As part of the response to the highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus outbreak in U.S. cattle and poultry and the associated human cases, CDC and partners are monitoring influenza A virus levels and detection of the H5 subtype in wastewater. Among 48 states and the District of Columbia that performed influenza A testing of wastewater during May 12-July 13, 2024, a weekly average of 309 sites in 38 states had sufficient data for analysis, and 11 sites in four states reported high levels of influenza A virus. H5 subtype testing was conducted at 203 sites in 41 states, with H5 detections at 24 sites in nine states. For each detection or high level, CDC and state and local health departments evaluated data from other influenza surveillance systems and partnered with wastewater utilities and agriculture departments to investigate potential sources. Among the four states with high influenza A virus levels detected in wastewater, three states had corresponding evidence of human influenza activity from other influenza surveillance systems. Among the 24 sites with H5 detections, 15 identified animal sources within the sewershed or adjacent county, including eight milk-processing inputs. Data from these early investigations can help health officials optimize the use of wastewater surveillance during the upcoming respiratory illness season.

BACKGROUND: COVID-19 screening testing (ST) can detect asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic cases, allowing for prompt identification of cases and close contacts. This study examined parents' and school staffs' knowledge and attitudes toward to a pilot school-based ST program in a school district in southern Arizona. METHODS: In May 2021, online surveys to parents and school staff were administered to examine attitudes toward ST and impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Unweighted percent estimates were calculated, and bivariate differences were examined by demographics. Associations were assessed using chi-square tests and logistic regression. RESULTS: The survey had response rates of 10% (606/6085) and 22% (187/849) among parents and staff, respectively. Approximately one-third of responding parents (35%) would or already allow their child to participate in school-based ST, 37% would not participate; 28% were unsure. Among responding staff, 46% would or already participate in ST, 33% would not; 21% were unsure. The top concern (38%) among responding staff was taking job-related leave if testing positive. CONCLUSION: Schools work to balance the needs of students, families, and staff by implementing supportive and flexible policies and practices founded on buy-in and acceptance from their communities.

OBJECTIVE: Despite widespread availability of COVID-19 vaccines, millions of Americans have not received the recommended vaccine doses. In the District of Columbia (DC), COVID-19 vaccination rates are lowest among residents who are Non-Hispanic (NH) Black and among school-aged children. We assessed COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy among staff and parents of students in DC K-12 public and public charter schools. METHODS: We conducted a telephone-based survey from February 6 to April 16, 2022 to staff, students, and parents of students who participated in school-based COVID-19 screening testing. COVID-19-related survey items included: vaccination status, reasons for not getting vaccinated, perceived vaccine access, and trusted COVID-19 information sources. Utilizing time-to-event analyses, we evaluated differences across demographic groups. RESULTS: The interview response rate was 25.8% (308/1193). Most unvaccinated participants were NH Black and ages 5 to 11 years. Median time from vaccine eligibility to uptake was 236 days for NH Black participants vs. 10 days for NH White participants. Vaccine safety was the top concern among unvaccinated participants. Government and healthcare providers were the most trusted COVID-19 information sources. CONCLUSIONS: Differences in timing of vaccine uptake among respondents and greater vaccine hesitancy among NH Black participants compared to other racial/ethnic groups highlight a need for continued tailored outreach and communication using trusted sources to convey the importance, benefits, and safety of COVID-19 vaccination.

Improving ventilation has been one of several COVID-19 prevention strategies implemented by kindergarten through grade 12 (K-12) schools to stay open for safe in-person learning. Because transmission of SARS-CoV-2 occurs through inhalation of infectious viral particles, it is important to reduce the concentration of and exposure time to infectious aerosols (1-3). CDC examined reported ventilation improvement strategies among U.S. K-12 public school districts using telephone survey data collected during August-December 2022. Maintaining continuous airflow through school buildings during active hours was the most frequently reported strategy by school districts (50.7%); 33.9% of school districts reported replacement or upgrade of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems; 28.0% reported installation or use of in-room air cleaners with high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters; and 8.2% reported installation of ultraviolet (UV) germicidal irradiation (UVGI) devices, which use UV light to kill airborne pathogens, including bacteria and viruses. School districts in National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) city locales, the West U.S. Census Bureau region, and those designated by U.S. Census Bureau Small Area Income Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) as high-poverty districts reported the highest percentages of HVAC system upgrades and HEPA-filtered in-room air cleaner use, although 28%-60% of all responses were unknown or missing. Federal funding remains available to school districts to support ventilation improvements. Public health departments can encourage K-12 school officials to use available funding to improve ventilation and help reduce transmission of respiratory diseases in K-12 settings.

OBJECTIVE: Globally, COVID-19 has affected how children learn. We evaluated the impact of Test to Stay (TTS) on secondary and tertiary transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and potential impact on in-person learning in four school districts in the United States from September 13-November 19, 2021. METHODS: Implementation of TTS varied across school districts. Data on index cases, school-based close contacts, TTS participation, and testing results were obtained from four school districts in diverse geographic regions. Descriptive statistics, secondary and tertiary attack risk, and a theoretical estimate of impact on in-person learning were calculated. RESULTS: Fifty-one schools in four school districts reported 374 COVID-19 index cases and 2,520 school-based close contacts eligible for TTS. The proportion participating in TTS ranged from 22%-79%. By district, the secondary attack risk (SAR) and tertiary attack risk (TAR) among TTS participants ranged between 2.2%-11.1% and 0%-17.6%, respectively. Nine clusters were identified among secondary cases and two among tertiary cases. The theoretical maximum number of days of in-person learning saved by using TTS was 976-4,650 days across jurisdictions. CONCLUSIONS: TTS preserves in-person learning days. Decisions to participate in TTS may have been influenced by ease of access to testing, communication between schools and families, testing logistics, and school resources. TAR determination became more complicated when numbers of close contacts increased. Minimizing exposure through continued implementation of layered prevention strategies is imperative. To ensure adequate resources for implementation of TTS, community transmission levels should be considered.

The highly transmissible SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant led to increased hospitalizations, staffing shortages, and increased school closures. To reduce spread in school-aged children during the Omicron peak, the District of Columbia implemented a test-to-return strategy in public and public charter schools after a two-week break from in-person learning.

PURPOSE: To investigate HIV transmission potential from a cluster of HIV infections among men who have sex with men to persons who inject drugs in 15 West Virginia counties. These counties were previously identified as highly vulnerable to rapid HIV dissemination through injection drug use (IDU) associated with high levels of opioid misuse. METHODS: We interviewed persons with 2017 HIV diagnoses about past-year risk behaviors and elicited sexual, IDU, and social contacts. We tested contacts for HIV and assessed risk behaviors. To determine HIV transmission potential from persons with 2017 diagnoses to persons who inject drugs, we assessed viral suppression status, HIV status of contacts, and IDU risk behaviors of persons living with HIV and contacts. RESULTS: We interviewed 78 persons: 39 with 2017 diagnoses and 39 contacts. Overall, 13/78 (17%) injected drugs in the past year. Of 19 persons with 2017 diagnoses and detectable virus, 9 (47%) had more than or equal to 1 sexual or IDU contacts of negative or unknown HIV status. During the past year, 2/9 had injected drugs and shared equipment, and 1/9 had more than or equal to 1 partner who did so. CONCLUSIONS: We identified IDU risk behavior among persons with 2017 diagnoses and their contacts. West Virginia HIV prevention programs should continue to give high priority to IDU harm reduction.

From January to July 2017, the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (WV DHHR) identified 10 cases of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection in three counties where HIV diagnoses typically range from six to 13 annually (1). In these counties, the spread of bloodborne pathogens via injection drug use (IDU) is a major public health concern, and risk reduction programs offering syringe services were not available, although they were available in other counties (2,3). As of July 2017, nine of the 10 persons identified were men who have sex with men (MSM), two of whom had reported a prior history of IDU. Coinfections with syphilis (five patients), hepatitis B virus (three), and hepatitis C virus (HCV) (two) were also documented. By September 2017, the sexual or injection contacts named by persons in the investigation expanded the original assessment area to encompass 15 counties, 14 of which were among the nation’s top 220 counties thought to be particularly vulnerable to rapid spread of HIV and HCV infections via IDU (4). The investigated counties share some characteristics with rural Scott County, Indiana, where an HIV outbreak was linked to IDU in 2015 (5), including a high prevalence of drug overdose deaths, prescription opioid sales, and unemployment.

OBJECTIVES: In January 2014, 4-methylcyclohexanemethanol spilled into the Elk River near Charleston, West Virginia, contaminating the water supply for about 120 000 households. The West Virginia American Water Company (WVAWC) issued a "do not use" water order for 9 counties. After the order was lifted (10 days after the spill), the communities' use of public water systems, information sources, alternative sources of water, and perceived impact of the spill on households were unclear to public health officials. To assist in recovery efforts, the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducted a Community Assessment for Public Health Emergency Response (CASPER). METHODS: We used the CASPER 2-stage cluster sampling design to select a representative sample of households to interview, and we conducted interviews in 171 households in April 2014. We used a weighted cluster analysis to generate population estimates in the sampling frame. RESULTS: Before the spill, 74.4% of households did not have a 3-day alternative water supply for each household member and pet. Although 83.6% of households obtained an alternative water source within 1 day of the "do not use" order, 37.4% of households reportedly used WVAWC water for any purpose. Nearly 3 months after the spill, 36.1% of households believed that their WVAWC water was safe, and 33.5% reported using their household water for drinking. CONCLUSIONS: CASPER results identified the need to focus on basic public health messaging and household preparedness efforts. Recommendations included (1) encouraging households to maintain a 3-day emergency water supply, (2) identifying additional alternative sources of water for future emergencies, and (3) increasing community education to address ongoing concerns about water.

Zika virus is a cause of microcephaly and brain abnormalities (1), and it is the first known mosquito-borne infection to cause congenital anomalies in humans. The establishment of a comprehensive surveillance system to monitor pregnant women with Zika virus infection will provide data to further elucidate the full range of potential outcomes for fetuses and infants of mothers with asymptomatic and symptomatic Zika virus infection during pregnancy. In February 2016, Zika virus disease and congenital Zika virus infections became nationally notifiable conditions in the United States (2). Cases in pregnant women with laboratory evidence of Zika virus infection who have either 1) symptomatic infection or 2) asymptomatic infection with diagnosed complications of pregnancy can be reported as cases of Zika virus disease to ArboNET* (2), CDC's national arboviral diseases surveillance system. Under existing interim guidelines from the Council for State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), asymptomatic Zika virus infections in pregnant women who do not have known pregnancy complications are not reportable. ArboNET does not currently include pregnancy surveillance information (e.g., gestational age or pregnancy exposures) or pregnancy outcomes. To understand the full impact of infection on the fetus and neonate, other systems are needed for reporting and active monitoring of pregnant women with laboratory evidence of possible Zika virus infection during pregnancy. Thus, in collaboration with state, local, tribal, and territorial health departments, CDC established two surveillance systems to monitor pregnancies and congenital outcomes among women with laboratory evidence of Zika virus infection(dagger) in the United States and territories: 1) the U.S. Zika Pregnancy Registry (USZPR),( section sign) which monitors pregnant women residing in U.S. states and all U.S. territories except Puerto Rico, and 2) the Zika Active Pregnancy Surveillance System (ZAPSS), which monitors pregnant women residing in Puerto Rico. As of May 12, 2016, the surveillance systems were monitoring 157 and 122 pregnant women with laboratory evidence of possible Zika virus infection from participating U.S. states and territories, respectively. Tracking and monitoring clinical presentation of Zika virus infection, all prenatal testing, and adverse consequences of Zika virus infection during pregnancy are critical to better characterize the risk for congenital infection, the performance of prenatal diagnostic testing, and the spectrum of adverse congenital outcomes. These data will improve clinical guidance, inform counseling messages for pregnant women, and facilitate planning for clinical and public health services for affected families.