OBJECTIVES: Mpox surveillance was integral during the 2022 outbreak response. We evaluated implementation of mpox surveillance in Tennessee during an outbreak response and made recommendations for surveillance during emerging infectious disease outbreaks. METHODS: To understand surveillance implementation, system processes, and areas for improvement, we conducted 8 semistructured focus groups and 7 interviews with 36 health care, laboratory, and health department representatives during September 9-20, 2022. We categorized and analyzed session transcription and notes. We analyzed completeness and timeliness of surveillance data, including 349 orthopoxvirus-positive laboratory reports from commercial, public health, and health system laboratories during July 1-August 31, 2022. RESULTS: Participants described an evolving system and noted that existing informatics platforms inefficiently supported iterations of reporting requirements. Clear communication, standardization of terminology, and shared, adaptable, and user-friendly informatics platforms were prioritized for future emerging infectious disease surveillance systems. Laboratory-reported epidemiologic information was often incomplete; only 55% (191 of 349) of reports included patient address and telephone number. The median time from symptom onset to specimen collection was 5 days (IQR, 3-6 d), from specimen collection to laboratory reporting was 3 days (IQR, 1-4 d), from laboratory reporting to patient interview was 1 day (IQR, 1-3 d), and from symptom onset to patient interview was 9 days (IQR, 7-12 d). CONCLUSIONS: Future emerging infectious disease responses would benefit from standardized surveillance approaches that facilitate rapid implementation. Closer collaboration among informatics, laboratory, and clinical partners across jurisdictions and agencies in determining system priorities and designing workflow processes could improve flexibility of the surveillance platform and completeness and timeliness of laboratory reporting. Improved timeliness will facilitate public health response and intervention, thereby mitigating morbidity.

During the 2022 multinational mpox outbreak, U.S. mpox cases primarily occurred among adult gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (1). Among all cases, 94% of patients reported exposure through sexual or other intimate contact (1). Currently, little is known about less common nonsexual mpox transmission. A systematic review of mpox transmission in countries with endemic mpox in Central Africa found that the secondary attack rate among unvaccinated household contacts ranged from 0% to 11%, with a pooled estimate of 8% (2). A better understanding of the risk for nonsexual transmission during the current outbreak in countries where mpox is not endemic is important for developing and implementing future prevention and control strategies.

The first three SARS-CoV-2 phylogenetic lineages classified as variants of concern (VOCs) in the United States (U.S.) from December 15, 2020 to February 28, 2021, Alpha (B.1.1.7), Beta (B.1.351), and Gamma (P.1) lineages, were initially detected internationally. This investigation examined available travel history of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases reported in the U.S. in whom laboratory testing showed one of these initial VOCs. Travel history, demographics, and health outcomes for a convenience sample of persons infected with a SARS-CoV-2 VOC from December 15, 2020 through February 28, 2021 were provided by 35 state and city health departments, and proportion reporting travel was calculated. Of 1,761 confirmed VOC cases analyzed, 1,368 had available data on travel history. Of those with data on travel history, 1,168 (85%) reported no travel preceding laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 and only 105 (8%) reported international travel during the 30 days preceding a positive SARS-CoV-2 test or symptom onset. International travel was reported by 92/1,304 (7%) of persons infected with the Alpha variant, 7/55 (22%) with Beta, and 5/9 (56%) with Gamma. Of the first three SARS-CoV-2 lineages designated as VOCs in the U.S., international travel was common only among the few Gamma cases. Most persons infected with Alpha and Beta variant reported no travel history, therefore, community transmission of these VOCs was likely common in the U.S. by March 2021. These findings underscore the importance of global surveillance using whole genome sequencing to detect and inform mitigation strategies for emerging SARS-CoV-2 VOCs.

During November 19-21, 2021, an indoor convention (event) in New York City (NYC), was attended by approximately 53,000 persons from 52 U.S. jurisdictions and 30 foreign countries. In-person registration for the event began on November 18, 2021. The venue was equipped with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration, and attendees were required to wear a mask indoors and have documented receipt of at least 1 dose of a COVID-19 vaccine.* On December 2, 2021, the Minnesota Department of Health reported the first case of community-acquired COVID-19 in the United States caused by the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant in a person who had attended the event (1). CDC collaborated with state and local health departments to assess event-associated COVID-19 cases and potential exposures among U.S.-based attendees using data from COVID-19 surveillance systems and an anonymous online attendee survey. Among 34,541 attendees with available contact information, surveillance data identified test results for 4,560, including 119 (2.6%) persons from 16 jurisdictions with positive SARS-CoV-2 test results. Most (4,041 [95.2%]), survey respondents reported always wearing a mask while indoors at the event. Compared with test-negative respondents, test-positive respondents were more likely to report attending bars, karaoke, or nightclubs, and eating or drinking indoors near others for at least 15 minutes. Among 4,560 attendees who received testing, evidence of widespread transmission during the event was not identified. Genomic sequencing of 20 specimens identified the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant (AY.25 and AY.103 sublineages) in 15 (75%) cases, and the Omicron variant (BA.1 sublineage) in five (25%) cases. These findings reinforce the importance of implementing multiple, simultaneous prevention measures, such as ensuring up-to-date vaccination, mask use, physical distancing, and improved ventilation in limiting SARS-CoV-2 transmission, during large, indoor events.(†).

Objectives: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention launched the Temporary Epidemiology Field Assignee (TEFA) Program to help state and local jurisdictions respond to the risk of Ebola virus importation during the 2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. We describe steps taken to launch the 2-year program, its outcomes and lessons learned. Methods: State and local health departments submitted proposals for a TEFA to strengthen local capacity in four key public health preparedness areas: 1) epidemiology and surveillance, 2) health systems preparedness, 3) health communications, and 4) incident management. TEFAs and jurisdictions were selected through a competitive process. Descriptions of TEFA activities in their quarterly reports were reviewed to select illustrative examples for each preparedness area. Results: Eleven TEFAs began in the fall of 2015, assigned to 7 states, 2 cities, 1 county and the District of Columbia. TEFAs strengthened epidemiologic capacity, investigating routine and major outbreaks in addition to implementing event-based and syndromic surveillance systems. They supported improvements in health communications, strengthened healthcare coalitions, and enhanced collaboration between local epidemiology and emergency preparedness units. Several TEFAs deployed to United States territories for the 2016 Zika Outbreak response. Conclusion: TEFAs made important contributions to their jurisdictions' preparedness. We believe the TEFA model can be a significant component of a national strategy for surging state and local capacity in future high-consequence events.

In late August and early September of 2017, Hurricanes Harvey and Irma swept through the Caribbean and made landfall in the continental United States. As Texas and Florida readied for direct impacts of the storms, nearby states prepared for the arrival of internally displaced persons. During the weeks surrounding the storms, the Tennessee Department of Health (TDH) supported all-hazards situational awareness for public health partners by enhancing syndromic surveillance activities, i.e., the monitoring of symptom combinations or other indicators within a population to inform public health action (1). | | TDH collects and analyzes emergency department (ED) data from 70 hospitals across Tennessee using the Electronic Surveillance System for Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE) (2). ESSENCE is a tool in the BioSense Platform made available to public health jurisdictions through CDC’s National Syndromic Surveillance Program (NSSP) (3). Syndromic surveillance typically supplements disease- or condition-specific surveillance; however, it can also improve situational awareness during an event or disaster.