Last data update: Jul 01, 2024. (Total: 47134 publications since 2009)
Records 1-4 (of 4 Records) |
Query Trace: Ndiaye SM [original query] |
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Assessment of suspected COVID-19 deaths in nonhealthcare settings in Cote d'Ivoire, March 11 to July 31, 2020
Ndiaye SM , Tiembre I , Amani YMR , Zamina BYG , Vroh JBB , Diarrassouba M . Health Secur 2023 21 (4) 280-285 According to hospital records, 5 months after reporting its first case of COVID-19, Cote d'Ivoire reported only 102 deaths. We conducted a community mortality survey in the 13 districts where 95% of COVID-19 cases were reported to assess COVID-19 mortality in nonhealthcare settings. To identify suspected COVID-19 deaths in communities, we used data from social and administrative institutions, such as police and fire departments, funeral homes, and places of worship, whose functions include providing services related to deaths. Our survey identified 54 (17.6%) suspected COVID-19 deaths, which is more than half of the official reported number. Our study showed that in areas with low access to healthcare and poorly functioning death notification and registration systems, community-based data sources could be used to identify suspected COVID-19 deaths outside of the health sector. They can provide early warning data on events, such as an unusual number of community deaths or diseases. |
Community-based surveillance in Cote d'Ivoire
Clara A , Ndiaye SM , Joseph B , Nzogu MA , Coulibaly D , Alroy KA , Gourmanon DC , Diarrassouba M , Toure-Adechoubou R , Houngbedji KA , Attiey HB , Balajee SA . Health Secur 2020 18 S23-s33 Community-based surveillance can be an important component of early warning systems. In 2016, the Cote d'Ivoire Ministry of Health launched a community-based surveillance project in 3 districts along the Guinea border. Community health workers were trained in detection and immediate reporting of diseases and events using a text-messaging platform. In December 2017, surveillance data from before and after implementation of community-based surveillance were analyzed in intervention and control districts. A total of 3,734 signals of priority diseases and 4,918 unusual health events were reported, of which 420 were investigated as suspect diseases and none were investigated as unusual health events. Of the 420 suspected cases reported, 23 (6%) were laboratory confirmed for a specific pathogen. Following implementation of community-based surveillance, 5-fold and 8-fold increases in reporting of suspected measles and yellow fever clusters, respectively, were documented. Reporting incidence rates in intervention districts for suspected measles, yellow fever, and acute flaccid paralysis were significantly higher after implementation, with a difference of 29.2, 19.0, and 2.5 cases per 100,000 person-years, respectively. All rate differences were significantly higher in intervention districts (p < 0.05); no significant increase in reporting was noted in control districts. These findings suggest that community-based surveillance strengthened detection and reporting capacity for several suspect priority diseases and events. However, the surveillance program was very sensitive, resulting in numerous false-positives. Learning from the community-based surveillance implementation experience, the ministry of health is revising signal definitions to reduce sensitivity and increase specificity, reviewing training materials, considering scaling up sustainable reporting platforms, and standardizing community health worker roles. |
Global health security agenda implementation: A case for community engagement
Armstrong-Mensah EA , Ndiaye SM . Health Secur 2018 16 (4) 217-223 In today's interconnected world, infectious diseases can spread rapidly within and between countries. The 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone underscored the inability of countries with limited capacities and weak public health systems to respond effectively to outbreaks. To mitigate future health threats, nations and international organizations launched the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) to accelerate compliance with the WHO's International Health Regulations, so as to enhance global protection from infectious disease threats. To advance GHSA's mandate to build capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases, and thereby contain threats at their source, community engagement is needed. This article advocates for community engagement in GHSA implementation, using examples from 3 GHSA action packages. A country's ability to prevent a local disease outbreak from becoming an epidemic often rests with the level of knowledge about the situation and the actions taken at the community level. |
Polio outbreak among nomads in Chad: outbreak response and lessons learned
Ndiaye SM , Ahmed MA , Denson M , Craig AS , Kretsinger K , Cherif B , Kandolo P , Moto DD , Richelot A , Tuma J . J Infect Dis 2014 210 Suppl 1 S74-84 BACKGROUND: In response to the 2011 and 2012 polio epidemic in Chad, Chad's Ministry of Public Health, with support from Global Polio Eradication Initiative partners, took steps to increase vaccination coverage of nomadic children with targeted polio campaigns. This article describes the strategies we used to vaccinate nomads in 3 districts of Chad. METHODS: Our targeted interventions involved using mobile vaccination teams, recruiting local nomads to identify settlements, using social mobilization, and offering vaccinations to children, women, and animals. RESULTS: Vaccination coverage of nomadic children 0-59 months of age increased, particularly among those never before vaccinated against polio. These increases occurred mostly in the intervention districts of Dourbali, from 2956 to 8164 vaccinated children, and Kyabe, from 7319 to 15 868. The number of first-time vaccinated nomadic children also increased the most in these districts, from 60 to 131 in Dourbali and from 1302 to 2973 in Kyabe. Coverage in the Massaguet district was only 37.7%. CONCLUSIONS: Our success was probably due to (1) appointment of staff to oversee implementation, (2) engagement of the national government and its partners, (3) participation of nomadic community leaders, (4) intersectoral collaboration between human and animal health services, and (5) flexibility and capacity of vaccinators to vaccinate when and where nomads were available. |
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