The International Health Regulations (IHR), an international law under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO), mandates that countries notify other countries of "travelers under public health observation." Between November 10, 2014, and July 12, 2015, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) made 2,374 notifications to the National IHR Focal Points in 114 foreign countries of travelers who were monitored by US health departments because they had been to an Ebola-affected country in West Africa. Given that countries have preidentified focal points as points of contacts for sharing of public health information, notifications could be made by CDC to a trusted public health recipient in another country within 24 hours of receipt of the traveler's information from a US health department. The majority of US health departments used this process, offered by CDC, to notify other countries of travelers intending to leave the United States while being monitored in their jurisdiction.

On April 23, 2016, the Democratic Republic of the Congo's (DRC's) Ministry of Health declared a yellow fever outbreak. As of May 24, 2016, approximately 90% of suspected yellow fever cases (n = 459) and deaths (45) were reported in a single province, Kongo Central Province, that borders Angola, where a large yellow fever outbreak had begun in December 2015. Two yellow fever mass vaccination campaigns were conducted in Kongo Central Province during May 25-June 7, 2016 and August 17-28, 2016. In June 2016, the DRC Ministry of Health requested assistance from CDC to control the outbreak. As of August 18, 2016, a total of 410 suspected yellow fever cases and 42 deaths were reported in Kongo Central Province. Thirty seven of the 393 specimens tested in the laboratory were confirmed as positive for yellow fever virus (local outbreak threshold is one laboratory-confirmed case of yellow fever). Although not well-documented for this outbreak, malaria, viral hepatitis, and typhoid fever are common differential diagnoses among suspected yellow fever cases in this region. Other possible diagnoses include Zika, West Nile, or dengue viruses; however, no laboratory-confirmed cases of these viruses were reported. Thirty five of the 37 cases of yellow fever were imported from Angola. Two-thirds of confirmed cases occurred in persons who crossed the DRC-Angola border at one market city on the DRC side, where ≤40,000 travelers cross the border each week on market day. Strategies to improve coordination between health surveillance and cross-border trade activities at land borders and to enhance laboratory and case-based surveillance and health border screening capacity are needed to prevent and control future yellow fever outbreaks.

On April 23, 2016, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Ministry of Health reported an outbreak of yellow fever. As of May 24, 2016, among 41 confirmed yellow fever cases, 31 (75.6%) had occurred in Kongo Central Province, in the western part of the country bordering Angola (1), where a large yellow outbreak had begun in December 2015. In response, during May 25–June 7, 2016, the DRC Ministry of Health administered approximately 240,000 doses of yellow fever vaccine to all persons aged ≥9 months during a mass vaccination campaign in Matadi, one of 31 health zones in the Kongo Central Province. The administrative vaccination coverage (i.e., the number of vaccine doses administered divided by the most recent census estimates for the target population), was estimated to have reached >99%. | During the campaign, health workers in the Matadi Health Zone were trained to identify adverse events following immunization (AEFIs), complete case report forms, and send forms weekly to both provincial officials and a national expert committee for vaccine pharmacovigilance. Although a provisional classification of AEFIs by severity is made at peripheral and provincial levels at the time of an initial investigation, responsibilities at the national level are to guide the investigation of suspected serious AEFIs, classify them according to standard AEFI cause–specific definitions, recommend additional testing of biologic specimens if warranted, and determine causality.

PROBLEM/CONDITION: Approximately 450,000 legal permanent immigrants and 75,000 refugees enter the United States annually after receiving required medical examinations by overseas panel physicians (physicians who follow the CDC medical screening guidelines provided to the U.S. Department of State). CDC has the regulatory responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases into the United States as well as for developing the guidelines, known as technical instructions, for the overseas medical examinations. Other conditions that are not infectious might preclude an immigrant or refugee from entering the United States and also are reported as part of the medical examination. After arrival in the United States, all refugees are recommended to obtain a medical assessment by a health-care provider or a health department within 30 days. In addition, immigrants with certain medical conditions such as noninfectious tuberculosis at the time of the original medical examination are recommended to be evaluated after arrival to ensure that appropriate prevention or treatment measures are instituted. Health departments need timely and accurate notifications of newly arriving immigrants, refugees, and persons with other visa types to facilitate these evaluations. Notifications for all newly arriving refugees (with or without medical conditions) and immigrants with medical conditions are provided by CDC's Electronic Disease Notification (EDN) system. This is the first report describing EDN. REPORTING PERIOD: This report summarizes notifications by the EDN system during January-December 2009. DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM: The EDN system is a centralized electronic reporting system that collects health information on newly arriving refugees and immigrants with Class A and Class B medical conditions. Class A conditions render applicants inadmissible and require a waiver for entry; Class B conditions are admissible but might require treatment or follow-up. Information in the EDN system is used to notify state health departments in all 50 states and the District of Columbia about the arrival of these persons in the United States. RESULTS: In 2009, the EDN system notified U.S. state and local health departments of 104,954 newly arriving refugees and immigrants, of whom 78,899 (75.2%) were refugees (with or without medical conditions), 19,358 (18.4%) were immigrants with medical conditions, and 6,697 (6.4%) were persons with other visa types. Of the 78,899 refugees, 21,319 (27%) had a medical condition. The majority (93.4%) of immigrants with medical conditions had tuberculosis classifications (i.e., either had evidence of latent tuberculosis infection or chest radiograph findings interpreted by the overseas panel physician as consistent with tuberculosis). Of the 41,415 refugees and immigrants with Class A or Class B medical conditions, 405 (1%) had Class A conditions, and 40,994 (99%) had Class B conditions. The majority of refugees and immigrants with suspected Class B tuberculosis were born in the Philippines (41.3%), Mexico (12.1%), Burma (8.7%), Vietnam (7.8%), and the Dominican Republic (5.8%). The majority of refugee notifications were for persons born in Iraq (23.9%), Burma (18.9%), and Bhutan (15.1%). Approximately one third of the tuberculosis notifications were sent to health departments in California (20.5%), Texas (9.8%), and New York (6.3%), and the national reporting rate for tuberculosis follow-up was 75.4% within 30 days of arrival. INTERPRETATION: The findings in this report suggest that 1) overseas medical screening results in a low frequency (0.4%) of inadmissible medical conditions in the United States, 2) the EDN system provides more direct notifications to health departments than the previous paper-based system about newly arriving immigrants and refugees who need medical follow-up, and 3) approximately 75% of follow-up occurs among persons with suspected tuberculosis who are reported to EDN by states receiving newly arriving refugees and immigrants. PUBLIC HEALTH ACTIONS: The data in this report can be used to help state and local health departments provide prompt and effective follow-up, evaluation, and treatment to newly arriving immigrants and refugees. Timely follow-up might prevent additional spread of tuberculosis or other communicable diseases of public health significance into their communities. In addition, information from the EDN system allows health departments to use their resources as effectively as possible by providing clinical information that identifies the refugees and immigrants who should be prioritized for evaluation and treatment.

Outbreaks of Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS) are rare. In June 2011, a cluster of cases of acute flaccid paralysis with features consistent with GBS was identified along the international border in the town of San Luis Rio Colorado (SLRC) in Sonora, Mexico, and in Yuma County, Arizona. A binational investigation involving United States and Mexican state and federal officials identified additional cases, and epidemiologic information suggested an association of GBS cases with a concomitant outbreak of Campylobacter jejuni .We describe the clinical, laboratory, and epidemiologic features of this outbreak. We identified cases of AFP in Mexico from national reporting data, and suspected GBS cases in Arizona through active casefinding and physician outreach at local hospitals. We categorized cases using standardized diagnostic criteria (Brighton International Criteria) for GBS through physical and neurological examination, medical record review, laboratory testing, and electrodiagnostic studies. Of 31 identified AFP cases, we classified 26 (18 from Sonora, 8 from Arizona) as GBS. All cases had weakness onset between May 4-July 21, 2011; 21 (81%) cases were male. One GBS case (4%) reached Brighton Level 1 (most diagnostically certain), 14 (54%) Level 2, and 11 (42%) Level 3. Estimated incidence was 26/100,000 persons/year, over 26 times the typical expected rate in this area. Clinical phenotype suggested acute motor axonal neuropathy (AMAN) or Fisher syndrome in all; electrodiagnostic studies in 14 of 16 cases tested also suggested AMAN. Twenty-one cases (81%) reported antecedent diarrhea a median of 11 days before weakness 11/18 cases tested (61%) had C. jejuni -specific serum IgM antibodies and 16/18 (89%) were seropositive for one or more antiganglioside antibodies. Although the exact source of exposure to C. jejuni in the cluster could not be determined with certainty, epidemiologic evidence suggested contaminated ground water in SLRC. In conclusion, in addition to epidemiologic evidence, the clinical and laboratory features of this unprecedented outbreak of GBS clustered in geographical location and time suggested C. jejuni infection as the precipitant. The reason for this outbreak is unknown, but may be related to specific host, pathogen, or environmental factors.

US-bound immigrants with suspected non-infectious TB are encouraged to be medically re-evaluated after arrival in the United States. We evaluated the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's immigrant referral process, designed to facilitate timely post-arrival evaluations. Over 1,200 immigrants with suspected TB arriving during October 1, 2008-September 30, 2010 were identified. In 2011, differences in days to evaluation initiation were assessed by referral type using survival analysis and Cox proportional hazard models. Among those receiving any referral, median time to post-arrival evaluation was significantly lower compared with immigrants receiving no referral (16 vs. 69 days, respectively; p < 0.0001). After adjusting for the covariates, immigrants receiving any referral initiated follow-up at 4 times the rate (adjusted hazard ratio = 4.0; p < 0.0001) of those receiving no referral. Implementing a referral system at US ports of entry will improve timeliness and increase the proportion of immigrants initiating domestic evaluation.

OBJECTIVE: To assess L-tryptophan (LT) dose, age, sex, and immunogenetic markers as possible risk or protective factors for the development of LT-associated eosinophilia-myalgia syndrome (EMS) and related clinical findings. METHODS: HLA-DRB1 and DQA1 allele typing and Gm/Km phenotyping were performed on a cohort of 94 white subjects with documented LT ingestion and standardized evaluations. Multivariate analyses compared LT dose, age, sex, and alleles among groups of subjects who ingested LT and subsequently developed surveillance criteria for EMS, developed EMS or characteristic features of EMS (EMS spectrum disorder), or developed no features of EMS (unaffected). RESULTS: Considering all sources of LT, higher LT dose (odds ratio [OR] 1.4, 95% confidence interval [95% CI] 1.1-1.8), age >45 years (OR 3.0, 95% CI 1.0-8.8), and HLA-DRB1*03 (OR 3.9, 95% CI 1.2-15.2), DRB1*04 (OR 3.9, 95% CI 1.1-16.4), and DQA1*0601 (OR 13.7, 95% CI 1.3-1.8) were risk factors for the development of EMS, whereas DRB1*07 (OR 0.12, 95% CI 0.02-0.48) and DQA1*0501 (OR 0.23, 95% CI 0.05-0.85) were protective. Similar risk and protective factors were seen for developing EMS following ingestion of implicated LT, except that DRB1*03 was not a risk factor and DQA1*0201 was an additional protective factor. EMS spectrum disorder also showed similar findings, but with DRB1*04 being a risk factor and DRB1*07 and DQA1*0201 being protective. There were no differences in sex distribution, Gm/Km allotypes, or Gm/Km phenotypes among any groups. CONCLUSION: In addition to the xenobiotic dose and subject age, polymorphisms in immune response genes may underlie the development of certain xenobiotic-induced immune-mediated disorders, and these findings may have implications for future related epidemics.