IMPORTANCE: Health information technology, such as electronic health records (EHRs), has been widely adopted, yet accessing and exchanging data in the fragmented US health care system remains challenging. To unlock the potential of EHR data to improve patient health, public health, and health care, it is essential to streamline the exchange of health data. As leaders across the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), we describe how DHHS has implemented fundamental building blocks to achieve this vision. OBSERVATIONS: Across DHHS, we have implemented 3 foundational building blocks called for by the 2016 21st Century Cures Act to create a unified approach for secure, high-quality, and timely exchange of health data across the health care system. The United States Core Data for Interoperability provides a minimum baseline for data elements that must be available in federally regulated health information technology systems such as certified EHRs. These data elements now must be accessible using Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources-a secure, flexible, and open-industry standard for health data exchange. The Trusted Exchange Framework and Common Agreement provides a network to securely exchange health data across the country. The 3 building blocks of United States Core Data for Interoperability, Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources, and Trusted Exchange Framework and Common Agreement are now in place thanks to diligent public and private sector work over 2 administrations. Across DHHS, we are working to refine these building blocks and increase their adoption through regulatory authorities, grants, and public-private partnerships. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: The technological building blocks described in this article are creating a unified approach to health data exchange for patient access, clinical care, quality improvement, scientific research, public health, and other uses of health data. Collaborations between the public, nonprofit, and private sectors are needed to maximize their potential. By unlocking the potential of health data, these building blocks are the foundation of a 21st-century digital health care system that will improve the experience of patients and clinicians and result in better health outcomes.

Bacillus anthracis causes anthrax through virulence factors encoded on two plasmids. However, non-B. anthracis organisms within the closely related, environmentally ubiquitous Bacillus cereus group (BCG) may cause an anthrax-like disease in humans through the partial adoption of anthrax-associated virulence genes, challenging the definition of anthrax disease. To elucidate these phenomena and their evolutionary past, we performed whole-genome sequencing on non-anthracis BCG isolates, including 93 archival (1967-2003) and 5 contemporary isolates (2019-2023). We produced annotated genomic assemblies and performed a pan-genome analysis to identify evidence of virulence gene homology and virulence gene acquisition by linear inheritance or horizontal gene transfer. At least one anthrax-associated virulence gene was annotated in ten isolates. Most homologous sequences in archival isolates showed evidence of pseudogenization and subsequent gene loss. The presence or absence of accessory genes, including anthrax-associated virulence genes, aligned with the phylogenetic structure of the BCG core genome. These findings support the hypothesis that anthrax-associated virulence genes were inherited from a common ancestor in the BCG and were retained or lost across different lineages, and contribute to a growing body of work informing public health strategies related to anthrax surveillance and identification.

Objective Although contact tracing is generally not used to control influenza pandemics, China and several countries in the Western Pacific Region employed contact tracing as part of COVID-19 response activities. To improve understanding on the use of contact tracing for COVID-19 emergency public health response activities, we describe reported COVID-19 contacts traced and quarantined in China and a proxy for number of reported contacts traced per reported case.Methods We abstracted publicly available online aggregate data reported from China’s National Health Commission and provincial health commissions’ COVID-19 daily situational reports for January 20–February 29, 2020. The number of new contacts traced by report date was computed as the difference between total contacts traced on consecutive reports. A proxy for the number of contacts traced per case was computed as the number of new contacts traced divided by the number of new cases.Results During January 20–February 29, 2020, China reported 80,968 new COVID-19 cases (Hubei Province = 67,608 [83%]), and 659,899 contacts traced (Hubei Province = 265,617 [40%]). Non-Hubei provinces reported more contacts traced per case than Hubei Province; this difference increased over time.Discussion Along with other NPI used in China, contact tracing likely contributed to reducing SARS-CoV-2 transmission by quarantining a large number of potentially infected contacts. Despite reporting only 15% of total cases, non-Hubei provinces had 1.5 times more reported contacts traced compared to Hubei Province. Contract tracing may have been more complete in areas and periods with lower case counts.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.Funding StatementData collection and analysis were conducted as part of COVID-19 emergency response. No external funds were used.Author DeclarationsI confirm all relevant ethical guidelines have been followed, and any necessary IRB and/or ethics committee approvals have been obtained.YesThe details of the IRB/oversight body that provided approval or exemption for the research described are given below:This activity was reviewed by CDC and was determined to be non-research, public health emergency response, consistent with applicable U.S. federal law and CDC policy.All necessary patient/participant consent has been obtained and the appropriate institutional forms have been archived.YesI understand that all clinical trials and any other prospective interventional studies must be registered with an ICMJE-approved registry, such as ClinicalTrials.gov. I confirm that any such study reported in the manuscript has been registered and the trial registration ID is provided (note: if posting a prospective study registered retrospectively, please provide a statement in the trial ID field explaining why the study was not registered in advance).YesI have followed all appropriate research reporting guidelines and uploaded the relevant EQUATOR Network research reporting checklist(s) and other pertinent material as supplementary files, if applicable.YesData were compiled from Provincial-Level Health Commission Websites Containing Publicly Available Reported Data on COVID-19 National Health Commission http://weekly.chinacdc.cn/news/TrackingtheEpidemic.htm Anhui http://wjw.ah.gov.cn/ Beijing http://wjw.beijing.gov.cn/xwzx_20031/xwfb/ Chongqing http://wsjkw.cq.gov.cn/ Fujian http://wjw.fujian.gov.cn/ Gansu http://wsjk.gansu.gov.cn/ Guangdong http://wsjkw.gd.gov.cn/zwyw_yqxx/index.html Guangxi http://wsjkw.gxzf.gov.cn/gzdt/bt/ Guizhou http://www.gzhfpc.gov.cn/ Hainan http://wst.hainan.gov.cn/swjw/index.html Hebei http://wsjkw.hebei.gov.cn/ Heilongjiang http://wsjkw.hlj.gov.cn/ Henan http://www.hnwsjsw.gov.cn/ Hubei http://wjw.hubei.gov.cn/fbjd/dtyw/ Hunan http://wjw.hunan.gov.cn/ Inner Mongolia http://wjw.nmg.gov.cn/ Jiangsu http://wjw.jiangsu.gov.cn/ Jiangxi http://hc.jiangxi.gov.cn/ Jilin http://wsjkw.jl.gov.cn/ Liaoning http://wsjk.ln.gov.cn/ Ningxia http://wsjkw.nx.gov.cn/ Qinghai https://wsjkw.qinghai.gov.cn/ Shaanxi http://sx jw.shaanxi.gov.cn/ Shandong http://wsjkw.shandong.gov.cn Shanghai http://wsjkw.sh.gov.cn/xwfb/index.html Shanxi http://wjw.shanxi.gov.cn/ Sichuan http://wsjkw.sc.gov.cn/scwsjkw/szyw/tygl.shtml Tianjin http://wsjs.tj.gov.cn/ Tibet http://wjw.xizang.gov.cn Xinjiang http://xjhfpc.gov.cn Yunnan http://ynswsjkw.yn.gov.cn/wjwWebsite/web/index Zhejiang http://www.zjwjw.gov.cn/col/col1202101/index.html

This article summarizes what is currently known about the 2019 novel coronavirus and offers interim guidance.

The global COVID-19 response focused heavily on nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) until vaccines became available. Even where vaccination coverage is low, over time governments have become increasingly reluctant to use NPIs. Inequities in vaccine and treatment accessibility and coverage, differences in vaccine effectiveness, waning immunity, and immune-escape variants of concern of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) reinforce the long-term need for mitigation. Initially, the concept of NPIs, and mitigation more broadly, was focused on prevention of SARS-CoV-2 transmission; however, mitigation can and has done more than prevent transmission. It has been used to address the clinical dimensions of the pandemic as well. The authors propose an expanded conceptualization of mitigation that encompasses a continuum of community and clinical mitigation measures that can help reduce infection, illness, and death from COVID-19. It can further help governments balance these efforts and address the disruptions in essential health services, increased violence, adverse mental health outcomes, and orphanhood precipitated by the pandemic and by NPIs themselves. The COVID-19 pandemic response revealed the benefits of a holistic and layered mitigation approach to public health emergencies from the outset. Lessons learned can inform the next phases of the current pandemic response and planning for future public health emergencies.

Confronted with a novel coronavirus, countries worldwide were forced to rapidly adjust their public health systems, platforms, and tools to respond to COVID-19. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and its global partners adapted health systems and programs originally developed for other purposes, such as controlling the HIV/AIDS pandemic through the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), Global Health Security Agenda implementation, influenza surveillance, and vaccine-preventable disease elimination and eradication. This special supplement of Emerging Infectious Diseases highlights responses to the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic from >80 countries, spanning 6 continents and representing >130 organizations. This article summarizes global adaptations of core public health functions during COVID-19: surveillance, information, and laboratory systems; workforce, institutional, and public health capacity; and clinical and health services delivery.

Early warning and response surveillance (EWARS) systems were widely used during the early COVID-19 response. Evaluating the effectiveness of EWARS systems is critical to ensuring global health security. We describe the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) global COVID-19 EWARS (CDC EWARS) system and the resources CDC used to gather, manage, and analyze publicly available data during the prepandemic period. We evaluated data quality and validity by measuring reporting completeness and compared these with data from Johns Hopkins University, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and indicator-based data from the World Health Organization. CDC EWARS was integral in guiding CDC's early COVID-19 response but was labor-intensive and became less informative as case-level data decreased and the pandemic evolved. However, CDC EWARS data were similar to those reported by other organizations, confirming the validity of each system and suggesting collaboration could improve EWARS systems during future pandemics.

Melioidosis, a potentially fatal infectious disease of humans and animals, including nonhuman primates (NHPs), is caused by the high-consequence pathogen Burkholderia pseudomallei. This environmental bacterium is found in the soil and water of tropical regions, such as Southeast Asia, where melioidosis is endemic. The global movement of humans and animals can introduce B. pseudomallei into nonendemic regions of the United States, where environmental conditions could allow establishment of the organism. Approximately 60% of NHPs imported into the United States originate in countries considered endemic for melioidosis. To prevent the introduction of infectious agents to the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) requires newly imported NHPs to be quarantined for at least 31 d, during which time their health is closely monitored. Most diseases of public health concern that are transmissible from imported NHPs have relatively short incubation periods that fall within the 31-d quarantine period. However, animals infected with B. pseudomallei may appear healthy for months to years before showing signs of illness, during which time they can shed the organism into the environment. Melioidosis presents diagnostic challenges because it causes nonspecific clinical signs, serologic screening can produce unreliable results, and culture isolates are often misidentified on rapid commercial testing systems. Here, we present a case of melioidosis in a cynomolgus macaque (Macaca fascicularis) that developed a subcutaneous abscess after importation from Cambodia to the United States. The bacterial isolate from the abscess was initially misidentified on a commercial test. This case emphasizes the possibility of melioidosis in NHPs imported from endemic countries and its associated diagnostic challenges. If melioidosis is suspected, diagnostic samples and culture isolates should be submitted to a laboratory in the CDC Laboratory Response Network for conclusive identification and characterization of the pathogen.

Anopheles mosquitoes are the vectors of human malaria, a disease responsible for a significant burden of global disease and over half a million deaths in 2020. Here, methods using a time series of cost-free Earth Observation (EO) data, 45,844 in situ mosquito monitoring captures, and the cloud processing platform Google Earth Engine are developed to identify the biogeographical variables driving the abundance and distribution of three malaria vectors—Anopheles gambiae s.l., An. funestus, and An. paludis—in two highly endemic areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. EO-derived topographical and time series land surface temperature and rainfall data sets are analysed using Random Forests (RFs) to identify their relative importance in relation to the abundance of the three mosquito species, and they show how spatial and temporal distributions vary by site, by mosquito species, and by month. The observed relationships differed between species and study areas, with the overall number of biogeographical variables identified as important in relation to species abundance, being 30 for An. gambiae s.l. and An. funestus and 26 for An. paludis. Results indicate rainfall and land surface temperature to consistently be the variables of highest importance, with higher rainfall resulting in greater mosquito abundance through the creation of pools acting as mosquito larval habitats; however, proportional coverage of forest and grassland, as well as proximity to forests, are also consistently identified as important. Predictive application of the RF models generated monthly abundance maps for each species, identifying both spatial and temporal hot-spots of high abundance and, by proxy, increased malaria infection risk. Results indicate greater temporal variability in An. gambiae s.l. and An. paludis abundances in response to seasonal rainfall, whereas An. funestus is generally more temporally stable, with maximum predicted abundances of 122 for An. gambiae s.l., 283 for An. funestus, and 120 for An. paludis. Model validation produced R2 values of 0.717 for An. gambiae s.l., 0.861 for An. funestus, and 0.448 for An. paludis. Monthly abundance values were extracted for 248,089 individual buildings, demonstrating how species abundance, and therefore biting pressure, varies spatially and seasonally on a building-to-building basis. These methods advance previous broader regional mosquito mapping and can provide a crucial tool for designing bespoke control programs and for improving the targeting of resource-constrained disease control activities to reduce malaria transmission and subsequent mortality in endemic regions, in line with the WHO’s ‘High Burden to High Impact’ initiative. The developed method was designed to be widely applicable to other areas, where suitable in situ mosquito monitoring data are available. Training materials were also made freely available in multiple languages, enabling wider uptake and implementation of the methods by users without requiring prior expertise in EO. © 2022 by the authors.

Oral antivirals for COVID-19 can be game changers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Challenges that may hinder current and future oral antiviral rollouts span use in special populations, drug-drug and herb-drug interactions, adverse events, development of resistance, black markets, and equity in access and prescribing. Future antivirals may address some of these barriers; however, health systems around the world should be equipped to receive and administer COVID-19 oral antivirals. Improvements in manufacturing capacity, community engagement, capacity for testing and linkage to care, and systems for surveillance and safety monitoring could "change the game" for LMICs, irrespective of any specific antiviral drug. Investments in health care infrastructure can promote resilience, not only for COVID-19 but also for future local and global health crises.

Anthrax-causing members of Bacillus cereus sensu lato (s.l.) pose a serious threat to public health. While most anthrax-causing strains resemble B. anthracis phenotypically, rare cases of anthrax-like illness caused by strains resembling "B. cereus" have been reported. Here, whole-genome sequencing was used to characterize three B. cereus s.l. isolates associated with two 2020 welder anthrax cases in the United States, which resembled "B. cereus" phenotypically. Comparison of the three genomes sequenced here to all publicly available, high-quality B. cereus s.l. genomes (n = 2890 total genomes) demonstrated that genomes associated with each case effectively belonged to separate species at the conventional 95% average nucleotide identity prokaryotic species threshold. Two PubMLST sequence type 78 (ST78) genomes affiliated with a case in Louisiana were most closely related to B. tropicus and possessed genes encoding the Bps exopolysaccharide capsule, as well as hemolysin BL (Hbl) and cytotoxin K (CytK). Comparatively, a ST108 genome associated with a case in Texas was most closely related to B. anthracis; however, like other anthrax-causing strains most closely related to B. anthracis, this genome did not possess Bps-, Hbl-, or CytK-encoding genes. Overall, results presented here provide insights into the evolution of anthrax-causing B. cereus s.l.

BACKGROUND: Anthrax is a zoonotic infection caused by the bacteria Bacillus anthracis. Humans acquire cutaneous infection through contact with infected animals or animal products. On May 6, 2018, three cows suddenly died on a farm in Kiruhura District. Shortly afterwards, a sub-county chief in Kiruhura District received reports of humans with suspected cutaneous anthrax in the same district. The patients had reportedly participated in the butchery and consumption of meat from the dead cows. We investigated to determine the magnitude of the outbreak, identify exposures associated with illness, and suggest evidence-based control measures. METHODS: We conducted a retrospective cohort study among persons whose households received any of the cow meat. We defined a suspected human cutaneous anthrax case as new skin lesions (e.g., papule, vesicle, or eschar) in a resident of Kiruhura District from 1 to 26 May 2018. A confirmed case was a suspected case with a lesion testing positive for B. anthracis by polymerase chain reaction (PCR). We identified cases through medical record review at Engari Health Centre and active case finding in the community. RESULTS: Of the 95 persons in the cohort, 22 were case-patients (2 confirmed and 20 suspected, 0 fatal cases) and 73 were non-case household members. The epidemic curve indicated multiple point-source exposures starting on May 6, when the dead cows were butchered. Among households receiving cow meat, participating in slaughtering (RR = 5.3, 95% CI 3.2-8.3), skinning (RR = 4.7, 95% CI = 3.1-7.0), cleaning waste (RR = 4.5, 95% CI = 3.1-6.6), and carrying meat (RR = 3.9, 95% CI = 2.2-7.1) increased the risk of infection. CONCLUSIONS: This cutaneous anthrax outbreak was caused by handling infected animal carcasses. We suggested to the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries to strengthen surveillance for possible veterinary anthrax and ensure that communities do not consume carcasses of livestock that died suddenly. We also suggested that the Ministry of Health equip health facilities with first-line antibiotics for community members during outbreaks.

Abstract Bacillus cereus group bacteria containing the anthrax toxin genes can cause fatal anthrax pneumonia in welders. Two welder's anthrax cases identified in 2020 were investigated to determine the source of each patient's exposure. Environmental sampling was performed at locations where each patient had recent exposure to soil and dust. Samples were tested for the anthrax toxin genes by real-time PCR, and culture was performed on positive samples to identify whether any environmental isolates matched the patient's clinical isolate. A total of 185 environmental samples were collected in investigation A for patient A and 108 samples in investigation B for patient B. All samples from investigation B were real-time PCR-negative, but 14 (8%) samples from investigation A were positive, including 10 from patient A's worksite and 4 from his work-related clothing and gear. An isolate genetically matching the one recovered from patient A was successfully cultured from a worksite soil sample. All welder's anthrax cases should be investigated to determine the source of exposure, which may be linked to their worksite. Welding and metalworking employers should consider conducting a workplace hazard assessment and implementing controls to reduce the risk of occupationally associated illnesses including welder's anthrax.

The SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant emerged shortly after COVID-19 vaccines became available in 2021. We describe SARS-CoV-2 breakthrough infections in a highly vaccinated, well-monitored US Embassy community in Kampala, Uganda. Defining breakthrough infection rates in highly vaccinated populations can help determine public health messaging, guidance, and policy globally.

While Bacillus cereus typically causes opportunistic infections in humans, within the last three decades, severe and fatal infections caused by isolates of the B. cereus group harboring anthrax toxin genes have been reported in the United States. From 1994 to 2020, seven cases of anthrax-like illness resulting from these isolates have been identified. With one exception, the cases have occurred in the Gulf States region of the United States among metalworkers. We aimed to develop an ecological niche model (ENM) to estimate a spatial area conducive to the survival of these organisms based on the presence of known human infections and environmental variables. The estimated ecological niche for B. cereus was modeled with the maximum entropy algorithm (Maxent). Environmental variables contributing most to the model were soil characteristics (cation exchange capacity, carbon content, soil pH), temperature, enhanced vegetation index (EVI), and land surface temperature (LST). Much of the suitable environments were located throughout the Gulf Coast Plain, Texas Backland Prairies, East Central Texas Plains, Edwards Plateau, Cross Timbers, Mississippi Alluvial Plain, and Central Great Plains. These findings may provide additional guidance to narrow potential risk areas to efficiently communicate messages to metalworkers and potentially identify individuals who may benefit from the anthrax vaccine.

On January 6, 2022, a cluster of COVID-19 cases* caused by the Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, was detected in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Hong Kong), resulting in the territory's fifth wave of COVID-19 cases (1). This wave peaked on March 4, 2022, with 8,764 COVID-19 cases per million population (2), resulting in a total of 1,049,959 cases and 5,906 COVID-19-associated deaths reported to the Hong Kong Department of Health during January 6-March 21, 2022.() Throughout this period, the COVID-19 mortality rate in Hong Kong (37.7 per million population) was among the highest reported worldwide since the COVID-19 pandemic began (3). Publicly available data on age-specific vaccination coverage in Hong Kong with a 2-dose primary vaccination series (with either Sinovac-CoronaVac [Sinovac], an inactivated COVID-19 viral vaccine, recommended for persons aged 3 years or BNT162b2 [Pfizer-BioNTech], an mRNA vaccine, for persons aged 5 years), as of December 23, 2021,()(,)() and COVID-19 mortality during January 6-March 21, 2022, were analyzed. By December 23, 2021, 67% of vaccine-eligible persons in Hong Kong had received 1 dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, 64% had received 2 doses, and 5% had received a booster dose. Among persons aged 60 years, these proportions were 52%, 49%, and 7%, respectively. Among those aged 60 years, vaccination coverage declined with age: 48% of persons aged 70-79 years had received 1 dose, 45% received 2 doses, and 7% had received a booster, and among those aged 80 years, 20%, 18%, and 2% had received 1 dose, 2 doses, and a booster dose, respectively. Among 5,906 COVID-19 deaths reported, 5,655 (96%) occurred in persons aged 60 years**; among these decedents, 3,970 (70%) were unvaccinated, 18% (1,023) had received 1 vaccine dose, and 12% (662) had received 2 doses. The overall rates of COVID-19-associated mortality among persons aged 60 years who were unvaccinated, who had received 1 COVID-19 vaccine dose, and who had received 2 vaccine doses were 10,076, 1,099, and 473 per million population, respectively; the risk for COVID-19-associated death among unvaccinated persons was 21.3 times that among recipients of 2-3 doses in this age group. The high overall mortality rate during the ongoing 2022 Hong Kong Omicron COVID-19 outbreak is being driven by deaths among unvaccinated persons aged 60 years. Efforts to identify and address gaps in age-specific vaccination coverage can help prevent high mortality from COVID-19, especially among persons aged 60 years.

Since 1997, nine cases of severe pneumonia, caused by species within the B. cereus group and with a presentation similar to that of inhalation anthrax, were reported in seemingly immunocompetent metalworkers, with most being welders. In seven of the cases, isolates were found to harbor a plasmid similar to the B. anthracis pXO1 that encodes anthrax toxins. In this paper, we review the literature on the B. cereus group spp. pneumonia among welders and other metalworkers, which we term welder’s anthrax. We describe the epidemiology, including more information on two cases of welder’s anthrax in 2020. We also describe the health risks associated with welding, potential mechanisms of infection and pathological damage, prevention measures according to the hierarchy of controls, and clinical and public health considerations. Considering occupational risk factors and controlling exposure to welding fumes and gases among workers, according to the hierarchy of controls, should help prevent disease transmission in the workplace. © 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.

COVID-19 vaccines are important tools to protect populations from severe disease and death.Among persons aged ≥60 years in Hong Kong, 49%, had received ≥2 doses of a COVID-19 vaccine, and vaccination coverage declined with age. During January-March 2022, reported COVID-19-associated deaths rose rapidly in Hong Kong. Among these deaths, 96% occurred in persons aged ≥60 years; within this age group, the risk for death was 20 times lower among those who were fully vaccinated compared with those who were unvaccinated.Efforts to identify and address gaps in age-specific vaccination coverage can help prevent high mortality from COVID-19, especially in older adults.Copyright and License information: Editorial Office of CCDCW, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2022.

Through active surveillance and contact tracing from outpatients, we aimed to identify and characterize SARS-CoV-2 variants circulating in Porto Velho, Rondnia a city in the Brazilian Amazon. As part of a prospective cohort, we gather information from 2,506 individuals among COVID-19 patients and household contacts. Epidemiological data, nasopharyngeal swabs, and blood samples were collected from all participants. Nasopharyngeal swabs were tested for antigen rapid diagnostic test and reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) followed by genomic sequencing. Blood samples underwent ELISA testing for IgA, IgG and IgM antibody levels. From 757 specimens sequenced, three were identified as Mu variant, none of the individuals carrying this variant had travel history in the previous 15 days before diagnosis. One case was asymptomatic and two presented mild symptoms. Two infected individuals from different household caring virus with additional amino acid substitutions ORF7a P45L and ORF1a T1055A compared to the Mu virus reference sequence. One patient presented IgG levels. Our results highlight that genomic surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 variants can assist in detecting the emergency of SARS-CoV-2 variants in the community, prior to its identification in other parts of the country. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

OBJECTIVE: Contact tracing has been used in China and several other countries in the WHO Western Pacific Region as part of the COVID-19 response. We describe COVID-19 cases and the number of contacts traced and quarantined per case as part of COVID-19 emergency public health response activities in China. METHODS: We abstracted publicly available, online aggregated data published in daily COVID-19 situational reports by China's National Health Commission and provincial health commissions between 20 January and 29 February 2020. The number of new contacts traced by report date was computed as the difference between total contacts traced in consecutive reports. A proxy for the number of contacts traced per case was computed as the number of new contacts traced divided by the number of new cases. RESULTS: During the study period, China reported 80 968 new COVID-19 cases and 659 899 contacts. In Hubei Province, there were 67 608 cases and 264 878 contacts, representing 83% and 40% of the total, respectively. Non-Hubei provinces reported tracing 1.5 times more contacts than Hubei Province; the weekly number of contacts traced per case was also higher in non-Hubei provinces than in Hubei Province and increased from 17.2 in epidemiological week 4 to 115.7 in epidemiological week 9. DISCUSSION: More contacts per case were reported from areas and periods with lower COVID-19 case counts. With other non-pharmaceutical interventions used in China, contact tracing and quarantining large numbers of potentially infected contacts probably contributed to reducing SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

High case counts after the Gamma (P. 1) variant of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 emerged in Brazil raised concerns that previously infected persons might become reinfected. Investigation of a cluster of coronavirus disease cases in Parintins, in the Brazilian Amazon, suggested household transmission but did not identify high rates of reinfection.

In 2020, CDC confirmed two cases of pneumonia (one fatal) in welders caused by rare Bacillus cereus group bacteria containing anthrax toxin genes typically associated with Bacillus anthracis. B. cereus group bacteria are gram-positive facultative anaerobes, often toxin-producing, that are ubiquitous in the environment and reside naturally in soil and dust (1). B. cereus can also be found in food, and although infection typically causes illnesses characterized by diarrhea or vomiting, B. cereus can have other clinical manifestations (e.g., pulmonary, ocular, or cutaneous). Among seven persons in the United States reported to be infected with B. cereus group bacteria containing anthrax toxin genes resulting in pneumonia since 1994, five patients died and two had critical illness with prolonged hospitalization and recovery (2–5). All persons with pneumonia were welders or other metalworkers who had worked in Louisiana or Texas (Table). In addition to the seven pneumonia cases, a cutaneous infection with B. cereus group bacteria containing anthrax toxin genes has been reported in a patient with an anthrax eschar in Florida.†

OBJECTIVES: The objective of the study was to characterize the timing and trends of select mitigation policies, changes in community mobility, and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) epidemiology in Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. STUDY DESIGN: Prospective abstraction of publicly available mitigation policies obtained from media reports and government websites. METHODS: Data analyzed include seven kinds of mitigation policies (mass gathering restrictions, international travel restrictions, passenger screening, traveler isolation/quarantine, school closures, business closures, and domestic movement restrictions) implemented between January 1 and April 26, 2020, changes in selected measures of community mobility assessed by Google Community Mobility Reports data, and COVID-19 epidemiology in Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. RESULTS: During the study period, community mobility decreased in Australia, Japan, and Singapore; there was little change in Hong Kong. The largest declines in mobility were seen in places that enforced mitigation policies. Across settings, transit-associated mobility declined the most and workplace-associated mobility the least. Singapore experienced an increase in cases despite the presence of stay-at-home orders, as migrant workers living in dormitories faced challenges to safely quarantine. CONCLUSIONS: Public policies may have different impacts on mobility and transmission of severe acute respiratory coronavirus-2 transmission. When enacting mitigation policies, decision makers should consider the possible impact of enforcement measures, the influence on transmission of factors other than movement restrictions, and the differential impact of mitigation policies on subpopulations.

Background: Accurate SARS-CoV-2 serological assays are critical for COVID-19 serosurveillance. However, previous studies have indicated possible cross-reactivity of these assays, including in malaria-endemic areas.Methods: We tested 213 well-characterized pre-pandemic samples from Nigeria using two SARS-CoV-2 serological assays: Abbott Architect IgG and Euroimmun NCP IgG assay, both targeting SARS-CoV-2 nucleocapsid protein. To assess antibody binding strength, an avidity assay was performed on these samples and on plasma from SARS-CoV-2 PCR-positive persons.Results: Thirteen (6.1%) of 212 samples run on the Abbott assay and 38 (17.8%) of 213 run on the Euroimmun assay were positive. Anti-Plasmodium IgG levels were significantly higher among false-positives for both Abbott and Euroimmun; no association was found with active P. falciparum infection. An avidity assay using various concentratIons of urea wash in the Euroimmun assay reduced loosely-bound IgG: of 37 positive/borderline pre-pandemic samples, 46%, 86%, 89%, and 97% became negative using 2M, 4M, 5M, and 8M urea washes, respectively. The wash slightly reduced avidity of antibodies from SARS-CoV-2 patients within 28 days of PCR confirmation; thereafter avidity increased for all urea concentrations except 8M.Conclusions: This validation found moderate to substantial cross-reactivity on two SARS-CoV-2 serological assays using samples from a malaria-endemic setting. A simple urea wash appeared to alleviate issues of cross-reactivity.

Public health travel restrictions (PHTR) are crucial measures during communicable disease outbreaks to prevent transmission during commercial airline travel and mitigate cross-border importation and spread. We evaluated PHTR implementation for US citizens on the Diamond Princess during its coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak in Japan in February 2020 to explore how PHTR reduced importation of COVID-19 to the United States during the early phase of disease containment. Using PHTR required substantial collaboration among the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, other US government agencies, the cruise line, and public health authorities in Japan. Original US PHTR removal criteria were modified to reflect international testing protocols and enable removal of PHTR for persons who recovered from illness. The impact of PHTR on epidemic trajectory depends on the risk for transmission during travel and geographic spread of disease. Lessons learned from the Diamond Princess outbreak provide critical information for future PHTR use.

Indicators for the measurement of programmes for the primary prevention of HIV are less aligned than indicators for HIV treatment, which results in a high burden of data collection, often without a clear vision for its use. As new evidence becomes available, the opportunity arises to critically evaluate the way countries and global bodies monitor HIV prevention programmes by incorporating emerging data on the strength of the evidence linking various factors with HIV acquisition, and by working to streamline indicators across stakeholders to reduce burdens on health-care systems. Programmes are also using new approaches, such as targeting specific sexual networks that might require non-traditional approaches to measurement. Technological advances can support these new directions and provide opportunities to use real-time analytics and new data sources to more effectively understand and adapt HIV prevention programmes to reflect population movement, risks, and an evolving epidemic.

BACKGROUND: The Diamond Princess cruise ship was the site of a large outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Of 437 Americans and their travel companions on the ship, 114 (26%) tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). METHODS: We interviewed 229 American passengers and crew after disembarkation following a ship-based quarantine to identify risk factors for infection and characterize transmission onboard the ship. RESULTS: The attack rate for passengers in single-person cabins or without infected cabinmates was 18% (58/329), compared with 63% (27/43) for those sharing a cabin with an asymptomatic infected cabinmate, and 81% (25/31) for those with a symptomatic infected cabinmate. Whole genome sequences from specimens from passengers who shared cabins clustered together. Of 66 SARS-CoV-2-positive American travelers with complete symptom information, 14 (21%) were asymptomatic while on the ship. Among SARS-CoV-2-positive Americans, 10 (9%) required intensive care, of whom 7 were ≥70 years. CONCLUSION: Our findings highlight the high risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission on cruise ships. High rates of SARS-CoV-2 positivity in cabinmates of individuals with asymptomatic infections suggest that triage by symptom status in shared quarters is insufficient to halt transmission. A high rate of intensive care unit admission among older individuals complicates the prospect of future cruise travel during the pandemic, given typical cruise passenger demographics. The magnitude and severe outcomes of this outbreak were major factors contributing to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's decision to halt cruise ship travel in U.S. waters in March 2020.

Background Scant data are available about global patterns of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) spread and global epidemiology of early confirmed cases of COVID-19 outside mainland China. We describe the global spread of SARS-CoV-2 and characteristics of COVID-19 cases and clusters before the characterisation of COVID-19 as a pandemic. METHODS: Cases of COVID-19 reported between Dec 31, 2019, and March 10, 2020 (ie, the prepandemic period), were identified daily from official websites, press releases, press conference transcripts, and social media feeds of national ministries of health or other government agencies. Case characteristics, travel history, and exposures to other cases were abstracted. Countries with at least one case were classified as affected. Early cases were defined as those among the first 100 cases reported from each country. Later cases were defined as those after the first 100 cases. We analysed reported travel to affected countries among the first case reported from each country outside mainland China, demographic and exposure characteristics among cases with age or sex information, and cluster frequencies and sizes by transmission settings. FINDINGS: Among the first case reported from each of 99 affected countries outside of mainland China, 75 (76%) had recent travel to affected countries; 60 (61%) had travelled to China, Italy, or Iran. Among 1200 cases with age or sex information, 874 (73%) were early cases. Among 762 early cases with age information, the median age was 51 years (IQR 35-63); 25 (3%) of 762 early cases occurred in children younger than 18 years. Overall, 21 (2%) of 1200 cases were in health-care workers and none were in pregnant women. 101 clusters were identified, of which the most commonly identified transmission setting was households (76 [75%]; mean 2·6 cases per cluster [range 2-7]), followed by non-health-care occupational settings (14 [14%]; mean 4·3 cases per cluster [2-14]), and community gatherings (11 [11%]; mean 14·2 cases per cluster [4-36]). INTERPRETATION: Cases with travel links to China, Italy, or Iran accounted for almost two-thirds of the first reported COVID-19 cases from affected countries. Among cases with age information available, most were among adults aged 18 years and older. Although there were many clusters of household transmission among early cases, clusters in occupational or community settings tended to be larger, supporting a possible role for physical distancing to slow the progression of SARS-CoV-2 spread. FUNDING: None.

Objective To evaluate changes in Ebola-related knowledge, attitudes and prevention practices during the Sierra Leone outbreak between 2014 and 2015. Methods Four cluster surveys were conducted: two before the outbreak peak (3499 participants) and two after (7104 participants). We assessed the effect of temporal and geographical factors on 16 knowledge, attitude and practice outcomes. Findings Fourteen of 16 knowledge, attitude and prevention practice outcomes improved across all regions from before to after the outbreak peak. The proportion of respondents willing to: (i) welcome Ebola survivors back into the community increased from 60.0% to 89.4% (adjusted odds ratio, aOR: 6.0; 95% confidence interval, CI: 3.9–9.1); and (ii) wait for a burial team following a relative’s death increased from 86.0% to 95.9% (aOR: 4.4; 95% CI: 3.2–6.0). The proportion avoiding unsafe traditional burials increased from 27.3% to 48.2% (aOR: 3.1; 95% CI: 2.4–4.2) and the proportion believing spiritual healers can treat Ebola decreased from 15.9% to 5.0% (aOR: 0.2; 95% CI: 0.1–0.3). The likelihood respondents would wait for burial teams increased more in high-transmission (aOR: 6.2; 95% CI: 4.2–9.1) than low-transmission (aOR: 2.3; 95% CI: 1.4–3.8) regions. Self-reported avoidance of physical contact with corpses increased in high but not low-transmission regions, aOR: 1.9 (95% CI: 1.4–2.5) and aOR: 0.8 (95% CI: 0.6–1.2), respectively. Conclusion Ebola knowledge, attitudes and prevention practices improved during the Sierra Leone outbreak, especially in high-transmission regions. Behaviourally-targeted community engagement should be prioritized early during outbreaks.