Last data update: Jan 27, 2025. (Total: 48650 publications since 2009)
Records 1-8 (of 8 Records) |
Query Trace: Moffett DB[original query] |
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Promoting awareness of data confidentiality and security during the COVID-19 pandemic in a low-income country-Sierra Leone
Kanu JS , Vandi MA , Bangura B , Draper K , Gorina Y , Foster MA , Harding JD , Ikoona EN , Jambai A , Kamara MAM , Kaitibi D , Moffett DB , Singh T , Redd JT . Public Health Rev 2024 45 1607540 OBJECTIVES: World Health Organization issued Joint Statement on Data Protection and Privacy in the COVID-19 Response stating that collection of vast amounts of personal data may potentially lead to the infringement of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development called on national governments to adhere to the international principles for data security and confidentiality. This paper describes the methods used to assist the Ministry of Health in bringing awareness of the data ownership, confidentiality and security principles to COVID-19 responders. METHODS: The Sierra Leone Epidemiological Data (SLED) Team data managers conducted training for groups of COVID-19 responders. Training included presentations on data confidentiality, information disclosure, physical and electronic data security, and cyber-security; and interactive discussion of real-life scenarios. A game of Jeopardy was created to test the participant's knowledge. RESULTS: This paper describes the methods used by the SLED Team to bring awareness of the DOCS principles to more than 2,500 COVID-19 responders. CONCLUSION: Similar efforts may benefit other countries where the knowledge, resources, and governing rules for protection of personal data are limited. |
Improvement in infection prevention and control compliance at the three tertiary hospitals of Sierra Leone following an operational research study
Kamara RZ , Kamara IF , Moses F , Kanu JS , Kallon C , Kabba M , Moffett DB , Fofanah BD , Margao S , Kamara MN , Moiwo MM , Kpagoi Sstk , Tweya HM , Kumar AMV , Terry RF . Trop Med Infect Dis 2023 8 (7) Implementing infection prevention and control (IPC) programmes in line with the World Health Organization's (WHO) eight core components has been challenging in Sierra Leone. In 2021, a baseline study found that IPC compliance in three tertiary hospitals was sub-optimal. We aimed to measure the change in IPC compliance and describe recommended actions at these hospitals in 2023. This was a 'before and after' observational study using two routine cross-sectional assessments of IPC compliance using the WHO IPC Assessment Framework tool. IPC compliance was graded as inadequate (0-200), basic (201-400), intermediate (401-600), and advanced (601-800). The overall compliance scores for each hospital showed an improvement from 'Basic' in 2021 to 'Intermediate' in 2023, with a percentage increase in scores of 16.9%, 18.7%, and 26.9% in these hospitals. There was improved compliance in all core components, with the majority in the 'Intermediate' level for each hospital IPC programme. Recommended actions including the training of healthcare workers and revision of IPC guidelines were undertaken, but a dedicated IPC budget and healthcare-associated infection surveillance remained as gaps in 2023. Operational research is valuable in monitoring and improving IPC programme implementation. To reach the 'Advanced' level, these hospitals should establish a dedicated IPC budget and develop long-term implementation plans. |
Prevalence of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus among livestock and ticks in Zhambyl Region, Kazakhstan, 2017
Bryant-Genevier J , Bumburidi Y , Kazazian L , Seffren V , Head JR , Berezovskiy D , Zhakipbayeva B , Salyer SJ , Knust B , Klena JD , Chiang CF , Mirzabekova G , Rakhimov K , Koekeev J , Kartabayev K , Mamadaliyev S , Guerra M , Blanton C , Shoemaker T , Singer D , Moffett DB . Am J Trop Med Hyg 2022 106 (5) 1478-85 Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is a highly fatal zoonotic disease endemic to Kazakhstan. Previous work estimated the seroprevalence of CCHF virus (CCHFV) among livestock owners in the Zhambyl region of southern Kazakhstan at 1.2%. To estimate CCHFV seroprevalence among cattle and sheep, we selected 15 villages with known history of CCHFV circulation (endemic) and 15 villages without known circulation (nonendemic) by cluster sampling with probability proportional to livestock population size. We collected whole blood samples from 521 sheep and 454 cattle from randomly selected households within each village and collected ticks found on the animals. We tested livestock blood for CCHFV-specific IgG antibodies by ELISA; ticks were screened for CCHFV RNA by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction and CCHFV antigen by antigen-capture ELISA. We administered questionnaires covering animal demographics and livestock herd characteristics to an adult in each selected household. Overall weighted seroprevalence was 5.7% (95% CI: 3.1, 10.3) among sheep and 22.5% (95% CI: 15.8, 31.2) among cattle. CCHFV-positive tick pools were found on two sheep (2.4%, 95% CI: 0.6, 9.5) and three cattle (3.8%, 95% CI: 1.2, 11.5); three CCHFV-positive tick pools were found in nonendemic villages. Endemic villages reported higher seroprevalence among sheep (15.5% versus 2.8%, P < 0.001) but not cattle (25.9% versus 20.1%, P = 0.42). Findings suggest that the current village classification scheme may not reflect the geographic distribution of CCHFV in Zhambyl and underscore that public health measures must address the risk of CCHF even in areas without a known history of circulation. |
Progress toward poliovirus containment implementation - worldwide, 2019-2020
Moffett DB , Llewellyn A , Singh H , Saxentoff E , Partridge J , Boualam L , Pallansch M , Wassilak S , Asghar H , Roesel S , Grabovac V , Rey-Benito G , Barnor J , Theo A , Swan J , Iakovenko M , Baig N , Gurung S , Pandel E , Zaffran M . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020 69 (37) 1330-1333 Since 1988, when World Health Organization (WHO) Member States and partners launched the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, the number of wild poliovirus (WPV) cases has declined from 350,000 in 125 countries to 176 in only two countries in 2019 (1). The Global Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication (GCC) declared two of the three WPV types, type 2 (WPV2) and type 3 (WPV3), eradicated globally in 2015 and 2019, respectively (1). Wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) remains endemic in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1). Containment under strict biorisk management measures is vital to prevent reintroduction of eradicated polioviruses into communities from poliovirus facilities. In 2015, Member States committed to contain type 2 polioviruses (PV2) in poliovirus-essential facilities (PEFs) certified in accordance with a global standard (2). Member states agreed to report national PV2 inventories annually, destroy unneeded PV2 materials, and, if retaining PV2 materials, establish national authorities for containment (NACs) and a PEF auditing process. Since declaration of WPV3 eradication in October 2019, these activities are also required with WPV3 materials. Despite challenges faced during 2019-2020, including the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the global poliovirus containment program continues to work toward important milestones. To maintain progress, all WHO Member States are urged to adhere to the agreed containment resolutions, including officially establishing legally empowered NACs and submission of PEF Certificates of Participation. |
Progress toward poliovirus containment implementation - worldwide, 2018-2019
Moffett DB , Llewellyn A , Singh H , Saxentoff E , Partridge J , Iakovenko M , Roesel S , Asghar H , Baig N , Grabovac V , Gurung S , Gumede-Moeletsi N , Barnor J , Theo A , Rey-Benito G , Villalobos A , Boualam L , Swan J , Sutter RW , Pandel E , Wassilak S , Oberste MS , Lewis I , Zaffran M . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2019 68 (38) 825-829 Among the three wild poliovirus (WPV) types, type 2 (WPV2) was declared eradicated globally by the Global Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication (GCC) in 2015. Subsequently, in 2016, a global withdrawal of Sabin type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) from routine use, through a synchronized switch from the trivalent formulation of oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV, containing vaccine virus types 1, 2, and 3) to the bivalent form (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3), was implemented. WPV type 3 (WPV3), last detected in 2012 (1), will possibly be declared eradicated in late 2019.* To ensure that polioviruses are not reintroduced to the human population after eradication, World Health Organization (WHO) Member States committed in 2015 to containing all polioviruses in poliovirus-essential facilities (PEFs) that are certified to meet stringent containment criteria; implementation of containment activities began that year for facilities retaining type 2 polioviruses (PV2), including type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) materials (2). As of August 1, 2019, 26 countries have nominated 74 PEFs to retain PV2 materials. Twenty-five of these countries have established national authorities for containment (NACs), which are institutions nominated by ministries of health or equivalent bodies to be responsible for poliovirus containment certification. All designated PEFs are required to be enrolled in the certification process by December 31, 2019 (3). When GCC certifies WPV3 eradication, WPV3 and vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) type 3 materials will also be required to be contained, leading to a temporary increase in the number of designated PEFs. When safer alternatives to wild and OPV/Sabin strains that do not require containment conditions are available for diagnostic and serologic testing, the number of PEFs will decrease. Facilities continuing to work with polioviruses after global eradication must minimize the risk for reintroduction into communities by adopting effective biorisk management practices. |
Applying a new framework for public health systems recovery following emergencies and disasters: The example of Haiti following a major earthquake and cholera outbreak
Fitter DL , Delson DB , Guillaume FD , Schaad AW , Moffett DB , Poncelet JL , Lowrance D , Gelting R . Am J Trop Med Hyg 2017 97 4-11 Emergencies can often directly impact health systems of an affected region or country, especially in resource-constrained areas. Health system recovery following an emergency is a complex and dynamic process. Health system recovery efforts have often been structured around the World Health Organization's health systems building blocks as demonstrated by the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment. Although this structure is valuable and well known, it can overlook the intricacies of public health systems. We retrospectively examine public health systems recovery, a subset of the larger health system, following the 2010 Haiti earthquake and cholera outbreak, through the lens of the 10 essential public health services. This framework illustrates the comprehensive nature of and helps categorize the activities necessary for a well-functioning public health system and can complement other assessments. Outlining the features of a public health system for recovery in structured manner can also help lay the foundation for sustainable long-term development leading to a more robust and resilient health system. |
Epidemic cholera in a crowded urban environment, Port-au-Prince, Haiti
Dunkle SE , Mba-Jonas A , Loharikar A , Fouche B , Peck M , Ayers T , Archer WR , Beau De Rochars VM , Bender T , Moffett DB , Tappero JW , Dahourou G , Roels TH , Quick R . Emerg Infect Dis 2011 17 (11) 2143-2146 We conducted a case-control study to investigate factors associated with epidemic cholera. Water treatment and handwashing may have been protective, highlighting the need for personal hygiene for cholera prevention in contaminated urban environments. We also found a diverse diet, a possible proxy for improved nutrition, was protective against cholera. |
Evaluating and regulating lead in synthetic turf
Van Ulirsch G , Gleason K , Gerstenberger S , Moffett DB , Pulliam G , Ahmed T , Fagliano J . Environ Health Perspect 2010 118 (10) 1345-9 BACKGROUND: In 2007, a synthetic turf recreational field in Newark, New Jersey, was closed because lead was found in synthetic turf fibers and in surface dust at concentrations exceeding hazard criteria. Consequently, public health professionals across the country began testing synthetic turf to determine whether it represented a lead hazard. Currently, no standardized methods exist to test for lead in synthetic turf or to assess lead hazards. OBJECTIVES: Our objectives were to increase awareness of potential lead exposure from synthetic turf by presenting data showing elevated lead in fibers and turf-derived dust; identify risk assessment uncertainties; recommend that federal and/or state agencies determine appropriate methodologies for assessing lead in synthetic turf; and recommend an interim standardized approach for sampling, interpreting results, and taking health-protective actions. DISCUSSION: Data collected from recreational fields and child care centers indicate lead in synthetic turf fibers and dust at concentrations exceeding the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 statutory lead limit of 300 mg/kg for consumer products intended for use by children, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's lead-dust hazard standard of 40 microg/ft2 for floors. CONCLUSIONS: Synthetic turf can deteriorate to form dust containing lead at levels that may pose a risk to children. Given elevated lead levels in turf and dust on recreational fields and in child care settings, it is imperative that a consistent, nationwide approach for sampling, assessment, and action be developed. In the absence of a standardized approach, we offer an interim approach to assess potential lead hazards when evaluating synthetic turf. EDITOR'S SUMMARY: A recreational field in Newark, New Jersey, was closed in 2007 because lead concentrations found in synthetic turf fibers and in surface dust exceeded hazard criteria. Consequently, public health professionals across the country began testing synthetic turf to determine whether it represented a lead hazard. Data collected from recreational fields and child care centers indicated lead in synthetic turf fibers and dust at concentrations that exceed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 statutory lead limit of 300 mg/kg for consumer products intended for use by children and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's lead-dust hazard standard of 40 microg/ft2 for floors. The authors conclude that synthetic turf can deteriorate to form dust containing lead at levels that may pose a risk to children. Currently, no standardized methods exist to test for lead in synthetic turf or to assess lead. Ulirsch et al. (p. 1345) summarize data on lead in fibers and turf-derived dust and discuss risk assessment uncertainties. They also note the need for regulatory agencies to develop standardized methods for assessing lead in synthetic turf and recommend an interim approach for sampling, interpreting results, and taking health-protective actions. |
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