Multisectoral, One Health collaboration is essential for addressing national and international health threats that arise at the human-animal-environment interface. Thanks to the efforts of multiple organisations, countries now have an array of One Health tools available to assess capacities within and between sectors, plan and prioritise activities, and strengthen multisectoral, One Health coordination, communication, and collaboration. By doing so, they are able to address health threats at the human-animal-environment interface, including emerging zoonotic and infectious diseases, more efficiently. However, to ensure optimal outcomes for the countries using these One Health tools, the partners responsible for implementation should regularly collaborate and share information such as implementation timelines, results and lessons learned, so that one process can inform the next. This paper presents a consensus framework on how commonly implemented One Health tools might align to best support countries in strengthening One Health systems. Twelve One Health tools were selected based on their high implementation rates, authors' experience with these tools and their focus on multisectoral, One Health coordination. Through a four-step process, the authors: a) jointly carried out a landscape analysis of One Health tools, using a Cloudbased spreadsheet to share the unique characteristics and applications of each tool; b) performed an implementation analysis to identify and share implementation dynamics and identify respective outcomes and synergies; c) jointly created a consensus conceptual model of how the authors suggest the tools might logically work together; and d) extrapolated from steps 1-3 an agreed-upon overarching conceptual framework for how current and future One Health tools could be categorised to best support One Health system strengthening at the national level. Highlighted One Health tools include the States Parties Annual Reporting Tool under the International Health Regulations (IHR), the World Organisation for Animal Health Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathway, the Joint External Evaluation process, IHR/PVS National Bridging Workshops, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization Tool, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Laboratory Mapping Tool, the FAO Assessment Tool for Laboratories and Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Systems, the FAO Surveillance Evaluation Tool, the One Health Systems Mapping and Analysis Resource Toolkit, the National Action Plan for Health Security, and IHR Monitoring and Evaluation Framework tools for After Action Reviews and Simulation Exercises. A new guidance document entitled, Taking a Multisectoral, One Health Approach: A Tripartite Guide to Addressing Zoonotic Diseases in Countries was also included as a framework that provides guidance to support the implementation of the outputs of the tools described.

Effectively preventing and controlling zoonotic diseases requires a One Health approach that involves collaboration across sectors responsible for human health, animal health (both domestic and wildlife), and the environment, as well as other partners. Here we describe the Generalizable One Health Framework (GOHF), a five-step framework that provides structure for using a One Health approach in zoonotic disease programs being implemented at the local, sub-national, national, regional, or international level. Part of the framework is a toolkit that compiles existing resources and presents them following a stepwise schematic, allowing users to identify relevant resources as they are required. Coupled with recommendations for implementing a One Health approach for zoonotic disease prevention and control in technical domains including laboratory, surveillance, preparedness and response, this framework can mobilize One Health and thereby enhance and guide capacity building to combat zoonotic disease threats at the human-animal-environment interface.

Canine rabies virus variant has been eliminated in the United States and multiple other countries. Globally, however, dogs remain the principal source for human rabies infections. The World Health Organization recommends that when dogs cross international borders, national importing authorities should require an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animal did not show signs of rabies at the time of shipment, was permanently identified, vaccinated, or revaccinated, and had been subjected to a serologic test for rabies before shipment. On June 8, 2015, an adult female dog that had recently been picked up from the streets of Cairo, Egypt, and shipped by a U.S. animal rescue organization to the United States was confirmed to have rabies by the Virginia Department of General Services Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services (DCLS). This dog was part of a large shipment of dogs and cats from Egypt that rescue organizations had distributed to multiple states for adoption. During the investigation, public health officials learned that the rabies vaccination certificate used for entry of the rabid dog into the United States had intentionally been falsified to avoid exclusion of the dog from entry under CDC's current dog importation regulations. This report underscores the ongoing risk posed by U.S. importation of domestic animals that have not been adequately vaccinated against rabies.

The United States imports a large volume of live wild and domestic animal species; these animals pose a demonstrated risk for introduction of zoonotic diseases. Rodents are imported for multiple purposes, including scientific research, zoo exhibits and the pet trade. Current U.S. public health regulatory restrictions specific to rodent importation pertain only to those of African origin. To understand the impacts of these regulations and the potential public health risks of international rodent trade to the United States, we evaluated live rodent import records during 1999-2013 by shipment volume and geographic origin, source (e.g. wild-caught versus captive- or commercially bred), intended purpose and rodent taxonomy. Live rodent imports increased from 2737 animals during 1999 to 173 761 animals during 2013. Increases in both the number and size of shipments contributed to this trend. The proportion of wild-captured imports declined from 75% during 1999 to <1% during 2013. Nearly all shipments during these years were imported for commercial purposes. Imports from Europe and other countries in North America experienced notable increases in volume. Gerbils and hamsters arriving from Europe and chinchillas, guinea pigs and hamsters arriving from other countries in North America were predominant taxa underlying this trend. After 2003, African-origin imports became sporadic events under the federal permit process. These patterns suggest development of large-scale captive rodent breeding markets abroad for commercial sale in the United States. While the shift from wild-captured imports alleviates many conservation concerns and risks for novel disease emergence, such consolidated sourcing might elevate exposure risks for zoonotic diseases associated with high-density rodent breeding (e.g. lymphocytic choriomeningitis or salmonellosis). A responsive border health system must periodically re-evaluate importation regulations in conjunction with key stakeholders to ensure a balance between the economic benefits of rodent trade against the potential public health risks.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) works in conjunction with state, territorial, local and tribal agencies (STLTAs) to prevent the transmission of infectious agents. Issuance of confinement agreements using CDC Form 75.37 'Notice to Owners and Importers of Dogs' to importers of dogs that are not vaccinated or incompletely vaccinated against rabies is part of the agency's regulatory programme to prevent the entry of dogs infected with rabies. Although this is a regulatory programme that depends heavily on partnerships between CDC and STLTAs, CDC had never formally evaluated the acceptability of the confinement agreement process with these partners. Thus, a short survey of nine STLTAs was conducted to evaluate whether these partners have enough personnel and resources to implement the regulation and their general opinions of the confinement agreement process. The results illustrate that CDC partners are dissatisfied to some extent with the process, and there are multiple issues limiting their success in enforcing the regulation.

International dog imports pose a risk because of the potential movement of disease agents, including the canine rabies virus variant which has been eliminated from the United States since 2007. US regulations require a rabies vaccination certificate for dogs arriving from rabies-endemic countries, but permit the importation of dogs that have not been adequately immunized against rabies, provided that the dogs are confined under conditions that restrict their contact with humans and other animals until they have been immunized. CDC Form 75.37, 'Notice to Owners and Importers of Dogs', explains the confinement requirements and serves as a binding confinement agreement with the importer. In this evaluation, we describe the characteristics of unimmunized dogs imported into the United States over a 1-year period based upon dog confinement agreements recorded at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) quarantine stations. Confinement agreements were issued for nearly 2800 unimmunized dogs that entered the United States during 1 June 2011-31 May 2012, the majority of which travelled to the United States by air and without any seasonal pattern in import volume. Over 60% of these animals were puppies <3 months of age and included a wide variety of breeds. The dogs arrived from 81 countries, with the majority arriving from North America or Europe. Dogs placed on confinement agreements had final destinations in 49 states. California, New York, Texas, Washington and Florida received the largest number of dogs on confinement agreements. These results (which do not reflect human travel or US dog ownership data) suggest that a large portion of unimmunized dogs arrive from rabies-endemic countries for commercial, shelter and rescue purposes. Further evaluation and key stakeholder involvement are needed to assess whether the current dog importation regulations are an adequate compromise between the benefits and risks of dog importation.

BACKGROUND: In fall 2009, many US communities experienced school closures during the influenza A H1N1 pandemic (pH1N1) and the state of Michigan reported 567 closures. We conducted an investigation in Michigan to describe pH1N1-related school policies, practices, and identify factors related to school closures. METHODS: We distributed an online survey to all Michigan K-12 school principals. Descriptive statistics and chi-square tests summarize school policies, practices, adherence to government guidelines, and differences between schools that closed and those that remained open during the pandemic. RESULTS: Of 4441 traditional K-12 Michigan schools, 937 (21%) principals responded to our survey representing approximately 374,000 students and 17,700 teachers. The majority (88%) of schools had influenza preparedness plans and followed government school influenza guidelines. Among respondents, 15% (137/937) of schools closed in fall 2009 with high absenteeism as the primary reason for closure. Schools that closed reported significant illness in their school, had <300 students, and had invested substantial resources preparing and responding to influenza. CONCLUSIONS: Adherence to government guidelines for schools appears high in Michigan. Closures occurred in schools that reported significant illness and were likely motivated by excessive absenteeism. Understanding factors related to closures during pH1N1 may inform future pandemic preparedness efforts.

BACKGROUND: Despite elimination of endemic measles in the United States (US), outbreaks associated with imported measles continue to occur. In 2007, the initiation of a multistate measles outbreak was associated with an imported case occurring in a participant at an international youth sporting event held in Pennsylvania. METHODS: Case finding and contact tracing were conducted. Control measures included isolating ill persons and administering postexposure prophylaxis to exposed persons without documented measles immunity. Laboratory evaluation of suspected cases and contacts included measles serologic testing, viral culture, detection of viral RNA by reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction, and viral genotyping. RESULTS: The index case occurred in a child from Japan aged 12 years. Contact tracing among 1250 persons in 8 states identified 7 measles cases; 5 (71%) cases occurred among persons without documented measles vaccination. Epidemiologic and laboratory investigation supported a single chain of transmission, linking the outbreak to contemporaneous measles virus genotype D5 transmission in Japan. Of the 471 event participants, 193 (41%) lacked documentation of presumed measles immunity, 94 (49%) of 193 were US-resident adults, 19 (10%) were non-US-resident adults (aged >18 years), and 80 (41%) were non-US-resident children. DISCUSSION: Measles outbreaks associated with imported disease are likely to continue in the US. Participants in international events, international travelers, and persons with routine exposure to such travelers might be at greater risk of measles. To reduce the impact of imported cases, high measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine coverage rates should be maintained throughout the US, and support should continue for global measles control and elimination.