Sierra Leone had been reported 4 months earlier on September 13, 2015 (1), and the World Health Organization had declared the end of Ebola virus transmission in Sierra Leone on November 7, 2015 (2). The Government of Sierra Leone launched a response to prevent further transmission of Ebola virus by identifying contacts of the decedent and monitoring them for Ebola signs and symptoms, ensuring timely treatment for anyone with Ebola, and conducting an epidemiologic investigation to identify the source of infection.

Before the current Ebola epidemic in West Africa, there were few documented cases of symptomatic Ebola patients traveling by commercial airline, and no evidence of transmission to passengers or crew members during airline travel. In July 2014 two persons with confirmed Ebola virus infection who were infected early in the Nigeria outbreak traveled by commercial airline while symptomatic, involving a total of four flights (two international flights and two Nigeria domestic flights). It is not clear what symptoms either of these two passengers experienced during flight; however, one collapsed in the airport shortly after landing, and the other was documented to have fever, vomiting, and diarrhea on the day the flight arrived. Neither infected passenger transmitted Ebola to other passengers or crew on these flights. In October 2014, another airline passenger, a U.S. health care worker who had traveled domestically on two commercial flights, was confirmed to have Ebola virus infection. Given that the time of onset of symptoms was uncertain, an Ebola airline contact investigation in the United States was conducted. In total, follow-up was conducted for 268 contacts in nine states, including all 247 passengers from both flights, 12 flight crew members, eight cleaning crew members, and one federal airport worker (81 of these contacts were documented in a report published previously). All contacts were accounted for by state and local jurisdictions and followed until completion of their 21-day incubation periods. No secondary cases of Ebola were identified in this investigation, confirming that transmission of Ebola during commercial air travel did not occur.

In response to the largest recognized Ebola virus disease epidemic now occurring in West Africa, the governments of affected countries, CDC, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other international organizations have collaborated to implement strategies to control spread of the virus. One strategy recommended by WHO calls for countries with Ebola transmission to screen all persons exiting the country for "unexplained febrile illness consistent with potential Ebola infection." Exit screening at points of departure is intended to reduce the likelihood of international spread of the virus. To initiate this strategy, CDC, WHO, and other global partners were invited by the ministries of health of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to assist them in developing and implementing exit screening procedures. Since the program began in August 2014, an estimated 80,000 travelers, of whom approximately 12,000 were en route to the United States, have departed by air from the three countries with Ebola transmission. Procedures were implemented to deny boarding to ill travelers and persons who reported a high risk for exposure to Ebola; no international air traveler from these countries has been reported as symptomatic with Ebola during travel since these procedures were implemented.

International dog imports pose a risk because of the potential movement of disease agents, including the canine rabies virus variant which has been eliminated from the United States since 2007. US regulations require a rabies vaccination certificate for dogs arriving from rabies-endemic countries, but permit the importation of dogs that have not been adequately immunized against rabies, provided that the dogs are confined under conditions that restrict their contact with humans and other animals until they have been immunized. CDC Form 75.37, 'Notice to Owners and Importers of Dogs', explains the confinement requirements and serves as a binding confinement agreement with the importer. In this evaluation, we describe the characteristics of unimmunized dogs imported into the United States over a 1-year period based upon dog confinement agreements recorded at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) quarantine stations. Confinement agreements were issued for nearly 2800 unimmunized dogs that entered the United States during 1 June 2011-31 May 2012, the majority of which travelled to the United States by air and without any seasonal pattern in import volume. Over 60% of these animals were puppies <3 months of age and included a wide variety of breeds. The dogs arrived from 81 countries, with the majority arriving from North America or Europe. Dogs placed on confinement agreements had final destinations in 49 states. California, New York, Texas, Washington and Florida received the largest number of dogs on confinement agreements. These results (which do not reflect human travel or US dog ownership data) suggest that a large portion of unimmunized dogs arrive from rabies-endemic countries for commercial, shelter and rescue purposes. Further evaluation and key stakeholder involvement are needed to assess whether the current dog importation regulations are an adequate compromise between the benefits and risks of dog importation.

BACKGROUND: Historically, New York City (NYC) Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) sexually transmitted disease (STD) clinics have operated completely free of charge but will soon begin billing patients for services. To inform billing strategies, we surveyed NYC DOHMH STD clinic patients in fall 2012 to examine response to the prospect of billing insurance and charging sliding-scale fees for services. METHODS: A total of 5017 individuals were surveyed from all patients accessing clinic services between September and December 2012 at 8 NYC DOHMH STD clinics. The anonymous survey was provided at registration to all patients, in English or Spanish. The data were analyzed to determine patient insurance status and other characteristics related to billing for STD services. RESULTS: More than half of respondents (51.0%) were uninsured, and 42.3% were unemployed. For 20.2% of respondents, billing would pose a considerable barrier to care. Nearly half of those insured (48.4%) said that they would not be willing to share insurance information with the STD clinics. CONCLUSIONS: Respondents who said they would not access STD clinic services if charged represent approximately 13,600 individuals each year who, if not promptly diagnosed and treated elsewhere, could be a continuing source of STIs including HIV. Confidentiality concerns and income are potential obstacles to billing insurance or charging a direct fee for STD services. New York City DOHMH plans to take the concerns raised in the survey findings into account when designing our billing system and carefully evaluate its impact to ensure that the need for accessible, confidential STD services continues to be met.

BACKGROUND: Population-based data for neonatal herpes simplex virus (HSV) infection are needed to describe disease burden and to develop and evaluate prevention strategies. METHODS: From April 2006 to September 2010, routine population-based surveillance was conducted using mandated provider and laboratory reports of neonatal HSV diagnoses and test results for New York City resident infants aged <= 60 days. Case investigations, including provider interviews and review of infant and maternal medical charts and vital records, were performed. Hospital discharge data were analyzed and compared with surveillance data findings. RESULTS: Between April 2006 and September 2010, New York City neonatal HSV surveillance detected 76 cases, for an average incidence of 13.3/100,000 (1/7519) live births. Median annual incidence of neonatal HSV estimated from administrative data for 1997 to 2008 was 11.8/100,000. Among surveillance cases, 90.8% (69/76) were laboratory confirmed. Among these, 40.6% (28/69) were HSV-1; 39.1% (27/69) were HSV-2; and 20.3% (14/69) were untyped. The overall case-fatality rate was 17.1% (13/76). Five cases were detected among infants aged > 42 days. In all, 80% (20/25) of the case-infants delivered by cesarean section were known to have obstetric interventions that could have increased risk of neonatal HSV transmission to the infant before delivery. Over half (68%, or 52/76) of all cases lacked timely or ideal diagnostics or treatment. CONCLUSIONS: Administrative data may be an adequate and relatively inexpensive source for assessing neonatal HSV burden, although they lack the detail and timeliness of surveillance. Prevention strategies should address HSV-1. Incubation periods might be longer than expected for neonatal HSV. Cesarean delivery might not be protective if preceded by invasive procedures. Provider education is needed to raise awareness of neonatal HSV and to assure appropriate testing and treatment.