HIV infection is associated with poor maternal health outcomes. In 2016, the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in Uganda was 336/100,000, and the neonatal mortality rate (NMR) was 19/1,000. Saving Mothers, Giving Life (SMGL) was a five-year maternal and neonatal health strengthening initiative launched in 2012 in Uganda. We extracted maternal and neonatal data for 2015-2016 from the initiative's population-based mortality surveillance system in 123 health facilities in Western Uganda. We collected data on the facilities, HIV status, antiretroviral drug (ARV) use, death, birth weight, delivery type, parity, Apgar scores, and complications. We compared mother and baby outcomes between HIV-positive or HIV-negative, computed risk ratios (RR) for adverse outcomes, and used the chi-square to test for significance in differences observed. Among 116,066 pregnant women who attended and gave birth at SMGL-implementing facilities during 2015-2016, 8,307 (7.7%) were HIV-positive, of whom 7,809 (94%) used antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) at the time of delivery. During birth, 23,993 (21%) women experienced ≥1 complications. Neonate Apgar scores <7 (8.8%) and maternal haemorrhage during birth (1.6%) were the most common outcomes. Overall facility MMR was 258/100,000 and NMR was 7.6/1,000. HIV infection increased risk of maternal death (RR = 3.6, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) = 2.4-5.5), maternal sepsis (RR = 2.1, 95% CI = 1.3-3.3), and infant birth weight <2,500g (RR = 1.2, 95% CI = 1.1-1.3), but was protective against maternal complications (RR = 0.92, 95% CI = 0.87-0.97) and perinatal death (RR = 0.78, 95% CI = 0.68-0.89). Among the HIV-positive, ARV non-use increased risk of maternal death (RR = 15, 95% CI = 7.1-31) and perinatal death (RR = 2.3, 95% CI = 1.6-3.4). SMGL reduced facility MMR and NMR below national rates. HIV-infection was associated with maternal sepsis and death. Failure to use ARVs among women living with HIV increased the risk of maternal and perinatal death. Use of the SMGL approach and complementary interventions that further strengthen HIV care, may continue to reduce MMR and NMR.

BACKGROUND: The COVID-19 pandemic overwhelmed the capacity of health facilities globally, emphasizing the need for readiness to respond to rapid increases in cases. The first wave of COVID-19 in Uganda peaked in late 2020 and demonstrated challenges with facility readiness to manage cases. The second wave began in May 2021. In June 2021, we assessed the readiness of health facilities in Uganda to manage the second wave of COVID-19. METHODS: Referral hospitals managed severe COVID-19 patients, while lower-level health facilities screened, isolated, and managed mild cases. We assessed 17 of 20 referral hospitals in Uganda and 71 of 3,107 lower-level health facilities, selected using multistage sampling. We interviewed health facility heads in person about case management, coordination and communication and reporting, and preparation for the surge of COVID-19 during first and the start of the second waves of COVID-19, inspected COVID-19 treatment units (CTUs) and other service delivery points. We used an observational checklist to evaluate capacity in infection prevention, medicines, personal protective equipment (PPE), and CTU surge capacity. We used the "ReadyScore" criteria to classify readiness levels as > 80% ('ready'), 40-80% ('work to do'), and < 40% ('not ready') and tailored the assessments to the health facility level. Scores for the lower-level health facilities were weighted to approximate representativeness for their health facility type in Uganda. RESULTS: The median (interquartile range (IQR)) readiness scores were: 39% (IQR: 30, 51%) for all health facilities, 63% (IQR: 56, 75%) for referral hospitals, and 32% (IQR: 24, 37%) for lower-level facilities. Of 17 referral facilities, two (12%) were 'ready' and 15 (88%) were in the "work to do" category. Fourteen (82%) had an inadequate supply of medicines, 12 (71%) lacked adequate supply of oxygen, and 11 (65%) lacked space to expand their CTU. Fifty-five (77%) lower-level health facilities were "not ready," and 16 (23%) were in the "work to do" category. Seventy (99%) lower-level health facilities lacked medicines, 65 (92%) lacked PPE, and 53 (73%) lacked an emergency plan for COVID-19. CONCLUSION: Few health facilities were ready to manage the second wave of COVID-19 in Uganda during June 2021. Significant gaps existed for essential medicines, PPE, oxygen, and space to expand CTUs. The Uganda Ministry of Health utilized our findings to set up additional COVID-19 wards in hospitals and deliver medicines and PPE to referral hospitals. Adequate readiness for future waves of COVID-19 requires additional support and action in Uganda.

Uganda established a National Action Plan for Health Security in 2019, following a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations (2005) capacities in 2017. The action plan enhanced national health security awareness, but implementation efforts were affected by limited funding, excess of activities, and challenges related to monitoring and evaluation. To improve implementation, Uganda conducted a multisectoral health security self-assessment in 2021 using the second edition of the JEE tool and developed a 1-year operational plan. From 2017 to 2021, Uganda's composite ReadyScore improved by 20%, with improvement in 13 of the 19 technical areas. Indicator scores showing limited capacity declined from 30% to 20%, and indicators with no capacity declined from 10% to 2%. More indicators had developed (47% vs 40%), demonstrated (29% vs 20%), and sustained (2% vs 0%) capacities in 2021 compared with 2017. Using the self-assessment JEE scores, 72 specific activities from the International Health Regulations (2005) benchmarks tool were selected for inclusion in a 1-year operational plan (2021-2022). In contrast to the 264 broad activities in the 5-year national action plan, the operational plan prioritized a small number of activities to enable sectors to focus limited resources on implementation. While certain capacities improved before and during implementation of the action plan, countries may benefit from using short-term operational planning to develop realistic and actionable health security plans to improve health security capacities.

Ebola virus disease (EVD) is a rare and often deadly viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF); four species of Ebola virus (Zaire ebolavirus, Sudan ebolavirus, Taï Forest ebolavirus, and Bundibugyo ebolavirus) cause occasional outbreaks among humans and nonhuman primates* (1). Infection is transmitted through direct contact with infectious blood, body fluids, and animal tissues. Symptoms include fever, abdominal pain, diarrhea, vomiting, generalized body weakness, and hemorrhage. Since 2000, four outbreaks of EVD caused by Sudan ebolavirus have been identified in Uganda; the largest outbreak (in 2000) resulted in 425 cases and 224 (53%) deaths (2,3). No vaccine is available to prevent Sudan ebolavirus infection, and treatment is supportive. The estimated case fatality rate is 55% (4).

BACKGROUND: In June 2019, surveillance data from the Uganda's District Health Information System revealed an outbreak of malaria in Kole District. Analysis revealed that cases had exceeded the outbreak threshold from January 2019. The Ministry of Health deployed our team to investigate the areas and people affected, identify risk factors for disease transmission, and recommend control and prevention measures. METHODS: We conducted an outbreak investigation involving a matched case-control study. We defined a confirmed case as a positive malaria test in a resident of Aboke, Akalo, Alito, and Bala sub-counties of Kole District January-June 2019. We identified cases by reviewing outpatient health records. Exposures were assessed in a 1:1 matched case-control study (n = 282) in Aboke sub-county. We selected cases systematically from 10 villages using probability proportionate to size and identified age- and village-matched controls. We conducted entomological and environmental assessments to identify mosquito breeding sites. We plotted epidemic curves and overlaid rainfall, and indoor residual spraying (IRS). Case-control exposures were combined into: breeding site near house, proximity to swamp and breeding site, and proximity to swamp; these were compared to no exposure in a logistic regression analysis. RESULTS: Of 18,737 confirmed case-patients (AR = 68/1,000), Aboke sub-county residents (AR = 180/1,000), children < 5 years (AR = 94/1,000), and females (AR = 90/1,000) were most affected. Longitudinal analysis of surveillance data showed decline in cases after an IRS campaign in 2017 but an increase after IRS cessation in 2018-2019. Overlay of rainfall and case data showed two malaria upsurges during 2019, occurring 35-42 days after rainfall increases. Among 141 case-patients and 141 controls, the combination of having mosquito breeding sites near the house and proximity to swamps increased the odds of malaria 6-fold (OR = 6.6, 95% CI = 2.24-19.7) compared to no exposures. Among 84 abandoned containers found near case-patients' and controls' houses, 14 (17%) had mosquito larvae. Adult Anopheles mosquitoes, larvae, pupae, and pupal exuviae were identified near affected houses. CONCLUSION: Stagnant water formed by increased rainfall likely provided increased breeding sites that drove this outbreak. Cessation of IRS preceded the malaria upsurges. We recommend re-introduction of IRS and removal of mosquito breeding sites in Kole District.

Uganda is an ecological hot spot with porous borders that lies in several infectious disease transmission belts, making it prone to disease outbreaks. To prepare and respond to these public health threats and emergencies in a coordinated manner, Uganda established the Uganda National Institute of Public Health (UNIPH) in 2013.Using a step-by-step process, Uganda's Ministry of Health (MOH) crafted a strategy with a vision, mission, goal, and strategic objectives, and identified value additions and key enablers for success. A regulatory impact assessment was then conducted to inform the drafting of principles of the bill for legislation on the Institute.Despite not yet attaining legal status, the UNIPH has already achieved faster, smarter, and more efficient and effective prevention, detection, and response to public health emergencies. Successes include a more coordinated multisectoral, disciplined, and organized response to emergencies; appropriate, timely, and complete information receipt and sharing; a functional national lab sample and results transportation network that has enabled detection and confirmation of public health events within 48 hours of alert; appropriate response to a confirmed public health event in 24-48 hours; and real-time surveillance of endemic- and epidemic-prone diseases.In this article, we document success stories, lessons learned, and challenges encountered during the unique staged process used to develop the components of the UNIPH. The creation of an integrated disease control center has proven to yield better collaboration and synergies between different arms of epidemic preparedness and response.

Uganda is highly vulnerable to public health emergencies (PHEs) due to its geographic location next to the Congo Basin epidemic hot spot, placement within multiple epidemic belts, high population growth rates, and refugee influx. In view of this, Uganda's Ministry of Health established the Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC) in September 2013, as a central coordination unit for all PHEs in the country. Uganda followed the World Health Organization's framework to establish the PHEOC, including establishing a steering committee, acquiring legal authority, developing emergency response plans, and developing a concept of operations. The same framework governs the PHEOC's daily activities. Between January 2014 and December 2021, Uganda's PHEOC coordinated response to 271 PHEs, hosted 207 emergency coordination meetings, trained all core staff in public health emergency management principles, participated in 21 simulation exercises, coordinated Uganda's Global Health Security Agenda activities, established 6 subnational PHEOCs, and strengthened the capacity of 7 countries in public health emergency management. In this article, we discuss the following lessons learned: PHEOCs are key in PHE coordination and thus mitigate the associated adverse impacts; although the functions of a PHEOC may be legalized by the existence of a National Institute of Public Health, their establishment may precede formally securing the legal framework; staff may learn public health emergency management principles on the job; involvement of leaders and health partners is crucial to the success of a public health emergency management program; subnational PHEOCs are resourceful in mounting regional responses to PHEs; and service on the PHE Strategic Committee may be voluntary.

BACKGROUND: Jimsonweed (Datura stramonium) contains toxic alkaloids that cause gastrointestinal and central nervous system symptoms when ingested. This can be lethal at high doses. The plant may grow together with leguminous crops, mixing with them during harvesting. On 13 March 2019, more than 200 case-patients were admitted to multiple health centres for acute gastrointestinal and neurologic symptoms. We investigated to determine the cause and magnitude of the outbreak and recommended evidence-based control and prevention measures. METHODS: We defined a suspected case as sudden onset of confusion, dizziness, convulsions, hallucinations, diarrhoea, or vomiting with no other medically plausible explanations in a resident of Napak or Amudat District from 1 March-30 April 2019. We reviewed medical records and canvassed all villages of the eight affected subcounties to identify cases. In a retrospective cohort study conducted in 17 villages that reported the earliest cases, we interviewed 211 residents about dietary history during 11-15 March. We used modified Poisson regression to assess suspected food exposures. Food samples underwent chemical (heavy metals, chemical contaminants, and toxins), proteomic, DNA, and microbiological testing in one national and three international laboratories. RESULTS: We identified 293 suspected cases; five (1.7%) died. Symptoms included confusion (62%), dizziness (38%), diarrhoea (22%), nausea/vomiting (18%), convulsions (12%), and hallucinations (8%). The outbreak started on 12 March, 2-12 h after Batch X of fortified corn-soy blend (CSB +) was distributed. In the retrospective cohort study, 66% of 134 persons who ate CSB + , compared with 2.2% of 75 who did not developed illness (RR(adj) = 22, 95% CI = 6.0-81). Samples of Batch X distributed 11-15 March contained 14 tropane alkaloids, including atropine (25-50 ppm) and scopolamine (1-10 ppm). Proteins of Solanaceae seeds and Jimsonweed DNA were identified. No other significant laboratory findings were observed. CONCLUSION: This was the largest documented outbreak caused by food contamination with tropane alkaloids. Implicated food was immediately withdrawn. Routine food safety and quality checks could prevent future outbreaks.

BACKGROUND: Since the declaration of the 10th Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in DRC on 1st Aug 2018, several neighboring countries have been developing and implementing preparedness efforts to prevent EVD cross-border transmission to enable timely detection, investigation, and response in the event of a confirmed EVD outbreak in the country. We describe Uganda's experience in EVD preparedness. RESULTS: On 4 August 2018, the Uganda Ministry of Health (MoH) activated the Public Health Emergency Operations Centre (PHEOC) and the National Task Force (NTF) for public health emergencies to plan, guide, and coordinate EVD preparedness in the country. The NTF selected an Incident Management Team (IMT), constituting a National Rapid Response Team (NRRT) that supported activation of the District Task Forces (DTFs) and District Rapid Response Teams (DRRTs) that jointly assessed levels of preparedness in 30 designated high-risk districts representing category 1 (20 districts) and category 2 (10 districts). The MoH, with technical guidance from the World Health Organisation (WHO), led EVD preparedness activities and worked together with other ministries and partner organisations to enhance community-based surveillance systems, develop and disseminate risk communication messages, engage communities, reinforce EVD screening and infection prevention measures at Points of Entry (PoEs) and in high-risk health facilities, construct and equip EVD isolation and treatment units, and establish coordination and procurement mechanisms. CONCLUSION: As of 31 May 2019, there was no confirmed case of EVD as Uganda has continued to make significant and verifiable progress in EVD preparedness. There is a need to sustain these efforts, not only in EVD preparedness but also across the entire spectrum of a multi-hazard framework. These efforts strengthen country capacity and compel the country to avail resources for preparedness and management of incidents at the source while effectively cutting costs of using a "fire-fighting" approach during public health emergencies.