The Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion (DHQP), within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), provides assistance to health departments and health care facilities investigating potential outbreaks and infection control breaches.1–3 These consultations typically involve assessments regarding potential risk of pathogen transmission and need for patient notification (ie, informing affected individuals about the outbreak or breach).4–6 These assessments can be challenging. The available information might not be sufficient to clearly characterize patient harms and infection risks. Accepted standards regarding patient notification in these situations are lacking. Stakeholder consensus on the best path forward can be difficult to obtain as the expectations of patients, health care providers, health care facilities, and public health do not always align.

BACKGROUND: The US Census Bureau's County Business Patterns (CBP) series provides a unique opportunity to describe the healthcare sector using a single, national data source. METHODS: We analyzed CBP data on business establishments in the healthcare industry for 2000-2016 for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Setting and facility types were defined using the North American Industry Classification System. RESULTS: In 2016, CBP enumerated 707,634 US healthcare establishments (a 34% increase from 2000); 86.5% were outpatient facilities and services followed by long-term care facilities (12.5%) and acute-care facilities (1.0%). Between 2000 and 2016, traditional facilities such as general medical surgical and surgical hospitals (-0.4%) and skilled nursing facilities (+0.1%) decreased or remained flat, while other long-term care and outpatient providers grew rapidly. CONCLUSION: This analysis highlights the steady growth and increased specialization of the US healthcare sector, particularly in long-term care and outpatient settings.

OBJECTIVES: To summarize patient notifications resulting from unsafe injection practices by health care personnel in the United States and describe recommended actions for prevention and response. PATIENTS AND METHODS: We examined records of events involving communications to groups of patients, conducted from January 1, 2012, through December 31, 2018, in which bloodborne pathogen testing was recommended or offered because of potential exposure to unsafe injection practices by health care personnel in the United States. Information compiled included: health care setting(s), type of unsafe injection practice(s), number of patients notified, number of outbreak-associated infections, and whether evidence suggesting bloodborne pathogen transmission prompted the notification. We compared these numbers with a similar review conducted from January 1, 2001, through December 31, 2011. RESULTS: From 2012 through 2018, more than 66,748 patients were notified as part of 38 patient notification events. Twenty-one involved exposures in non-hospital settings. Twenty-five involved syringe and/or needle reuse in the context of routine patient care; 11 involved drug tampering by a health care provider. The majority of events (n=25) were prompted by identification of unsafe injection practices alone, absent any documented infections at the time of notification. Outbreak-associated hepatitis B virus and/or hepatitis C virus infections were documented for 11 of the events; 8 involved patient-to-patient transmission, and 3 involved provider-to-patient transmission. CONCLUSIONS: Since 2001, nearly 200,000 patients in the United States were notified about potential exposure to blood-contaminated medications or injection equipment. Facility leadership has an obligation to ensure adherence to safe injection practices and to respond properly if unsafe injection practices are identified.

BACKGROUND: To inform development, targeting, and penetration of materials from a national injection safety campaign, an evaluation was conducted to assess provider knowledge, attitudes, and practices related to unsafe injection practices. METHODS: A panel of physicians (n = 370) and nurses (n = 320) were recruited from 8 states to complete an online survey. Questions, using 5-point Likert and Spector scales, addressed acceptability and frequency of unsafe practices (eg, reuse of a syringe on >1 patient). Results were stratified to identify differences among physician specialties and nurse practice locations. RESULTS: Unsafe injection practices were reported by both physicians and nurses across all surveyed physician specialties and nurse practice locations. Twelve percent (12.4%) of physicians and 3% of nurses indicated reuse of syringes for >1 patient occurs in their workplace; nearly 5% of physicians indicated this practice usually or always occurs. A higher proportion of oncologists reported unsafe practices occurring in their workplace. CONCLUSIONS: There is a dangerous minority of providers violating basic standards of care; practice patterns may vary by provider group and specialty. More research is needed to understand how best to identify providers placing patients at risk of infection and modify their behaviors.

Identification of a recently acquired viral hepatitis infection among repeat blood donors can be a sentinel event signaling a possible healthcare-associated infection (HAI) in the donor, especially in individuals who did not disclose self-reported behavioral risk factors and were test-negative at prior successful donations. With the 2012 update to the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) acute hepatitis B and hepatitis C surveillance case definitions, asymptomatic individuals who meet the laboratory criteria for these case definitions should be included among the cases reportable to public health authorities (1,2). This report serves as a reminder of the importance of recognizing incident hepatitis infections in blood donors as a possible sentinel event to uncover previous healthcare-associated transmission clusters, and that identification of a hepatitis B virus (HBV) or hepatitis C virus (HCV) nucleic acid test (NAT) confirmed positive result within six months of a NAT negative result (as may be identified in a repeat blood donor) is reportable to public health authorities. Recent data suggest consideration that this six month period be extended to within one year.

BACKGROUND: Drug diversion by health care personnel poses a risk for serious patient harm. Public health identified 2 patients diagnosed with acute hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection who shared a common link with a hospital. Further investigation implicated a drug-diverting, HCV-infected surgical technician who was subsequently employed at an ambulatory surgical center. METHODS: Patients at the 2 facilities were offered testing for HCV infection if they were potentially exposed. Serum from the surgical technician and patients testing positive for HCV but without evidence of infection before their surgical procedure was further tested to determine HCV genotype and quasi-species sequences. Parenteral medication handling practices at the 2 facilities were evaluated. RESULTS: The 2 facilities notified 5970 patients of their possible exposure to HCV, 88% of whom were tested and had results reported to the state public health departments. Eighteen patients had HCV highly related to the surgical technician's virus. The surgical technician gained unauthorized access to fentanyl owing to limitations in procedures for securing controlled substances. CONCLUSIONS: Public health surveillance identified an outbreak of HCV infection due to an infected health care provider engaged in diversion of injectable narcotics. The investigation highlights the value of public health surveillance in identifying HCV outbreaks and uncovering a method of drug diversion and its impacts on patients.

OBJECTIVE: To summarize available information about outbreaks of infections stemming from drug diversion in US health care settings and describe recommended protocols and public health actions. PATIENTS AND METHODS: We reviewed records at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention related to outbreaks of infections from drug diversion by health care personnel in US health care settings from January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2013. Searches of the medical literature published during the same period were also conducted using PubMed. Information compiled included health care setting(s), infection type(s), specialty of the implicated health care professional, implicated medication(s), mechanism(s) of diversion, number of infected patients, number of patients with potential exposure to blood-borne pathogens, and resolution of the investigation. RESULTS: We identified 6 outbreaks over a 10-year period beginning in 2004; all occurred in hospital settings. Implicated health care professionals included 3 technicians and 3 nurses, one of whom was a nurse anesthetist. The mechanism by which infections were spread was tampering with injectable controlled substances. Two outbreaks involved tampering with opioids administered via patient-controlled analgesia pumps and resulted in gram-negative bacteremia in 34 patients. The remaining 4 outbreaks involved tampering with syringes or vials containing fentanyl; hepatitis C virus infection was transmitted to 84 patients. In each of these outbreaks, the implicated health care professional was infected with hepatitis C virus and served as the source; nearly 30,000 patients were potentially exposed to blood-borne pathogens and targeted for notification advising testing. CONCLUSION: These outbreaks revealed gaps in prevention, detection, and response to drug diversion in US health care facilities. Drug diversion is best prevented by health care facilities having strong narcotics security measures and active monitoring systems. Appropriate response includes assessment of harm to patients, consultation with public health officials when tampering with injectable medication is suspected, and prompt reporting to enforcement agencies.

BACKGROUND: Although hepatitis B virus (HBV) transmission in dental settings is rare, in 2009 a cluster of acute HBV infections was reported among attendees of a two-day portable dental clinic in West Virginia. METHODS: The authors conducted a retrospective investigation by using treatment records and volunteer logs, interviews of patients and volunteers with acute HBV infection as well as of other clinic volunteers, and molecular sequencing of the virus from those acutely infected. RESULTS: The clinic was held under the auspices of a charitable organization in a gymnasium staffed by 750 volunteers, including dental care providers who treated 1,137 adults. Five acute HBV infections-involving three patients and two volunteers-were identified by the local and state health departments. Of four viral isolates available for testing, all were genotype D. Three case patients underwent extractions; one received restorations and one a dental prophylaxis. None shared a treatment provider with any of the others. One case volunteer worked in maintenance; the other directed patients from triage to the treatment waiting area. Case patients reported no behavioral risk factors for HBV infection. The investigation revealed numerous infection control breaches. CONCLUSIONS: Transmission of HBV to three patients and two volunteers is likely to have occurred at a portable dental clinic. Specific breaches in infection control could not be linked to these HBV transmissions. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: All dental settings should adhere to recommended infection control practices, including oversight; training in prevention of bloodborne pathogens transmission; receipt of HBV vaccination for staff who may come into contact with blood or body fluids; use of appropriate personal protective equipment, sterilization and disinfection procedures; and use of measures, such as high-volume suction, to minimize the spread of blood.

TO THE EDITOR: Since September 2012, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and state and local health departments have been investigating an outbreak of fungal infections associated with injections from three lots of contaminated methylprednisolone acetate produced at a single compounding pharmacy. As of May 6, 2013, a total of 741 cases have been reported in 20 states, with 55 deaths. The primary pathogen isolated from patient specimens has been Exserohilum rostratum, which has also been recovered from sealed vials of methylprednisolone acetate. Before this outbreak, human infections with E. rostratum were rarely reported. Little is known about the management of E. rostratum infections, especially when the disease involves the central nervous system.

BACKGROUND: Fungal infections are rare complications of injections for treatment of chronic pain. In September 2012, we initiated an investigation into fungal infections associated with injections of preservative-free methylprednisolone acetate that was purchased from a single compounding pharmacy. METHODS: Three lots of methylprednisolone acetate were recalled by the pharmacy; examination of unopened vials later revealed fungus. Notification of all persons potentially exposed to implicated methylprednisolone acetate was conducted by federal, state, and local public health officials and by staff at clinical facilities that administered the drug. We collected clinical data on standardized case-report forms, and we tested for the presence of fungi in isolates and specimens by examining cultures and performing polymerase-chain-reaction assays and histopathological and immunohistochemical testing. RESULTS: As of October 19, 2012, more than 99% of 13,534 potentially exposed persons had been contacted. As of December 10, there were 590 reported cases of infection in 19 states, with 37 deaths (6%). As of November 26, laboratory evidence of Exserohilum rostratum was present in specimens from 100 case patients (17%). Additional data were available for 386 case patients (65%); 300 of these patients (78%) had meningitis. Case patients had received a median of 1 injection (range, 1 to 6) of implicated methylprednisolone acetate. The median age of the patients was 64 years (range, 16 to 92), and the median incubation period was 20 days (range, 0 to 120); 33 patients (9%) had a stroke. CONCLUSIONS: Analysis of preliminary data from a large multistate outbreak of fungal infections showed substantial morbidity and mortality. The infections were associated with injection of a contaminated glucocorticoid medication from a single compounding pharmacy. Rapid public health actions included prompt recall of the implicated product, notification of exposed persons, and early outreach to clinicians.

BACKGROUND: We investigated an outbreak of fungal infections of the central nervous system that occurred among patients who received epidural or paraspinal glucocorticoid injections of preservative-free methylprednisolone acetate prepared by a single compounding pharmacy. METHODS: Case patients were defined as patients with fungal meningitis, posterior circulation stroke, spinal osteomyelitis, or epidural abscess that developed after epidural or paraspinal glucocorticoid injections. Clinical and procedure data were abstracted. A cohort analysis was performed. RESULTS: The median age of the 66 case patients was 69 years (range, 23 to 91). The median time from the last epidural glucocorticoid injection to symptom onset was 18 days (range, 0 to 56). Patients presented with meningitis alone (73%), the cauda equina syndrome or focal infection (15%), or posterior circulation stroke with or without meningitis (12%). Symptoms and signs included headache (in 73% of the patients), new or worsening back pain (in 50%), neurologic symptoms (in 48%), nausea (in 39%), and stiff neck (in 29%). The median cerebrospinal fluid white-cell count on the first lumbar puncture among patients who presented with meningitis, with or without stroke or focal infection, was 648 per cubic millimeter (range, 6 to 10,140), with 78% granulocytes (range, 0 to 97); the protein level was 114 mg per deciliter (range, 29 to 440); and the glucose concentration was 44 mg per deciliter (range, 12 to 121) (2.5 mmol per liter [range, 0.7 to 6.7]). A total of 22 patients had laboratory confirmation of Exserohilum rostratum infection (21 patients) or Aspergillus fumigatus infection (1 patient). The risk of infection increased with exposure to lot 06292012@26, older vials, higher doses, multiple procedures, and translaminar approach to epidural glucocorticoid injection. Voriconazole was used to treat 61 patients (92%); 35 patients (53%) were also treated with liposomal amphotericin B. Eight patients (12%) died, seven of whom had stroke. CONCLUSIONS: We describe an outbreak of fungal meningitis after epidural or paraspinal glucocorticoid injection with methylprednisolone from a single compounding pharmacy. Rapid recognition of illness and prompt initiation of therapy are important to prevent complications. (Funded by the Tennessee Department of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.).

BACKGROUND: Unsafe injection practices in health-care settings often result in notification of potentially affected patients, to disclose the error and recommend blood-borne pathogens testing. Few studies have assessed public perceptions and preferences for patient notification. METHODS: Six focus groups were conducted during Fall 2009, with residents of Atlanta, GA, and New York City, NY. Questions focused on preferences for receiving health information, knowledge of safe injection practices, and responses to and preferences for a patient notification letter. A mixed-method analysis was performed for qualitative themes and descriptive statistics. RESULTS: A total of 53 individuals participated; only 2 had ever heard of the term safe injection practices. After identification of unsafe injection practices, participants preferred to be notified via telephone, letter/mailing, email, or face-to-face from the facility where the incident occurred. More than 25 different types of information were mentioned as elements to be placed in a patient notification letter including: corrective actions by the facility, course of action for the patient, assurance of medical coverage, and how it happened/reason for the incident. Participants preferred that the tone of the letter be empathetic; nearly all indicated it was "very likely" that they would seek testing if notified. CONCLUSIONS: Facilities and health departments should strive to assure the notification process is conducted swiftly, clearly guiding affected patients to the necessary course of action. Notification letters are not "one size fits all," and some preferences expressed by patients may not be feasible in all situations. Prevention efforts should be complemented by research on improving effective patient communications when unsafe injection practices necessitate patient notification.

BACKGROUND: Syringe reuse and other unsafe injection practices can expose patients to bloodborne pathogens (eg, hepatitis B and C viruses and human immunodeficiency virus). Evidence of such infection control lapses has resulted in patient notifications, but the scope and magnitude of these events have not been well characterized. OBJECTIVES: To summarize patient notification events resulting from unsafe injection practices in the US health care settings. METHODS: We examined records of events that involved communications to groups of patients, conducted during 2001-2011, advising bloodborne pathogen testing stemming from potential exposures to unsafe injection practices. RESULTS: We identified 35 patient notification events related to unsafe injection practices in at least 17 states, resulting in an estimated total of 130,198 patients notified. Among the identified notification events, 83% involved outpatient settings and 74% occurred since 2007, including the 4 largest events (>5000 patients per event). The primary breach identified (≥16 events; 44%) was syringe reuse to access shared medications (eg, single-dose or multidose vials). Twenty-two (63%) notifications stemmed from the identification of viral hepatitis transmission, whereas 13 (37%) were prompted by the discovery of unsafe injection practices, absent evidence of bloodborne pathogen transmission. CONCLUSIONS: Unsafe injection practices represent a form of medical error that have manifested as large-scale adverse events, affecting thousands of patients in a wide variety of health care settings. Our findings suggest that increased oversight and attention to basic infection control are needed to maintain patient safety, along with research to identify best practices for triggering and managing patient notifications.

Reports of health care-associated viral hepatitis transmission have been increasing in the United States. Transmission due to poor infection control practices during myocardial perfusion imaging (MPI) has not previously been reported. The aim of this study was to identify the source of incident hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection in a patient without identified risk factors who had undergone MPI 6 weeks before diagnosis. Practices at the cardiology clinic and nuclear pharmacy were evaluated, and HCV testing was performed in patients with shared potential exposures. Clinical and epidemiologic information was obtained for patients with HCV infection, and molecular testing was performed to assess viral relatedness. Evidence of HCV transmission among patients who had undergone MPI at the cardiology clinic on 2 separate dates was found, involving 2 potential source patients and a total of 5 newly infected patients. Molecular testing identified a high degree of genetic homology among viruses from patients with common procedure dates. The nuclear medicine technologist routinely drew up flush from multidose vials of saline solution using the same needle and syringe that had been used to administer radiopharmaceutical doses. Multipatient use of vials was not observed, but a review of purchasing invoices and interviews with staff members suggested that this had occurred. No evidence of transmission via contamination of radiopharmaceuticals at the nuclear pharmacy was found. In conclusion, transmission of HCV occurred because of unsafe injection practices during MPI. Cardiologists should carefully review their infection control practices and the practices of other staff members involved with these procedures.

OBJECTIVE: In August 2007, Illinois passed legislation mandating methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) admission screening for intensive care unit patients. We assessed hospital staff perceptions of the implementation of this law. DESIGN: Mixed-methods evaluation using structured focus groups and questionnaires. SETTING: Eight Chicago-area hospitals. PARTICIPANTS: Three strata of staff (leadership, midlevel, and frontline) at each hospital. Methods. All participants completed a questionnaire and participated in a focus group. Focus group transcripts were thematically coded and analyzed. The proportion of staff agreeing with statements about MRSA and the legislation was compared across staff types. RESULTS: Overall, 126 hospital staff participated in 23 focus groups. Fifty-six percent of participants agreed that the legislation had a positive effect at their facility; frontline staff were more likely to agree than midlevel and leadership staff ([Formula: see text]). Perceived benefits of the legislation included increased awareness of MRSA among staff and better knowledge of the epidemiology of MRSA colonization. Perceived negative consequences included the psychosocial effect of screening and contact precautions on patients and increased use of resources. Most participants (59%) would choose to continue the activities associated with the legislation but advised facilities in states considering similar legislation to educate staff and patients about MRSA screening and to draft clear implementation plans. CONCLUSION: Staff from Chicago-area hospitals perceived that mandatory MRSA screening legislation resulted in some benefits but highlighted implementation challenges. States considering similar initiatives might minimize these challenges by optimizing messaging to patients and healthcare staff, drafting implementation plans, and developing program evaluation strategies.

Motamedifar and Askarian reported the results of a study evaluating aerobic bacterial contamination of medication vials present on multiple wards at a large, teaching hospital in Iran.1 The authors identified bacterial contamination in 5.6% of the 637 medication vials that were sampled. In the United States, contamination of parenteral medication vials has served as an underappreciated source of health care-associated infections including bloodstream infections, epidural abscesses, and viral hepatitis.2, 3, 4, 5 This study highlighted the general risk of extrinsic contamination of medication vials and prompts us to comment on several important factors that contribute to the potential for contamination and spread of infections. | The investigators described all of the medication vials tested as “multidose” based on a functional definition: “a vial that was used more than once.” However, only 1 of the contaminated vials contained antimicrobial preservative. In the United States, these preservative-free parenteral medications would likely have been labeled as single-dose or single-use vials, not intended for use in more than 1 patient. Unfortunately, the distinction between true multidose vials, which are labeled as such and generally contain an antimicrobial preservative, and other types of medication is often not understood by health care providers. There have been repeated instances in which parenteral medications labeled as single-use or single-dose were mistakenly referred to by health care personnel as “multidose” and used for multiple patients because they appeared to contain quantities in excess of those needed for a single patient. When used properly, vials that are labeled by manufacturers as multidose can be safely accessed multiple times. This stands in contrast to other injectable medications labeled as single-use or single-dose, which should only be used for a single patient.

BACKGROUND: In January 2008, 3 persons with acute hepatitis C who all underwent endoscopy at a single facility in Nevada were identified. METHOD: We reviewed clinical and laboratory data from initially detected cases of acute hepatitis C and reviewed infection control practices at the clinic where case patients underwent endoscopy. Persons who underwent procedures on days when the case patients underwent endoscopy were tested for hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection and other bloodborne pathogens. Quasispecies analysis determined the relatedness of HCV in persons infected. RESULTS: In addition to the 3 initial cases, 5 additional cases of clinic-acquired HCV infection were identified from 2 procedure dates included in this initial field investigation. Quasispecies analysis revealed 2 distinct clusters of clinic-acquired HCV infections and a source patient related to each cluster, suggesting separate transmission events. Of 49 HCV-susceptible persons whose procedures followed that of the source patient on 25 July 2007, 1 (2%) was HCV infected. Among 38 HCV-susceptible persons whose procedures followed that of another source patient on 21 September 2007, 7 (18%) were HCV infected. Reuse of syringes on single patients in conjunction with use of single-use propofol vials for multiple patients was observed during normal clinic operations. CONCLUSION: Patient-to-patient transmission of HCV likely resulted from contamination of single-use medication vials that were used for multiple patients during anesthesia administration. The resulting public health notification of approximately 50,000 persons was the largest of its kind in United States health care. This investigation highlighted breaches in aseptic technique, deficiencies in oversight of outpatient settings, and difficulties in detecting and investigating such outbreaks.

BACKGROUND: States, including Illinois, have passed legislation mandating the use of International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes for reporting healthcare-associated infections, such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the sensitivity of ICD-9-CM code combinations for detection of MRSA infection and to understand implications for reporting. METHODS: We reviewed discharge and microbiology databases from July through August of 2005, 2006, and 2007 for ICD-9-CM codes or microbiology results suggesting MRSA infection at a tertiary care hospital near Chicago, Illinois. Medical records were reviewed to confirm MRSA infection. Time from admission to first positive MRSA culture result was evaluated to identify hospital-onset MRSA (HO-MRSA) infections. The sensitivity of MRSA code combinations for detecting confirmed MRSA infections was calculated using all codes present in the discharge record (up to 15); the effect of reviewing only 9 diagnosis codes, the number reported to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, was also evaluated. The sensitivity of the combination of diagnosis codes for detection of HO-MRSA infections was compared with that for community-onset MRSA (CO-MRSA) infections. RESULTS: We identified 571 potential MRSA infections with the use of screening criteria; 403 (71%) were confirmed MRSA infections, of which 61 (15%) were classified as HO-MRSA. The sensitivity of MRSA code combinations was 59% for all confirmed MRSA infections when 15 diagnoses were reviewed compared with 31% if only 9 diagnoses were reviewed ([Formula: see text]). The sensitivity of code combinations was 33% for HO-MRSA infections compared with 62% for CO-MRSA infections ([Formula: see text]). CONCLUSIONS: Limiting analysis to 9 diagnosis codes resulted in low sensitivity. Furthermore, code combinations were better at revealing CO-MRSA infections than HO-MRSA infections. These limitations could compromise the validity of ICD-9-CM codes for interfacility comparisons and for reporting of healthcare-associated MRSA infections.

Current understanding of viral hepatitis transmission in United States health care settings indicates progress over the past several decades with respect to the risks from transfusions or blood products. Likewise, risks to health care providers from sharps injuries and other blood and body fluid exposures have been reduced as a consequence of widespread hepatitis B vaccination and the adoption of safer work practices. Increasing recognition of outbreaks involving patient-to-patient spread of hepatitis B and hepatitis C virus infections, however, has uncovered a disturbing trend. This article highlights the importance of basic infection control and the need for increased awareness of safe injection practices.