In 2021, the US government undertook Operation Allies Welcome, in which evacuees from Afghanistan arrived at 2 US ports of entry in Virginia and Pennsylvania. Because of the rapid evacuation process, the US government granted evacuees an exemption to a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) requirement in place at that time-namely, that air passengers present a negative SARS-CoV-2 viral test result or documentation of recovery from COVID-19 before they boarded international flights bound for the United States. This study describes cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection detected among 65 068 evacuees who arrived at the 2 ports of entry in August and September 2021. Because evacuees were a population at increased risk for infection with diseases of public health concern, CDC staff helped coordinate on-site and on-arrival testing, visually observed evacuees for signs and symptoms of communicable disease, and referred evacuees for further evaluation and treatment as needed. CDC staff used antigen or nucleic acid amplification tests at the ports of entry to evaluate evacuees aged ≥2 years without documentation of recent SARS-CoV-2 infection. CDC staff isolated evacuees with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection and quarantined their close contacts, consistent with CDC guidance at the time, before evacuees rejoined the repatriation process. Of 65 068 evacuees, 214 (0.3%) were confirmed as having SARS-CoV-2 infection after port-of-entry testing. Cases of measles, varicella, pertussis, tuberculosis, hepatitis A, malaria, leishmaniasis, and diarrheal illness were also identified. Although the percentage of SARS-CoV-2 infection was low in this evacuated population, communicable disease detection at US ports of entry, along with vaccination efforts, was an important part of a multilayered approach to mitigate the transmission of disease in congregate housing facilities and into US communities.

During October 2021, the County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency identified | 18 five cases of shigellosis among persons experiencing homelessness (PEH). We conducted an | 19 outbreak investigation and developed interventions to respond to shigellosis outbreaks among | 20 PEH. Confirmed cases occurred among PEH with stool-cultured Shigella sonnei; probable cases | 21 were among PEH with Shigella-positive culture-independent diagnostic testing. Patients were | 22 interviewed to determine infectious sources and risk factors. Fifty-three patients were identified | 23 (47 confirmed, six probable); 34 (64%) were hospitalized. None died. No point source was | 24 identified. Patients reported inadequate access to clean water and sanitation facilities, including | 25 public restrooms closed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. After implementing interventions, | 26 including handwashing stations, more frequent public restroom cleaning, sanitation kit | 27 distribution, and isolation housing for ill persons, S. sonnei cases decreased to preoutbreak | 28 frequencies. Improving public sanitation access was associated with decreased cases and should | 29 be considered to prevent outbreaks among PEH

Viral genomic surveillance has been a critical source of information during the COVID-19 pandemic, but publicly available data can be sparse, concentrated in wealthy countries, and often made public weeks or months after collection. We used publicly available viral genomic surveillance data submitted to GISAID and GenBank to examine sequencing coverage and lag time to submission during 2020-2021. We compared publicly submitted sequences by country with reported infection rates and population and also examined data based on country-level World Bank income status and World Health Organization region. We found that as global capacity for viral genomic surveillance increased, international disparities in sequencing capacity and timeliness persisted along economic lines. Our analysis suggests that increasing viral genomic surveillance coverage worldwide and decreasing turnaround times could improve timely availability of sequencing data to inform public health action.

The National Immunization Survey Adult COVID Module used a random-digit-dialed phone survey during April 22, 2021-January 29, 2022 to quantify COVID-19 vaccination, intent, attitudes, and barriers by detailed race/ethnicity, interview language, and nativity. Foreign-born respondents overall and within racial/ethnic categories had higher vaccination coverage (80.9%), higher intent to be vaccinated (4.2%), and lower hesitancy towards COVID-19 vaccination (6.0%) than US-born respondents (72.6%, 2.9%, and 15.8%, respectively). Vaccination coverage was significantly lower for certain subcategories of national origin or heritage (e.g., Jamaican (68.6%), Haitian (60.7%), Somali (49.0%) in weighted estimates). Respondents interviewed in Spanish had lower vaccination coverage than interviewees in English but higher intent to be vaccinated and lower reluctance. Collection and analysis of nativity, detailed race/ethnicity and language information allow identification of disparities among racial/ethnic subgroups. Vaccination programs could use such information to implement culturally and linguistically appropriate focused interventions among communities with lower vaccination coverage.

Travel can facilitate SARS-CoV-2 introduction. To reduce introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infections, the state of Alaska implemented a program on June 6, 2020, for arriving air, sea, and road travelers that required either molecular testing for SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, or a 14-day self-quarantine after arrival. The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) used weekly standardized reports submitted by 10 participating Alaska airports to evaluate air traveler choices to undergo testing or self-quarantine, traveler test results, and airport personnel experiences while implementing the program. Among 386,435 air travelers who arrived in Alaska during June 6-November 14, 2020, a total of 184,438 (48%) chose to be tested within 72 hours before arrival, 111,370 (29%) chose to be tested on arrival, and 39,685 (10%) chose to self-quarantine without testing after arrival. An additional 15,112 persons received testing at airport testing sites; these were primarily travelers obtaining a second test 7-14 days after arrival, per state guidance. Of the 126,482 airport tests performed in Alaska, 951 (0.8%) results were positive, or one per 406 arriving travelers. Airport testing program administrators reported that clear communication, preparation, and organization were vital for operational success; challenges included managing travelers' expectations and ensuring that sufficient personnel and physical space were available to conduct testing. Expected mitigation measures such as vaccination, physical distancing, mask wearing, and avoidance of gatherings after arrival might also help limit postarrival transmission. Posttravel self-quarantine and testing programs might reduce travel-associated SARS-CoV-2 transmission and importation, even without enforcement. Traveler education and community and industry partnerships might help ensure success.