BACKGROUND: Bartonella spp. infect a variety of vertebrates throughout the world, with generally high prevalence. Several Bartonella spp. are known to cause diverse clinical manifestations in humans and have been recognized as emerging pathogens. These bacteria are mainly transmitted by blood-sucking arthropods, such as fleas and lice. The role of ticks in the transmission of Bartonella spp. is unclear. METHODS: A recently developed quadruplex polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplicon next-generation sequencing approach that targets Bartonella-specific fragments on gltA, ssrA, rpoB, and groEL was applied to test host-seeking Ixodes scapularis ticks (n = 1641; consisting of 886 nymphs and 755 adults) collected in 23 states of the eastern half of the United States and Ixodes pacificus ticks (n = 966; all nymphs) collected in California in the western United States for the presence of Bartonella DNA. These species were selected because they are common human biters and serve as vectors of pathogens causing the greatest number of vector-borne diseases in the United States. RESULTS: No Bartonella DNA was detected in any of the ticks tested by any target. CONCLUSIONS: Owing to the lack of Bartonella detection in a large number of host-seeking Ixodes spp. ticks tested across a broad geographical region, our results strongly suggest that I. scapularis and I. pacificus are unlikely to contribute more than minimally, if at all, to the transmission of Bartonella spp.

Background Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), the respiratory disease caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was first identified in Wuhan, China and has since become pandemic. As part of initial response activities in the United States, enhanced contact investigations were conducted to enable early identification and isolation of additional cases and to learn more about risk factors for transmission.Methods Close contacts of nine early travel-related cases in the United States were identified. Close contacts meeting criteria for active monitoring were followed, and selected individuals were targeted for collection of additional exposure details and respiratory samples. Respiratory samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.Results There were 404 close contacts who underwent active monitoring in the response jurisdictions; 338 had at least basic exposure data, of whom 159 had ≥1 set of respiratory samples collected and tested. Across all known close contacts under monitoring, two additional cases were identified; both secondary cases were in spouses of travel-associated case patients. The secondary attack rate among household members, all of whom had ≥1 respiratory sample tested, was 13% (95% CI: 4 – 38%).Conclusions The enhanced contact tracing investigations undertaken around nine early travel-related cases of COVID-19 in the United States identified two cases of secondary transmission, both spouses. Rapid detection and isolation of the travel-associated case patients, enabled by public awareness of COVID-19 among travelers from China, may have mitigated transmission risk among close contacts of these cases.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.Funding StatementNo external funding was sought or received.Author DeclarationsAll relevant ethical guidelines have been followed; any necessary IRB and/or ethics committee approvals have been obtained and details of the IRB/oversight body are included in the manuscript.YesAll necessary patient/participant consent has been obtained and the appropriate institutional forms have been archived.YesI understand that all clinical trials and any other prospective interventional studies must be registered with an ICMJE-approved registry, such as ClinicalTrials.gov. I confirm that any such study reported in the manuscript has been registered and the trial registration ID is provided (note: if posting a prospective study registered retrospectively, please provide a statement in the trial ID field explaining why the study was not registered in advance).YesI have followed all appropriate research reporting guidelines and uploaded the relevant EQUATOR Network research reporting checklist(s) and other pertinent material as supplementary files, if applicable.YesData may be available upon reasonable request.

To reduce the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and its associated impacts on health and society, COVID-19 vaccines are essential. The U.S. government is working to produce and deliver safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines for the entire U.S. population. The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)1 has broadly outlined its approach for developing recommendations for the use of each COVID-19 vaccine authorized or approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for Emergency Use Authorization or licensure.1 ACIP’s recommendation process includes an explicit and transparent evidence-based method for assessing a vaccine’s safety and efficacy as well as consideration of other factors, including implementation.2 Because the initial supply of vaccine will likely be limited, ACIP will also recommend which groups should receive the earliest allocations of vaccine. The ACIP COVID-19 Vaccines Work Group and consultants with expertise in ethics and health equity considered external expert committee reports and published literature and deliberated the ethical issues associated with COVID-19 vaccine allocation decisions. The purpose of this report is to describe the four ethical principles that will assist ACIP in formulating recommendations for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine while supply is limited, in addition to scientific data and implementation feasibility: (1) maximize benefits and minimize harms; (2) promote justice; (3) mitigate health inequities; and (4) promote transparency. These principles can also aid state, tribal, local, and territorial public health authorities as they develop vaccine implementation strategies within their own communities based on ACIP recommendations.

This article summarizes what is currently known about the 2019 novel coronavirus and offers interim guidance.

During February 2021-June 2022, the Georgia Department of Public Health (GDPH) detected five clusters of rapid HIV transmission concentrated among Hispanic or Latino (Hispanic) gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (MSM) in metropolitan Atlanta. The clusters were detected through routine analysis of HIV-1 nucleotide sequence data obtained through public health surveillance (1,2). Beginning in spring 2021, GDPH partnered with health districts with jurisdiction in four metropolitan Atlanta counties (Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, and Gwinnett) and CDC to investigate factors contributing to HIV spread, epidemiologic characteristics, and transmission patterns. Activities included review of surveillance and partner services interview data,(†) medical chart reviews, and qualitative interviews with service providers and Hispanic MSM community members. By June 2022, these clusters included 75 persons, including 56% who identified as Hispanic, 96% who reported male sex at birth, 81% who reported male-to-male sexual contact, and 84% of whom resided in the four metropolitan Atlanta counties. Qualitative interviews identified barriers to accessing HIV prevention and care services, including language barriers, immigration- and deportation-related concerns, and cultural norms regarding sexuality-related stigma. GDPH and the health districts expanded coordination, initiated culturally concordant HIV prevention marketing and educational activities, developed partnerships with organizations serving Hispanic communities to enhance outreach and services, and obtained funding for a bilingual patient navigation program with academic partners to provide staff members to help persons overcome barriers and understand the health care system. HIV molecular cluster detection can identify rapid HIV transmission among sexual networks involving ethnic and sexual minority groups, draw attention to the needs of affected populations, and advance health equity through tailored responses that address those needs.

As of November 9, 2022, a total of 28,730 cases of monkeypox (mpox) had been reported in the United States,* primarily among adult cisgender men reporting recent male-to-male sexual contact (1). Transgender and gender-diverse persons, who constitute an estimated 0.5% of the U.S. adult population,(†) face unique health disparities and barriers to care (2-4). However, data on the epidemiologic and clinical features of Monkeypox virus infections in this population are limited (5). CDC analyzed U.S. case surveillance data on mpox cases in transgender and gender-diverse adults reported during May 17-November 4, 2022. During this period, 466 mpox cases in transgender and gender-diverse adults were reported, accounting for 1.7% of reported cases among adults. Most were in transgender women (43.1%) or gender-diverse persons (42.1%); 14.8% were in transgender men. Among 374 (80.3%) mpox cases in transgender and gender-diverse adults with information available on sexual or close intimate contact, 276 (73.8%) reported sexual or close intimate contact with a cisgender male partner during the 3 weeks preceding symptom onset. During the ongoing outbreak, transgender and gender-diverse persons have been disproportionately affected by mpox. Members of this population frequently reported recent sexual or close intimate contact with cisgender men, who might be in sexual networks experiencing the highest incidence of mpox. These findings highlight the importance of tailoring public health prevention and outreach efforts to transgender and gender-diverse communities and could guide strategies to reduce mpox transmission.

In 2019, the West Virginia (WV) Bureau for Public Health identified 15 HIV diagnoses among people who inject drugs (PWID) in Kanawha County, an area disproportionately affected by the opioid crisis; previously, annual diagnoses were less than 5. We investigated health care use and service delivery among PWID during the outbreak to identify opportunities to improve HIV- and opioid-related interventions.

BACKGROUND: Evidence suggests that wearing permethrin-treated military uniforms is not associated with current adverse health conditions. However, exposure through this route results in permethrin biomarker concentrations considerably higher than those in the U.S. POPULATION: The U.S. Army is exploring different methods of uniform treatment that reduce exposure while maintaining effective protection from insect vector-borne diseases. OBJECTIVE: To compare permethrin exposure when wearing two types of permethrin-treated military uniforms. METHODS: Eight male soldiers participated in a 32-day crossover design study to compare permethrin exposure when wearing the current Army uniform (CurrU) and a uniform with a new applied fabric treatment (NewU). Each soldier wore the uniforms for designated 8 h/day time periods over 3 consecutive days separated by a 'wash-out' week of no exposure. Permethrin exposure was assessed from the urinary concentrations of 3-phenoxybenzoic acid (3-PBA) and of the sum of cis- and trans-3-(2,2-dichlorovinyl)-2,2-dimethylcyclopropane-1-carboxylic acid (∑DCCA). Estimated dose was determined based on ∑DCCA concentrations. RESULTS: Permethrin exposure biomarkers were 21% (3-PBA, p = 0.025) and 35% (∑DCCA, p < 0.001) lower when wearing the NewU compared to the CurrU; the dose was 33% lower (p = 0.05). SIGNIFICANCE: Findings suggest the new treatment reduces human permethrin exposure biomarkers resulting from wearing-treated military uniforms.

Declines in cervical intraepithelial neoplasia grades 2-3 and adenocarcinoma in situ (CIN2+) observed among young women suggest impact from human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination. To further evaluate vaccine impact including cross-protection and type replacement, we described high-risk (HR)-HPV type-specific cervical precancer incidence rates among women aged 20-39 years, 2008-2016. We analyzed cross-sectional population-based data on 18,344 cases of CIN2+ from a 5-site surveillance system. Diagnostic specimens were tested for individual HPV types, including 14 HR-HPV types (HPV16/18/31/33/35/39/45/51/52/56/58/59/66/68). We estimated age-specific annual HR-HPV type-specific CIN2+ incidence per 100,000 screened women for individual types, vaccine HR-HPV types (HPV16/18) and non-vaccine HR-HPV types (non-HPV16/18). We evaluated trends using average annual percent changes (AAPC) and 95% confidence intervals (CI), and estimated total declines by comparing 2015-2016 to 2008-2009 using incidence rate ratios. Among 20-24-year-olds, HPV16/18-CIN2+ declined from 2008 through 2016 (AAPC: -21.3%, 95% CI: -28.1%, -13.8%), whereas no trend was observed for non-HPV16/18-CIN2+ (AAPC: -1.8%, 95% CI: -8.1%, 4.9%). After 2010, CIN2+ among 20-24-year-olds was more often caused by non-vaccine versus vaccine HR-HPV types. No significant declining trends were observed in older age groups. In 2015-2016 compared to 2008-2009, HPV16-CIN2+ declined 78%, HPV18-CIN2+ 72%, and HPV31-CIN2+ 51% among 20-24-year-olds; no increases were observed in type-specific CIN2+ incidence. Among 25-29-year-olds, HPV16-CIN2+ declined 18%; CIN2+ attributed to seven nonvaccine types increased significantly. No significant declines were observed in older groups. Significant declines in HPV16/18-CIN2+ in 20-24-year-olds and HPV16-CIN2+ in 25-29-year-olds corroborate impact of HPV vaccination. A declining trend in HPV31-CIN2+ is consistent with cross-protection from vaccination.

Of 65 cases during an HIV outbreak among persons who inject drugs (PWID) in Kanawha County, West Virginia during 2019-2021, 61 (94%) had hepatitis C diagnosed at a median of 46 months prior to HIV diagnosis. Hepatitis C diagnosis among PWID should trigger improved access to prevention and treatment services.

Monkeypox virus, an orthopoxvirus related to the variola virus that causes smallpox, causes a zoonotic disease with an unknown animal reservoir. Clinical manifestations of monkeypox include a prodrome of fever, lymphadenopathy, headache, and malaise 1 to 2 weeks after infection, progressing to a centrifugal rash that includes vesicles and pustules, sometimes numbering in the hundreds or thousands (1). Monkeypox virus infection can be transmitted through cutaneous routes during close or intimate contact with a person whose lesions are not yet crusted over and healed, via fomites that have had contact with a person with monkeypox, and by respiratory droplets among people with close, sustained face-to-face contact.

On May 17, 2022, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory confirmed the presence of orthopoxvirus DNA via real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from lesion swabs obtained from a Massachusetts resident. Orthopoxviruses include Monkeypox virus, the causative agent of monkeypox. Subsequent real-time PCR testing at CDC on May 18 confirmed that the patient was infected with the West African clade of Monkeypox virus. Since then, confirmed cases* have been reported by nine states. In addition, 28 countries and territories,(†) none of which has endemic monkeypox, have reported laboratory-confirmed cases. On May 17, CDC, in coordination with state and local jurisdictions, initiated an emergency response to identify, monitor, and investigate additional monkeypox cases in the United States. This response has included releasing a Health Alert Network (HAN) Health Advisory, developing interim public health and clinical recommendations, releasing guidance for LRN testing, hosting clinician and public health partner outreach calls, disseminating health communication messages to the public, developing protocols for use and release of medical countermeasures, and facilitating delivery of vaccine postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) and antivirals that have been stockpiled by the U.S. government for preparedness and response purposes. On May 19, a call center was established to provide guidance to states for the evaluation of possible cases of monkeypox, including recommendations for clinical diagnosis and orthopoxvirus testing. The call center also gathers information about possible cases to identify interjurisdictional linkages. As of May 31, this investigation has identified 17(§) cases in the United States; most cases (16) were diagnosed in persons who identify as gay, bisexual, or men who have sex with men (MSM). Ongoing investigation suggests person-to-person community transmission, and CDC urges health departments, clinicians, and the public to remain vigilant, institute appropriate infection prevention and control measures, and notify public health authorities of suspected cases to reduce disease spread. Public health authorities are identifying cases and conducting investigations to determine possible sources and prevent further spread. This activity was reviewed by CDC and conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy.(¶).

In 2015, Botswana introduced the quadrivalent human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine as a two-dose schedule in girls aged 9-13 years. We sought to establish a baseline HPV prevalence in unvaccinated young adults in Botswana. HIV-uninfected men and women aged 18-22 years were recruited from the University of Botswana in Gaborone during October 2019-February 2021. Demographic and behavioural characteristics were self-reported during structured interviews. Self-collected vaginal and penile swabs were tested for 28 HPV types using Seegene Anyplex II HPV28. We compared any HPV type, quadrivalent vaccine (HPV 6, 11, 16, 18)-type and non-quadrivalent vaccine-type prevalence in men and women and evaluated the risk factors for prevalence of any HPV type. A total of 493 men and 500 women were included in the analysis. Compared to men, women had higher prevalence of any HPV type (63.0% versus 31.4%, P < 0.001), vaccine-type HPV (21% versus 9.7%, P < 0.001) and non-vaccine-type HPV (60.4% versus 28.4%, P < 0.001). Higher prevalence of any HPV type in men and women was associated with having >/=2 sex partners in the past 12 months; always using condoms in the past 3 months was associated with a lower HPV prevalence. These data provide baseline information for future evaluation of the population impact of the HPV vaccination programme, including potential herd effects in men.

INTRODUCTION: In 2015, Botswana introduced quadrivalent human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine for girls aged 9-13 years. To establish a baseline HPV prevalence for future HPV vaccine impact monitoring, we evaluated HPV prevalences among the youngest unvaccinated women in Botswana and compared HPV prevalences among women living with HIV (WLHIV) and without HIV. METHODS: Women aged 18-22 years were recruited from the University of Botswana and HIV clinics in Gaborone from October 2019-January 2021. Demographic and behavioral characteristics were self-reported during structured interviews; HIV clinical characteristics were abstracted from medical charts. Self-collected vaginal swabs were tested for 28 HPV types using Seegene Anyplex II HPV28. We compared prevalence of any HPV, high risk (HR)-HPV, and quadrivalent HPV vaccine types (HPV6/11/16/18) among WLHIV and women without HIV and evaluated risk factors for prevalence of HR-HPV. RESULTS: A total of 306 WLHIV and 500 women without HIV were recruited. Compared to women without HIV, WLHIV were more likely to be sexually experienced (86.6% versus 74.4%) and have ≥ 3 lifetime sex partners (55.3% versus 27.8%). All HPV type prevalences were significantly higher among WLHIV compared to women without HIV, including prevalence of any HPV (82.7% versus 63.0%), HR-HPV (72.9% versus 53.8%), and quadrivalent vaccine HPV types (34.3% versus 21.0%). Among WLHIV, there were no differences between those perinatally and non-perinatally infected for HPV prevalences, number of HPV types detected, CD4 count, or viral load. CONCLUSIONS: Over one-third of WLHIV and nearly a quarter of those without HIV had vaccine-type HPV detected. This study supports need for the national HPV vaccination program in Botswana and provides important baseline data for future evaluation of impact of the program.

OBJECTIVE: To understand recent patterns in reported baseline HIV drug resistance testing over time in the United States. DESIGN: Data from the National HIV Surveillance System (NHSS) for persons who were aged at least 13years at the time of HIV diagnosis during 2014-2019 and resided in one of 12 United States jurisdictions with high levels of reporting in 2014 and 2015. METHODS: Among persons included in the analysis, we calculated the total proportion of HIV diagnoses occurring during 2014-2019 with a reported baseline sequence by year of diagnosis and sequence type. A baseline sequence was defined as any PR/RT or IN sequence generated from a specimen collected 90days after diagnosis. RESULTS: During 2014-2019, reported levels of baseline PR/RT (with or without IN) testing varied by year from 46.9% to 51.8% without any clear pattern over time. PR/RT with IN testing increased (8.3% to 19.4%), and IN-only testing remained low (1.9% to 1.3%). CONCLUSIONS: While reported levels of baseline PR/RT (with or without IN) testing have remained sufficiently high for the purposes of molecular cluster detection, higher levels would strengthen jurisdictions' and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's ability to monitor trends in HIV drug resistance and detect and respond to HIV molecular clusters. Efforts to increase levels of reported baseline testing likely need to address both gaps in testing as well as reporting.

In 2019, the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health (WV BPH), Cabell-Huntington Health Department (CHHD), and CDC collaborated to respond to an HIV outbreak among people who inject drugs (PWID). CDC, WV BPH, and CHHD formed a cross-agency communications team to establish situational awareness, identify knowledge gaps, and establish key audiences for messages, including the general population, PWID, and clinical and social service providers. The team disseminated up-to-date information about the outbreak, and prioritized messages addressing stigma related to drug use, syringe services programs, and HIV. Messages were continually updated to address the evolving situation and to resonate with local values. Messages were disseminated via advertisements, local news media, and directly to PWID, people experiencing homelessness, and providers. The response supplemented CHHD's assets, including strong relationships and community knowledge, with staff capacity and expertise from state and federal agencies. This collaborative approach is a useful model to address communication needs.

During October 2019, the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health (WVBPH) noted that an increasing number of persons who inject drugs (PWID) in Kanawha County received a diagnosis of HIV. The number of HIV diagnoses among PWID increased from less than five annually during 2016-2018 to 11 during January-October 2019 (Figure). Kanawha County (with an approximate population of 180,000*) has high rates of opioid use disorder and overdose deaths, which have been increasing since 2016,(†) and the county is located near Cabell County, which experienced an HIV outbreak among PWID during 2018-2019 (1,2). In response to the increase in HIV diagnoses among PWID in 2019, WVBPH released a Health Advisory(§); and WVBPH and Kanawha-Charleston Health Department (KCHD) convened an HIV task force, conducted care coordination meetings, received CDC remote assistance to support response activities, and expanded HIV testing and outreach.

INTRODUCTION: In January 2019, the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health detected increased HIV diagnoses among people who inject drugs in Cabell County. Responding to HIV clusters and outbreaks is 1 of the 4 pillars of the Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S. initiative and requires activities from the Diagnose, Treat, and Prevent pillars. This article describes the design and implementation of a comprehensive response, featuring interventions from all pillars. METHODS: This study used West Virginia Bureau for Public Health data to identify HIV diagnoses during January 1, 2018-October 9, 2019 among (1) people who inject drugs linked to Cabell County, (2) their sex or injecting partners, or (3) others with an HIV sequence linked to Cabell County people who inject drugs. Surveillance data, including HIV-1 polymerase sequences, were analyzed to estimate the transmission rate and timing of infections using molecular clock phylogenetic analysis. Federal, state, and local partners designed and implemented a comprehensive response during January 2019-October 2019. RESULTS: Of 82 people identified in the outbreak, most were male (60%), were White (91%), and reported unstable housing (80%). In a large molecular cluster containing 56 of 60 (93%) available sequences, 93% of inferred transmissions occurred after January 1, 2018. HIV testing, HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis, and syringe services were rapidly expanded, leading to improved linkage to HIV care and viral suppression. CONCLUSIONS: Evidence of rapid transmission in this outbreak galvanized robust collaboration among federal, state, and local partners, leading to critical improvements in HIV prevention and care services. HIV outbreak response requires increased coordination and creativity to improve service delivery to people affected by rapid HIV transmission.

The Respond pillar of the Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S. initiative, which consists of activities also known as cluster and outbreak detection and response, offers a framework to guide tailored implementation of proven HIV prevention strategies where transmission is occurring most rapidly. Cluster and outbreak response involves understanding the networks in which rapid transmission is occurring; linking people in the network to essential services; and identifying and addressing gaps in programs and services such as testing, HIV and other medical care, pre-exposure prophylaxis, and syringe services programs. This article reviews the experience gained through 30 HIV cluster and outbreak responses in North America during 2000-2020 to describe approaches for implementing these core response strategies. Numerous jurisdictions that have implemented these response strategies have demonstrated success in improving outcomes related to HIV care and viral suppression, testing, use of prevention services, and reductions in transmission or new diagnoses. Efforts to address important gaps in service delivery revealed by cluster and outbreak detection and response can strengthen prevention efforts broadly through multidisciplinary, multisector collaboration. In this way, the Respond pillar embodies the collaborative, data-guided approach that is critical to the overall success of the Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S. initiative.

Diagnoses of HIV among people who inject drugs have increased in the U.S. during 2014-2018 for the first time in 2 decades, and multiple HIV outbreaks have been detected among people who inject drugs since 2015. These epidemiologic trends pose a significant concern for achieving goals of the federal initiative for Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S. Syringe services programs are cost effective, safe, and highly effective in reducing HIV transmission and are an essential component of a comprehensive, integrated approach to addressing these concerns. Yet, geographic coverage of these programs remains limited in the U.S., and many jurisdictions continue to have laws and policies that limit or disallow syringe services programs. An in-depth literature review was conducted on the role of syringe services programs in the Ending the HIV Epidemic initiative. Empirical and model-based evidence consistently shows that syringe services programs have the highest impact in HIV prevention when combined with access to medications for substance use disorder and antiretroviral therapy. Their effectiveness is further maximized when they provide services without restrictions and include proven and innovative strategies to expand access to harm-reduction and clinical services (e.g., peer outreach, telehealth). Increasing geographic and service coverage of syringe services programs requires strong and sustainable policy, funding, and community support and will need to address new challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Syringe services programs have a key role in all 4 Ending the HIV Epidemic initiative strategies-Prevent, Diagnose, Treat, and Respond-and thus are instrumental to its success in preventing disease and saving lives.

OBJECTIVES: Before community transmission of COVID-19 was recognized in the United States, cruise ship passengers with high risk for exposure to SARS-CoV-2 were repatriated and quarantined. We describe cases of influenza-like illness (ILI) among responders. METHODS: We reviewed situation reports and responder illness reports to characterize ill responders, including illness onset date, symptoms, fever, diagnostic tests, potential breaches in PPE use, and return to work status. RESULTS: Among 339 responders, nine (3%) reported ILI. No breaches in PPE were reported. Three responders with ILI were tested for both SARS-CoV-2 infection and influenza A; none tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 infection and two tested positive for influenza A. CONCLUSIONS: Despite an outbreak of ILI among responders, none were diagnosed with COVID-19, suggesting preventive measures in place might have been sufficient to prevent responders from SARS-CoV-2 exposure.

BACKGROUND: Transmitted HIV drug resistance can threaten the efficacy of antiretroviral therapy (ART) and preexposure prophylaxis (PrEP). Drug resistance testing is recommended at entry to HIV care in the United States and provides valuable insight for clinical decision-making and population-level monitoring. METHODS: We assessed transmitted drug resistance-associated mutation (TDRM) prevalence and predicted susceptibility to common HIV drugs among U.S. persons with HIV diagnosed during 2014-2018 who had a drug resistance test performed ≤3 months after HIV diagnosis and reported to the National HIV Surveillance System and who resided in 28 jurisdictions where ≥20% of HIV diagnoses had an eligible sequence during this period. RESULTS: Of 50,747 persons in the analysis, 9,616 (18.9%) had ≥1 TDRM. TDRM prevalence was 0.8% for integrase strand transfer inhibitors (INSTI), 4.2% for protease inhibitors, 6.9% for nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors, and 12.0% for non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors. Most individual mutations had a prevalence <1.0% including M184V (0.9%) and K65R (0.1%); K103N was most prevalent (8.6%). TDRM prevalence did not increase or decrease significantly during 2014-2018 overall, for individual drug classes, or for key individual mutations except for M184V (12.9% increase per year, 95% CI=5.6-20.6). CONCLUSIONS: TDRM prevalence overall and for individual drug classes remained stable during 2014-2018; transmitted INSTI resistance was uncommon. Continued population-level monitoring of INSTI and NRTI mutations, especially M184V and K65R, is warranted amidst expanding use of second-generation INSTI and PrEP.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and state, territorial, and local health departments have expanded efforts to detect and respond to HIV clusters and outbreaks in the United States. In July 2017, CDC created the HIV Outbreak Coordination Unit (OCU) to ensure consistent and collaborative assessment of requests from health departments for consultation or support on possible HIV clusters and outbreaks of elevated concern. The HIV OCU is a multidisciplinary, cross-organization functional unit within CDC's Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention. HIV OCU members have expertise in areas such as outbreak detection and investigation, prevention, laboratory services, surveillance and epidemiology, policy, communication, and operations. HIV OCU discussions facilitate problem solving, coordination, and situational awareness. Between HIV OCU meetings, designated CDC staff members communicate regularly with health departments to provide support and assessment. During July 2017-December 2019, the HIV OCU reviewed 31 possible HIV clusters and outbreaks (ie, events) in 22 states that were detected by CDC, health departments, or local partners; 17 events involved HIV transmission associated with injection drug use, and other events typically involved sexual transmission or overall increases in HIV diagnoses. CDC supported health departments remotely or on site with planning and prioritization; data collection, management, and analysis; communications; laboratory support; multistate coordination; and expansion of HIV prevention services. The HIV OCU has augmented CDC's support of HIV cluster and outbreak assessment and response at health departments and had important internal organizational benefits. Health departments may benefit from developing or strengthening similar units to coordinate detection and response efforts within and across public health agencies and advance the national Ending the HIV Epidemic initiative.

BACKGROUND: The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, caused by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), evolved rapidly in the United States. This report describes the demographic, clinical, and epidemiologic characteristics of 544 U.S. persons under investigation (PUI) for COVID-19 with complete SARS-CoV-2 testing in the beginning stages of the pandemic from January 17 through February 29, 2020. METHODS: In this surveillance cohort, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provided consultation to public health and healthcare professionals to identify PUI for SARS-CoV-2 testing by quantitative real-time reverse-transcription PCR. Demographic, clinical, and epidemiologic characteristics of PUI were reported by public health and healthcare professionals during consultation with on-call CDC clinicians and subsequent submission of a CDC PUI Report Form. Characteristics of laboratory-negative and laboratory-positive persons were summarized as proportions for the period of January 17-February 29, and characteristics of all PUI were compared before and after February 12 using prevalence ratios. RESULTS: A total of 36 PUI tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 and were classified as confirmed cases. Confirmed cases and PUI testing negative for SARS-CoV-2 had similar demographic, clinical, and epidemiologic characteristics. Consistent with changes in PUI evaluation criteria, 88% (13/15) of confirmed cases detected before February 12, 2020, reported travel from China. After February 12, 57% (12/21) of confirmed cases reported no known travel- or contact-related exposures. CONCLUSIONS: These findings can inform preparedness for future pandemics, including capacity for rapid expansion of novel diagnostic tests to accommodate broad surveillance strategies to assess community transmission, including potential contributions from asymptomatic and presymptomatic infections.

Molecular cluster detection analyzes HIV sequences to identify rapid HIV transmission and inform public health responses. We describe changes in the capability to detect molecular clusters and in geographic variation in transmission dynamics. We examined the reporting completeness of HIV-1 polymerase sequences in quarterly National HIV Surveillance System datasets from December 2015 to December 2019. Priority clusters were identified quarterly. To understand populations recently affected by rapid transmission, we described the transmission risk and race/ethnicity of people in clusters first detected in 2018-2019. During December 2015 to December 2019, national sequence completeness increased from 26% to 45%. Of the 1212 people in the 136 clusters first detected in 2018-2019, 69% were men who have sex with men (MSM) and 11% were people who inject drugs (PWID). State-by-state analysis showed substantial variation in transmission risk and racial/ethnic groups in clusters of rapid transmission. HIV sequence reporting has increased nationwide. Molecular cluster analysis identifies rapid transmission in varied populations and identifies emerging patterns of rapid transmission in specific population groups, such as PWID, who, in 2015-2016, comprised only 1% of people in such molecular clusters. These data can guide efforts to focus, tailor, and scale up prevention and care services for these populations.

On February 27, 2021, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for the Janssen COVID-19 (Ad.26.COV2.S) vaccine (Janssen Biotech, Inc, a Janssen Pharmaceutical company, Johnson & Johnson; New Brunswick, New Jersey). The Janssen COVID-19 vaccine is a recombinant, replication-incompetent adenovirus serotype 26 (Ad26) vector vaccine, encoding the stabilized prefusion spike glycoprotein of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19 (1). Vaccination with the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine consists of a single dose (5 × 1010 virus particles per 0.5-mL dose) administered intramuscularly. On February 28, 2021, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued an interim recommendation* for use of the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine in persons aged ≥18 years for the prevention of COVID-19. This vaccine is the third COVID-19 vaccine authorized under an EUA for the prevention of COVID-19 in the United States (2). To guide its deliberations regarding the vaccine, ACIP used the Evidence to Recommendations (EtR) framework,† following the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) approach.§ The ACIP recommendation for the use of the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine under an EUA is interim and will be updated as additional information becomes available.

From January 1, 2018, through October 9, 2019, 82 HIV diagnoses occurred among people who inject drugs (PWID) in Cabell County, West Virginia. Increasing the use of HIV preexposure prophylaxis (PrEP) among PWID was one of the goals of a joint federal, state, and local response to this HIV outbreak. Through partnerships with the local health department, a federally qualified health center, and an academic medical system, we integrated PrEP into medication-assisted treatment, syringe services program, and primary health care settings. During the initial PrEP implementation period (April 18-May 17, 2019), 110 health care providers and administrators received PrEP training, the number of clinics offering PrEP increased from 2 to 15, and PrEP referrals were integrated with partner services, outreach, and testing activities. The number of people on PrEP increased from 15 in the 6 months before PrEP expansion to 127 in the 6 months after PrEP implementation. Lessons learned included the importance of implementing PrEP within existing health care services, integrating PrEP with other HIV prevention response activities, adapting training and material to fit the local context, and customizing care to meet the needs of PWID. The delivery of PrEP to PWID is challenging but complements other HIV prevention interventions. The expansion of PrEP in response to this HIV outbreak in Cabell County provides a framework for expanding PrEP in other outbreak and non-outbreak settings.

The incidence of neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS), a withdrawal syndrome associated with prenatal opioid or other substance exposure (1), has increased as part of the U.S. opioid crisis (2). No national NAS surveillance system exists (3), and data about the accuracy of state-based surveillance are limited (4,5). In February 2018, the Pennsylvania Department of Health began surveillance for opioid-related NAS in birthing facilities and pediatric hospitals* (6). In March 2019, CDC helped the Pennsylvania Department of Health assess the accuracy of this reporting system at five Pennsylvania hospitals. Medical records of 445 infants who possibly had NAS were abstracted; these infants had either been reported by hospital providers as having NAS or assigned an International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-10-CM) hospital discharge code potentially related to NAS.(†) Among these 445 infants, 241 were confirmed as having NAS. Pennsylvania's NAS surveillance identified 191 (sensitivity = 79%) of the confirmed cases. The proportion of infants with confirmed NAS who were assigned the ICD-10-CM code for neonatal withdrawal symptoms from maternal use of drugs of addiction (P96.1) was similar among infants reported to surveillance (71%) and those who were not (78%; p = 0.30). Infants with confirmed NAS who were not assigned code P96.1 typically had less severe signs and symptoms. Accurate NAS surveillance, which is necessary to monitor changes and regional differences in incidence and assist with planning for needed services, includes and is strengthened by a combination of diagnosis code assessment and focused medical record review.

On December 18, 2020, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for the Moderna COVID-19 (mRNA-1273) vaccine (ModernaTX, Inc; Cambridge, Massachusetts), a lipid nanoparticle-encapsulated, nucleoside-modified mRNA vaccine encoding the stabilized prefusion spike glycoprotein of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (1). This vaccine is the second COVID-19 vaccine authorized under an EUA for the prevention of COVID-19 in the United States (2). Vaccination with the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine consists of 2 doses (100 μg, 0.5 mL each) administered intramuscularly, 1 month (4 weeks) apart. On December 19, 2020, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued an interim recommendation* for use of the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine in persons aged ≥18 years for the prevention of COVID-19. To guide its deliberations regarding the vaccine, ACIP employed the Evidence to Recommendation (EtR) Framework,(†) using the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) approach.(§) Use of all COVID-19 vaccines authorized under an EUA, including the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine, should be implemented in conjunction with ACIP's interim recommendations for allocating initial supplies of COVID-19 vaccines (3). The ACIP recommendation for the use of the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine under EUA is interim and will be updated as additional information becomes available.

The first vaccines for prevention of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the United States were authorized for emergency use by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (1) and recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) in December 2020.* However, demand for COVID-19 vaccines is expected to exceed supply during the first months of the national COVID-19 vaccination program. ACIP advises CDC on population groups and circumstances for vaccine use.(†) On December 1, ACIP recommended that 1) health care personnel(§) and 2) residents of long-term care facilities(¶) be offered COVID-19 vaccination first, in Phase 1a of the vaccination program (2). On December 20, 2020, ACIP recommended that in Phase 1b, vaccine should be offered to persons aged ≥75 years and frontline essential workers (non-health care workers), and that in Phase 1c, persons aged 65-74 years, persons aged 16-64 years with high-risk medical conditions, and essential workers not recommended for vaccination in Phase 1b should be offered vaccine.** These recommendations for phased allocation provide guidance for federal, state, and local jurisdictions while vaccine supply is limited. In its deliberations, ACIP considered scientific evidence regarding COVID-19 epidemiology, ethical principles, and vaccination program implementation considerations. ACIP's recommendations for COVID-19 vaccine allocation are interim and might be updated based on changes in conditions of FDA Emergency Use Authorization, FDA authorization for new COVID-19 vaccines, changes in vaccine supply, or changes in COVID-19 epidemiology.