Since its launch in 1988, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative has made substantial progress toward the eradication of wild poliovirus (WPV), including eradicating two of the three serotypes, and reducing the countries with ongoing endemic transmission of WPV type 1 (WPV1) to just Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both countries are considered a single epidemiologic block. Despite the occurrence of only a single confirmed WPV1 case during the first half of 2023, Pakistan experienced widespread circulation of WPV1 over the subsequent 12 months, specifically in the historical reservoirs of the cities of Karachi, Peshawar, and Quetta. As of June 30, 2024, eight WPV1 cases had been reported in Pakistan in 2024, compared with six reported during all of 2023. These cases, along with more than 300 WPV1-positive environmental surveillance (sewage) samples reported during 2023-2024, indicate that Pakistan is not on track to interrupt WPV1 transmission. The country's complex sociopolitical and security environment continues to pose formidable challenges to poliovirus elimination. To interrupt WPV1 transmission, sustained political commitment to polio eradication, including increased accountability at all levels, would be vital for the polio program. Efforts to systematically track and vaccinate children who are continually missed during polio vaccination activities should be enhanced by better addressing operational issues and the underlying reasons for community resistance to vaccination and vaccine hesitancy.

Since the establishment of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in 1988, Pakistan remains one of only two countries (along with Afghanistan) with continued endemic transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV). This report describes Pakistan's progress toward polio eradication during January 2022-June 2023. During 2022, Pakistan reported 20 WPV type 1 (WPV1) cases, all of which occurred within a small geographic area encompassing three districts in south Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. As of June 23, only a single WPV1 case from Bannu district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has been reported in 2023, compared with 13 cases during the same period in 2022. In addition, 11 WPV1 isolates have been reported from various environmental surveillance (ES) sewage sampling sites to date in 2023, including in Karachi, the capital of the southern province of Sindh. Substantial gaps remain in the quality of supplementary immunization activities (SIAs), especially in poliovirus reservoir areas. Despite the attenuation and apparently limited geographic scope of poliovirus circulation in Pakistan, the isolation of WPV1 from an ES site in Karachi is cause for concern about the actual geographic limits of transmission. Interrupting WPV1 transmission will require meticulous tracking and sustained innovative efforts to vaccinate children who are regularly missed during SIAs and rapidly responding to any new WPV1 isolations.

Conflict poses a threat to the stability of health-care systems around the world. Within the context of immunization service delivery, conflict-affected geographies are often dogged by recurrent disease outbreaks due to the inability to administer life-saving vaccines to children residing in these areas. Essential immunization coverage is often poor in conflict-affected geographies, and within the specific context of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), multiple rounds of supplementary immunization activities are often needed to compensate for the inability to provide adequate immunization services. In order to implement polio vaccination activities, GPEI has often resorted to innovative approaches to reach and vaccinate children in security-compromised areas. This article examines the approaches adopted by the global polio program in conducting vaccination activities in conflict-affected geographies with the aim of understanding how they have influenced the successes and setbacks of the program in its bid to eradicate all polioviruses.

After reporting a single wild poliovirus (WPV) type 1 (WPV1) case in 2021, Pakistan reported 14 cases during April 1-July 31, 2022. Pakistan and Afghanistan are the only countries where endemic WPV transmission has never been interrupted (1). In its current 5-year strategic plan, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has set a goal of interrupting all WPV1 transmission by the end of 2023 (1-3). The reemergence of WPV cases in Pakistan after 14 months with no case detection has uncovered transmission in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the most historically challenging area. This report describes Pakistan's progress toward polio eradication during January 2021-July 2022 and updates previous reports (4,5). As of August 20, 2022, all but one of the 14 WPV1 cases in Pakistan during 2022 have been reported from North Waziristan district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In underimmunized populations, excretion of vaccine virus can, during a period of 12-18 months, lead to reversion to neurovirulence, resulting in circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs), which can cause paralysis and outbreaks. An outbreak of cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2), which began in Pakistan in 2019, has been successfully contained; the last case occurred in April 2021 (1,6). Despite program improvements, 400,000-500,000 children continue to be missed during nationwide polio supplementary immunization activities (SIAs),* and recent isolation of poliovirus from sewage samples collected in other provinces suggests wider WPV1 circulation during the ongoing high transmission season. Although vaccination efforts have been recently complicated by months of flooding during the summer of 2022, to successfully interrupt WPV1 transmission in the core reservoirs in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and reach the GPEI goal, emphasis should be placed on further improving microplanning and supervision of SIAs and on systematic tracking and vaccination of persistently missed children in these reservoir areas of Pakistan.

BACKGROUND: Declining antimicrobial susceptibility to current gonorrhoea antibiotic treatment and inadequate treatment options have raised the possibility of untreatable gonorrhoea. New prevention approaches, such as vaccination, are needed. Outer membrane vesicle meningococcal serogroup B vaccines might be protective against gonorrhoea. We evaluated the effectiveness of a serogroup B meningococcal outer membrane vesicle vaccine (MenB-4C) against gonorrhoea in individuals aged 16-23 years in two US cities. METHODS: We identified laboratory-confirmed gonorrhoea and chlamydia infections among individuals aged 16-23 years from sexually transmitted infection surveillance records in New York City and Philadelphia from 2016 to 2018. We linked gonorrhoea and chlamydia case records to immunisation registry records to determine MenB-4C vaccination status at infection, defined as complete vaccination (two MenB-4C doses administered 30-180 days apart), partial vaccination (single MenB-4C vaccine dose), or no vaccination (serogroup B meningococcal vaccine naive). Using log-binomial regression with generalised estimating equations to account for correlations between multiple infections per patient, we calculated adjusted prevalence ratios (APR) and 95% CIs to determine if vaccination was protective against gonorrhoea. We used individual-level data for descriptive analyses and infection-level data for regression analyses. FINDINGS: Between Jan 1, 2016, and Dec 31, 2018, we identified 167 706 infections (18 099 gonococcal infections, 124 876 chlamydial infections, and 24 731 gonococcal and chlamydial co-infections) among 109 737 individuals linked to the immunisation registries. 7692 individuals were vaccinated, of whom 4032 (52·4%) had received one dose, 3596 (46·7%) two doses, and 64 (<1·0%) at least three doses. Compared with no vaccination, complete vaccination series (APR 0·60, 95% CI 0·47-0·77; p<0·0001) and partial vaccination series (0·74, 0·63-0·88; p=0·0012) were protective against gonorrhoea. Complete MenB-4C vaccination series was 40% (95% CI 23-53) effective against gonorrhoea and partial MenB-4C vaccination series was 26% (12-37) effective. INTERPRETATION: MenB-4C vaccination was associated with a reduced gonorrhoea prevalence. MenB-4C could offer cross-protection against Neisseria gonorrhoeae. Development of an effective gonococcal vaccine might be feasible with implications for gonorrhoea prevention and control. FUNDING: None.

In January and February 2015, Neisseria meningitidis serogroup B (NmB) outbreaks occurred at two universities in the United States, and mass vaccination campaigns using MenB vaccines were initiated as part of a public health response. Meningococcal carriage evaluations were conducted concurrently with vaccination campaigns at these two universities and at a third university, where no NmB outbreak occurred. Meningococcal isolates (N = 1,514) obtained from these evaluations were characterized for capsule biosynthesis by whole-genome sequencing (WGS). Functional capsule polysaccharide synthesis (cps) loci belonging to one of seven capsule genogroups (B, C, E, W, X, Y, and Z) were identified in 122 isolates (8.1%). Approximately half [732 (48.4%)] of isolates could not be genogrouped because of the lack of any serogroup-specific genes. The remaining 660 isolates (43.5%) contained serogroup-specific genes for genogroup B, C, E, W, X, Y, or Z, but had mutations in the cps loci. Identified mutations included frameshift or point mutations resulting in premature stop codons, missing or fragmented genes, or disruptions due to insertion elements. Despite these mutations, 49/660 isolates expressed capsule as observed with slide agglutination, whereas 45/122 isolates with functional cps loci did not express capsule. Neither the variable capsule expression nor the genetic variation in the cps locus was limited to a certain clonal complex, except for capsule null isolates (predominantly clonal complex 198). Most of the meningococcal carriage isolates collected from student populations at three US universities were non-groupable as a result of either being capsule null or containing mutations within the capsule locus. Several mutations inhibiting expression of the genes involved with the synthesis and transport of the capsule may be reversible, allowing the bacteria to switch between an encapsulated and non-encapsulated state. These findings are particularly important as carriage is an important component of the transmission cycle of the pathogen, and understanding the impact of genetic variations on the synthesis of capsule, a meningococcal vaccine target and an important virulence factor, may ultimately inform strategies for control and prevention of disease caused by this pathogen.

On February 27, 2021, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for the adenovirus-vectored COVID-19 vaccine (Janssen Biotech, Inc., a Janssen Pharmaceutical company, Johnson & Johnson), and on February 28, 2021, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued an interim recommendation for its use as a single-dose primary vaccination in persons aged ≥18 years (1,2). On April 13, 2021, CDC and FDA recommended a pause in the use of Janssen COVID-19 vaccine after reports of thrombosis with thrombocytopenia syndrome (TTS), a rare condition characterized by low platelets and thrombosis, including at unusual sites such as the cerebral venous sinus (cerebral venous sinus thrombosis [CVST]), after receipt of the vaccine.* ACIP rapidly convened two emergency meetings to review reported cases of TTS, and 10 days after the pause commenced, ACIP reaffirmed its interim recommendation for use of the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine in persons aged ≥18 years, but included a warning regarding rare clotting events after vaccination, primarily among women aged 18-49 years (3). In July, after review of an updated benefit-risk assessment accounting for risks of Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) and TTS, ACIP concluded that benefits of vaccination with Janssen COVID-19 vaccine outweighed risks. Through ongoing safety surveillance and review of reports from the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), additional cases of TTS after receipt of Janssen COVID-19 vaccine, including deaths, were identified. On December 16, 2021, ACIP held an emergency meeting to review updated data on TTS and an updated benefit-risk assessment. At that meeting, ACIP made a recommendation for preferential use of mRNA COVID-19 vaccines over the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine, including both primary and booster doses administered to prevent COVID-19, for all persons aged ≥18 years. The Janssen COVID-19 vaccine may be considered in some situations, including for persons with a contraindication to receipt of mRNA COVID-19 vaccines.

Meningococcal disease is a serious bacterial infection | caused by Neisseria meningitidis, usually presenting as | meningitis, bacteraemia, or both. Even with appropriate | treatment, the case fatality rate is approximately | 10–15%, and 10–20% of survivors have long-term | sequelae.1 N meningitidis colonises the oropharynx and | is spread through the respiratory secretions of patients | with meningococcal disease or asymptomatic carriers. In | many regions, including Europe, adolescents and young | adults have the highest carriage rates and are thus | considered to be the primary source of transmission to | other age groups.2

BACKGROUND: The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends routine vaccination with a quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate serogroup A,C,W,Y (MenACWY) vaccine at 11-12 years of age, with a booster dose at 16 years. ACIP also recommends meningococcal vaccination for persons at increased risk of meningococcal disease, including a 2-dose primary series and regular booster doses for persons at increased risk because of underlying medical conditions. U.S. cases of serogroup A, C, W, and Y meningococcal disease in persons previously vaccinated with MenACWY vaccine have not been systematically described since 2008. Characterization of these cases is important to understand potential factors leading to breakthrough disease. METHODS: We analyzed cases of serogroup A,C,W, and Y meningococcal disease reported through the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) from 2014 through 2018. State health departments submitted additional information on risk factors and clinical course. RESULTS: During 2014-2018, 822 cases of serogroup A, C, W, and Y meningococcal disease were reported through NNDSS; 34 (4%) were in patients who previously received ≥ 1 dose of MenACWY vaccine. Twenty-three vaccinated patients were up-to-date on MenACWY vaccine per recommendations, and seven were not up-to-date; four were missing information on the number of doses received. Seventeen cases (50%) occurred > 3 years after the most recent dose. A significantly higher proportion of vaccinated patients were people living with HIV (PLWH) compared to unvaccinated patients. Eight of the 34 vaccinated patients were immunosuppressed, including five PLWH, one taking eculizumab, and two taking other immunosuppressive medications. The case fatality ratio did not differ between vaccinated and unvaccinated patients. CONCLUSIONS: Immunosuppression, incomplete vaccination, and waning immunity likely contributed to breakthrough cases of meningococcal disease among people who received MenACWY vaccine. Continued monitoring of serogroup A, C, W, and Y meningococcal disease in previously vaccinated persons will help inform meningococcal disease prevention efforts.

Since serogroup B meningococcal (MenB) vaccines became available in the United States, six serogroup B meningococcal disease cases have been reported in MenB-4C (n = 4) or MenB-FHbp (n = 2) recipients. Cases were identified and characterized through surveillance and health record review. All five available isolates were characterized using whole genome sequencing; four isolates (from MenB-4C recipients) were further characterized using flow cytometry, MenB-4C-induced serum bactericidal activity (SBA), and genetic Meningococcal Antigen Typing System (gMATS). Three patients were at increased meningococcal disease risk because of an outbreak or underlying medical conditions, and only four of the six patients had completed a full 2-dose MenB series. Isolates were available from 5 patients, and all contained sub-family A FHbp. The four isolates from MenB-4C recipients expressed NhbA but were mismatched for the other MenB-4C vaccine antigens. These four isolates were relatively resistant to MenB-4C-induced SBA, but predicted by gMATS to be covered. Overall, patient risk factors, incomplete vaccine series completion, waning immunity, and strain resistance to SBA likely contributed to disease in these six patients.

The Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 (BNT162b2) vaccine is a lipid nanoparticle-formulated, nucleoside-modified mRNA vaccine encoding the prefusion spike glycoprotein of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. On August 23, 2021, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved a Biologics License Application (BLA) for use of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine, marketed as Comirnaty (Pfizer, Inc.), in persons aged ≥16 years (1). The Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine is also recommended for adolescents aged 12-15 years under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) (1). All persons aged ≥12 years are recommended to receive 2 doses (30 μg, 0.3 mL each), administered 3 weeks apart (2,3). As of November 2, 2021, approximately 248 million doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine had been administered to persons aged ≥12 years in the United States.* On October 29, 2021, FDA issued an EUA amendment for a new formulation of Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine for use in children aged 5-11 years, administered as 2 doses (10 μg, 0.2 mL each), 3 weeks apart (Table) (1). On November 2, 2021, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued an interim recommendation(†) for use of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine in children aged 5-11 years for the prevention of COVID-19. To guide its deliberations regarding recommendations for the vaccine, ACIP used the Evidence to Recommendation (EtR) Framework(§) and incorporated a Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) approach.(¶) The ACIP recommendation for the use of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine in children aged 5-11 years under an EUA is interim and will be updated as additional information becomes available. The Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine has high efficacy (>90%) against COVID-19 in children aged 5-11 years, and ACIP determined benefits outweigh risks for vaccination. Vaccination is important to protect children against COVID-19 and reduce community transmission of SARS-CoV-2.

Three COVID-19 vaccines are currently approved under a Biologics License Application (BLA) or authorized under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and recommended for primary vaccination by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) in the United States: the 2-dose mRNA-based Pfizer-BioNTech/Comirnaty and Moderna COVID-19 vaccines and the single-dose adenovirus vector-based Janssen (Johnson & Johnson) COVID-19 vaccine (1,2) (Box 1). In August 2021, FDA amended the EUAs for the two mRNA COVID-19 vaccines to allow for an additional primary dose in certain immunocompromised recipients of an initial mRNA COVID-19 vaccination series (1). During September-October 2021, FDA amended the EUAs to allow for a COVID-19 vaccine booster dose following a primary mRNA COVID-19 vaccination series in certain recipients aged ≥18 years who are at increased risk for serious complications of COVID-19 or exposure to SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19), as well as in recipients aged ≥18 years of Janssen COVID-19 vaccine (1) (Table). For the purposes of these recommendations, an additional primary (hereafter additional) dose refers to a dose of vaccine administered to persons who likely did not mount a protective immune response after initial vaccination. A booster dose refers to a dose of vaccine administered to enhance or restore protection by the primary vaccination, which might have waned over time. Health care professionals play a critical role in COVID-19 vaccination efforts, including for primary, additional, and booster vaccination, particularly to protect patients who are at increased risk for severe illness and death.

When the Global Polio Eradication Initiative began in 1988, wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission was occurring in 125 countries; currently, only WPV type 1 (WPV1) transmission continues, and as of August 2021, WPV1 transmission persists in only two countries (1,2). This report describes Pakistan's progress toward polio eradication during January 2020-July 2021 and updates previous reports (3,4). In 2020, Pakistan reported 84 WPV1 cases, a 43% reduction from 2019; as of August 25, 2021, Pakistan has reported one WPV1 case in 2021. Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) emerges as a result of attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) virus regaining neurovirulence after prolonged circulation in underimmunized populations and can lead to paralysis. In 2019, 22 cases of cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) were reported in Pakistan, 135 cases were reported in 2020, and eight cases have been reported as of August 25, 2021. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, planned supplementary immunization activities (SIAs)* were suspended during mid-March-June 2020 (3,5). Seven SIAs were implemented during July 2020-July 2021 without substantial decreases in SIA quality. Improving the quality of polio SIAs, vaccinating immigrants from Afghanistan, and implementing changes to enhance program accountability and performance would help the Pakistan polio program achieve its goal of interrupting WPV1 transmission by the end of 2022.

In December 2020, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued Emergency Use Authorizations (EUAs) for Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna COVID-19 vaccines, and in February 2021, FDA issued an EUA for the Janssen (Johnson & Johnson) COVID-19 vaccine. After each EUA, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued interim recommendations for vaccine use; currently Pfizer-BioNTech is authorized and recommended for persons aged ≥12 years and Moderna and Janssen for persons aged ≥18 years (1-3). Both Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines, administered as 2-dose series, are mRNA-based COVID-19 vaccines, whereas the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine, administered as a single dose, is a recombinant replication-incompetent adenovirus-vector vaccine. As of July 22, 2021, 187 million persons in the United States had received at least 1 dose of COVID-19 vaccine (4); close monitoring of safety surveillance has demonstrated that serious adverse events after COVID-19 vaccination are rare (5,6). Three medical conditions have been reported in temporal association with receipt of COVID-19 vaccines. Two of these (thrombosis with thrombocytopenia syndrome [TTS], a rare syndrome characterized by venous or arterial thrombosis and thrombocytopenia, and Guillain-Barré syndrome [GBS], a rare autoimmune neurologic disorder characterized by ascending weakness and paralysis) have been reported after Janssen COVID-19 vaccination. One (myocarditis, cardiac inflammation) has been reported after Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccination or Moderna COVID-19 vaccination, particularly after the second dose; these were reviewed together and will hereafter be referred to as mRNA COVID-19 vaccination. ACIP has met three times to review the data associated with these reports of serious adverse events and has comprehensively assessed the benefits and risks associated with receipt of these vaccines. During the most recent meeting in July 2021, ACIP determined that, overall, the benefits of COVID-19 vaccination in preventing COVID-19 morbidity and mortality outweigh the risks for these rare serious adverse events in adults aged ≥18 years; this balance of benefits and risks varied by age and sex. ACIP continues to recommend COVID-19 vaccination in all persons aged ≥12 years. CDC and FDA continue to closely monitor reports of serious adverse events and will present any additional data to ACIP for consideration. Information regarding risks and how they vary by age and sex and type of vaccine should be disseminated to providers, vaccine recipients, and the public.

Carriage evaluations were conducted during 2015 to 2016 at two U.S. universities in conjunction with the response to disease outbreaks caused by Neisseria meningitidis serogroup B and at a university where outbreak and response activities had not occurred. All eligible students at the two universities received the serogroup B meningococcal factor H binding protein vaccine (MenB-FHbp); 5.2% of students (181/3,509) at one university received MenB-4C. A total of 1,514 meningococcal carriage isolates were obtained from 8,905 oropharyngeal swabs from 7,001 unique participants. Whole-genome sequencing data were analyzed to understand MenB-FHbp's impact on carriage and antigen genetic diversity and distribution. Of 1,422 isolates from carriers with known vaccination status (726 [51.0%] from MenB-FHbp-vaccinated, 42 [3.0%] from MenB-4C-vaccinated, and 654 [46.0%] from unvaccinated participants), 1,406 (98.9%) had intact fHbp alleles (716 from MenB-FHbp-vaccinated participants). Of 726 isolates from MenB-FHbp-vaccinated participants, 250 (34.4%) harbored FHbp peptides that may be covered by MenB-FHbp. Genogroup B was detected in 122/1,422 (8.6%) and 112/1,422 (7.9%) isolates from MenB-FHbp-vaccinated and unvaccinated participants, respectively. FHbp subfamily and peptide distributions between MenB-FHbp-vaccinated and unvaccinated participants were not statistically different. Eighteen of 161 MenB-FHbp-vaccinated repeat carriers (11.2%) acquired a new strain containing one or more new vaccine antigen peptides during multiple rounds of sample collection, which was not statistically different (P = 0.3176) from the unvaccinated repeat carriers (1/30; 3.3%). Our findings suggest that lack of MenB vaccine impact on carriage was not due to missing the intact fHbp gene; MenB-FHbp did not affect antigen genetic diversity and distribution during the study period.IMPORTANCE The impact of serogroup B meningococcal (MenB) vaccines on carriage is not completely understood. Using whole-genome sequencing data, we assessed the diversity and distribution of MenB vaccine antigens (particularly FHbp) among 1,514 meningococcal carriage isolates recovered from vaccinated and unvaccinated students at three U.S. universities, two of which underwent MenB-FHbp mass vaccination campaigns following meningococcal disease outbreaks. The majority of carriage isolates recovered from participants harbored intact fHbp genes, about half of which were recovered from MenB-FHbp-vaccinated participants. The distribution of vaccine antigen peptides was similar among carriage isolates recovered from vaccinated and unvaccinated participants, and almost all strains recovered from repeat carriers retained the same vaccine antigen profile, suggesting insignificant vaccine selective pressure on the carriage population in these universities.

BACKGROUND: Outbreaks of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) pose a threat to the eventual eradication of all polioviruses. In 2017, an outbreak of cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) occurred in the midst of a war in Syria. We describe vaccination-based risk factors for and the successful response to the outbreak. METHODS: We performed a descriptive analysis of cVDPV2 cases and key indicators of poliovirus surveillance and vaccination activities during 2016-2018. In the absence of reliable subnational coverage data, we used the caregiver-reported vaccination status of children with non-polio acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) as a proxy for vaccination coverage. We then estimated the relative odds of being unvaccinated against polio, comparing children in areas affected by the outbreak to children in other parts of Syria in order to establish the presence of poliovirus immunity gaps in outbreak affected areas. FINDINGS: A total of 74 cVDPV2 cases were reported, with paralysis onset ranging from 3 March to 21 September 2017. All but three cases were reported from Deir-ez-Zor governorate and 84% had received < 3 doses of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV). After adjusting for age and sex, non-polio AFP case-patients aged 6-59 months in outbreak-affected areas had 2.5 (95% CI: 1.1-5.7) increased odds of being unvaccinated with OPV compared with non-polio AFP case-patients in the same age group in other parts of Syria. Three outbreak response rounds of monovalent OPV type 2 (mOPV2) vaccination were conducted, with governorate-level coverage mostly exceeding 80%. INTERPRETATION: Significant declines in both national and subnational polio vaccination coverage, precipitated by war and a humanitarian crisis, led to a cVDPV2 outbreak in Syria that was successfully contained following three rounds of mOPV2 vaccination.

As the world follows the progress of vaccine uptake in the fight against COVID-19, we are once again reminded of how vaccines can impact our personal health and the health of our communities. But even as we look to safe and effective vaccines as the best way forward, vaccine hesitancy already threatens our ability to effectively protect communities from vaccine-preventable diseases.1 Vaccine hesitancy is nothing new; however, the speed of information sharing in our global community has accelerated the spread of both accurate vaccine information and vaccine misinformation. Recent measles outbreaks in the United States have demonstrated how the spread of misinformation has a real-world impact, particularly in close-knit communities.2 Persistent underimmunization—associated with factors like vaccine hesitancy and health care access—challenge us to make sure that vaccine-preventable infections like measles, pertussis, and human papillomavirus do not continue to cause preventable illness and death.

On December 11, 2020, the US reached an extraordinary milestone in the efforts to end the COVID-19 pandemic: the Food and Drug Administration authorized emergency use of the first COVID-19 vaccine, manufactured by Pfizer-BioNTech. Since then, 2 additional COVID-19 vaccines, Moderna and Janssen (Johnson & Johnson), have received Emergency Use Authorization in the US and, as of March 8, 2021, more than 31 million people, or 9.4% of the total population, have completed a vaccination series.1

On February 27, 2021, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for the Janssen COVID-19 (Ad.26.COV2.S) vaccine (Janssen Biotech, Inc, a Janssen Pharmaceutical company, Johnson & Johnson; New Brunswick, New Jersey). The Janssen COVID-19 vaccine is a recombinant, replication-incompetent adenovirus serotype 26 (Ad26) vector vaccine, encoding the stabilized prefusion spike glycoprotein of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19 (1). Vaccination with the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine consists of a single dose (5 × 1010 virus particles per 0.5-mL dose) administered intramuscularly. On February 28, 2021, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued an interim recommendation* for use of the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine in persons aged ≥18 years for the prevention of COVID-19. This vaccine is the third COVID-19 vaccine authorized under an EUA for the prevention of COVID-19 in the United States (2). To guide its deliberations regarding the vaccine, ACIP used the Evidence to Recommendations (EtR) framework,† following the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) approach.§ The ACIP recommendation for the use of the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine under an EUA is interim and will be updated as additional information becomes available.

In North America and Europe, serogroup B causes most cases of meningococcal disease in infants.1, 2, 3 The first serogroup B meningococcal vaccine, 4CMenB (Bexsero; GlaxoSmithKline, Rixensart, Belgium), was authorised in the EU in 2013 as a 3 + 1 schedule for infants, with three doses administered during the first year of life and a booster dose at 12 months.4 In 2015, the UK was the first country to implement a routine infant 4CMenB immunisation programme. However, cost-effectiveness and epidemiological considerations led the UK to choose a novel 2 + 1 schedule with doses at 2, 4, and 12 months of age, despite an absence of corresponding immunogenicity data.5

Although vaccine acceptance and uptake are overall high among children in the United States, vaccine delays or refusals are a growing concern. Vaccine hesitancy is a challenge for the pediatric provider, given the diverse factors associated with hesitancy and the limited evidence on effective strategies for addressing vaccine hesitancy in the provider office. In this article, we review available evidence and approaches for vaccine communication, including the importance of using a whole-team approach, building trust, starting the conversation early, using a presumptive approach for vaccine recommendations, motivational interviewing with parents who have concerns for vaccines, and additional techniques for responding to parent questions. We also review organizational strategies to help create a culture of immunization in the practice, including evidence-based approaches for increasing vaccine uptake and efficiency. Although these communication approaches and organizational strategies are intended to reassure parents who are vaccine hesitant that all routine, universally recommended vaccines are safe and effective, they likely will take on increased significance as the development, implementation, and evaluation of coronavirus disease 2019 vaccines continue to unfold. [Pediatr Ann. 2020;49(12):e523-e531.].

On December 18, 2020, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for the Moderna COVID-19 (mRNA-1273) vaccine (ModernaTX, Inc; Cambridge, Massachusetts), a lipid nanoparticle-encapsulated, nucleoside-modified mRNA vaccine encoding the stabilized prefusion spike glycoprotein of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (1). This vaccine is the second COVID-19 vaccine authorized under an EUA for the prevention of COVID-19 in the United States (2). Vaccination with the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine consists of 2 doses (100 μg, 0.5 mL each) administered intramuscularly, 1 month (4 weeks) apart. On December 19, 2020, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued an interim recommendation* for use of the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine in persons aged ≥18 years for the prevention of COVID-19. To guide its deliberations regarding the vaccine, ACIP employed the Evidence to Recommendation (EtR) Framework,(†) using the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) approach.(§) Use of all COVID-19 vaccines authorized under an EUA, including the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine, should be implemented in conjunction with ACIP's interim recommendations for allocating initial supplies of COVID-19 vaccines (3). The ACIP recommendation for the use of the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine under EUA is interim and will be updated as additional information becomes available.

On December 11, 2020, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 (BNT162b2) vaccine (Pfizer, Inc; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), a lipid nanoparticle-formulated, nucleoside-modified mRNA vaccine encoding the prefusion spike glycoprotein of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (1). Vaccination with the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine consists of 2 doses (30 μg, 0.3 mL each) administered intramuscularly, 3 weeks apart. On December 12, 2020, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued an interim recommendation* for use of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine in persons aged ≥16 years for the prevention of COVID-19. To guide its deliberations regarding the vaccine, ACIP employed the Evidence to Recommendation (EtR) Framework,(†) using the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) approach.(§) The recommendation for the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine should be implemented in conjunction with ACIP's interim recommendation for allocating initial supplies of COVID-19 vaccines (2). The ACIP recommendation for the use of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine under EUA is interim and will be updated as additional information becomes available.

In 2010, Burkina Faso completed the first nationwide mass-vaccination campaign of a meningococcal A conjugate vaccine, drastically reducing the incidence of disease caused by serogroup A meningococci. Since then, other strains, such as those belonging to serogroups W, X and C, have continued to cause outbreaks within the region. A carriage study was conducted in 2016 and 2017 in the country to characterize the meningococcal strains circulating among healthy individuals following the mass-vaccination campaign. Four cross-sectional carriage evaluation rounds were conducted in two districts of Burkina Faso, Kaya and Ouahigouya. Oropharyngeal swabs were collected for the detection of Neisseria meningitidis by culture. Confirmed N. meningitidis isolates underwent whole-genome sequencing for molecular characterization. Among 13 758 participants, 1035 (7.5 %) N. meningitidis isolates were recovered. Most isolates (934/1035; 90.2 %) were non-groupable and primarily belonged to clonal complex (CC) 192 (822/934; 88 %). Groupable isolates (101/1035; 9.8 %) primarily belonged to CCs associated with recent outbreaks in the region, such as CC11 (serogroup W) and CC10217 (serogroup C); carried serogroup A isolates were not detected. Phylogenetic analysis revealed several CC11 strains circulating within the country, several of which were closely related to invasive isolates. Three sequence types (STs) were identified among eleven CC10217 carriage isolates, two of which have caused recent outbreaks in the region (ST-10217 and ST-12446). Our results show the importance of carriage studies to track the outbreak-associated strains circulating within the population in order to inform future vaccination strategies and molecular surveillance programmes.

This report compiles and summarizes all recommendations from CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) for use of meningococcal vaccines in the United States. As a comprehensive summary and update of previously published recommendations, it replaces all previously published reports and policy notes. This report also contains new recommendations for administration of booster doses of serogroup B meningococcal (MenB) vaccine for persons at increased risk for serogroup B meningococcal disease. These guidelines will be updated as needed on the basis of availability of new data or licensure of new meningococcal vaccines. ACIP recommends routine vaccination with a quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine (MenACWY) for adolescents aged 11 or 12 years, with a booster dose at age 16 years. ACIP also recommends routine vaccination with MenACWY for persons aged ≥2 months at increased risk for meningococcal disease caused by serogroups A, C, W, or Y, including persons who have persistent complement component deficiencies; persons receiving a complement inhibitor (e.g., eculizumab [Soliris] or ravulizumab [Ultomiris]); persons who have anatomic or functional asplenia; persons with human immunodeficiency virus infection; microbiologists routinely exposed to isolates of Neisseria meningitidis; persons identified to be at increased risk because of a meningococcal disease outbreak caused by serogroups A, C, W, or Y; persons who travel to or live in areas in which meningococcal disease is hyperendemic or epidemic; unvaccinated or incompletely vaccinated first-year college students living in residence halls; and military recruits. ACIP recommends MenACWY booster doses for previously vaccinated persons who become or remain at increased risk. In addition, ACIP recommends routine use of MenB vaccine series among persons aged ≥10 years who are at increased risk for serogroup B meningococcal disease, including persons who have persistent complement component deficiencies; persons receiving a complement inhibitor; persons who have anatomic or functional asplenia; microbiologists who are routinely exposed to isolates of N. meningitidis; and persons identified to be at increased risk because of a meningococcal disease outbreak caused by serogroup B. ACIP recommends MenB booster doses for previously vaccinated persons who become or remain at increased risk. In addition, ACIP recommends a MenB series for adolescents and young adults aged 16-23 years on the basis of shared clinical decision-making to provide short-term protection against disease caused by most strains of serogroup B N. meningitidis.

IMPORTANCE: In 2005, the US Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommended routine quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate (MenACWY) vaccine for all adolescents aged 11 to 12 years, and in 2010, a booster dose for adolescents aged 16 years. Measuring the association between MenACWY vaccination and the incidence of meningococcal disease in adolescents is critical for evaluating the adolescent vaccination program and informing future vaccine policy. OBJECTIVE: To describe the association between MenACWY vaccination and the incidence of meningococcal disease in US adolescents. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: In this cohort study, analysis of surveillance data included all confirmed and probable cases of Neisseria meningitidis reported to the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2017. Statistical analysis was conducted from October 1, 2018, to August 31, 2019. EXPOSURES: Routine MenACWY vaccination among US adolescents. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Poisson segmented regression analysis was used to model the annual incidence of meningococcal disease among adolescents aged 11 to 15 years and 16 to 22 years before the introduction of the MenACWY vaccine (2000-2005), after the primary dose recommendation (2006-2010), and after the booster dose recommendation (2011-2017); 95% CIs were used to determine significant differences between time periods. RESULTS: The national incidence of meningococcal disease declined from 0.61 cases per 100 000 population during the prevaccine period (2000-2005) to 0.15 cases per 100 000 population during the post-booster dose period (2011-2017). The greatest percentage decline was observed for serogroup C, W, and Y combined (CWY) among adolescents aged 11 to 15 years and 16 to 22 years in the periods after vaccine introduction. Incidence of serogroup CWY meningococcal disease among adolescents aged 11 to 15 years decreased by 16.3% (95% CI, 12.1%-20.3%) annually during the prevaccine period and 27.8% (95% CI, 20.6%-34.4%) during the post-primary dose period (P = .02); among adolescents aged 16 to 22 years, the incidence decreased by 10.6% (95% CI, 6.8%-14.3%) annually in the post-primary dose period and 35.6% (95% CI, 29.3%-41.0%) annually in the post-booster dose period (P < .001). An estimated 222 cases of meningococcal disease due to serogroup CWY among adolescents were averted through vaccination during the evaluation period. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: After introduction of a primary and booster MenACWY dose, the rates of decline in incidence of meningococcal disease due to serogroup C, W, or Y accelerated nearly 2-fold to 3-fold in vaccinated adolescent age groups. Although the MenACWY vaccine alone cannot explain the decline of meningococcal disease in the United States, these data suggest that MenACWY vaccination is associated with reduced disease rates in adolescents.

BACKGROUND: In the first 2 years after a nationwide mass vaccination campaign of 1-29-year-olds with a meningococcal serogroup A conjugate vaccine (MenAfriVac) in Burkina Faso, carriage and disease due to serogroup A Neisseria meningitidis were nearly eliminated. We aimed to assess the long-term effect of MenAfriVac vaccination on meningococcal carriage and herd immunity. METHODS: We did four cross-sectional studies of meningococcal carriage in people aged 9 months to 36 years in two districts of Burkina Faso between May 2, 2016, and Nov 6, 2017. Demographic information and oropharyngeal swabs were collected. Meningococcal isolates were characterised using whole-genome sequencing. FINDINGS: Of 14 295 eligible people, 13 758 consented and had specimens collected and laboratory results available, 1035 of whom were meningococcal carriers. Accounting for the complex survey design, prevalence of meningococcal carriage was 7.60% (95% CI 5.67-9.52), including 6.98% (4.86-9.11) non-groupable, 0.48% (0.01-0.95) serogroup W, 0.10% (0.01-0.18) serogroup C, 0.03% (0.00-0.80) serogroup E, and 0% serogroup A. Prevalence ranged from 5.44% (95% CI 4.18-6.69) to 9.14% (6.01-12.27) by district, from 4.67% (2.71-6.64) to 11.17% (6.75-15.59) by round, and from 3.39% (0.00-8.30) to 10.43% (8.08-12.79) by age group. By clonal complex, 822 (88%) of 934 non-groupable isolates were CC192, all 83 (100%) serogroup W isolates were CC11, and nine (69%) of 13 serogroup C isolates were CC10217. INTERPRETATION: Our results show the continued effect of MenAfriVac on serogroup A meningococcal carriage, for at least 7 years, among vaccinated and unvaccinated cohorts. Carriage prevalence of epidemic-prone serogroup C CC10217 and serogroup W CC11 was low. Continued monitoring of N meningitidis carriage will be crucial to further assess the effect of MenAfriVac and inform the vaccination strategy for future multivalent meningococcal vaccines. FUNDING: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.

Background: Despite insecurity challenges in Somalia, key indicators for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance have met recommended targets. However, recent outbreaks of vaccine-derived polioviruses have raised concerns about possible gaps. We analyzed nonpolio enterovirus (NPEV) and Sabin poliovirus isolation rates to investigate whether comparing these rates can inform about the integrity of stool specimens from inaccessible areas and the likelihood of detecting circulating polioviruses. Methods: Using logistic regression, we analyzed case-based AFP surveillance data for 1348 cases with onset during 2014-2017. We assessed the adjusted impacts of variables including age, accessibility, and Sabin-like virus isolation on NPEV detection. Results: NPEVs were more likely to be isolated from AFP case patients reported from inaccessible areas than accessible areas (23% vs 15%; P = .01). In a multivariable model, inaccessibility and detection of Sabin-like virus were positively associated with NPEV detection (adjusted odds ratio [AOR], 1.75; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.14-2.65; and AOR, 1.79; 95% CI, 1.07-2.90; respectively), while being aged >/=5 years was negatively associated (AOR, 0.42; 95% CI, 0.20-0.85). Conclusions: Rates of NPEV and Sabin poliovirus detection in inaccessible areas suggest that the integrity of fecal specimens tested for AFP surveillance in Somalia can generate useful AFP data, but uncertainties remain about surveillance system quality.

In the United States and around the world, measles (a serious, potentially fatal, and extremely contagious infection) was considered a disease of the past until recently. However, what was once old news is now making headlines again with a remarkably predictable storyline: when immunity to measles falls in a population, outbreaks soon follow. This scenario has unfolded in places such as Ukraine, the Philippines, Israel, and Samoa with devastating consequences.1 In 2019 alone, the United Kingdom and 3 other European countries lost measles elimination status in part because of vaccine hesitancy, or the delay in acceptance or the refusal of vaccination despite availability of vaccination services, which was named one of the top global public health threats by the World Health Organization. Amid this global measles resurgence, the United States experienced a chain reaction of measles cases imported into close-knit, undervaccinated communities (primarily by unvaccinated US residents carrying measles home from outbreaks abroad), leading to outbreaks across the country in 2018 and 2019. These outbreaks were fueled by targeted vaccine misinformation and resulted in the highest number of measles cases in almost 30 years, nearly costing the United States its measles elimination status.2 To protect our nation, we need to change this narrative. We must empower families, in all communities and across generations, to feel confident in the decision to vaccinate.

In 2015 and 2016, meningococcal carriage evaluations were conducted at two universities in the United States following mass vaccination campaigns in response to Neisseria meningitidis serogroup B (NmB) disease outbreaks. A simultaneous carriage evaluation was also conducted at a university near one of the outbreaks, where no NmB cases were reported and no mass vaccination occurred. A total of ten cross-sectional carriage evaluation rounds were conducted, resulting in 1,514 meningococcal carriage isolates collected from 7,001 unique participants; 1,587 individuals were swabbed at multiple time points (repeat participants). All isolates underwent whole-genome sequencing. The most frequently observed clonal complexes (CC) were CC198 (27.3%), followed by CC1157 (17.4%), CC41/44 (9.8%), CC35 (7.4%), and CC32 (5.6%). Phylogenetic analysis identified carriage isolates that were highly similar to the NmB outbreak strains; comparative genomics between these outbreak and carriage isolates revealed genetic changes in virulence genes. Among repeat participants, 348 individuals carried meningococcal bacteria during at least one carriage evaluation round; 50.3% retained N. meningitidis carriage of a strain with the same sequence type (ST) and CC across rounds, 44.3% only carried N. meningitidis in one round, and 5.4% acquired a new N. meningitidis strain between rounds. Recombination, point mutations, deletions, and simple sequence repeats were the most frequent genetic mechanisms found in isolates collected from hosts carrying a strain of the same ST and CC across rounds. Our findings provide insight on the dynamics of meningococcal carriage among a population that is at higher risk for invasive meningococcal disease than the general population.IMPORTANCE U.S. university students are at a higher risk of invasive meningococcal disease than the general population. The responsible pathogen, Neisseria meningitidis, can be carried asymptomatically in the oropharynx; the dynamics of meningococcal carriage and the genetic features that distinguish carriage versus disease states are not completely understood. Through our analyses, we aimed to provide data to address these topics. We whole-genome sequenced 1,514 meningococcal carriage isolates from individuals at three U.S. universities, two of which underwent mass vaccination campaigns following recent meningococcal outbreaks. We describe the within-host genetic changes among individuals carrying a strain with the same molecular type over time, the primary strains being carried in this population, and the genetic differences between closely related outbreak and carriage strains. Our results provide detailed information on the dynamics of meningococcal carriage and the genetic differences in carriage and outbreak strains, which can inform future efforts to reduce the incidence of invasive meningococcal disease.