Engineered nanomaterial emission and exposure characterization studies have been completed at more than 60 different facilities by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). These experiences have provided NIOSH the opportunity to refine an earlier published technique, the Nanoparticle Emission Assessment Technique (NEAT 1.0), into a more comprehensive technique for assessing worker and workplace exposures to engineered nanomaterials. This change is reflected in the new name Nanomaterial Exposure Assessment Technique (NEAT 2.0) which distinguishes it from NEAT 1.0. NEAT 2.0 places a stronger emphasis on time-integrated, filter-based sampling (i.e., elemental mass analysis and particle morphology) in the worker's breathing zone (full shift and task specific) and area samples to develop job exposure matrices. NEAT 2.0 includes a comprehensive assessment of emissions at processes and job tasks, using direct-reading instruments (i.e., particle counters) in data-logging mode to better understand peak emission periods. Evaluation of worker practices, ventilation efficacy, and other engineering exposure control systems and risk management strategies serve to allow for a comprehensive exposure assessment.

Organizations around the world have called for the responsible development of nanotechnology. The goals of this approach are to emphasize the importance of considering and controlling the potential adverse impacts of nanotechnology in order to develop its capabilities and benefits. A primary area of concern is the potential adverse impact on workers, since they are the first people in society who are exposed to the potential hazards of nanotechnology. Occupational safety and health criteria for defining what constitutes responsible development of nanotechnology are needed. This article presents five criterion actions that should be practiced by decision-makers at the business and societal levels-if nanotechnology is to be developed responsibly. These include (1) anticipate, identify, and track potentially hazardous nanomaterials in the workplace; (2) assess workers' exposures to nanomaterials; (3) assess and communicate hazards and risks to workers; (4) manage occupational safety and health risks; and (5) foster the safe development of nanotechnology and realization of its societal and commercial benefits. All these criteria are necessary for responsible development to occur. Since it is early in the commercialization of nanotechnology, there are still many unknowns and concerns about nanomaterials. Therefore, it is prudent to treat them as potentially hazardous until sufficient toxicology, and exposure data are gathered for nanomaterial-specific hazard and risk assessments. In this emergent period, it is necessary to be clear about the extent of uncertainty and the need for prudent actions.

Occupational exposure to engineered nanomaterials (ENMs) is considered a new and challenging occurrence. Preliminary information from laboratory studies indicates that workers exposed to some kinds of ENMs could be at risk of adverse health effects. To protect the nanomaterial workforce, a precautionary risk management approach is warranted and given the newness of ENMs and emergence of nanotechnology, a naturalistic view of risk management is useful. Employers have the primary responsibility for providing a safe and healthy workplace. This is achieved by identifying and managing risks which include recognition of hazards, assessing exposures, characterizing actual risk, and implementing measures to control those risks. Following traditional risk management models for nanomaterials is challenging because of uncertainties about the nature of hazards, issues in exposure assessment, questions about appropriate control methods, and lack of occupational exposure limits (OELs) or nano-specific regulations. In the absence of OELs specific for nanomaterials, a precautionary approach has been recommended in many countries. The precautionary approach entails minimizing exposures by using engineering controls and personal protective equipment (PPE). Generally, risk management utilizes the hierarchy of controls. Ideally, risk management for nanomaterials should be part of an enterprise-wide risk management program or system and this should include both risk control and a medical surveillance program that assesses the frequency of adverse effects among groups of workers exposed to nanomaterials. In some cases, the medical surveillance could include medical screening of individual workers to detect early signs of work-related illnesses. All medical surveillance should be used to assess the effectiveness of risk management; however, medical surveillance should be considered as a second line of defense to ensure that implemented risk management practices are effective.

In 2001, letters filled with a powder containing anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) spores were delivered by mail to a number of governmental and media locations within the United States. In response, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provided guidelines for office personnel who might encounter a letter containing suspicious powder. These guidelines were developed during the crisis and in the absence of experimental data from laboratory or field investigations. An obvious need thus exists for quantitative and scientific verification for validation of these guidelines. This study attempts to address this need, adapting earlier work that used a multiple small office test site to create a model system in an open office test site in a vacated office building in which Bacillus atrophaeus spores (as a simulant for B. anthracis spores) were released by opening a letter. Using SF(6) as a tracer gas, smoke tubes (containing stannic chloride) to visualize airflow, culturable aerosol sampling, and aerosol spectrometry we were able to characterize airflow and unmitigated spore aerosol dissemination within the office test site. Subsequently, two scripted test scenarios were used to reproduce selected portions of the existing CDC response guidelines and a modified version where the contaminated letter opener warned co-workers to evacuate then waited 5 min before doing so himself. By not leaving together with other co-workers, the risk of the letter opener cross-contaminating others was eliminated. The total potential spore aerosol exposure of the letter opener was not affected by remaining still and waiting 5 min to allow co-workers to escape first before leaving the office. Closing office doors and quickly deactivating the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system significantly reduced spore aerosol concentrations outside the main open office in which they had been released.