Last data update: Nov 04, 2024. (Total: 48056 publications since 2009)
Records 1-10 (of 10 Records) |
Query Trace: Redd SC[original query] |
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CDC's evolving approach to emergency response
Redd SC , Frieden TR . Health Secur 2017 15 (1) 41-52 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) transformed its approach to preparing for and responding to public health emergencies following the anthrax attacks of 2001. The Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, an organizational home for emergency response at CDC, was established, and 4 programs were created or greatly expanded after the anthrax attacks: (1) an emergency management program, including an Emergency Operations Center; (2) increased support of state and local health department efforts to prepare for emergencies; (3) a greatly enlarged Strategic National Stockpile of medicines, vaccines, and medical equipment; and (4) a regulatory program to assure that work done on the most dangerous pathogens and toxins is done as safely and securely as possible. Following these changes, CDC led responses to 3 major public health emergencies: the 2009-10 H1N1 influenza pandemic, the 2014-16 Ebola epidemic in West Africa, and the ongoing Zika epidemic. This article reviews the programs of CDC's Office of Public Health Preparedness, the major responses, and how these responses have resulted in changes in CDC's approach to responding to public health emergencies. |
Zika virus -10 public health achievements in 2016 and future priorities
Oussayef NL , Pillai SK , Honein MA , Ben Beard C , Bell B , Boyle CA , Eisen LM , Kohl K , Kuehnert MJ , Lathrop E , Martin SW , Martin R , McAllister JC , McClune EP , Mead P , Meaney-Delman D , Petersen B , Petersen LR , Polen KN , Powers AM , Redd SC , Sejvar JJ , Sharp T , Villanueva J , Jamieson DJ . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2017 65 (52) 1482-1488 The introduction of Zika virus into the Region of the Americas (Americas) and the subsequent increase in cases of congenital microcephaly resulted in activation of CDC's Emergency Operations Center on January 22, 2016, to ensure a coordinated response and timely dissemination of information, and led the World Health Organization to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on February 1, 2016. During the past year, public health agencies and researchers worldwide have collaborated to protect pregnant women, inform clinicians and the public, and advance knowledge about Zika virus (Figure 1). This report summarizes 10 important contributions toward addressing the threat posed by Zika virus in 2016. To protect pregnant women and their fetuses and infants from the effects of Zika virus infection during pregnancy, public health activities must focus on preventing mosquito-borne transmission through vector control and personal protective practices, preventing sexual transmission by advising abstention from sex or consistent and correct use of condoms, and preventing unintended pregnancies by reducing barriers to access to highly effective reversible contraception. |
Using results from infectious disease modeling to improve the response to a potential H7N9 influenza pandemic
Rasmussen SA , Redd SC . Clin Infect Dis 2015 60 Suppl 1 S9-s10 As the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other government agencies prepared for a possible H7N9 pandemic, many questions arose about the virus's expected burden and the effectiveness of key interventions. Public health decision makers need information to compare interventions so that efforts can be focused on interventions most likely to have the greatest impact on morbidity and mortality. To guide decision making, CDC's pandemic response leadership turned to experts in modeling for assistance. H7N9 modeling results provided a quantitative estimate of the impact of different interventions and emphasized the importance of key assumptions. In addition, these H7N9 modeling efforts highlighted the need for modelers to work closely with investigators collecting data so that model assumptions can be adjusted as new information becomes available and with decision makers to ensure that the results of modeling impact policy decisions. |
Pandemic influenza planning, United States, 1978-2008
Iskander J , Strikas RA , Gensheimer KF , Cox NJ , Redd SC . Emerg Infect Dis 2013 19 (6) 879-85 During the past century, 4 influenza pandemics occurred. After the emergence of a novel influenza virus of swine origin in 1976, national, state, and local US public health authorities began planning efforts to respond to future pandemics. Several events have since stimulated progress in public health emergency planning: the 1997 avian influenza A(H5N1) outbreak in Hong Kong, China; the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States; the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome; and the 2003 reemergence of influenza A(H5N1) virus infection in humans. We outline the evolution of US pandemic planning since the late 1970s, summarize planning accomplishments, and explain their ongoing importance. The public health community's response to the 2009 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic demonstrated the value of planning and provided insights into improving future plans and response efforts. Preparedness planning will enhance the collective, multilevel response to future public health crises. |
Novel framework for assessing epidemiologic effects of influenza epidemics and pandemics
Reed C , Biggerstaff M , Finelli L , Koonin LM , Beauvais D , Uzicanin A , Plummer A , Bresee J , Redd SC , Jernigan DB . Emerg Infect Dis 2013 19 (1) 85-91 The effects of influenza on a population are attributable to the clinical severity of illness and the number of persons infected, which can vary greatly between seasons or pandemics. To create a systematic framework for assessing the public health effects of an emerging pandemic, we reviewed data from past influenza seasons and pandemics to characterize severity and transmissibility (based on ranges of these measures in the United States) and outlined a formal assessment of the potential effects of a novel virus. The assessment was divided into 2 periods. Because early in a pandemic, measurement of severity and transmissibility is uncertain, we used a broad dichotomous scale in the initial assessment to divide the range of historic values. In the refined assessment, as more data became available, we categorized those values more precisely. By organizing and prioritizing data collection, this approach may inform an evidence-based assessment of pandemic effects and guide decision making. |
Collaboration in state health departments on the immunization program during the H1N1 response
Redd SC , Kosmos CA . Biosecur Bioterror 2012 10 (1) 155-7 The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic was the longest and most intense public health response since the improvements in public health preparedness were initiated in the years after the 2001 World Trade Center and anthrax attacks. In addition to this general preparedness and response work, more focused preparations for an influenza pandemic were begun in 2005 with additional resources and focus as the H5N1 virus emerged in Asia and policymakers recognized its potential to cause a catastrophic public health emergency. These preparations undoubtedly set the stage for the work undertaken to respond to the H1N1 pandemic.1 In looking back on the H1N1 pandemic, it is vital that we work to understand what elements of our preparation were most effective and how our response might have been improved, so that we can prepare and respond more effectively in the future. The research reported in this issue of the Journal by Chamberlain and colleagues is an important contribution to what we must learn from the experiences of the H1N1 pandemic.2 The work was conducted by 1 of 9 CDC-funded Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers; each pursues multidisciplinary public health systems research aimed at improving the nation's public health system preparedness and response capabilities. | With the aim of improving emergency immunization efforts, the Chamberlain et al article offers insights into the perspectives of immunization program managers on work done before and during the H1N1 immunization program. Although conditions differed in states, there are at least 3 general lessons. The first is that the routine, everyday public health systems are the foundation for public health responses. The second lesson is that an effective planning process must delineate how those everyday systems will be adapted to create a unified response system, where capabilities from multiple public health areas must work together. And third, an exercise and training program is necessary to assure that the people who will be staffing the response understand and have practiced their roles as envisioned in the response plan. We briefly review these 3 lessons and what the Chamberlain et al article teaches us about the collaboration between state preparedness directors and immunization program managers. |
The science behind preparing and responding to pandemic influenza: the lessons and limits of science
Schuchat A , Bell BP , Redd SC . Clin Infect Dis 2011 52 S8-S12 A strong evidence base provides the foundation for planning and response strategies. Investments in pandemic preparedness included support for research that aided early detection, response, and control of the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) (pH1N1) pandemic. Scientific investigations conducted during the pandemic guided understanding of the virus, disease severity, and epidemiologic risk factors. Field investigations also produced information that strengthened guidance for the use of antivirals, identification of target populations for monovalent pH1N1 vaccine, and refinement of recommendations for social distancing measures. Communication of this evolving evidence base was important to sustaining credibility of public health. Areas where substantial controversy emerged, such as the optimal approach to respiratory protection of healthcare workers, often suffered from gaps in the evidence base. Many aspects of the 2009-2010 pandemic influenza experience provide ongoing opportunities for additional study, which will strengthen plans for future pandemic response as well as control of seasonal influenza. |
Estimating the burden of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) in the United States (April 2009-April 2010)
Shrestha SS , Swerdlow DL , Borse RH , Prabhu VS , Finelli L , Atkins CY , Owusu-Edusei K , Bell B , Mead PS , Biggerstaff M , Brammer L , Davidson H , Jernigan D , Jhung MA , Kamimoto LA , Merlin TL , Nowell M , Redd SC , Reed C , Schuchat A , Meltzer MI . Clin Infect Dis 2011 52 S75-S82 To calculate the burden of 2009 pandemic influenza A (pH1N1) in the United States, we extrapolated from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Emerging Infections Program laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations across the entire United States, and then corrected for underreporting. From 12 April 2009 to 10 April 2010, we estimate that approximately 60.8 million cases (range: 43.3-89.3 million), 274,304 hospitalizations (195,086-402,719), and 12,469 deaths (8,868-18,306) occurred in the United States due to pH1N1. Eighty-seven percent of deaths occurred in those under 65 years of age with children and working adults having risks of hospitalization and death 4 to 7 times and 8 to 12 times greater, respectively, than estimates of impact due to seasonal influenza covering the years 1976-2001. In our study, adults 65 years of age or older were found to have rates of hospitalization and death that were up to 75% and 81%, respectively, lower than seasonal influenza. These results confirm the necessity of a concerted public health response to pH1N1. |
1918 and 2009: a tale of two pandemics
Redd SC , Frieden TR , Schuchat A , Briss PA . Public Health Rep 2010 125 Suppl 3 3-5 Learning lessons from previous pandemics is not merely an academic exercise. Our experiences from 1918 and other 20th-century pandemics helped us prepare for and respond to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. In addition to better understanding these earlier pandemics, we must continue to learn and apply lessons from our experience with the current H1N1 pandemic to improve our ability to respond to future pandemics. Any reflection on the first pandemics of the 20th and 21st centuries must begin with gratitude for the fruits of science and technology, many of which were unimaginable in 1918. We can now detect, prevent, and treat disease; clarify the dynamic circumstances of pandemics; and save lives. |
Protecting vulnerable populations from pandemic influenza in the United States: a strategic imperative
Hutchins SS , Truman BI , Merlin TL , Redd SC . Am J Public Health 2009 99 S243-8 Protecting vulnerable populations from pandemic influenza is a strategic imperative. The US national strategy for pandemic influenza preparedness and response assigns roles to governments, businesses, civic and community-based organizations, individuals, and families. Because influenza is highly contagious, inadequate preparedness or untimely response in vulnerable populations increases the risk of infection for the general population. Recent public health emergencies have reinforced the importance of preparedness and the challenges of effective response among vulnerable populations. We explore definitions and determinants of vulnerable, at-risk, and special populations and highlight approaches for ensuring that pandemic influenza preparedness includes these populations and enables them to respond appropriately. We also provide an overview of population-specific and cross-cutting articles in this theme issue on influenza preparedness for vulnerable populations. |
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