Children and youth with special healthcare needs are at risk for severe consequences during infectious disease emergencies. Messages for parents and caregivers from trusted sources, via preferred channels, that contain the information they need, may improve health outcomes for this population. In this mixed methods study, we conducted a survey (N=297) and 80 semistructured interviews, with 70 caregivers of children and youth and 10 young adults with special healthcare needs, between April 2018 and June 2019 in Pennsylvania. The survey presented 3 scenarios (ie, storm, disease outbreak, radiation event); the interviews included questions about storms and an outbreak. This article addresses only the disease outbreak data from each set. Participants were recruited through convenience samples from an urban tertiary care children's hospital and practices in a statewide medical home network. In this article, we summarize the preferred information sources, channels, and content needs of caregivers of children and youth with special healthcare needs during an infectious disease emergency. Nearly 84% of caregivers reported that they believe their child's doctor is the best source of information. Other preferred sources include medical experts (31%); the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (30%); friends, family, and neighbors (21%); and local or state health and emergency management (17%). Pediatric healthcare providers play an important role in providing information to parents and caregivers of children and youth with special healthcare needs during an infectious disease emergency. Public health agencies can establish health communication plans that integrate medical practices and other reliable sources to promote the dissemination of accurate information from trusted messengers.

Point-of-care antigen tests are an important tool for SARS-CoV-2 detection. Antigen tests are less sensitive than real-time reverse-transcriptase PCR (rRT-PCR). Data on the performance of the BinaxNOW antigen test compared to rRT-PCR and viral culture by symptom and known exposure status, timing during disease or exposure period and demographic variables are limited. During November 3(rd)-17(th), 2020, we collected paired upper respiratory swab specimens to test for SARS-CoV-2 by rRT-PCR and Abbott BinaxNOW (BinaxNOW) antigen test at two community testing sites in Pima County, Arizona. We administered a questionnaire to capture symptoms, known exposure status and previous SARS-CoV-2 test results. Specimens positive by either test were analyzed by viral culture. Previously we showed overall BinaxNOW sensitivity was 52.5%. Here we showed BinaxNOW sensitivity increased to 65.7% among currently symptomatic individuals reporting a known exposure. BinaxNOW sensitivity was lower among participants with a known exposure and previously symptomatic (32.4%) or never symptomatic (47.1%) within 14 days of testing. Sensitivity was 71.1% in participants within a week of symptom onset. In participants with a known exposure, sensitivity was highest 8-10 days post-exposure (75%). The positive predictive value for recovery of virus in cell culture was 56.7% for BinaxNOW-positive and 35.4% for rRT-PCR-positive specimens. Result reporting time was 2.5 hours for BinaxNOW and 26 hours for rRT-PCR. Point-of-care antigen tests have a shorter turn-around time compared to laboratory-based nucleic acid amplification tests, which allows for more rapid identification of infected individuals. Antigen test sensitivity limitations are important to consider when developing a testing program.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection in children is often asymptomatic or results in only mild disease.1 Data on the extent of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from children and adolescents in the household setting, including transmission to older persons who are at increased risk for severe disease, are limited.2 After an outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) at an overnight camp,3 we conducted a retrospective cohort study involving camp attendees and their household contacts to assess secondary transmission and factors associated with household transmission (additional details are provided in the Methods section in the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of this letter at NEJM.org).

In December 2020, two COVID-19 vaccines (Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna) received Emergency Use Authorization from the Food and Drug Administration.*(,)(†) Both vaccines require 2 doses for a completed series. The recommended interval between doses is 21 days for Pfizer-BioNTech and 28 days for Moderna; however, up to 42 days between doses is permissible when a delay is unavoidable.(§) Two analyses of COVID-19 vaccine administration data were conducted among persons who initiated the vaccination series during December 14, 2020-February 14, 2021, and whose doses were reported to CDC through February 20, 2021. The first analysis was conducted to determine whether persons who received a first dose and had sufficient time to receive the second dose (i.e., as of February 14, 2021, >25 days from receipt of Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine or >32 days from receipt of Moderna vaccine had elapsed) had received the second dose. A second analysis was conducted among persons who received a second COVID-19 dose by February 14, 2021, to determine whether the dose was received during the recommended dosing interval, which in this study was defined as 17-25 days (Pfizer-BioNTech) and 24-32 days (Moderna) after the first dose. Analyses were stratified by jurisdiction and by demographic characteristics. In the first analysis, among 12,496,258 persons who received the first vaccine dose and for whom sufficient time had elapsed to receive the second dose, 88.0% had completed the series, 8.6% had not received the second dose but remained within the allowable interval (≤42 days since the first dose), and 3.4% had missed the second dose (outside the allowable interval, >42 days since the first dose). The percentage of persons who missed the second dose varied by jurisdiction (range = 0.0%-9.1%) and among demographic groups was highest among non-Hispanic American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN) persons (5.1%) and persons aged 16-44 years (4.0%). In the second analysis, among 14,205,768 persons who received a second dose, 95.6% received the dose within the recommended interval, although percentages varied by jurisdiction (range = 79.0%-99.9%). Public health officials should identify and address possible barriers to completing the COVID-19 vaccination series to ensure equitable coverage across communities and maximum health benefits for recipients. Strategies to ensure series completion could include scheduling second-dose appointments at the first-dose administration and sending reminders for second-dose visits.

Objectives. To assess SARS-CoV-2 transmission within a correctional facility and recommend mitigation strategies.Methods. From April 29 to May 15, 2020, we established the point prevalence of COVID-19 among incarcerated persons and staff within a correctional facility in Arkansas. Participants provided respiratory specimens for SARS-CoV-2 testing and completed questionnaires on symptoms and factors associated with transmission.Results. Of 1647 incarcerated persons and 128 staff tested, 30.5% of incarcerated persons (range by housing unit = 0.0%-58.2%) and 2.3% of staff tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. Among those who tested positive and responded to symptom questions (431 incarcerated persons, 3 staff), 81.2% and 33.3% were asymptomatic, respectively. Most incarcerated persons (58.0%) reported wearing cloth face coverings 8 hours or less per day, and 63.3% reported close contact with someone other than their bunkmate.Conclusions. If testing remained limited to symptomatic individuals, fewer cases would have been detected or detection would have been delayed, allowing transmission to continue. Rapid implementation of mass testing and strict enforcement of infection prevention and control measures may be needed to mitigate spread of SARS-CoV-2 in this setting. (Am J Public Health. Published online ahead of print March 18, 2021: e1-e10. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.306117).

In December 2020, two COVID-19 vaccines (Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna) were authorized for emergency use in the United States for the prevention of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).* Because of limited initial vaccine supply, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) prioritized vaccination of health care personnel(†) and residents and staff members of long-term care facilities (LTCF) during the first phase of the U.S. COVID-19 vaccination program (1). Both vaccines require 2 doses to complete the series. Data on vaccines administered during December 14, 2020-January 14, 2021, and reported to CDC by January 26, 2021, were analyzed to describe demographic characteristics, including sex, age, and race/ethnicity, of persons who received ≥1 dose of COVID-19 vaccine (i.e., initiated vaccination). During this period, 12,928,749 persons in the United States in 64 jurisdictions and five federal entities(§) initiated COVID-19 vaccination. Data on sex were reported for 97.0%, age for 99.9%, and race/ethnicity for 51.9% of vaccine recipients. Among persons who received the first vaccine dose and had reported demographic data, 63.0% were women, 55.0% were aged ≥50 years, and 60.4% were non-Hispanic White (White). More complete reporting of race and ethnicity data at the provider and jurisdictional levels is critical to ensure rapid detection of and response to potential disparities in COVID-19 vaccination. As the U.S. COVID-19 vaccination program expands, public health officials should ensure that vaccine is administered efficiently and equitably within each successive vaccination priority category, especially among those at highest risk for infection and severe adverse health outcomes, many of whom are non-Hispanic Black (Black), non-Hispanic American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN), and Hispanic persons (2,3).

OBJECTIVES: In late June 2020, a large outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) occurred at a sleep-away youth camp in Georgia, affecting primarily persons </=21 years. We conducted a retrospective cohort study among campers and staff (attendees) to determine the extent of the outbreak and assess factors contributing to transmission. METHODS: Attendees were interviewed to ascertain demographic characteristics, known exposures to COVID-19 and community exposures, and mitigation measures before, during, and after attending camp. COVID-19 case status was determined for all camp attendees on the basis of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) test results and reported symptoms. We calculated attack rates and instantaneous reproduction numbers and sequenced SARS-CoV-2 viral genomes from the outbreak. RESULTS: Among 627 attendees, the median age was 15 years (interquartile range: 12-16 years); 56% (351 of 627) of attendees were female. The attack rate was 56% (351 of 627) among all attendees. On the basis of date of illness onset or first positive test result on a specimen collected, 12 case patients were infected before arriving at camp and 339 case patients were camp associated. Among 288 case patients with available symptom information, 45 (16%) were asymptomatic. Despite cohorting, 50% of attendees reported direct contact with people outside their cabin cohort. On the first day of camp session, the instantaneous reproduction number was 10. Viral genomic diversity was low. CONCLUSIONS: Few introductions of SARS-CoV-2 into a youth congregate setting resulted in a large outbreak. Testing strategies should be combined with prearrival quarantine, routine symptom monitoring with appropriate isolation and quarantine, cohorting, social distancing, mask wearing, and enhanced disinfection and hand hygiene. Promotion of mitigation measures among younger populations is needed.

Rapid antigen tests, such as the Abbott BinaxNOW COVID-19 Ag Card (BinaxNOW), offer results more rapidly (approximately 15-30 minutes) and at a lower cost than do highly sensitive nucleic acid amplification tests (NAATs) (1). Rapid antigen tests have received Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for use in symptomatic persons (2), but data are lacking on test performance in asymptomatic persons to inform expanded screening testing to rapidly identify and isolate infected persons (3). To evaluate the performance of the BinaxNOW rapid antigen test, it was used along with real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing to analyze 3,419 paired specimens collected from persons aged ≥10 years at two community testing sites in Pima County, Arizona, during November 3-17, 2020. Viral culture was performed on 274 of 303 residual real-time RT-PCR specimens with positive results by either test (29 were not available for culture). Compared with real-time RT-PCR testing, the BinaxNOW antigen test had a sensitivity of 64.2% for specimens from symptomatic persons and 35.8% for specimens from asymptomatic persons, with near 100% specificity in specimens from both groups. Virus was cultured from 96 of 274 (35.0%) specimens, including 85 (57.8%) of 147 with concordant antigen and real-time RT-PCR positive results, 11 (8.9%) of 124 with false-negative antigen test results, and none of three with false-positive antigen test results. Among specimens positive for viral culture, sensitivity was 92.6% for symptomatic and 78.6% for asymptomatic individuals. When the pretest probability for receiving positive test results for SARS-CoV-2 is elevated (e.g., in symptomatic persons or in persons with a known COVID-19 exposure), a negative antigen test result should be confirmed by NAAT (1). Despite a lower sensitivity to detect infection, rapid antigen tests can be an important tool for screening because of their quick turnaround time, lower costs and resource needs, high specificity, and high positive predictive value (PPV) in settings of high pretest probability. The faster turnaround time of the antigen test can help limit transmission by more rapidly identifying infectious persons for isolation, particularly when used as a component of serial testing strategies.

In the 10 months since the first confirmed case of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was reported in the United States on January 20, 2020 (1), approximately 13.8 million cases and 272,525 deaths have been reported in the United States. On October 30, the number of new cases reported in the United States in a single day exceeded 100,000 for the first time, and by December 2 had reached a daily high of 196,227.* With colder weather, more time spent indoors, the ongoing U.S. holiday season, and silent spread of disease, with approximately 50% of transmission from asymptomatic persons (2), the United States has entered a phase of high-level transmission where a multipronged approach to implementing all evidence-based public health strategies at both the individual and community levels is essential. This summary guidance highlights critical evidence-based CDC recommendations and sustainable strategies to reduce COVID-19 transmission. These strategies include 1) universal face mask use, 2) maintaining physical distance from other persons and limiting in-person contacts, 3) avoiding nonessential indoor spaces and crowded outdoor spaces, 4) increasing testing to rapidly identify and isolate infected persons, 5) promptly identifying, quarantining, and testing close contacts of persons with known COVID-19, 6) safeguarding persons most at risk for severe illness or death from infection with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, 7) protecting essential workers with provision of adequate personal protective equipment and safe work practices, 8) postponing travel, 9) increasing room air ventilation and enhancing hand hygiene and environmental disinfection, and 10) achieving widespread availability and high community coverage with effective COVID-19 vaccines. In combination, these strategies can reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission, long-term sequelae or disability, and death, and mitigate the pandemic's economic impact. Consistent implementation of these strategies improves health equity, preserves health care capacity, maintains the function of essential businesses, and supports the availability of in-person instruction for kindergarten through grade 12 schools and preschool. Individual persons, households, and communities should take these actions now to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission from its current high level. These actions will provide a bridge to a future with wide availability and high community coverage of effective vaccines, when safe return to more everyday activities in a range of settings will be possible.

We describe coronavirus disease (COVID-19) among US food manufacturing and agriculture workers and provide updated information on meat and poultry processing workers. Among 742 food and agriculture workplaces in 30 states, 8,978 workers had confirmed COVID-19; 55 workers died. Racial and ethnic minority workers could be disproportionately affected by COVID-19.

Contact tracing is a strategy implemented to minimize the spread of communicable diseases (1,2). Prompt contact tracing, testing, and self-quarantine can reduce the transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (3,4). Community engagement is important to encourage participation in and cooperation with SARS-CoV-2 contact tracing (5). Substantial investments have been made to scale up contact tracing for COVID-19 in the United States. During June 1-July 12, 2020, the incidence of COVID-19 cases in North Carolina increased 183%, from seven to 19 per 100,000 persons per day* (6). To assess local COVID-19 contact tracing implementation, data from two counties in North Carolina were analyzed during a period of high incidence. Health department staff members investigated 5,514 (77%) persons with COVID-19 in Mecklenburg County and 584 (99%) in Randolph Counties. No contacts were reported for 48% of cases in Mecklenburg and for 35% in Randolph. Among contacts provided, 25% in Mecklenburg and 48% in Randolph could not be reached by telephone and were classified as nonresponsive after at least one attempt on 3 consecutive days of failed attempts. The median interval from specimen collection from the index patient to notification of identified contacts was 6 days in both counties. Despite aggressive efforts by health department staff members to perform case investigations and contact tracing, many persons with COVID-19 did not report contacts, and many contacts were not reached. These findings indicate that improved timeliness of contact tracing, community engagement, and increased use of community-wide mitigation are needed to interrupt SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral respiratory illness caused by SARS-CoV-2. During January 21-July 25, 2020, in response to official requests for assistance with COVID-19 emergency public health response activities, CDC deployed 208 teams to assist 55 state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments. CDC deployment data were analyzed to summarize activities by deployed CDC teams in assisting state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments to identify and implement measures to contain SARS-CoV-2 transmission (1). Deployed teams assisted with the investigation of transmission in high-risk congregate settings, such as long-term care facilities (53 deployments; 26% of total), food processing facilities (24; 12%), correctional facilities (12; 6%), and settings that provide services to persons experiencing homelessness (10; 5%). Among the 208 deployed teams, 178 (85%) provided assistance to state health departments, 12 (6%) to tribal health departments, 10 (5%) to local health departments, and eight (4%) to territorial health departments. CDC collaborations with health departments have strengthened local capacity and provided outbreak response support. Collaborations focused attention on health equity issues among disproportionately affected populations (e.g., racial and ethnic minority populations, essential frontline workers, and persons experiencing homelessness) and through a place-based focus (e.g., persons living in rural or frontier areas). These collaborations also facilitated enhanced characterization of COVID-19 epidemiology, directly contributing to CDC data-informed guidance, including guidance for serial testing as a containment strategy in high-risk congregate settings, targeted interventions and prevention efforts among workers at food processing facilities, and social distancing.

During January 1, 2020-August 10, 2020, an estimated 5 million cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) were reported in the United States.* Published state and national data indicate that persons of color might be more likely to become infected with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, experience more severe COVID-19-associated illness, including that requiring hospitalization, and have higher risk for death from COVID-19 (1-5). CDC examined county-level disparities in COVID-19 cases among underrepresented racial/ethnic groups in counties identified as hotspots, which are defined using algorithmic thresholds related to the number of new cases and the changes in incidence.(†) Disparities were defined as difference of ≥5% between the proportion of cases and the proportion of the population or a ratio ≥1.5 for the proportion of cases to the proportion of the population for underrepresented racial/ethnic groups in each county. During June 5-18, 205 counties in 33 states were identified as hotspots; among these counties, race was reported for ≥50% of cumulative cases in 79 (38.5%) counties in 22 states; 96.2% of these counties had disparities in COVID-19 cases in one or more underrepresented racial/ethnic groups. Hispanic/Latino (Hispanic) persons were the largest group by population size (3.5 million persons) living in hotspot counties where a disproportionate number of cases among that group was identified, followed by black/African American (black) persons (2 million), American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN) persons (61,000), Asian persons (36,000), and Native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander (NHPI) persons (31,000). Examining county-level data disaggregated by race/ethnicity can help identify health disparities in COVID-19 cases and inform strategies for preventing and slowing SARS-CoV-2 transmission. More complete race/ethnicity data are needed to fully inform public health decision-making. Addressing the pandemic's disproportionate incidence of COVID-19 in communities of color can reduce the community-wide impact of COVID-19 and improve health outcomes.

The geographic areas in the United States most affected by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have changed over time. On May 7, 2020, CDC, with other federal agencies, began identifying counties with increasing COVID-19 incidence (hotspots) to better understand transmission dynamics and offer targeted support to health departments in affected communities. Data for January 22-July 15, 2020, were analyzed retrospectively (January 22-May 6) and prospectively (May 7-July 15) to detect hotspot counties. No counties met hotspot criteria during January 22-March 7, 2020. During March 8-July 15, 2020, 818 counties met hotspot criteria for ≥1 day; these counties included 80% of the U.S. population. The daily number of counties meeting hotspot criteria peaked in early April, decreased and stabilized during mid-April-early June, then increased again during late June-early July. The percentage of counties in the South and West Census regions* meeting hotspot criteria increased from 10% and 13%, respectively, during March-April to 28% and 22%, respectively, during June-July. Identification of community transmission as a contributing factor increased over time, whereas identification of outbreaks in long-term care facilities, food processing facilities, correctional facilities, or other workplaces as contributing factors decreased. Identification of hotspot counties and understanding how they change over time can help prioritize and target implementation of U.S. public health response activities.

BACKGROUND: Since August, 2019, US public health officials have been investigating a national outbreak of e-cigarette, or vaping, product use-associated lung injury (EVALI). A spectrum of histological patterns consistent with acute to subacute lung injury has been seen in biopsies; however, autopsy findings have not been systematically characterised. We describe the pathological findings in autopsy and biopsy tissues submitted to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for the evaluation of suspected EVALI. METHODS: Between Aug 1, 2019, and Nov 30, 2019, we examined lung biopsy (n=10 individuals) and autopsy (n=13 individuals) tissue samples received by the CDC, submitted by 16 US states, from individuals with: a history of e-cigarette, or vaping, product use; respiratory, gastrointestinal, or constitutional symptoms; and either pulmonary infiltrates or opacities on chest imaging, or sudden death from an undetermined cause. We also reviewed medical records, evaluated histopathology, and performed infectious disease testing when indicated by histopathology and clinical history. FINDINGS: 21 cases met surveillance case definitions for EVALI, with a further two cases of clinically suspected EVALI evaluated. All ten lung biopsies showed histological evidence of acute to subacute lung injury, including diffuse alveolar damage or organising pneumonia. These patterns were also seen in nine of 13 (69%) autopsy cases, most frequently diffuse alveolar damage (eight autopsies), but also acute and organising fibrinous pneumonia (one autopsy). Additional pulmonary pathology not necessarily consistent with EVALI was seen in the remaining autopsies, including bronchopneumonia, bronchoaspiration, and chronic interstitial lung disease. Three of the five autopsy cases with no evidence of, or a plausible alternative cause for acute lung injury, had been classified as confirmed or probable EVALI according to surveillance case definitions. INTERPRETATION: Acute to subacute lung injury patterns were seen in all ten biopsies and most autopsy lung tissues from individuals with suspected EVALI. Acute to subacute lung injury can have numerous causes; however, if it is identified in an individual with a history of e-cigarette, or vaping, product use, and no alternative cause is apparent, a diagnosis of EVALI should be strongly considered. A review of autopsy tissue pathology in suspected EVALI deaths can also identify alternative diagnoses, which can enhance the specificity of public health surveillance efforts. FUNDING: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Meat and poultry processing facilities face distinctive challenges in the control of infectious diseases, including coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (1). COVID-19 outbreaks among meat and poultry processing facility workers can rapidly affect large numbers of persons. Assessment of COVID-19 cases among workers in 115 meat and poultry processing facilities through April 27, 2020, documented 4,913 cases and 20 deaths reported by 19 states (1). This report provides updated aggregate data from states regarding the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19, the number and demographic characteristics of affected workers, and the number of COVID-19-associated deaths among workers, as well as descriptions of interventions and prevention efforts at these facilities. Aggregate data on confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths among workers identified and reported through May 31, 2020, were obtained from 239 affected facilities (those with a laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 case in one or more workers) in 23 states.* COVID-19 was confirmed in 16,233 workers, including 86 COVID-19-related deaths. Among 14 states reporting the total number of workers in affected meat and poultry processing facilities (112,616), COVID-19 was diagnosed in 9.1% of workers. Among 9,919 (61%) cases in 21 states with reported race/ethnicity, 87% occurred among racial and ethnic minority workers. Commonly reported interventions and prevention efforts at facilities included implementing worker temperature or symptom screening and COVID-19 education, mandating face coverings, adding hand hygiene stations, and adding physical barriers between workers. Targeted workplace interventions and prevention efforts that are appropriately tailored to the groups most affected by COVID-19 are critical to reducing both COVID-19-associated occupational risk and health disparities among vulnerable populations. Implementation of these interventions and prevention efforts(dagger) across meat and poultry processing facilities nationally could help protect workers in this critical infrastructure industry.

In the United States, approximately 180,000 patients receive mental health services each day at approximately 4,000 inpatient and residential psychiatric facilities (1). SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), can spread rapidly within congregate residential settings (2-4), including psychiatric facilities. On April 13, 2020, two patients were transferred to Wyoming's state psychiatric hospital from a private psychiatric hospital that had confirmed COVID-19 cases among its residents and staff members (5). Although both patients were asymptomatic at the time of transfer and one had a negative test result for SARS-CoV-2 at the originating facility, they were both isolated and received testing upon arrival at the state facility. On April 16, 2020, the test results indicated that both patients had SARS-CoV-2 infection. In response, the state hospital implemented expanded COVID-19 infection prevention and control (IPC) procedures (e.g., enhanced screening, testing, and management of new patient admissions) and adapted some standard IPC measures to facilitate implementation within the psychiatric patient population (e.g., use of modified face coverings). To assess the likely effectiveness of these procedures and determine SARS-CoV-2 infection prevalence among patients and health care personnel (HCP) (6) at the state hospital, a point prevalence survey was conducted. On May 1, 2020, 18 days after the patients' arrival, 46 (61%) of 76 patients and 171 (61%) of 282 HCP had nasopharyngeal swabs collected and tested for SARS-CoV-2 RNA by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction. All patients and HCP who received testing had negative test results, suggesting that the hospital's expanded IPC strategies might have been effective in preventing the introduction and spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection within the facility. In congregate residential settings, prompt identification of COVID-19 cases and application of strong IPC procedures are critical to ensuring the protection of other patients and staff members. Although standard guidance exists for other congregate facilities (7) and for HCP in general (8), modifications and nonstandard solutions might be needed to account for the specific needs of psychiatric facilities, their patients, and staff members.

We examined Zika-related inquiries to CDC-INFO, the national contact center for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to identify potential communication gaps. The most frequently asked questions related to travel or geographic location of Zika (42% of all inquiries), information about laboratory testing (13%), or acquiring a Zika test (11%).

Importance: To date, limited information is available on the characteristics of adolescents with e-cigarette, or vaping, product use-associated lung injury (EVALI). Objective: To inform public health and clinical practice by describing differences in demographics, substance use behaviors, and clinical characteristics of EVALI among adolescents compared with adults. Design, Setting, and Participants: Surveillance data reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention during the 2019 EVALI outbreak were used to calculate adjusted prevalence ratios (aPRs) with 95% CIs and to test differences between 360 hospitalized or deceased adolescents vs 859 young adults and 936 adults with EVALI (N = 2155). Main Outcomes and Measures: Demographics, substance use behaviors, and clinical characteristics. Results: Included in this cross-sectional study were 360 hospitalized or deceased adolescents (age range, 13-17 years; 67.9% male) vs 859 young adults (age range, 18-24 years; 72.4% male) and 936 adults (age range, 25-49 years; 65.6% male) with EVALI. Adolescents diagnosed as having EVALI reported using any nicotine-containing (62.4%), any tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)-containing (81.7%), and both (50.8%) types of e-cigarette or vaping products. Informal sources for obtaining nicotine-containing and THC-containing e-cigarette or vaping products were more commonly reported by adolescents (50.5% for nicotine and 96.5% for THC) than young adults (19.8% for nicotine [aPR, 2.49; 95% CI, 1.78-3.46] and 86.9% for THC [aPR, 1.11; 95% CI, 1.05-1.18]) or adults (24.3% for nicotine [aPR, 2.06; 95% CI, 1.49-2.84] and 75.1% for THC [aPR, 1.29; 95% CI, 1.19-1.40]). Mental, emotional, or behavioral disorders were commonly reported; a history of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder was almost 4 times more likely among adolescents (18.1%) than adults (4.9%) (aPR, 3.74; 95% CI, 1.92-7.26). A history of asthma was more likely to be reported among adolescents (43.6%) than adults (28.3%) (aPR, 1.53; 95% CI, 1.14-2.05). Gastrointestinal and constitutional symptoms were more common in adolescents (90.9% and 97.3%, respectively) than adults (75.3% and 94.5%, respectively) (aPR, 1.20; 95% CI, 1.13-1.28 and aPR, 1.03; 95% CI, 1.00-1.06, respectively). Because of missing data, percentages may not be able to be calculated from data provided. Conclusions and Relevance: Public health and clinical professionals should continue to provide information to adolescents about the association between EVALI and THC-containing e-cigarette or vaping product use, especially those products obtained through informal sources, and that the use of any e-cigarette or vaping product is unsafe. Compared with adults, it appears that adolescents with EVALI more frequently have a history of asthma and mental, emotional, or behavioral disorders, such as attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and report nonspecific problems, including gastrointestinal and constitutional symptoms; therefore, obtaining a confidential substance use history that includes e-cigarette or vaping product use is recommended.

Congregate work and residential locations are at increased risk for infectious disease transmission including respiratory illness outbreaks. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is primarily spread person to person through respiratory droplets. Nationwide, the meat and poultry processing industry, an essential component of the U.S. food infrastructure, employs approximately 500,000 persons, many of whom work in proximity to other workers (1). Because of reports of initial cases of COVID-19, in some meat processing facilities, states were asked to provide aggregated data concerning the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19 and the number of workers with COVID-19 in these facilities, including COVID-19-related deaths. Qualitative data gathered by CDC during on-site and remote assessments were analyzed and summarized. During April 9-27, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases among 115 meat or poultry processing facilities in 19 states were reported to CDC. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,913 (approximately 3%) workers, and 20 COVID-19-related deaths were reported. Facility barriers to effective prevention and control of COVID-19 included difficulty distancing workers at least 6 feet (2 meters) from one another (2) and in implementing COVID-19-specific disinfection guidelines.* Among workers, socioeconomic challenges might contribute to working while feeling ill, particularly if there are management practices such as bonuses that incentivize attendance. Methods to decrease transmission within the facility include worker symptom screening programs, policies to discourage working while experiencing symptoms compatible with COVID-19, and social distancing by workers. Source control measures (e.g., the use of cloth face covers) as well as increased disinfection of high-touch surfaces are also important means of preventing SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Mitigation efforts to reduce transmission in the community should also be considered. Many of these measures might also reduce asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission (3). Implementation of these public health strategies will help protect workers from COVID-19 in this industry and assist in preserving the critical meat and poultry production infrastructure (4).

BACKGROUND: As of January 7, 2020, a total of 2558 hospitalized patients with nonfatal cases and 60 patients with fatal cases of e-cigarette, or vaping, product use-associated lung injury (EVALI) had been reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). METHODS: In a national study, we compared the characteristics of patients with fatal cases of EVALI with those of patients with nonfatal cases to improve the ability of clinicians to identify patients at increased risk for death from the condition. Health departments reported cases of EVALI to the CDC and included, when available, data from medical-record abstractions and patient interviews. Analyses included all the patients with fatal or nonfatal cases of EVALI that were reported to the CDC as of January 7, 2020. We also present three case reports of patients who died from EVALI to illustrate the clinical characteristics common among such patients. RESULTS: Most of the patients with fatal or nonfatal cases of EVALI were male (32 of 60 [53%] and 1666 of 2498 [67%], respectively). The proportion of patients with fatal or nonfatal cases was higher among those who were non-Hispanic white (39 of 49 [80%] and 1104 of 1818 [61%], respectively) than among those in other race or ethnic groups. The proportion of patients with fatal cases was higher among those 35 years of age or older (44 of 60 [73%]) than among those younger than 35 years, but the proportion with nonfatal cases was lower among those 35 years of age or older (551 of 2514 [22%]). Among the patients who had an available medical history, a higher proportion of those with fatal cases than those with nonfatal cases had a history of asthma (13 of 57 [23%] vs. 102 of 1297 [8%]), cardiac disease (26 of 55 [47%] vs. 115 of 1169 [10%]), or a mental health condition (32 of 49 [65%] vs. 575 of 1398 [41%]). A total of 26 of 50 patients (52%) with fatal cases had obesity. Half the patients with fatal cases (25 of 54 [46%]) were seen in an outpatient setting before hospitalization or death. CONCLUSIONS: Chronic conditions, including cardiac and respiratory diseases and mental health conditions, were common among hospitalized patients with EVALI.

OBJECTIVES: The spread of Zika virus throughout Latin America and parts of the United States in 2016 and 2017 presented a challenge to public health communicators. The objective of our study was to describe emergency risk communication practices during the 2016-2017 Zika outbreak to inform future infectious disease communication efforts. METHODS: We conducted semi-structured telephone interviews with 13 public health policy makers and practitioners, 10 public information officers, and 5 vector-control officials from May through August 2017. RESULTS: Within the public health macro-environment, extended outbreak timeframe, government trust, US residence status, and economic insecurity set the backdrop for Zika communication efforts. Limited resources, staffing, and partnerships negatively affected public health structural capacity for communication efforts. Public health communicators and practitioners used a range of processes and practices to engage in education and outreach, including fieldwork, community meetings, and contact with health care providers. Overall, public health agencies' primary goals were to prevent Zika infection, reduce transmission, and prevent adverse birth outcomes. CONCLUSIONS: Lessons learned from this disease response included understanding the macro-environment, developing partnerships across agencies and the community, and valuing diverse message platforms. These lessons can be used to improve communication approaches for health officials at the local, state, and federal levels during future infectious disease outbreaks.

Aerial spraying of products to kill larvae or adult mosquitoes is a public health measure used to control vector-borne diseases. In some outbreaks, the intervention has evoked controversy and community resistance. This study evaluated how local opinion leaders in US localities affected by Zika think about community engagement in public health policies for outbreak response. In December 2017 through March 2018, 4 focus groups were convened in Houston, TX, New Orleans, LA, Miami, FL, and Brooklyn, NY. They discussed a hypothetical scenario that featured vector control by aerial spraying. Participants (N = 20) more readily accepted this vector control method under 4 conditions: They were informed of alternatives, benefits, and risks for human health and the environment. Public health claims were backed by objective evidence and an authority figure genuinely working in the community's interests. They received timely notice about how to mitigate toxin exposure. And, aerial spraying helped to protect vulnerable individuals. The community engagement requirements of the local opinion leaders resonate with core principles of recent public health ethics frameworks: namely, personal autonomy, transparency, reasonableness, and solidarity. Participants foresaw problems with community consent in an era of growing social media use and mistrust in governmental and scientific authority. They also debated whether health authorities should use moral-based arguments, in addition to science-based ones, to communicate aerial spraying's risks and benefits.

What is already known on this topic? In a recent examination of rehospitalization and death among previously hospitalized patients with e-cigarette or vaping, product use–associated lung injury (EVALI), at least one quarter of rehospitalizations and deaths occurred within 2 days of discharge; comorbidities were common among patients who were rehospitalized or who died after discharge. What is added by this report? Updated guidance recommends posthospitalization outpatient follow-up, optimally within 48 hours of discharge, and emphasizes the importance of preparation for hospital discharge and postdischarge care coordination to reduce risk of rehospitalization and death among hospitalized EVALI patients. What are the implications for public health practice? Incorporating this updated guidance into the management of hospitalized EVALI patients might reduce EVALI-associated morbidity and mortality. © 2020 Department of Health and Human Services. All rights reserved.

On August 1, 2019, the first cases of electronic cigarette (e-cigarette), or vaping, product use–associated lung injury (EVALI) were reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).1 The cluster was an initial signal of an outbreak that by December 17, 2019, had resulted in 2506 cases involving hospitalized patients being reported to the CDC. Most patients with EVALI have been men and adolescent boys (67%), have been younger than 35 years of age (78%), and have reported using e-cigarette products containing tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) (80%).2

Summary What is already known about this topic? Some patients hospitalized for e-cigarette, or vaping, product use–associated lung injury (EVALI) have been rehospitalized or have died after hospital discharge. What is added by this report? Compared with other EVALI patients, rehospitalized patients and patients who died after hospital discharge were more likely to have one or more chronic conditions, including cardiac disease, chronic pulmonary disease, and diabetes, and to be older. At least one quarter of rehospitalizations and deaths occurred within 2 days after discharge. What are the implications for public health practice? Intensive discharge planning, ensuring clinical stability before discharge, optimized case management, and follow-up optimally within 48 hours after hospital discharge might minimize EVALI patients’ risk for rehospitalization and death, especially among patients with chronic conditions. © 2020 Department of Health and Human Services. All rights reserved.

CDC, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), state and local health departments, and public health and clinical stakeholders are investigating a nationwide outbreak of e-cigarette, or vaping, product use-associated lung injury (EVALI) (1). CDC has published recommendations for health care providers regarding EVALI (2-4). Recently, researchers from Utah and New York published proposed diagnosis and treatment algorithms for EVALI (5,6). EVALI remains a diagnosis of exclusion because, at present, no specific test or marker exists for its diagnosis, and evaluation should be guided by clinical judgment. Because patients with EVALI can experience symptoms similar to those associated with influenza or other respiratory infections (e.g., fever, cough, headache, myalgias, or fatigue), it might be difficult to differentiate EVALI from influenza or community-acquired pneumonia on initial assessment; EVALI might also co-occur with respiratory infections. This report summarizes recommendations for health care providers managing patients with suspected or known EVALI when respiratory infections such as influenza are more prevalent in the community than they have been in recent months (7). Recommendations include 1) asking patients with respiratory, gastrointestinal, or constitutional symptoms about the use of e-cigarette, or vaping, products; 2) evaluating those suspected to have EVALI with pulse oximetry and obtaining chest imaging, as clinically indicated; 3) considering outpatient management for clinically stable EVALI patients who meet certain criteria; 4) testing patients for influenza, particularly during influenza season, and administering antimicrobials, including antivirals, in accordance with established guidelines; 5) using caution when considering prescribing corticosteroids for outpatients, because this treatment modality has not been well studied among outpatients, and corticosteroids could worsen respiratory infections; 6) recommending evidence-based treatment strategies, including behavioral counseling, to help patients discontinue using e-cigarette, or vaping, products; and 7) emphasizing the importance of annual influenza vaccination for all persons aged >/=6 months, including patients who use e-cigarette, or vaping products.

CDC, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), state and local health departments, and public health and clinical stakeholders are investigating a nationwide outbreak of e-cigarette, or vaping, product use-associated lung injury (EVALI) (1). As of November 13, 2019, 49 states, the District of Columbia, and two U.S. territories (Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands) have reported 2,172 EVALI cases to CDC, including 42 (1.9%) EVALI-associated deaths. To inform EVALI surveillance, including during the 2019-20 influenza season, case report information supplied by states for hospitalized and nonhospitalized patients with EVALI were analyzed using data collected as of November 5, 2019. Among 2,016 EVALI patients with available data on hospitalization status, 1,906 (95%) were hospitalized, and 110 (5%) were not hospitalized. Demographic characteristics of hospitalized and nonhospitalized patients were similar; most were male (68% of hospitalized versus 65% of nonhospitalized patients), and most were aged <35 years (78% of hospitalized versus 74% of nonhospitalized patients). These patients also reported similar use of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)-containing products (83% of hospitalized versus 84% of nonhospitalized patients). Given the similarity between hospitalized and nonhospitalized EVALI patients, the potential for large numbers of respiratory infections during the emerging 2019-20 influenza season, and the potential difficulty in distinguishing EVALI from respiratory infections, CDC will no longer collect national data on nonhospitalized EVALI patients. Further collection of data on nonhospitalized patients will be at the discretion of individual state, local, and territorial health departments. Candidates for outpatient management of EVALI should have normal oxygen saturation (>/=95% while breathing room air), no respiratory distress, no comorbidities that might compromise pulmonary reserve, reliable access to care, strong social support systems, and should be able to ensure follow-up within 24-48 hours of initial evaluation and to seek medical care promptly if respiratory symptoms worsen. Health care providers should emphasize the importance of annual influenza vaccination for all persons aged >/=6 months, including persons who use e-cigarette, or vaping, products (2,3).

Public Health Laboratories (PHLs) in Puerto Rico did not escape the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria. We implemented a quality management system (QMS) approach to systematically reestablish laboratory testing, after evaluating structural and functional damage. PHLs were inoperable immediately after the storm. Our QMS-based approach began in October 2017, ended in May 2018, and resulted in the reestablishment of 92% of baseline laboratory testing capacity. Here, we share lessons learned from the historic recovery of the largest United States' jurisdiction to lose its PHL capacity, and provide broadly applicable tools for other jurisdictions to enhance preparedness for public health emergencies.

In response to an outbreak of Zika virus that started in February 2016 on Kosrae Island, Kosrae State, Federated States of Micronesia, we conducted entomological investigations, including a survey to characterize the mosquito fauna on Kosrae, from November 29 to December 8, 2016. Mosquitoes were collected using several surveillance methods in order to sample all stages of the mosquito life cycle. Eggs were collected using ovicups, larvae and pupae were sampled using standard dippers, and adults were collected using aspirators and Biogents-2 Sentinel traps. All species previously recorded from Kosrae State were found in the current survey, confirming their continued presence on the island. Aedes aegypti was detected on Lelu Island, representing a new municipal record. The collection of Ae. vexans nocturnus represents a new species record for Kosrae, increasing the number of known taxa on this island from 6 to 7. The report herein provides updated knowledge of the mosquitoes that occur on Kosrae State, Federated States of Micronesia.