Last data update: Jan 13, 2025. (Total: 48570 publications since 2009)
Records 1-30 (of 64 Records) |
Query Trace: Maccannell D[original query] |
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Genomic surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 variants: Circulation of Omicron XBB and JN.1 lineages - United States, May 2023-September 2024
Ma KC , Castro J , Lambrou AS , Rose EB , Cook PW , Batra D , Cubenas C , Hughes LJ , MacCannell DR , Mandal P , Mittal N , Sheth M , Smith C , Winn A , Hall AJ , Wentworth DE , Silk BJ , Thornburg NJ , Paden CR . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024 73 (42) 938-945 CDC continues to track the evolution of SARS-CoV-2, including the Omicron variant and its descendants, using national genomic surveillance. This report summarizes U.S. trends in variant proportion estimates during May 2023-September 2024, a period when SARS-CoV-2 lineages primarily comprised descendants of Omicron variants XBB and JN.1. During summer and fall 2023, multiple descendants of XBB with immune escape substitutions emerged and reached >10% prevalence, including EG.5-like lineages by June 24, FL.1.5.1-like lineages by August 5, HV.1 lineage by September 30, and HK.3-like lineages by November 11. In winter 2023, the JN.1 variant emerged in the United States and rapidly attained predominance nationwide, representing a substantial genetic shift (>30 spike protein amino acid differences) from XBB lineages. Descendants of JN.1 subsequently circulated and reached >10% prevalence, including KQ.1-like and KP.2-like lineages by April 13, KP.3 and LB.1-like lineages by May 25, and KP.3.1.1 by July 20. Surges in COVID-19 cases occurred in winter 2024 during the shift to JN.1 predominance, as well as in summer 2023 and 2024 during circulation of multiple XBB and JN.1 descendants, respectively. The ongoing evolution of the Omicron variant highlights the importance of continued genomic surveillance to guide medical countermeasure development, including the selection of antigens for updated COVID-19 vaccines. |
Infectious disease surveillance needs for the United States: lessons from Covid-19
Lipsitch M , Bassett MT , Brownstein JS , Elliott P , Eyre D , Grabowski MK , Hay JA , Johansson MA , Kissler SM , Larremore DB , Layden JE , Lessler J , Lynfield R , MacCannell D , Madoff LC , Metcalf CJE , Meyers LA , Ofori SK , Quinn C , Bento AI , Reich NG , Riley S , Rosenfeld R , Samore MH , Sampath R , Slayton RB , Swerdlow DL , Truelove S , Varma JK , Grad YH . Front Public Health 2024 12 1408193 The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need to upgrade systems for infectious disease surveillance and forecasting and modeling of the spread of infection, both of which inform evidence-based public health guidance and policies. Here, we discuss requirements for an effective surveillance system to support decision making during a pandemic, drawing on the lessons of COVID-19 in the U.S., while looking to jurisdictions in the U.S. and beyond to learn lessons about the value of specific data types. In this report, we define the range of decisions for which surveillance data are required, the data elements needed to inform these decisions and to calibrate inputs and outputs of transmission-dynamic models, and the types of data needed to inform decisions by state, territorial, local, and tribal health authorities. We define actions needed to ensure that such data will be available and consider the contribution of such efforts to improving health equity. |
PHA4GE quality control contextual data tags: standardized annotations for sharing public health sequence datasets with known quality issues to facilitate testing and training
Griffiths EJ , Mendes I , Maguire F , Guthrie JL , Wee BA , Schmedes S , Holt K , Yadav C , Cameron R , Barclay C , Dooley D , MacCannell D , Chindelevitch L , Karsch-Mizrachi I , Waheed Z , Katz L , Petit Iii R , Dave M , Oluniyi P , Nasar MI , Raphenya A , Hsiao WWL , Timme RE . Microb Genom 2024 10 (6) As public health laboratories expand their genomic sequencing and bioinformatics capacity for the surveillance of different pathogens, labs must carry out robust validation, training, and optimization of wet- and dry-lab procedures. Achieving these goals for algorithms, pipelines and instruments often requires that lower quality datasets be made available for analysis and comparison alongside those of higher quality. This range of data quality in reference sets can complicate the sharing of sub-optimal datasets that are vital for the community and for the reproducibility of assays. Sharing of useful, but sub-optimal datasets requires careful annotation and documentation of known issues to enable appropriate interpretation, avoid being mistaken for better quality information, and for these data (and their derivatives) to be easily identifiable in repositories. Unfortunately, there are currently no standardized attributes or mechanisms for tagging poor-quality datasets, or datasets generated for a specific purpose, to maximize their utility, searchability, accessibility and reuse. The Public Health Alliance for Genomic Epidemiology (PHA4GE) is an international community of scientists from public health, industry and academia focused on improving the reproducibility, interoperability, portability, and openness of public health bioinformatic software, skills, tools and data. To address the challenges of sharing lower quality datasets, PHA4GE has developed a set of standardized contextual data tags, namely fields and terms, that can be included in public repository submissions as a means of flagging pathogen sequence data with known quality issues, increasing their discoverability. The contextual data tags were developed through consultations with the community including input from the International Nucleotide Sequence Data Collaboration (INSDC), and have been standardized using ontologies - community-based resources for defining the tag properties and the relationships between them. The standardized tags are agnostic to the organism and the sequencing technique used and thus can be applied to data generated from any pathogen using an array of sequencing techniques. The tags can also be applied to synthetic (lab created) data. The list of standardized tags is maintained by PHA4GE and can be found at https://github.com/pha4ge/contextual_data_QC_tags. Definitions, ontology IDs, examples of use, as well as a JSON representation, are provided. The PHA4GE QC tags were tested, and are now implemented, by the FDA's GenomeTrakr laboratory network as part of its routine submission process for SARS-CoV-2 wastewater surveillance. We hope that these simple, standardized tags will help improve communication regarding quality control in public repositories, in addition to making datasets of variable quality more easily identifiable. Suggestions for additional tags can be submitted to PHA4GE via the New Term Request Form in the GitHub repository. By providing a mechanism for feedback and suggestions, we also expect that the tags will evolve with the needs of the community. |
Bacterial strain typing.
MacCannell D . Clin Lab Med 2013 33 (3) 629-50 Over the course of the past several decades, rapid advancements in molecular technologies have revolutionized the practice of public health microbiology, and have fundamentally changed the nature, accuracy, and timeliness of laboratory data for outbreak investigation and response. Whole-genome sequencing, in particular, is becoming an increasingly feasible and cost-effective approach for near real-time high-resolution strain typing, genomic characterization, and comparative analyses. This review discusses the current state of the art in bacterial strain typing for outbreak investigation and infectious disease surveillance, and the impact of emerging genomic technologies on the field of public health microbiology. |
Putting everything in its place: using the INSDC compliant Pathogen Data Object Model to better structure genomic data submitted for public health applications
Timme RE , Karsch-Mizrachi I , Waheed Z , Arita M , MacCannell D , Maguire F , Petit Iii R , Page AJ , Mendes CI , Nasar MI , Oluniyi P , Tyler AD , Raphenya AR , Guthrie JL , Olawoye I , Rinck G , O'Cathail C , Lees J , Cochrane G , Cummins C , Brister JR , Klimke W , Feldgarden M , Griffiths E . Microb Genom 2023 9 (12) Fast, efficient public health actions require well-organized and coordinated systems that can supply timely and accurate knowledge. Public databases of pathogen genomic data, such as the International Nucleotide Sequence Database Collaboration (INSDC), have become essential tools for efficient public health decisions. However, these international resources began primarily for academic purposes, rather than for surveillance or interventions. Now, queries need to access not only the whole genomes of multiple pathogens but also make connections using robust contextual metadata to identify issues of public health relevance. Databases that over time developed a patchwork of submission formats and requirements need to be consistently organized and coordinated internationally to allow effective searches.To help resolve these issues, we propose a common pathogen data structure called the Pathogen Data Object Model (DOM) that will formalize the minimum pieces of sequence data and contextual data necessary for general public health uses, while recognizing that submitters will likely withhold a wide range of non-public contextual data. Further, we propose contributors use the Pathogen DOM for all pathogen submissions (bacterial, viral, fungal, and parasites), which will simplify data submissions and provide a consistent and transparent data structure for downstream data analyses. We also highlight how improved submission tools can support the Pathogen DOM, offering users additional easy-to-use methods to ensure this structure is followed. |
Evidence review and recommendations for the implementation of genomics for antimicrobial resistance surveillance: reports from an international expert group
Baker KS , Jauneikaite E , Nunn JG , Midega JT , Atun R , Holt KE , Walia K , Howden BP , Tate H , Okeke IN , Carattoli A , Hsu LY , Hopkins KL , Muloi DM , Wheeler NE , Aanensen DM , Mason LCE , Rodgus J , Hendriksen RS , Essack SY , Egyir B , Halpin AL , MacCannell DR , Campos J , Srikantiah P , Feasey NA , Peacock SJ . Lancet Microbe 2023 4 (12) e1035-e1039 Nearly a century after the beginning of the antibiotic era, which has been associated with unparalleled improvements in human health and reductions in mortality associated with infection, the dwindling pipeline for new antibiotic classes coupled with the inevitable spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a major global challenge. Historically, surveillance of bacteria with AMR typically relied on phenotypic analysis of isolates taken from infected individuals, which provides only a low-resolution view of the epidemiology behind an individual infection or wider outbreak. Recent years have seen increasing adoption of powerful new genomic technologies with the potential to revolutionise AMR surveillance by providing a high-resolution picture of the AMR profile of the bacteria causing infections and providing real-time actionable information for treating and preventing infection. However, many barriers remain to be overcome before genomic technologies can be adopted as a standard part of routine AMR surveillance around the world. Accordingly, the Surveillance and Epidemiology of Drug-resistant Infections Consortium convened an expert working group to assess the benefits and challenges of using genomics for AMR surveillance. In this Series, we detail these discussions and provide recommendations from the working group that can help to realise the massive potential benefits for genomics in surveillance of AMR. |
Early detection and surveillance of the SARS-CoV-2 variant BA.2.86 - Worldwide, July-October 2023
Lambrou AS , South E , Ballou ES , Paden CR , Fuller JA , Bart SM , Butryn DM , Novak RT , Browning SD , Kirby AE , Welsh RM , Cornforth DM , MacCannell DR , Friedman CR , Thornburg NJ , Hall AJ , Hughes LJ , Mahon BE , Daskalakis DC , Shah ND , Jackson BR , Kirking HL . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2023 72 (43) 1162-1167 Early detection of emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants is critical to guiding rapid risk assessments, providing clear and timely communication messages, and coordinating public health action. CDC identifies and monitors novel SARS-CoV-2 variants through diverse surveillance approaches, including genomic, wastewater, traveler-based, and digital public health surveillance (e.g., global data repositories, news, and social media). The SARS-CoV-2 variant BA.2.86 was first sequenced in Israel and reported on August 13, 2023. The first U.S. COVID-19 case caused by this variant was reported on August 17, 2023, after a patient received testing for SARS-CoV-2 at a health care facility on August 3. In the following month, eight additional U.S. states detected BA.2.86 across various surveillance systems, including specimens from health care settings, wastewater surveillance, and traveler-based genomic surveillance. As of October 23, 2023, sequences have been reported from at least 32 countries. Continued variant tracking and further evidence are needed to evaluate the full public health impact of BA.2.86. Timely genomic sequence submissions to global public databases aided early detection of BA.2.86 despite the decline in the number of specimens being sequenced during the past year. This report describes how multicomponent surveillance and genomic sequencing were used in real time to track the emergence and transmission of the BA.2.86 variant. This surveillance approach provides valuable information regarding implementing and sustaining comprehensive surveillance not only for novel SARS-CoV-2 variants but also for future pathogen threats. |
Utilization of Whole Genome Sequencing to Understand SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Dynamics in Long-Term Care Facilities, Correctional Facilities and Meat Processing Plants in Minnesota, March – June 2020 (preprint)
Lehnertz NB , Wang X , Garfin J , Taylor J , Zipprich J , VonBank B , Martin K , Eikmeier D , Medus C , Wiedinmyer B , Bernu C , Plumb M , Pung K , Honein MA , Carter R , MacCannell D , Smith KE , Como-Sabetti K , Ehresmann K , Danila R , Lynfield R . medRxiv 2021 2020.12.30.20248277 Congregate settings and high-density workplaces have endured a disproportionate impact from COVID-19. In order to provide further understanding of the transmission patterns of SARS-CoV-2 in these settings, whole genome sequencing (WGS) was performed on samples obtained from 8 selected outbreaks in Minnesota from March – June, 2020. WGS and phylogenetic analysis was conducted on 319 samples, constituting 14.4% of the 2,222 total SARS-CoV-2-positive individuals associated with these outbreaks. Among the sequenced specimens, three LTCFs and both correctional facilities had spread associated with a single genetic sequence. A fourth LTCF had outbreak cases associated with two distinct sequences. In contrast, cases associated with outbreaks in the two meat processing plants represented multiple SARS-CoV-2 sequences. These results suggest that a single introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into a facility can result in a widespread outbreak, and early identification and cohorting of cases, along with continued vigilance with infection prevention and control measures is imperative.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.Funding StatementStudy was supported by the ELC Cares grant from CDC.Author DeclarationsI confirm all relevant ethical guidelines have been followed, and any necessary IRB and/or ethics committee approvals have been obtained.YesThe details of the IRB/oversight body that provided approval or exemption for the research described are given below:The manuscript was reviewed in accordance with standard CDC protocol, in which the approved CDC chain of command in the COVID 19 response division reviewed the manuscript and determined that it was non-research, public health response. As such, it was determined by CDC review to be exempt from further institutional review board evaluation. In summary, this manuscript and activity was reviewed by CDC and was conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy (see e.g., 45 C.F.R. part 46, 21 C.F.R. part 56; 42 U.S.C. 241(d); 5 U.S.C 552a; 44 U.S.C. 351 et seq.).All necessary patient/participant consent has been obtained and the appropriate institutional forms have been archived.YesI understand that all clinical trials and any other prospective interventional studies must be registered with an ICMJE-approved registry, such as ClinicalTrials.gov. I confirm that any such study reported in the manuscript has been registered and the trial registration ID is provided (note: if posting a prospective study registered retrospectively, please provide a statement in the trial ID field explaining why the study was not registered in advance).YesI have followed all appropriate research reporting guidelines and uploaded the relevant EQUATOR Network research reporting checklist(s) and other pertinent material as supplementary files, if applicable.YesThere is no referred data. |
Early introductions and community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7 in the United States (preprint)
Alpert T , Brito AF , Lasek-Nesselquist E , Rothman J , Valesano AL , MacKay MJ , Petrone ME , Breban MI , Watkins AE , Vogels CBF , Kalinich CC , Dellicour S , Russell A , Kelly JP , Shudt M , Plitnick J , Schneider E , Fitzsimmons WJ , Khullar G , Metti J , Dudley JT , Nash M , Beaubier N , Wang J , Liu C , Hui P , Muyombwe A , Downing R , Razeq J , Bart SM , Grills A , Morrison SM , Murphy S , Neal C , Laszlo E , Rennert H , Cushing M , Westblade L , Velu P , Craney A , Fauntleroy KA , Peaper DR , Landry ML , Cook PW , Fauver JR , Mason CE , Lauring AS , George KS , MacCannell DR , Grubaugh ND . medRxiv 2021 The emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7, first detected in the United Kingdom, has become a global public health concern because of its increased transmissibility. Over 2500 COVID-19 cases associated with this variant have been detected in the US since December 2020, but the extent of establishment is relatively unknown. Using travel, genomic, and diagnostic data, we highlight the primary ports of entry for B.1.1.7 in the US and locations of possible underreporting of B.1.1.7 cases. Furthermore, we found evidence for many independent B.1.1.7 establishments starting in early December 2020, followed by interstate spread by the end of the month. Finally, we project that B.1.1.7 will be the dominant lineage in many states by mid to late March. Thus, genomic surveillance for B.1.1.7 and other variants urgently needs to be enhanced to better inform the public health response. |
A Genomic Survey of SARS-CoV-2 Reveals Multiple Introductions into Northern California without a Predominant Lineage (preprint)
Deng X , Gu W , Federman S , du Plessis L , Pybus OG , Faria N , Wang C , Yu G , Pan CY , Guevara H , Sotomayor-Gonzalez A , Zorn K , Gopez A , Servellita V , Hsu E , Miller S , Bedford T , Greninger AL , Roychoudhury P , Starita LM , Famulare M , Chu HY , Shendure J , Jerome KR , Anderson C , Gangavarapu K , Zeller M , Spencer E , Andersen KG , MacCannell D , Paden CR , Li Y , Zhang J , Tong S , Armstrong G , Morrow S , Willis M , Matyas BT , Mase S , Kasirye O , Park M , Chan C , Yu AT , Chai SJ , Villarino E , Bonin B , Wadford DA , Chiu CY . medRxiv 2020 The COVID-19 pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has spread globally, resulting in >300,000 reported cases worldwide as of March 21st, 2020. Here we investigate the genetic diversity and genomic epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 in Northern California using samples from returning travelers, cruise ship passengers, and cases of community transmission with unclear infection sources. Virus genomes were sampled from 29 patients diagnosed with COVID-19 infection from Feb 3rd through Mar 15th. Phylogenetic analyses revealed at least 8 different SARS-CoV-2 lineages, suggesting multiple independent introductions of the virus into the state. Virus genomes from passengers on two consecutive excursions of the Grand Princess cruise ship clustered with those from an established epidemic in Washington State, including the WA1 genome representing the first reported case in the United States on January 19th. We also detected evidence for presumptive transmission of SARS-CoV-2 lineages from one community to another. These findings suggest that cryptic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Northern California to date is characterized by multiple transmission chains that originate via distinct introductions from international and interstate travel, rather than widespread community transmission of a single predominant lineage. Rapid testing and contact tracing, social distancing, and travel restrictions are measures that will help to slow SARS-CoV-2 spread in California and other regions of the USA. |
Wastewater sequencing uncovers early, cryptic SARS-CoV-2 variant transmission (preprint)
Karthikeyan S , Levy JI , De Hoff P , Humphrey G , Birmingham A , Jepsen K , Farmer S , Tubb HM , Valles T , Tribelhorn CE , Tsai R , Aigner S , Sathe S , Moshiri N , Henson B , Mark AM , Hakim A , Baer NA , Barber T , Belda-Ferre P , Chacón M , Cheung W , Cresini ES , Eisner ER , Lastrella AL , Lawrence ES , Marotz CA , Ngo TT , Ostrander T , Plascencia A , Salido RA , Seaver P , Smoot EW , McDonald D , Neuhard RM , Scioscia AL , Satterlund AM , Simmons EH , Abelman DB , Brenner D , Bruner JC , Buckley A , Ellison M , Gattas J , Gonias SL , Hale M , Hawkins F , Ikeda L , Jhaveri H , Johnson T , Kellen V , Kremer B , Matthews G , McLawhon RW , Ouillet P , Park D , Pradenas A , Reed S , Riggs L , Sanders A , Sollenberger B , Song A , White B , Winbush T , Aceves CM , Anderson C , Gangavarapu K , Hufbauer E , Kurzban E , Lee J , Matteson NL , Parker E , Perkins SA , Ramesh KS , Robles-Sikisaka R , Schwab MA , Spencer E , Wohl S , Nicholson L , McHardy IH , Dimmock DP , Hobbs CA , Bakhtar O , Harding A , Mendoza A , Bolze A , Becker D , Cirulli ET , Isaksson M , Barrett KMS , Washington NL , Malone JD , Schafer AM , Gurfield N , Stous S , Fielding-Miller R , Garfein RS , Gaines T , Anderson C , Martin NK , Schooley R , Austin B , MacCannell DR , Kingsmore SF , Lee W , Shah S , McDonald E , Yu AT , Zeller M , Fisch KM , Longhurst C , Maysent P , Pride D , Khosla PK , Laurent LC , Yeo GW , Andersen KG , Knight R . medRxiv 2022 As SARS-CoV-2 continues to spread and evolve, detecting emerging variants early is critical for public health interventions. Inferring lineage prevalence by clinical testing is infeasible at scale, especially in areas with limited resources, participation, or testing/sequencing capacity, which can also introduce biases. SARS-CoV-2 RNA concentration in wastewater successfully tracks regional infection dynamics and provides less biased abundance estimates than clinical testing. Tracking virus genomic sequences in wastewater would improve community prevalence estimates and detect emerging variants. However, two factors limit wastewater-based genomic surveillance: low-quality sequence data and inability to estimate relative lineage abundance in mixed samples. Here, we resolve these critical issues to perform a high-resolution, 295-day wastewater and clinical sequencing effort, in the controlled environment of a large university campus and the broader context of the surrounding county. We develop and deploy improved virus concentration protocols and deconvolution software that fully resolve multiple virus strains from wastewater. We detect emerging variants of concern up to 14 days earlier in wastewater samples, and identify multiple instances of virus spread not captured by clinical genomic surveillance. Our study provides a scalable solution for wastewater genomic surveillance that allows early detection of SARS-CoV-2 variants and identification of cryptic transmission. |
Early detection of SARS-CoV-2 variants using traveler-based genomic surveillance at four US airports, September 2021- January 2022 (preprint)
Wegrzyn RD , Appiah GD , Morfino R , Milford SR , Walker AT , Ernst ET , Darrow WW , Li SL , Robison K , MacCannell D , Dai D , Girinathan BP , Hicks AL , Cosca B , Woronoff G , Plocik AM , Simen BB , Moriarty L , Guagliardo SAJ , Cetron MS , Friedman CR . medRxiv 2022 22 Background Despite layered mitigation measures, international travel during the COVID-19 pandemic continues to facilitate global spread of SARS-CoV-2, including novel variants of concern (VOCs). On November 26, 2021, B.1.1.529 (Omicron) was designated as a VOC by the World Health Organization [1]. On December 6, 2021, as part of measures to reduce the introduction and spread of Omicron, the requirement for a negative SARS-CoV-2 test taken before air travel to the United States was shortened from three days to one day pre-departure [1]. Although SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequencing has increased significantly during the pandemic [2], there is still a gap in early detection of emerging variants among arriving travelers. In September 2021, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in collaboration with private partners, implemented a voluntary SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance pilot program. Initially we enrolled arriving air travelers from India. On November 28, we expanded the program to include travelers arriving from countries with high travel volumes, including those where Omicron was first detected. Methods Design, Setting, and Participants During September 29-November 27, 2021, the surveillance program included travelers arriving on seven direct flights from India at three international airports: John F. Kennedy, New York (September 29), Newark Liberty, New Jersey (October 4), and San Francisco, California (October 12). During November 28-January 23, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Georgia was added, and participation was offered to travelers from South Africa, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Brazil, arriving on approximately 50 flights per day. Participants were 18 years or older, provided informed consent, and completed demographic, clinical, and travel history questions. Copyright The copyright holder for this preprint is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. This article is a US Government work. It is not subject to copyright under 17 USC 105 and is also made available for use under a CC0 license. |
Genomic surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 variants: Circulation of Omicron lineages - United States, January 2022-May 2023
Ma KC , Shirk P , Lambrou AS , Hassell N , Zheng XY , Payne AB , Ali AR , Batra D , Caravas J , Chau R , Cook PW , Howard D , Kovacs NA , Lacek KA , Lee JS , MacCannell DR , Malapati L , Mathew S , Mittal N , Nagilla RR , Parikh R , Paul P , Rambo-Martin BL , Shepard SS , Sheth M , Wentworth DE , Winn A , Hall AJ , Silk BJ , Thornburg N , Kondor R , Scobie HM , Paden CR . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2023 72 (24) 651-656 CDC has used national genomic surveillance since December 2020 to monitor SARS-CoV-2 variants that have emerged throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, including the Omicron variant. This report summarizes U.S. trends in variant proportions from national genomic surveillance during January 2022-May 2023. During this period, the Omicron variant remained predominant, with various descendant lineages reaching national predominance (>50% prevalence). During the first half of 2022, BA.1.1 reached predominance by the week ending January 8, 2022, followed by BA.2 (March 26), BA.2.12.1 (May 14), and BA.5 (July 2); the predominance of each variant coincided with surges in COVID-19 cases. The latter half of 2022 was characterized by the circulation of sublineages of BA.2, BA.4, and BA.5 (e.g., BQ.1 and BQ.1.1), some of which independently acquired similar spike protein substitutions associated with immune evasion. By the end of January 2023, XBB.1.5 became predominant. As of May 13, 2023, the most common circulating lineages were XBB.1.5 (61.5%), XBB.1.9.1 (10.0%), and XBB.1.16 (9.4%); XBB.1.16 and XBB.1.16.1 (2.4%), containing the K478R substitution, and XBB.2.3 (3.2%), containing the P521S substitution, had the fastest doubling times at that point. Analytic methods for estimating variant proportions have been updated as the availability of sequencing specimens has declined. The continued evolution of Omicron lineages highlights the importance of genomic surveillance to monitor emerging variants and help guide vaccine development and use of therapeutics. |
Erratum: Vol. 71, No. 6.
Lambrou AS , Shirk P , Steele MK , Paul P , Paden CR , Cadwell B , Reese HE , Aoki Y , Hassell N , Caravas J , Kovacs NA , Gerhart JG , Ng HJ , Zheng XY , Beck A , Chau R , Cintron R , Cook PW , Gulvik CA , Howard D , Jang Y , Knipe K , Lacek KA , Moser KA , Paskey AC , Rambo-Martin BL , Nagilla RR , Rethchless AC , Schmerer MW , Seby S , Shephard SS , Stanton RA , Stark TJ , Uehara A , Unoarumhi Y , Bentz ML , Burhgin A , Burroughs M , Davis ML , Keller MW , Keong LM , Le SS , Lee JS , Madden Jr JC , Nobles S , Owouor DC , Padilla J , Sheth M , Wilson MM , Talarico S , Chen JC , Oberste MS , Batra D , McMullan LK , Halpin AL , Galloway SE , MacCannell DR , Kondor R , Barnes J , MacNeil A , Silk BJ , Dugan VG , Scobie HM , Wentworth DE . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2022 71 (14) 528 The report “Genomic Surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 Variants: Predominance of the Delta (B.1.617.2) and Omicron (B.1.1.529) Variants — United States, June 2021–January 2022” contained several errors. |
Cryptic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Washington State.
Bedford T , Greninger AL , Roychoudhury P , Starita LM , Famulare M , Huang ML , Nalla A , Pepper G , Reinhardt A , Xie H , Shrestha L , Nguyen TN , Adler A , Brandstetter E , Cho S , Giroux D , Han PD , Fay K , Frazar CD , Ilcisin M , Lacombe K , Lee J , Kiavand A , Richardson M , Sibley TR , Truong M , Wolf CR , Nickerson DA , Rieder MJ , Englund JA , Hadfield J , Hodcroft EB , Huddleston J , Moncla LH , Müller NF , Neher RA , Deng X , Gu W , Federman S , Chiu C , Duchin J , Gautom R , Melly G , Hiatt B , Dykema P , Lindquist S , Queen K , Tao Y , Uehara A , Tong S , MacCannell D , Armstrong GL , Baird GS , Chu HY , Shendure J , Jerome KR . medRxiv 2020 Following its emergence in Wuhan, China, in late November or early December 2019, the SARS-CoV-2 virus has rapidly spread throughout the world. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) a pandemic. Genome sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 strains allows for the reconstruction of transmission history connecting these infections. Here, we analyze 346 SARS-CoV-2 genomes from samples collected between 20 February and 15 March 2020 from infected patients in Washington State, USA. We found that the large majority of SARS-CoV-2 infections sampled during this time frame appeared to have derived from a single introduction event into the state in late January or early February 2020 and subsequent local spread, strongly suggesting cryptic spread of COVID-19 during the months of January and February 2020, before active community surveillance was implemented. We estimate a common ancestor of this outbreak clade as occurring between 18 January and 9 February 2020. From genomic data, we estimate an exponential doubling between 2.4 and 5.1 days. These results highlight the need for large-scale community surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 introductions and spread and the power of pathogen genomics to inform epidemiological understanding. |
Spike Gene Target Amplification in a Diagnostic Assay as a Marker for Public Health Monitoring of Emerging SARS-CoV-2 Variants - United States, November 2021-January 2023.
Scobie HM , Ali AR , Shirk P , Smith ZR , Paul P , Paden CR , Hassell N , Zheng XY , Lambrou AS , Kondor R , MacCannell D , Thornburg NJ , Miller J , Wentworth D , Silk BJ . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2023 72 (5) 125-127 Monitoring emerging SARS-CoV-2 lineages and their epidemiologic characteristics helps to inform public health decisions regarding vaccine policy, the use of therapeutics, and health care capacity. When the SARS-CoV-2 Alpha variant emerged in late 2020, a spike gene (S-gene) deletion (Δ69-70) in the N-terminal region, which might compensate for immune escape mutations that impair infectivity (1), resulted in reduced or failed S-gene target amplification in certain multitarget reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assays, a pattern referred to as S-gene target failure (SGTF) (2). The predominant U.S. SARS-CoV-2 lineages have generally alternated between SGTF and S-gene target presence (SGTP), which alongside genomic sequencing, has facilitated early monitoring of emerging variants. During a period when Omicron BA.5-related sublineages (which exhibit SGTF) predominated, an XBB.1.5 sublineage with SGTP has rapidly expanded in the northeastern United States and other regions. |
Wastewater sequencing reveals early cryptic SARS-CoV-2 variant transmission.
Karthikeyan S , Levy JI , De Hoff P , Humphrey G , Birmingham A , Jepsen K , Farmer S , Tubb HM , Valles T , Tribelhorn CE , Tsai R , Aigner S , Sathe S , Moshiri N , Henson B , Mark AM , Hakim A , Baer NA , Barber T , Belda-Ferre P , Chacón M , Cheung W , Cresini ES , Eisner ER , Lastrella AL , Lawrence ES , Marotz CA , Ngo TT , Ostrander T , Plascencia A , Salido RA , Seaver P , Smoot EW , McDonald D , Neuhard RM , Scioscia AL , Satterlund AM , Simmons EH , Abelman DB , Brenner D , Bruner JC , Buckley A , Ellison M , Gattas J , Gonias SL , Hale M , Hawkins F , Ikeda L , Jhaveri H , Johnson T , Kellen V , Kremer B , Matthews G , McLawhon RW , Ouillet P , Park D , Pradenas A , Reed S , Riggs L , Sanders A , Sollenberger B , Song A , White B , Winbush T , Aceves CM , Anderson C , Gangavarapu K , Hufbauer E , Kurzban E , Lee J , Matteson NL , Parker E , Perkins SA , Ramesh KS , Robles-Sikisaka R , Schwab MA , Spencer E , Wohl S , Nicholson L , McHardy IH , Dimmock DP , Hobbs CA , Bakhtar O , Harding A , Mendoza A , Bolze A , Becker D , Cirulli ET , Isaksson M , Schiabor Barrett KM , Washington NL , Malone JD , Schafer AM , Gurfield N , Stous S , Fielding-Miller R , Garfein RS , Gaines T , Anderson C , Martin NK , Schooley R , Austin B , MacCannell DR , Kingsmore SF , Lee W , Shah S , McDonald E , Yu AT , Zeller M , Fisch KM , Longhurst C , Maysent P , Pride D , Khosla PK , Laurent LC , Yeo GW , Andersen KG , Knight R . Nature 2022 609 (7925) 101-108 As SARS-CoV-2 continues to spread and evolve, detecting emerging variants early is critical for public health interventions. Inferring lineage prevalence by clinical testing is infeasible at scale, especially in areas with limited resources, participation, or testing/sequencing capacity, which can also introduce biases(1-3). SARS-CoV-2 RNA concentration in wastewater successfully tracks regional infection dynamics and provides less biased abundance estimates than clinical testing(4,5). Tracking virus genomic sequences in wastewater would improve community prevalence estimates and detect emerging variants. However, two factors limit wastewater-based genomic surveillance: low-quality sequence data and inability to estimate relative lineage abundance in mixed samples. Here, we resolve these critical issues to perform a high-resolution, 295-day wastewater and clinical sequencing effort, in the controlled environment of a large university campus and the broader context of the surrounding county. We develop and deploy improved virus concentration protocols and deconvolution software that fully resolve multiple virus strains from wastewater. We detect emerging variants of concern up to 14 days earlier in wastewater samples, and identify multiple instances of virus spread not captured by clinical genomic surveillance. Our study provides a scalable solution for wastewater genomic surveillance that allows early detection of SARS-CoV-2 variants and identification of cryptic transmission. |
Early detection of SARS-CoV-2 variants using traveler-based genomic surveillance at four US airports, September 2021- January 2022.
Wegrzyn RD , Appiah GD , Morfino R , Milford SR , Walker AT , Ernst ET , Darrow WW , Li SL , Robison K , MacCannell D , Dai D , Girinathan BP , Hicks AL , Cosca B , Woronoff G , Plocik AM , Simen BB , Moriarty L , Guagliardo SAJ , Cetron MS , Friedman CR . Clin Infect Dis 2023 76 (3) e540-e543 We enrolled arriving international air travelers in a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 genomic surveillance program. We used molecular testing of pooled nasal swabs and sequenced positive samples for sublineage. Traveler-based surveillance provided early-warning variant detection, reporting the first US Omicron BA.2 and BA.3 in North America. |
Genomic Surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 Variants: Predominance of the Delta (B.1.617.2) and Omicron (B.1.1.529) Variants - United States, June 2021-January 2022.
Lambrou AS , Shirk P , Steele MK , Paul P , Paden CR , Cadwell B , Reese HE , Aoki Y , Hassell N , Caravas J , Kovacs NA , Gerhart JG , Ng HJ , Zheng XY , Beck A , Chau R , Cintron R , Cook PW , Gulvik CA , Howard D , Jang Y , Knipe K , Lacek KA , Moser KA , Paskey AC , Rambo-Martin BL , Nagilla RR , Rethchless AC , Schmerer MW , Seby S , Shephard SS , Stanton RA , Stark TJ , Uehara A , Unoarumhi Y , Bentz ML , Burhgin A , Burroughs M , Davis ML , Keller MW , Keong LM , Le SS , Lee JS , Madden Jr JC , Nobles S , Owouor DC , Padilla J , Sheth M , Wilson MM , Talarico S , Chen JC , Oberste MS , Batra D , McMullan LK , Halpin AL , Galloway SE , MacCannell DR , Kondor R , Barnes J , MacNeil A , Silk BJ , Dugan VG , Scobie HM , Wentworth DE . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2022 71 (6) 206-211 Genomic surveillance is a critical tool for tracking emerging variants of SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19), which can exhibit characteristics that potentially affect public health and clinical interventions, including increased transmissibility, illness severity, and capacity for immune escape. During June 2021-January 2022, CDC expanded genomic surveillance data sources to incorporate sequence data from public repositories to produce weighted estimates of variant proportions at the jurisdiction level and refined analytic methods to enhance the timeliness and accuracy of national and regional variant proportion estimates. These changes also allowed for more comprehensive variant proportion estimation at the jurisdictional level (i.e., U.S. state, district, territory, and freely associated state). The data in this report are a summary of findings of recent proportions of circulating variants that are updated weekly on CDC's COVID Data Tracker website to enable timely public health action.(†) The SARS-CoV-2 Delta (B.1.617.2 and AY sublineages) variant rose from 1% to >50% of viral lineages circulating nationally during 8 weeks, from May 1-June 26, 2021. Delta-associated infections remained predominant until being rapidly overtaken by infections associated with the Omicron (B.1.1.529 and BA sublineages) variant in December 2021, when Omicron increased from 1% to >50% of circulating viral lineages during a 2-week period. As of the week ending January 22, 2022, Omicron was estimated to account for 99.2% (95% CI = 99.0%-99.5%) of SARS-CoV-2 infections nationwide, and Delta for 0.7% (95% CI = 0.5%-1.0%). The dynamic landscape of SARS-CoV-2 variants in 2021, including Delta- and Omicron-driven resurgences of SARS-CoV-2 transmission across the United States, underscores the importance of robust genomic surveillance efforts to inform public health planning and practice. |
Future-proofing and maximizing the utility of metadata: The PHA4GE SARS-CoV-2 contextual data specification package.
Griffiths EJ , Timme RE , Mendes CI , Page AJ , Alikhan NF , Fornika D , Maguire F , Campos J , Park D , Olawoye IB , Oluniyi PE , Anderson D , Christoffels A , da Silva AG , Cameron R , Dooley D , Katz LS , Black A , Karsch-Mizrachi I , Barrett T , Johnston A , Connor TR , Nicholls SM , Witney AA , Tyson GH , Tausch SH , Raphenya AR , Alcock B , Aanensen DM , Hodcroft E , Hsiao WWL , Vasconcelos ATR , MacCannell DR . Gigascience 2022 11 BACKGROUND: The Public Health Alliance for Genomic Epidemiology (PHA4GE) (https://pha4ge.org) is a global coalition that is actively working to establish consensus standards, document and share best practices, improve the availability of critical bioinformatics tools and resources, and advocate for greater openness, interoperability, accessibility, and reproducibility in public health microbial bioinformatics. In the face of the current pandemic, PHA4GE has identified a need for a fit-for-purpose, open-source SARS-CoV-2 contextual data standard. RESULTS: As such, we have developed a SARS-CoV-2 contextual data specification package based on harmonizable, publicly available community standards. The specification can be implemented via a collection template, as well as an array of protocols and tools to support both the harmonization and submission of sequence data and contextual information to public biorepositories. CONCLUSIONS: Well-structured, rich contextual data add value, promote reuse, and enable aggregation and integration of disparate datasets. Adoption of the proposed standard and practices will better enable interoperability between datasets and systems, improve the consistency and utility of generated data, and ultimately facilitate novel insights and discoveries in SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19. The package is now supported by the NCBI's BioSample database. |
SARS-CoV-2 Genomic Surveillance Reveals Little Spread From a Large University Campus to the Surrounding Community.
Valesano AL , Fitzsimmons WJ , Blair CN , Woods RJ , Gilbert J , Rudnik D , Mortenson L , Friedrich TC , O'Connor DH , MacCannell DR , Petrie JG , Martin ET , Lauring AS . Open Forum Infect Dis 2021 8 (11) ofab518 BACKGROUND: Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has had high incidence rates at institutions of higher education (IHE) in the United States, but the transmission dynamics in these settings are poorly understood. It remains unclear to what extent IHE-associated outbreaks have contributed to transmission in nearby communities. METHODS: We implemented high-density prospective genomic surveillance to investigate these dynamics at the University of Michigan and the surrounding community during the Fall 2020 semester (August 16-November 24). We sequenced complete severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) genomes from 1659 individuals, including 468 students, representing 20% of cases in students and 25% of total cases in Washtenaw County over the study interval. RESULTS: Phylogenetic analysis identified >200 introductions into the student population, most of which were not related to other student cases. There were 2 prolonged student transmission clusters, of 115 and 73 individuals, that spanned multiple on-campus residences. Remarkably, <5% of nonstudent genomes were descended from student clusters, and viral descendants of student cases were rare during a subsequent wave of infections in the community. CONCLUSIONS: The largest outbreaks among students at the University of Michigan did not significantly contribute to the rise in community cases in Fall 2020. These results provide valuable insights into SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics at the regional level. |
Transmission Dynamics of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 in High-Density Settings, Minnesota, USA, March-June 2020.
Lehnertz NB , Wang X , Garfin J , Taylor J , Zipprich J , VonBank B , Martin K , Eikmeier D , Medus C , Wiedinmyer B , Bernu C , Plumb M , Pung K , Honein MA , Carter R , MacCannell D , Smith KE , Como-Sabetti K , Ehresmann K , Danila R , Lynfield R . Emerg Infect Dis 2021 27 (8) 2052-2063 Coronavirus disease has disproportionately affected persons in congregate settings and high-density workplaces. To determine more about the transmission patterns of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in these settings, we performed whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis on 319 (14.4%) samples from 2,222 SARS-CoV-2-positive persons associated with 8 outbreaks in Minnesota, USA, during March-June 2020. Sequencing indicated that virus spread in 3 long-term care facilities and 2 correctional facilities was associated with a single genetic sequence and that in a fourth long-term care facility, outbreak cases were associated with 2 distinct sequences. In contrast, cases associated with outbreaks in 2 meat-processing plants were associated with multiple SARS-CoV-2 sequences. These results suggest that a single introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into a facility can result in a widespread outbreak. Early identification and cohorting (segregating) of virus-positive persons in these settings, along with continued vigilance with infection prevention and control measures, is imperative. |
SARS-CoV-2 Variants of Interest and Concern naming scheme conducive for global discourse.
Konings F , Perkins MD , Kuhn JH , Pallen MJ , Alm EJ , Archer BN , Barakat A , Bedford T , Bhiman JN , Caly L , Carter LL , Cullinane A , de Oliveira T , Druce J , El Masry I , Evans R , Gao GF , Gorbalenya AE , Hamblion E , Herring BL , Hodcroft E , Holmes EC , Kakkar M , Khare S , Koopmans MPG , Korber B , Leite J , MacCannell D , Marklewitz M , Maurer-Stroh S , Rico JAM , Munster VJ , Neher R , Munnink BO , Pavlin BI , Peiris M , Poon L , Pybus O , Rambaut A , Resende P , Subissi L , Thiel V , Tong S , van der Werf S , von Gottberg A , Ziebuhr J , Van Kerkhove MD . Nat Microbiol 2021 6 (7) 821-823 A group convened and led by the Virus Evolution Working Group of the World Health Organization reports on its deliberations and announces a naming scheme that will enable clear communication about SARS-CoV-2 variants of interest and concern. | | Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the causative agent of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), has a linear, unsegmented, positive-sense RNA genome. As with all viruses, SARS-CoV-2 continuously adapts to changing environments in real time via random genome mutations that are subject to natural selection. Most mutations are neutral or detrimental to the virus; however, a small number of mutations may provide a selective advantage, such as escape from the host immune system or resistance to antiviral drugs. Such mutations may also lead to increased fitness for transmissibility. As mutated forms of viruses or variants spread from person to person, they will eventually be detected at the population level. |
Genomic Surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 Variants Circulating in the United States, December 2020-May 2021.
Paul P , France AM , Aoki Y , Batra D , Biggerstaff M , Dugan V , Galloway S , Hall AJ , Johansson MA , Kondor RJ , Halpin AL , Lee B , Lee JS , Limbago B , MacNeil A , MacCannell D , Paden CR , Queen K , Reese HE , Retchless AC , Slayton RB , Steele M , Tong S , Walters MS , Wentworth DE , Silk BJ . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021 70 (23) 846-850 SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, is constantly mutating, leading to new variants (1). Variants have the potential to affect transmission, disease severity, diagnostics, therapeutics, and natural and vaccine-induced immunity. In November 2020, CDC established national surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 variants using genomic sequencing. As of May 6, 2021, sequences from 177,044 SARS-CoV-2-positive specimens collected during December 20, 2020-May 6, 2021, from 55 U.S. jurisdictions had been generated by or reported to CDC. These included 3,275 sequences for the 2-week period ending January 2, 2021, compared with 25,000 sequences for the 2-week period ending April 24, 2021 (0.1% and 3.1% of reported positive SARS-CoV-2 tests, respectively). Because sequences might be generated by multiple laboratories and sequence availability varies both geographically and over time, CDC developed statistical weighting and variance estimation methods to generate population-based estimates of the proportions of identified variants among SARS-CoV-2 infections circulating nationwide and in each of the 10 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) geographic regions.* During the 2-week period ending April 24, 2021, the B.1.1.7 and P.1 variants represented an estimated 66.0% and 5.0% of U.S. SARS-CoV-2 infections, respectively, demonstrating the rise to predominance of the B.1.1.7 variant of concern(†) (VOC) and emergence of the P.1 VOC in the United States. Using SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance methods to analyze surveillance data produces timely population-based estimates of the proportions of variants circulating nationally and regionally. Surveillance findings demonstrate the potential for new variants to emerge and become predominant, and the importance of robust genomic surveillance. Along with efforts to characterize the clinical and public health impact of SARS-CoV-2 variants, surveillance can help guide interventions to control the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. |
Introduction, Transmission Dynamics, and Fate of Early SARS-CoV-2 Lineages in Santa Clara County, California.
Villarino E , Deng X , Kemper CA , Jorden MA , Bonin B , Rudman SL , Han GS , Yu G , Wang C , Federman S , Bushnell B , Wadford DA , Lin W , Tao Y , Paden CR , Bhatnagar J , MacCannell T , Tong S , Batson J , Chiu CY . J Infect Dis 2021 224 (2) 207-217 We combined viral genome sequencing with contact tracing to investigate introduction and evolution of SARS-CoV-2 lineages in Santa Clara County, California from January 27 to March 21, 2020. Of 558 persons with COVID-19, 101 genomes from 143 available clinical samples comprised 17 different lineages including SCC1 (n=41), WA1 (n=9, including the first 2 reported deaths in the United States, diagnosed post-mortem), D614G (n=4), ancestral Wuhan Hu-1 (n=21), and 13 others (n=26). Public health intervention may have curtailed the persistence of lineages that appeared transiently during February-March. By August, only D614G lineages introduced after March 21 were circulating in SCC. |
Early introductions and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7 in the United States.
Alpert T , Brito AF , Lasek-Nesselquist E , Rothman J , Valesano AL , MacKay MJ , Petrone ME , Breban MI , Watkins AE , Vogels CBF , Kalinich CC , Dellicour S , Russell A , Kelly JP , Shudt M , Plitnick J , Schneider E , Fitzsimmons WJ , Khullar G , Metti J , Dudley JT , Nash M , Beaubier N , Wang J , Liu C , Hui P , Muyombwe A , Downing R , Razeq J , Bart SM , Grills A , Morrison SM , Murphy S , Neal C , Laszlo E , Rennert H , Cushing M , Westblade L , Velu P , Craney A , Cong L , Peaper DR , Landry ML , Cook PW , Fauver JR , Mason CE , Lauring AS , St George K , MacCannell DR , Grubaugh ND . Cell 2021 184 (10) 2595-2604 e13 The emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7, first detected in the United Kingdom, has become a global public health concern because of its increased transmissibility. Over 2,500 COVID-19 cases associated with this variant have been detected in the United States (US) since December 2020, but the extent of establishment is relatively unknown. Using travel, genomic, and diagnostic data, we highlight that the primary ports of entry for B.1.1.7 in the US were in New York, California, and Florida. Furthermore, we found evidence for many independent B.1.1.7 establishments starting in early December 2020, followed by interstate spread by the end of the month. Finally, we project that B.1.1.7 will be the dominant lineage in many states by mid- to late March. Thus, genomic surveillance for B.1.1.7 and other variants urgently needs to be enhanced to better inform the public health response. |
Emergence and rapid transmission of SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 in the United States.
Washington NL , Gangavarapu K , Zeller M , Bolze A , Cirulli ET , Schiabor Barrett KM , Larsen BB , Anderson C , White S , Cassens T , Jacobs S , Levan G , Nguyen J , Ramirez JM3rd , Rivera-Garcia C , Sandoval E , Wang X , Wong D , Spencer E , Robles-Sikisaka R , Kurzban E , Hughes LD , Deng X , Wang C , Servellita V , Valentine H , De Hoff P , Seaver P , Sathe S , Gietzen K , Sickler B , Antico J , Hoon K , Liu J , Harding A , Bakhtar O , Basler T , Austin B , MacCannell D , Isaksson M , Febbo PG , Becker D , Laurent M , McDonald E , Yeo GW , Knight R , Laurent LC , de Feo E , Worobey M , Chiu CY , Suchard MA , Lu JT , Lee W , Andersen KG . Cell 2021 184 (10) 2587-2594 e7 The highly transmissible B.1.1.7 variant of SARS-CoV-2, first identified in the United Kingdom, has gained a foothold across the world. Using S gene target failure (SGTF) and SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequencing, we investigated the prevalence and dynamics of this variant in the United States (US), tracking it back to its early emergence. We found that, while the fraction of B.1.1.7 varied by state, the variant increased at a logistic rate with a roughly weekly doubling rate and an increased transmission of 40%-50%. We revealed several independent introductions of B.1.1.7 into the US as early as late November 2020, with community transmission spreading it to most states within months. We show that the US is on a similar trajectory as other countries where B.1.1.7 became dominant, requiring immediate and decisive action to minimize COVID-19 morbidity and mortality. |
Emergence of SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 Lineage - United States, December 29, 2020-January 12, 2021.
Galloway SE , Paul P , MacCannell DR , Johansson MA , Brooks JT , MacNeil A , Slayton RB , Tong S , Silk BJ , Armstrong GL , Biggerstaff M , Dugan VG . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021 70 (3) 95-99 On December 14, 2020, the United Kingdom reported a SARS-CoV-2 variant of concern (VOC), lineage B.1.1.7, also referred to as VOC 202012/01 or 20I/501Y.V1.* The B.1.1.7 variant is estimated to have emerged in September 2020 and has quickly become the dominant circulating SARS-CoV-2 variant in England (1). B.1.1.7 has been detected in over 30 countries, including the United States. As of January 13, 2021, approximately 76 cases of B.1.1.7 have been detected in 12 U.S. states.(†) Multiple lines of evidence indicate that B.1.1.7 is more efficiently transmitted than are other SARS-CoV-2 variants (1-3). The modeled trajectory of this variant in the U.S. exhibits rapid growth in early 2021, becoming the predominant variant in March. Increased SARS-CoV-2 transmission might threaten strained health care resources, require extended and more rigorous implementation of public health strategies (4), and increase the percentage of population immunity required for pandemic control. Taking measures to reduce transmission now can lessen the potential impact of B.1.1.7 and allow critical time to increase vaccination coverage. Collectively, enhanced genomic surveillance combined with continued compliance with effective public health measures, including vaccination, physical distancing, use of masks, hand hygiene, and isolation and quarantine, will be essential to limiting the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Strategic testing of persons without symptoms but at higher risk of infection, such as those exposed to SARS-CoV-2 or who have frequent unavoidable contact with the public, provides another opportunity to limit ongoing spread. |
Cryptic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Washington state.
Bedford T , Greninger AL , Roychoudhury P , Starita LM , Famulare M , Huang ML , Nalla A , Pepper G , Reinhardt A , Xie H , Shrestha L , Nguyen TN , Adler A , Brandstetter E , Cho S , Giroux D , Han PD , Fay K , Frazar CD , Ilcisin M , Lacombe K , Lee J , Kiavand A , Richardson M , Sibley TR , Truong M , Wolf CR , Nickerson DA , Rieder MJ , Englund JA , Hadfield J , Hodcroft EB , Huddleston J , Moncla LH , Müller NF , Neher RA , Deng X , Gu W , Federman S , Chiu C , Duchin JS , Gautom R , Melly G , Hiatt B , Dykema P , Lindquist S , Queen K , Tao Y , Uehara A , Tong S , MacCannell D , Armstrong GL , Baird GS , Chu HY , Shendure J , Jerome KR . Science 2020 370 (6516) 571-575 Following its emergence in Wuhan, China, in late November or early December 2019, the SARS-CoV-2 virus has rapidly spread globally. Genome sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 allows reconstruction of its transmission history, although this is contingent on sampling. We have analyzed 453 SARS-CoV-2 genomes collected between 20 February and 15 March 2020 from infected patients in Washington State, USA. We find that most SARS-CoV-2 infections sampled during this time derive from a single introduction in late January or early February 2020 which subsequently spread locally before active community surveillance was implemented. |
STROBE-metagenomics: a STROBE extension statement to guide the reporting of metagenomics studies.
Bharucha T , Oeser C , Balloux F , Brown JR , Carbo EC , Charlett A , Chiu CY , Claas ECJ , de Goffau MC , de Vries JJC , Eloit M , Hopkins S , Huggett JF , MacCannell D , Morfopoulou S , Nath A , O'Sullivan DM , Reoma LB , Shaw LP , Sidorov I , Simner PJ , Van Tan L , Thomson EC , van Dorp L , Wilson MR , Breuer J , Field N . Lancet Infect Dis 2020 20 (10) e251-e260 The term metagenomics refers to the use of sequencing methods to simultaneously identify genomic material from all organisms present in a sample, with the advantage of greater taxonomic resolution than culture or other methods. Applications include pathogen detection and discovery, species characterisation, antimicrobial resistance detection, virulence profiling, and study of the microbiome and microecological factors affecting health. However, metagenomics involves complex and multistep processes and there are important technical and methodological challenges that require careful consideration to support valid inference. We co-ordinated a multidisciplinary, international expert group to establish reporting guidelines that address specimen processing, nucleic acid extraction, sequencing platforms, bioinformatics considerations, quality assurance, limits of detection, power and sample size, confirmatory testing, causality criteria, cost, and ethical issues. The guidance recognises that metagenomics research requires pragmatism and caution in interpretation, and that this field is rapidly evolving. |
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