Pregnant, postpartum, and lactating people, and infants have unique needs during public health emergencies, including nuclear and radiological incidents. This report provides information on the CDC Division of Reproductive Health's emergency preparedness and response activities to address the needs of women of reproductive age (aged 15-49 years), people who are pregnant, postpartum, or lactating, and infants during a radiation emergency. Highlighted preparedness activities include: (1) development of a quick reference guide to inform key questions about pregnant, postpartum, and lactating people, and infants during radiation emergencies; and (2) exercising the role of reproductive health experts during nuclear and radiological incident preparedness activities.

Since September 11, 2001, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has increased efforts to prepare the agency and public health partners for response to potential nuclear/radiological disasters. During the week of May 16-20, 2022, the CDC participated in a national-level radiological emergency exercise, Cobalt Magnet 22 (CM22). The exercise scenario consisted of a notional, failed search mission for a radiological dispersal device (RDD, "dirty bomb"), followed by its explosion during a public event in a large US city. Testing radioanalytical laboratory capabilities during a nuclear/radiological incident was an exercise objective, and developing clear messaging on low-dose exposure and long-term health concerns was a primary output of the exercise. The CDC practiced its activation protocols, exercised the establishment of its updated Incident Management System structure for radiation emergencies, and identified critical staffing needs for this type of response.

Following a nuclear fission event, there likely would be a large number of contaminated persons who would seek assistance at community reception centers to be established outside the affected area. This paper provides a methodology for calculating inhalation doses to public health and other response personnel at such facilities who would be receiving and assisting potentially contaminated persons from whom particles can be resuspended. Three hypothetical facilities were considered: the Base Case is a rather small room with no forced air ventilation. The Preferred Case, which is more realistic, is a mid-sized room with an operating HVAC system with air being recirculated through a filter. The Gymnasium Case has only fresh air intake. Initial bounding calculations for the Base Case indicated the need for pre-screening of arrivals to avoid unacceptable doses to staff. The screening criterion selected was 1.67 × 106 Bq m-2. Calculations are presented for radionuclide concentrations in air, dose to staff from inhalation, and how exposures and the resulting doses can be altered by air-turnover rates and the use of filters with varying efficiency. Doses are presented for various arrival times and for both plutonium- and uranium-fueled detonations. The highest calculated dose via inhalation with no respiratory protection was 0.23 mSv for the Base Case. The more important radionuclides contributing to dose with exposure starting at day D + 1 were 239Np and 133I. At day D + 30, 131I and 140Ba were the more important dosimetrically. The variable creating the highest uncertainty was the slough-off factor for resuspension of contamination from people arriving at the reception center.

Indoor radon is the second leading cause of lung cancer in the United States (US) after smoking and the number one for lung cancer in non-smokers. Understanding how indoor radon varies during the year reveals the best time to test to avoid underestimating exposure. This study looks at the temporal variation in 13 years of radon concentrations in buildings located in 46 US states and the District of Columbia (DC). In the dataset, radon concentration varies from 3.7 Bq m-3 (Becquerels per cubic meter) to 52,958.1 Bq m-3, with an overall mean of 181.4 Bq m-3. About 35.4% of tests have a radon concentration level equal to or greater than the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) action level 4.0 pCi L-1 (148 Bq m-3).3 Temporal variation in radon concentrations was assessed using the overall monthly mean radon concentration. The highest concentrations were found in January (203.8 Bq m-3) and the lowest in July (129.5 Bq m-3). Higher monthly mean indoor radon concentrations were found in January, February, and October, and lower in July, August, and June. This result is consistent with findings from other studies and suggests continuing to encourage radon testing throughout the year with an emphasis on testing during the colder months.

Radon is the second leading cause of lung cancer in the U.S. after smoking. Lung cancer deaths attributable to radon are preventable through testing and mitigation. Yet there is a lack of awareness and understanding about radon, its risks, and how to prevent radon-associated lung cancer. This month’s column highlights some of the activities the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is working on to help build awareness and understanding, and to encourage preventative actions among the general public, as well as clinicians.

OBJECTIVE: The objectives of this study were to: validate current capacity estimates for radiological emergency response by collecting time motion observations from stations that would be used for screening and decontaminating populations, and use collected times to evaluate potential impact on current throughput calculations. METHODS: Time observations were collected at 11 functional radiation exercises across the country and aggregated for analysis for population monitoring activities, including contamination screening, decontamination, and registration. Collected times were compared to published estimates in current planning guidance, and evaluated to determine the suitability of using exercise observations to estimate throughput capacity. RESULTS: 2532-time observations were collected from 11 functional exercises. Of those, 2380 were validated and used for analysis. Contamination screening times varied greatly from current guidance, ranging from 19% below to 267% above existing estimates. Measurements indicate that capacity to perform contamination screening is significantly overestimated when using current estimates of service times and calculations when compared to observed aggregate service times. CONCLUSION: Aggregate service time data presented in this study can be used to yield a more realistic estimate of capacity to respond to a radiation event.

In 2016 the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) established a Nuclear/Radiological Training and Exercise Preparedness (TEP) Program to better prepare its workforce to respond to a nuclear/radiological incident. The TEP program is comprised of staff across CDC programs with a variety of specialties such as epidemiologists, clinicians, data managers, communicators, environmental health specialists, at risk population specialists and health physicists. Key TEP activities include the preparation of the CDC Nuclear/Radiological Incident Response and Recovery Annex that describes CDC's roles and responsibilities in the event of a nuclear/radiological incident; establishment of an Incident Management System (IMS) structure to reflect an agency-wide response consistent with CDC's All Hazards Plan; and completion of nuclear/radiological public health preparedness and response training and exercises. In addition to training sessions on the various radiation topics, the TEP program includes seminars on the various roles and responsibilities of the task forces defined in IMS during a response. The TEP program includes a range of discussion-based (seminars, workshops, tabletop exercises) and operations-based (drills and functional exercises) activities aimed at enhancing IMS staff capabilities and capacity to be prepared to respond to a nuclear/radiological incident. In summary, the CDC's Nuclear/Radiological TEP Program prepares knowledgeable, well-trained staff, or a radiation-savvy workforce, ready for a robust response to a nuclear/radiological emergency.

In April 2017, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) participated in the Gotham Shield Exercise, led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and in collaboration with other federal agencies to test the federal, state and local government's ability to respond to an improvised nuclear device (IND). With active engagement from CDC leadership, 266 scientific and support staff from across the agency participated in the Gotham Shield exercise. The scenario involved a 10-kiloton detonation near the Lincoln Tunnel in New Jersey. This nuclear detonation scenario provided CDC with the opportunity to test some of the all-hazards tools the agency uses during response to other national or international emergencies, such as Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and mapping tools, and apply these tools to a nuclear emergency. Geospatial analysis associated with real time data can provide near real time information for individuals and entities associated with response and recovery activities. This type of analysis can provide timely data in regard to maps and information used to properly place staging areas for Community Reception Centers (CRC), mass care locations, and other medical care and countermeasure related services. Maps showing locations of power loss, such as locations of lost or inoperable main electrical grid and substations, combined with real time data on where power is available provides valuable information for first responders and emergency managers as well as responders engaged in communicating critical public messages to affected populations in these areas. By using real-time information, response officials can direct the response, allocate scarce resources, aid in coordination efforts, and provide a more efficient means of providing critical public health and medical services. The results of the exercise highlight the importance of using geospatial analysis for response planning and effect mitigation before, during, and after a public health event of this magnitude, and the value they represent in informed decision making.

In 2015-16, the US Department of Health and Human Services led 23 US Government (USG) agencies including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and more than 120 subject matter experts in conducting an in-depth review of the US core public health capacities and evaluation of the country's compliance with the International Health Regulations using the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) methodology. This two-part process began with a detailed 'self-assessment' followed by a comprehensive independent, external evaluation conducted by 15 foreign assessors. In the Radiation Emergencies Technical Area, on a scale from 1-lowest to 5-highest, the assessors concurred with the USG self-assessed score of 3 in both of the relevant indicators. The report identified five priority actions recommended to improve the USG capacity to handle large-scale radiation emergencies. CDC is working to implement a post-JEE roadmap to address these priority actions in partnership with national and international partners.

This summary of the 53rd Annual Meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) captures the highlights of the presentations including the Warren K. Sinclair Keynote Address and the five scientific sessions and wrap-up summary and panel discussion of "Assessment of National Efforts in Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Terrorism: Is There a Need for Realignment to Close Remaining Gaps?" The issue of radiological emergency preparedness has evolved in the last 20 y from a primarily nuclear power plant focus to a wider, more comprehensive approach that includes response to all types of radiological and nuclear emergencies, including terrorism. The meeting took an introspective look at the advances in radiological emergency preparedness in the last 15 y and focused on four major topic areas: Plans and guidance, training and exercising for both the first responder and the first receiver communities, recovery and return, and communication. In each area, the speakers reflected on the current state of that specific area and provided three to five practicable priority actions/initiatives for future work. As a result of the meeting, NCRP has made a commitment to create a committee to write a commentary that will go into more detail in each of the proposed priority areas discussed in the meeting and provide a roadmap for future work.

One of the biggest medical challenges after the detonation of a nuclear device will be implementing a strategy to assess the severity of radiation exposure among survivors and to triage them appropriately. Those found to be at significant risk for radiation injury can be prioritized to receive potentially lifesaving myeloid cytokines and to be evacuated to other communities with intact health care infrastructure prior to the onset of severe complications of bone marrow suppression. Currently, the most efficient and accessible triage method is the use of sequential complete blood counts to assess lymphocyte depletion kinetics that correlate with estimated whole-body dose radiation exposure. However, even this simple test will likely not be available initially on the scale required to assess the at-risk population. Additional variables such as geographic location of exposure, sheltering, and signs and symptoms may be useful for initial sorting. An interdisciplinary working group composed of federal, state, and local public health experts proposes an Exposure And Symptom Triage (EAST) tool combining estimates of exposure from maps with clinical assessments and single lymphocyte counts if available. The proposed tool may help sort survivors efficiently at assembly centers near the damage and fallout zones and enable rapid prioritization for appropriate treatment and transport.

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami damaged nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi complex in Japan, resulting in radionuclide release. In response, US officials augmented existing radiological screening at its ports of entry (POEs) to detect and decontaminate travelers contaminated with radioactive materials. During March 12 to 16, radiation screening protocols detected 3 travelers from Japan with external radioactive material contamination at 2 air POEs. Beginning March 23, federal officials collaborated with state and local public health and radiation control authorities to enhance screening and decontamination protocols at POEs. Approximately 543 000 (99%) travelers arriving directly from Japan at 25 US airports were screened for radiation contamination from March 17 to April 30, and no traveler was detected with contamination sufficient to require a large-scale public health response. The response highlighted synergistic collaboration across government levels and leveraged screening methods already in place at POEs, leading to rapid protocol implementation. Policy development, planning, training, and exercising response protocols and the establishment of federal authority to compel decontamination of travelers are needed for future radiological responses. Comparison of resource-intensive screening costs with the public health yield should guide policy decisions, given the historically low frequency of contaminated travelers arriving during radiological disasters.