Last data update: Jan 21, 2025. (Total: 48615 publications since 2009)
Records 1-3 (of 3 Records) |
Query Trace: Pullman A[original query] |
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The Impact of Community-Based Testing Sites and Gift Incentives on COVID-19 Testing Uptake in Maryland, April 29 - May 9, 2021.
Turbyfill C , Thomas I , Agravat N , Prasher JM , Nett RJ , Stevens M , Ricaldi JN , Dunams TM , Brickhouse-Frazier L , Carter MD , Gebru Y , King A , May CS , Miller JD , Oguh C , Pullman A , Roman K , Rose C , Scherr R , Sidibe T , Soelaeman R , Weinstein J , Wilson T , Tran CH . Am J Health Promot 2022 37 (2) 8901171221119796 PURPOSE: Information on incentives for COVID-19 testing is needed to understand effective practices that encourage testing uptake. We describe characteristics of those who received an incentive after performing a rapid antigen test. DESIGN: Cross-sectional descriptive analysis of survey data. SETTING: During April 29-May 9, 2021, COVID-19 rapid antigen testing was offered in 2 Maryland cities. SAMPLE: Convenience sample of 553 adults (≥18 years) who tested and received an incentive; 93% consented to survey. MEASURES: Survey questions assessed reasons for testing, testing history, barriers, and demographics. ANALYSIS: Robust Poisson regressions were used to determine characteristic differences based on testing history and between participants who would re-test in the future without an incentive vs participants who would not. RESULTS: The most common reasons for testing were the desire to be tested (n = 280; 54%) and convenience of location (n = 146; 28%). Those motivated by an incentive to test (n = 110; 21%) were 5.83 times as likely to state they would not test again without an incentive, compared to those with other reasons for testing (95% CI: 2.67-12.72, P < .001). CRITICAL LIMITATIONS: No comparative study group. CONCLUSION: Results indicate internal motivation and convenience were prominent factors supporting testing uptake. Incentives may increase community testing participation, particularly among people who have never tested. Keywords COVID-19, pandemic, incentives, health behavior, community testing. |
Epidemiologically Linked COVID-19 Outbreaks at a Youth Camp and Men's Conference - Illinois, June-July 2021.
Matthias J , Patrick S , Wiringa A , Pullman A , Hinton S , Campos J , Belville T , Sinner Mph M , Buchanan TT , Sim B , Goldesberry KE . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021 70 (35) 1223-1227 On June 30, 2021, the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) contacted CDC concerning COVID-19 outbreaks at two events sponsored by the same organization: a 5-day overnight church camp for persons aged 14-18 years and a 2-day men's conference. Neither COVID-19 vaccination nor COVID-19 testing was required before either event. As of August 13, a total of 180 confirmed and probable cases had been identified among attendees at the two events and their close contacts. Among the 122 cases associated with the camp or the conference (primary cases), 18 were in persons who were fully vaccinated, with 38 close contacts. Eight of these 38 close contacts subsequently became infected with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19 (secondary cases); among the eight close contacts with secondary cases, one half (four) were fully vaccinated. Among the 180 total persons with outbreak-associated cases, five (2.8%) were hospitalized; no deaths occurred. None of the vaccinated persons with cases were hospitalized. Approximately 1,000 persons across at least four states were exposed to SARS-CoV-2 through attendance at these events or through close contact with a person who had a primary case. This investigation underscores the impact of secondary SARS-CoV-2 transmission during large events, such as camps and conferences, when COVID-19 prevention strategies are not implemented. In Los Angeles County, California, during July 2021, when the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant was predominant, unvaccinated residents were five times more likely to be infected and 29 times more likely to be hospitalized from infection than were vaccinated residents (1). Implementation of multiple prevention strategies, including vaccination and nonpharmaceutical interventions such as masking, physical distancing, and screening testing, are critical to preventing SARS-CoV-2 transmission and serious complications from COVID-19. |
Building biosafety capacity in our nation's laboratories
Chung CL , Bellis KS , Pullman A , O'Connor A , Shultz A . Health Secur 2019 17 (5) 353-363 The 2014 Ebola outbreak revealed biosafety vulnerabilities across the United States. We distributed $24.1 million to health departments to support public health laboratories (PHLs) and sentinel clinical laboratory partners to improve biosafety practices. We used 9 indicators to evaluate PHLs and associated clinical laboratories from March 2015 through April 2018 using descriptive statistics. On average, over 6 reporting periods, 59 awardee PHLs and 4,040 clinical laboratories responded. By April 2018, 92% (57 of 62) of PHLs had conducted at least 1 risk assessment for work with Ebola and another highly infectious disease. The number of PHLs having a policy for risk assessments increased from 32 of 61 (52%) to 49 of 54 (91%). The percentage of awardees meeting the target (80%) for associated clinical laboratories with staff certifications to package/ship rose from 32% (19 of 60) to 46% (25 of 54). The percentage of awardees meeting the target (70%) for associated clinical laboratories with risk assessment policies increased from 18% (8 of 44) to 28% (15 of 54). Awardees reported improvement among Ebola treatment centers/Ebola assessment hospitals with policies to perform risk assessments from 48% (20 of 42) to 67% (34 of 51). Public health laboratories and their clinical partners made progress on their abilities to address biosafety concerns and implement consistent biosafety practices, improving their ability to work safely with biological threats. More attention is needed to address gaps in the clinical community. Support for biosafety activities is critical to continuing to achieve progress. |
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