Last data update: Jun 17, 2024. (Total: 47034 publications since 2009)
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On alert for Ebola: public health risk assessment of travellers from Uganda to the U.S. during the 2022 outbreak
Fowler JJ , Preston LE , Gearhart S , Figueroa A , Christensen D , Mitchell C , Hernandez E , Grills AW , Morrison SM , Wilkinson M , Talib T , Lavilla K , Watson T , Mitcham D , Nash R , Veguilla MC , Hansen S , Cohen NJ , Nu Clarke SA , Smithson A , Shearer E , Pella DG , Morris JD , Meehan S , Aboukheir M , Adams K , Sunavala Z , Conley J , Abouattier M , Palo M , Pimentel LC , Berro A , Mainzer H , Byrkit R , Kim D , Katebi V , Alvarado-Ramy F , Roohi S , Wojno AE , Brown CM , Gertz AM . J Travel Med 2024 ![]() BACKGROUND: On September 20, 2022, the Ugandan Ministry of Health declared an outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Sudan ebolavirus. METHODS: From October 6, 2022, through January 10, 2023, CDC staff conducted public health assessments at five U.S. ports of entry for travellers identified as having been in Uganda in the previous 21 days. CDC also recommended that state, local and territorial health departments ('health departments') conduct post-arrival monitoring of these travellers. CDC provided traveller contact information daily to 58 health departments and collected health department data regarding monitoring outcomes. RESULTS: Among 11 583 travellers screened, 132 (1%) required additional assessment due to potential exposures or symptoms of concern. Fifty-three (91%) health departments reported receiving traveller data from CDC for 10 114 (87%) travellers, of whom 8499 (84%) were contacted for monitoring, 1547 (15%) could not be contacted, and 68 (1%) had no reported outcomes. No travellers with high-risk exposures or Ebola disease were identified. CONCLUSIONS: Entry risk assessment and post-arrival monitoring of travellers are resource-intensive activities which had low demonstrated yield during this and previous outbreaks. The efficiency of future responses could be improved by incorporating an assessment of risk of importation of disease, accounting for individual travellers' potential for exposure, and expanded use of methods that reduce burden to federal agencies, health departments, and travellers. |
Initial public health response and interim clinical guidance for the 2019 novel coronavirus outbreak - United States, December 31, 2019-February 4, 2020.
Patel A , Jernigan DB , 2019-nCOV CDC Response Team , Abdirizak Fatuma , Abedi Glen , Aggarwal Sharad , Albina Denise , Allen Elizabeth , Andersen Lauren , Anderson Jade , Anderson Megan , Anderson Tara , Anderson Kayla , Bardossy Ana Cecilia , Barry Vaughn , Beer Karlyn , Bell Michael , Berger Sherri , Bertulfo Joseph , Biggs Holly , Bornemann Jennifer , Bornstein Josh , Bower Willie , Bresee Joseph , Brown Clive , Budd Alicia , Buigut Jennifer , Burke Stephen , Burke Rachel , Burns Erin , Butler Jay , Cantrell Russell , Cardemil Cristina , Cates Jordan , Cetron Marty , Chatham-Stephens Kevin , Chatham-Stevens Kevin , Chea Nora , Christensen Bryan , Chu Victoria , Clarke Kevin , Cleveland Angela , Cohen Nicole , Cohen Max , Cohn Amanda , Collins Jennifer , Conners Erin , Curns Aaron , Dahl Rebecca , Daley Walter , Dasari Vishal , Davlantes Elizabeth , Dawson Patrick , Delaney Lisa , Donahue Matthew , Dowell Chad , Dyal Jonathan , Edens William , Eidex Rachel , Epstein Lauren , Evans Mary , Fagan Ryan , Farris Kevin , Feldstein Leora , Fox LeAnne , Frank Mark , Freeman Brandi , Fry Alicia , Fuller James , Galang Romeo , Gerber Sue , Gokhale Runa , Goldstein Sue , Gorman Sue , Gregg William , Greim William , Grube Steven , Hall Aron , Haynes Amber , Hill Sherrasa , Hornsby-Myers Jennifer , Hunter Jennifer , Ionta Christopher , Isenhour Cheryl , Jacobs Max , Jacobs Slifka Kara , Jernigan Daniel , Jhung Michael , Jones-Wormley Jamie , Kambhampati Anita , Kamili Shifaq , Kennedy Pamela , Kent Charlotte , Killerby Marie , Kim Lindsay , Kirking Hannah , Koonin Lisa , Koppaka Ram , Kosmos Christine , Kuhar David , Kuhnert-Tallman Wendi , Kujawski Stephanie , Kumar Archana , Landon Alexander , Lee Leslie , Leung Jessica , Lindstrom Stephen , Link-Gelles Ruth , Lively Joana , Lu Xiaoyan , Lynch Brian , Malapati Lakshmi , Mandel Samantha , Manns Brian , Marano Nina , Marlow Mariel , Marston Barbara , McClung Nancy , McClure Liz , McDonald Emily , McGovern Oliva , Messonnier Nancy , Midgley Claire , Moulia Danielle , Murray Janna , Noelte Kate , Noonan-Smith Michelle , Nordlund Kristen , Norton Emily , Oliver Sara , Pallansch Mark , Parashar Umesh , Patel Anita , Patel Manisha , Pettrone Kristen , Pierce Taran , Pietz Harald , Pillai Satish , Radonovich Lewis , Reagan-Steiner Sarah , Reel Amy , Reese Heather , Rha Brian , Ricks Philip , Rolfes Melissa , Roohi Shahrokh , Roper Lauren , Rotz Lisa , Routh Janell , Sakthivel Senthil Kumar Sarmiento Luisa , Schindelar Jessica , Schneider Eileen , Schuchat Anne , Scott Sarah , Shetty Varun , Shockey Caitlin , Shugart Jill , Stenger Mark , Stuckey Matthew , Sunshine Brittany , Sykes Tamara , Trapp Jonathan , Uyeki Timothy , Vahey Grace , Valderrama Amy , Villanueva Julie , Walker Tunicia , Wallace Megan , Wang Lijuan , Watson John , Weber Angie , Weinbaum Cindy , Weldon William , Westnedge Caroline , Whitaker Brett , Whitaker Michael , Williams Alcia , Williams Holly , Willams Ian , Wong Karen , Xie Amy , Yousef Anna . Am J Transplant 2020 20 (3) 889-895 This article summarizes what is currently known about the 2019 novel coronavirus and offers interim guidance. |
The 2021 WHO catalogue of Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex mutations associated with drug resistance: a genotypic analysis
Walker TM , Fowler PW , Knaggs J , Hunt M , Peto TE , Walker AS , Crook DW , Walker TM , Miotto P , Cirillo DM , Kser CU , Knaggs J , Iqbal Z , Hunt M , Chindelevitch L , Farhat MR , Comas I , Comas I , Posey J , Omar SV , Peto TE , Walker AS , Crook DW , Suresh A , Uplekar S , Laurent S , Colman RE , Rodwell TC , Nathanson CM , Zignol M , Ismail N , Rodwell TC , Walker AS , Steyn AJC , Lalvani A , Baulard A , Christoffels A , Mendoza-Ticona A , Trovato A , Skrahina A , Lachapelle AS , Brankin A , Piatek A , GibertoniCruz A , Koch A , Cabibbe AM , Spitaleri A , Brandao AP , Chaiprasert A , Suresh A , Barbova A , VanRie A , Ghodousi A , Bainomugisa A , Mandal A , Roohi A , Javid B , Zhu B , Letcher B , Rodrigues C , Nimmo C , Nathanson CM , Duncan C , Coulter C , Utpatel C , Liu C , Grazian C , Kong C , Kser CU , Wilson DJ , Cirillo DM , Matias D , Jorgensen D , Zimenkov D , Chetty D , Moore DA , Clifton DA , Crook DW , vanSoolingen D , Liu D , Kohlerschmidt D , Barreira D , Ngcamu D , SantosLazaro ED , Kelly E , Borroni E , Roycroft E , Andre E , Bttger EC , Robinson E , Menardo F , Mendes FF , Jamieson FB , Coll F , Gao GF , Kasule GW , Rossolini GM , Rodger G , Smith EG , Meintjes G , Thwaites G , Hoffmann H , Albert H , Cox H , Laurenson IF , Comas I , Arandjelovic I , Barilar I , Robledo J , Millard J , Johnston J , Posey J , Andrews JR , Knaggs J , Gardy J , Guthrie J , Taylor J , Werngren J , Metcalfe J , Coronel J , Shea J , Carter J , Pinhata JM , Kus JV , Todt K , Holt K , Nilgiriwala KS , Ghisi KT , Malone KM , Faksri K , Musser KA , Joseph L , Rigouts L , Chindelevitch L , Jarrett L , Grandjean L , Ferrazoli L , Rodrigues M , Farhat M , Schito M , Fitzgibbon MM , Loemb MM , Wijkander M , Ballif M , Rabodoarivelo MS , Mihalic M , Wilcox M , Hunt M , Zignol M , Merker M , Egger M , O'Donnell M , Caws M , Wu MH , Whitfield MG , Inouye M , Mansj M , DangThi MH , Joloba M , Kamal SM , Okozi N , Ismail N , Mistry N , Hoang NN , Rakotosamimanana N , Paton NI , Rancoita PMV , Miotto P , Lapierre P , Hall PJ , Tang P , Claxton P , Wintringer P , Keller PM , Thai PVK , Fowler PW , Supply P , Srilohasin P , Suriyaphol P , Rathod P , Kambli P , Groenheit R , Colman RE , Ong RTH , Warren RM , Wilkinson RJ , Diel R , Oliveira RS , Khot R , Jou R , Tahseen S , Laurent S , Gharbia S , Kouchaki S , Shah S , Plesnik S , Earle SG , Dunstan S , Hoosdally SJ , Mitarai S , Gagneux S , Omar SV , Yao SY , GrandjeanLapierre S , Battaglia S , Niemann S , Pandey S , Uplekar S , Halse TA , Cohen T , Cortes T , Prammananan T , Kohl TA , Thuong NTT , Teo TY , Peto TEA , Rodwell TC , William T , Walker TM , Rogers TR , Surve U , Mathys V , Furi V , Cook V , Vijay S , Escuyer V , Dreyer V , Sintchenko V , Saphonn V , Solano W , Lin WH , vanGemert W , He W , Yang Y , Zhao Y , Qin Y , Xiao YX , Hasan Z , Iqbal Z , Puyen ZM , CryPticConsortium theSeq , Treat Consortium . Lancet Microbe 2022 3 (4) e265-e273 Background: Molecular diagnostics are considered the most promising route to achievement of rapid, universal drug susceptibility testing for Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex (MTBC). We aimed to generate a WHO-endorsed catalogue of mutations to serve as a global standard for interpreting molecular information for drug resistance prediction. Methods: In this systematic analysis, we used a candidate gene approach to identify mutations associated with resistance or consistent with susceptibility for 13 WHO-endorsed antituberculosis drugs. We collected existing worldwide MTBC whole-genome sequencing data and phenotypic data from academic groups and consortia, reference laboratories, public health organisations, and published literature. We categorised phenotypes as follows: methods and critical concentrations currently endorsed by WHO (category 1); critical concentrations previously endorsed by WHO for those methods (category 2); methods or critical concentrations not currently endorsed by WHO (category 3). For each mutation, we used a contingency table of binary phenotypes and presence or absence of the mutation to compute positive predictive value, and we used Fisher's exact tests to generate odds ratios and Benjamini-Hochberg corrected p values. Mutations were graded as associated with resistance if present in at least five isolates, if the odds ratio was more than 1 with a statistically significant corrected p value, and if the lower bound of the 95% CI on the positive predictive value for phenotypic resistance was greater than 25%. A series of expert rules were applied for final confidence grading of each mutation. Findings: We analysed 41 137 MTBC isolates with phenotypic and whole-genome sequencing data from 45 countries. 38 215 MTBC isolates passed quality control steps and were included in the final analysis. 15 667 associations were computed for 13 211 unique mutations linked to one or more drugs. 1149 (73%) of 15 667 mutations were classified as associated with phenotypic resistance and 107 (07%) were deemed consistent with susceptibility. For rifampicin, isoniazid, ethambutol, fluoroquinolones, and streptomycin, the mutations' pooled sensitivity was more than 80%. Specificity was over 95% for all drugs except ethionamide (914%), moxifloxacin (916%) and ethambutol (933%). Only two resistance mutations were identified for bedaquiline, delamanid, clofazimine, and linezolid as prevalence of phenotypic resistance was low for these drugs. Interpretation: We present the first WHO-endorsed catalogue of molecular targets for MTBC drug susceptibility testing, which is intended to provide a global standard for resistance interpretation. The existence of this catalogue should encourage the implementation of molecular diagnostics by national tuberculosis programmes. Funding: Unitaid, Wellcome Trust, UK Medical Research Council, and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY 4.0 license |
Risk Assessment and Management of COVID-19 Among Travelers Arriving at Designated U.S. Airports, January 17-September 13, 2020.
Dollard P , Griffin I , Berro A , Cohen NJ , Singler K , Haber Y , de la Motte Hurst C , Stolp A , Atti S , Hausman L , Shockey CE , Roohi S , Brown CM , Rotz LD , Cetron MS , Alvarado-Ramy F . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020 69 (45) 1681-1685 ![]() In January 2020, with support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CDC instituted an enhanced entry risk assessment and management (screening) program for air passengers arriving from certain countries with widespread, sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The objectives of the screening program were to reduce the importation of COVID-19 cases into the United States and slow subsequent spread within states. Screening aimed to identify travelers with COVID-19-like illness or who had a known exposure to a person with COVID-19 and separate them from others. Screening also aimed to inform all screened travelers about self-monitoring and other recommendations to prevent disease spread and obtain their contact information to share with public health authorities in destination states. CDC delegated postarrival management of crew members to airline occupational health programs by issuing joint guidance with the Federal Aviation Administration.* During January 17-September 13, 2020, a total of 766,044 travelers were screened, 298 (0.04%) of whom met criteria for public health assessment; 35 (0.005%) were tested for SARS-CoV-2, and nine (0.001%) had a positive test result. CDC shared contact information with states for approximately 68% of screened travelers because of data collection challenges and some states' opting out of receiving data. The low case detection rate of this resource-intensive program highlighted the need for fundamental change in the U.S. border health strategy. Because SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission can occur in the absence of symptoms and because the symptoms of COVID-19 are nonspecific, symptom-based screening programs are ineffective for case detection. Since the screening program ended on September 14, 2020, efforts to reduce COVID-19 importation have focused on enhancing communications with travelers to promote recommended preventive measures, reinforcing mechanisms to refer overtly ill travelers to CDC, and enhancing public health response capacity at ports of entry. More efficient collection of contact information for international air passengers before arrival and real-time transfer of data to U.S. health departments would facilitate timely postarrival public health management, including contact tracing, when indicated. Incorporating health attestations, predeparture and postarrival testing, and a period of limited movement after higher-risk travel, might reduce risk for transmission during travel and translocation of SARS-CoV-2 between geographic areas and help guide more individualized postarrival recommendations. |
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Prevalence, Seroprevalence, and Exposure among Evacuees from Wuhan, China, 2020.
Hallowell BD , Carlson CM , Jacobs JR , Pomeroy M , Steinberg J , Tenforde MW , McDonald E , Foster L , Feldstein LR , Rolfes MA , Haynes A , Abedi GR , Odongo GS , Saruwatari K , Rider EC , Douville G , Bhakta N , Maniatis P , Lindstrom S , Thornburg NJ , Lu X , Whitaker BL , Kamili S , Sakthivel SK , Wang L , Malapati L , Murray JR , Lynch B , Cetron M , Brown C , Roohi S , Rotz L , Borntrager D , Ishii K , Moser K , Rasheed M , Freeman B , Lester S , Corbett KS , Abiona OM , Hutchinson GB , Graham BS , Pesik N , Mahon B , Braden C , Behravesh CB , Stewart R , Knight N , Hall AJ , Killerby ME . Emerg Infect Dis 2020 26 (9) 1998-2004 To determine prevalence of, seroprevalence of, and potential exposure to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among a cohort of evacuees returning to the United States from Wuhan, China, in January 2020, we conducted a cross-sectional study of quarantined evacuees from 1 repatriation flight. Overall, 193 of 195 evacuees completed exposure surveys and submitted upper respiratory or serum specimens or both at arrival in the United States. Nearly all evacuees had taken preventive measures to limit potential exposure while in Wuhan, and none had detectable SARS-CoV-2 in upper respiratory tract specimens, suggesting the absence of asymptomatic respiratory shedding among this group at the time of testing. Evidence of antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 was detected in 1 evacuee, who reported experiencing no symptoms or high-risk exposures in the previous 2 months. These findings demonstrated that this group of evacuees posed a low risk of introducing SARS-CoV-2 to the United States. |
Case definitions used during the first 6 months of the 10th Ebola virus disease outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - four neighboring countries, August 2018-February 2019
Medley AM , Mavila O , Makumbi I , Nizeyemana F , Umutoni A , Balisanga H , Manoah YK , Geissler A , Bunga S , MacDonald G , Homsy J , Ojwang J , Ewetola R , Raghunathan PL , MacGurn A , Singler K , Ward S , Roohi S , Brown V , Shoemaker T , Lako R , Kabeja A , Muruta A , Lubula L , Merrill R . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020 69 (1) 14-19 On August 1, 2018, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) declared its 10th Ebola virus disease (Ebola) outbreak in an area with a high volume of cross-border population movement to and from neighboring countries. The World Health Organization (WHO) designated Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda as the highest priority countries for Ebola preparedness because of the high risk for cross-border spread from DRC (1). Countries might base their disease case definitions on global standards; however, historical context and perceived risk often affect why countries modify and adapt definitions over time, moving toward or away from regional harmonization. Discordance in case definitions among countries might reduce the effectiveness of cross-border initiatives during outbreaks with high risk for regional spread. CDC worked with the ministries of health (MOHs) in DRC, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda to collect MOH-approved Ebola case definitions used during the first 6 months of the outbreak to assess concordance (i.e., commonality in category case definitions) among countries. Changes in MOH-approved Ebola case definitions were analyzed, referencing the WHO standard case definition, and concordance among the four countries for Ebola case categories (i.e., community alert, suspected, probable, confirmed, and case contact) was assessed at three dates (2). The number of country-level revisions ranged from two to four, with all countries revising Ebola definitions by February 2019 after a December 2018 peak in incidence in DRC. Case definition complexity increased over time; all countries included more criteria per category than the WHO standard definition did, except for the "case contact" and "confirmed" categories. Low case definition concordance and lack of awareness of regional differences by national-level health officials could reduce effectiveness of cross-border communication and collaboration. Working toward regional harmonization or considering systematic approaches to addressing country-level differences might increase efficiency in cross-border information sharing. |
Laboratory-based respiratory virus surveillance pilot project on select cruise ships in Alaska, 2013-15
Rogers KB , Roohi S , Uyeki TM , Montgomery D , Parker J , Fowler NH , Xu X , Ingram DJ , Fearey D , Williams SM , Tarling G , Brown CM , Cohen NJ . J Travel Med 2017 24 (6) Background: Influenza outbreaks can occur among passengers and crews during the Alaska summertime cruise season. Ill travellers represent a potential source for introduction of novel or antigenically drifted influenza virus strains to the United States. From May to September 2013-2015, the Alaska Division of Public Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and two cruise lines implemented a laboratory-based public health surveillance project to detect influenza and other respiratory viruses among ill crew members and passengers on select cruise ships in Alaska. Methods: Cruise ship medical staff collected 2-3 nasopharyngeal swab specimens per week from passengers and crew members presenting to the ship infirmary with acute respiratory illness (ARI). Specimens were tested for respiratory viruses at the Alaska State Virology Laboratory (ASVL); a subset of specimens positive for influenza virus were sent to CDC for further antigenic characterization. Results: Of 410 nasopharyngeal specimens, 83% tested positive for at least one respiratory virus; 71% tested positive for influenza A or B virus. Antigenic characterization of pilot project specimens identified strains matching predominant circulating seasonal influenza virus strains, which were included in the northern or southern hemisphere influenza vaccines during those years. Results were relatively consistent across age groups, recent travel history, and influenza vaccination status. Onset dates of illness relative to date of boarding differed between northbound (occurring later in the voyage) and southbound (occurring within the first days of the voyage) cruises. Conclusions: The high yield of positive results indicated that influenza was common among passengers and crews sampled with ARI. This finding reinforces the need to bolster influenza prevention and control activities on cruise ships. Laboratory-based influenza surveillance on cruise ships may augment inland influenza surveillance and inform control activities. However, these benefits should be weighed against the costs and operational limitations of instituting laboratory-based surveillance programs on ships. |
Travel and border health measures to prevent the international spread of Ebola
Cohen NJ , Brown CM , Alvarado-Ramy F , Bair-Brake H , Benenson GA , Chen TH , Demma AJ , Holton NK , Kohl KS , Lee AW , McAdam D , Pesik N , Roohi S , Smith CL , Waterman SH , Cetron MS . MMWR Suppl 2016 65 (3) 57-67 During the 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa, CDC implemented travel and border health measures to prevent international spread of the disease, educate and protect travelers and communities, and minimize disruption of international travel and trade. CDC staff provided in-country technical assistance for exit screening in countries in West Africa with Ebola outbreaks, implemented an enhanced entry risk assessment and management program for travelers at U.S. ports of entry, and disseminated information and guidance for specific groups of travelers and relevant organizations. New and existing partnerships were crucial to the success of this response, including partnerships with international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Organization for Migration, and nongovernment organizations, as well as domestic partnerships with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and state and local health departments. Although difficult to assess, travel and border health measures might have helped control the epidemic's spread in West Africa by deterring or preventing travel by symptomatic or exposed persons and by educating travelers about protecting themselves. Enhanced entry risk assessment at U.S. airports facilitated management of travelers after arrival, including the recommended active monitoring. These measures also reassured airlines, shipping companies, port partners, and travelers that travel was safe and might have helped maintain continued flow of passenger traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region. Travel and border health measures implemented in the countries with Ebola outbreaks laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts related to borders and travel, including development of regional surveillance systems, cross-border coordination, and implementation of core capacities at designated official points of entry in accordance with the International Health Regulations (2005). New mechanisms developed during this response to target risk assessment and management of travelers arriving in the United States may enhance future public health responses. The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html). |
Evaluation of emergency drug releases from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Quarantine Stations
Roohi S , Grinnell M , Sandoval M , Cohen NJ , Crocker K , Allen C , Dougherty C , Jolly J , Pesik N . J Emerg Manag 2015 13 (1) 19-23 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Quarantine Stations distribute select lifesaving drug products that are not commercially available or are in limited supply in the United States for emergency treatment of certain health conditions. Following a retrospective analysis of shipment records, the authors estimated an average of 6.66 hours saved per shipment when drug products were distributed from quarantine stations compared to a hypothetical centralized site from CDC headquarters in Atlanta, GA. This evaluation supports the continued use of a decentralized model which leverages CDC's regional presence and maximizes efficiency in the distribution of lifesaving drugs. |
Airport exit and entry screening for Ebola - August-November 10, 2014
Brown CM , Aranas AE , Benenson GA , Brunette G , Cetron M , Chen TH , Cohen NJ , Diaz P , Haber Y , Hale CR , Holton K , Kohl K , Le AW , Palumbo GJ , Pearson K , Phares CR , Alvarado-Ramy F , Roohi S , Rotz LD , Tappero J , Washburn FM , Watkins J , Pesik N . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2014 63 (49) 1163-7 In response to the largest recognized Ebola virus disease epidemic now occurring in West Africa, the governments of affected countries, CDC, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other international organizations have collaborated to implement strategies to control spread of the virus. One strategy recommended by WHO calls for countries with Ebola transmission to screen all persons exiting the country for "unexplained febrile illness consistent with potential Ebola infection." Exit screening at points of departure is intended to reduce the likelihood of international spread of the virus. To initiate this strategy, CDC, WHO, and other global partners were invited by the ministries of health of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to assist them in developing and implementing exit screening procedures. Since the program began in August 2014, an estimated 80,000 travelers, of whom approximately 12,000 were en route to the United States, have departed by air from the three countries with Ebola transmission. Procedures were implemented to deny boarding to ill travelers and persons who reported a high risk for exposure to Ebola; no international air traveler from these countries has been reported as symptomatic with Ebola during travel since these procedures were implemented. |
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