The California Department of Public Health (CDPH) reviewed 109 cases of healthcare personnel (HCP) with laboratory-confirmed mpox to understand transmission risk in healthcare settings. Overall, 90% of HCP with mpox had nonoccupational exposure risk factors. One occupationally acquired case was associated with sharps injury while unroofing a patient's lesion for diagnostic testing.

Reptiles are one of the fastest growing sectors in the United States pet industry. Reptile-associated salmonellosis (RAS) continues to be an important public health problem, especially among children. We investigated an outbreak of human Salmonella infections resulting from serotypes Cotham and Kisarawe, predominately occurring among children. An outbreak of illnesses was identified in persons with exposure to pet bearded dragon lizards. Human and animal health officials, in cooperation with the pet industry, conducted epidemiologic, traceback and laboratory investigations. Onsite sampling was conducted at two US breeding facilities, one foreign breeding facility, and a large pet retail chain. A total of 166 patients in 36 states were identified with illness onset dates from 02/2012-06/2014. The median patient age was 3 years (range, <1-79 years), 57% were aged </=5 years, and 37% were aged </=1 year. Forty-four patients (37%) were hospitalized, predominantly children. Sampling at breeding facilities and a national pet store chain resulted in isolation of outbreak serotypes at each facility; isolation proportions ranged from 2%-24% of samples collected at each facility.Epidemiologic, microbiologic and traceback evidence linked an outbreak of uncommon Salmonella serotypes to contact with pet bearded dragons. The high proportion of infants involved in this outbreak highlights the need to educate owners about the risk of RAS in children and the potential for household contamination by pet reptiles or their habitats. Strategies should be developed to improve breeding practices, biosecurity and monitoring protocols to reduce Salmonella in the pet reptile trade.

Here, we report the full coding sequence of rhinovirus C47 (RV-C47), obtained from a patient respiratory sample collected during an acute respiratory illness investigation in Butte County, California, in January 2017. This is the first whole-genome sequence of RV-C47 to be reported.

OBJECTIVE: We evaluated the usefulness and accuracy of media-reported data for active disaster-related mortality surveillance. METHODS: From October 29 through November 5, 2012, epidemiologists from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) tracked online media reports for Hurricane Sandy-related deaths by use of a keyword search. To evaluate the media-reported data, vital statistics records of Sandy-related deaths were compared to corresponding media-reported deaths and assessed for percentage match. Sensitivity, positive predictive value (PPV), and timeliness of the media reports for detecting Sandy-related deaths were calculated. RESULTS: Ninety-nine media-reported deaths were identified and compared with the 90 vital statistics death records sent to the CDC by New York City (NYC) and the 5 states that agreed to participate in this study. Seventy-five (76%) of the media reports matched with vital statistics records. Only NYC was able to actively track Sandy-related deaths during the event. Moderate sensitivity (83%) and PPV (83%) were calculated for the matching media-reported deaths for NYC. CONCLUSIONS: During Hurricane Sandy, the media-reported information was moderately sensitive, and percentage match with vital statistics records was also moderate. The results indicate that online media-reported deaths can be useful as a supplemental source of information for situational awareness and immediate public health decision-making during the initial response stage of a disaster.

Surface water contaminants in Kentucky during and after 2011 flooding were characterized. Surface water samples were collected during flood stage (May 2-4, 2011; n = 15) and after (July 25-26, 2011; n = 8) from four different cities along the Ohio River and were analyzed for the presence of microbial indicators, pathogens, metals, and chemical contaminants. Contaminant concentrations during and after flooding were compared using linear and logistic regression. Surface water samples collected during flooding had higher levels of E. coli, enterococci, Salmonella, Campylobacter, E. coli O157:H7, adenovirus, arsenic, copper, iron, lead, and zinc compared to surface water samples collected 3-months post-flood (P < 0.05). These results suggest that flooding increases microbial and chemical loads in surface water. These findings reinforce commonly recommended guidelines to limit exposure to flood water and to appropriately sanitize contaminated surfaces and drinking wells after contamination by flood water.

On August 30, 2013, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) was notified by several hospitals of an increase in the number of patients visiting their emergency departments (EDs) with altered mental status after using synthetic marijuana. Synthetic marijuana is dried plant material sprayed with various synthetic cannabinoids and smoked as an alternative to smoking marijuana. In response to the increase in ED visits associated with the use of synthetic marijuana, CDPHE asked all Colorado EDs to report through EMResource (a web-based reporting system) any patients examined on or after August 21 with altered mental status after use of a synthetic marijuana product. Serum and urine specimens from patients also were requested. On September 8, CDPHE, with the assistance of CDC, began an epidemiologic investigation to characterize the outbreak, determine the active substance and source of the synthetic marijuana product, and prevent further morbidity and mortality. Investigators reviewed ED visit reports submitted through EMResource and medical charts. A probable case was defined as any illness resulting in a visit to a Colorado ED during August 21-September 18, 2013, by a patient with suspected synthetic marijuana use in the 24 hours preceding illness onset. Of 263 patient visits reported to CDPHE through EMResource (214) and other means, such as e-mail and fax (49), a total of 221 (84%) represented probable cases (Figure).

This report augments guidelines published in 1990 for investigating clusters of health events (CDC. Guidelines for investigating clusters of health events. MMWR 1990;39[No. RR-11]). The 1990 Guidelines considered any noninfectious disease cluster, injuries, birth defects, and previously unrecognized syndromes or illnesses. These new guidelines focus on cancer clusters. State and local health departments can use these guidelines to develop a systematic approach to responding to community concerns regarding cancer clusters. The guidelines are intended to apply to situations in which a health department responds to an inquiry about a suspected cancer cluster in a residential or community setting only. Occupational or medical treatment-related clusters are not included in this report. Since 1990, many improvements have occurred in data resources, investigative techniques, and analytic/statistical methods, and much has been learned from both large- and small-scale cancer cluster investigations. These improvements and lessons have informed these updated guidelines. These guidelines utilize a four-step approach (initial response, assessment, major feasibility study, and etiologic investigation) as a tool for managing a reported cluster. Even if a cancer cluster is identified, there is no guarantee that a common cause or an environmental contaminant will be implicated. Identification of a common cause or an implicated contaminant might be an expected outcome for the concerned community. Therefore, during all parts of an inquiry, responders should be transparent, communicate clearly, and explain their decisions to the community.

CONTEXT: Diethylene glycol (DEG) mass poisoning is a persistent public health problem. Unfortunately, there are no human biological data on DEG and its suspected metabolites in poisoning. If present and associated with poisoning, the evidence for use of traditional therapies such as fomepizole and/or hemodialysis would be much stronger. OBJECTIVE: To characterize DEG and its metabolites in stored serum, urine, and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) specimens obtained from human DEG poisoning victims enrolled in a 2006 case-control study. METHODS: In the 2006 study, biological samples from persons enrolled in a case-control study (42 cases with new-onset, unexplained AKI and 140 age-, sex-, and admission date-matched controls without AKI) were collected and shipped to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta for various analyses and were then frozen in storage. For this study, when sufficient volume of the original specimen remained, the following analytes were quantitatively measured in serum, urine, and CSF: DEG, 2-hydroxyethoxyacetic acid (HEAA), diglycolic acid, ethylene glycol, glycolic acid, and oxalic acid. Analytes were measured using low resolution GC/MS, descriptive statistics calculated and case results compared with controls when appropriate. Specimens were de-identified so previously collected demographic, exposure, and health data were not available. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (with exact p-values) and bivariable exact logistic regression were used in SAS v9.2 for data analysis. RESULTS: The following samples were analyzed: serum, 20 case, and 20 controls; urine, 11 case and 22 controls; and CSF, 11 samples from 10 cases and no controls. Diglycolic acid was detected in all case serum samples (median, 40.7 mcg/mL; range, 22.6-75.2) and no controls, and in all case urine samples (median, 28.7 mcg/mL; range, 14-118.4) and only five (23%) controls (median, < Lower Limit of Quantitation (LLQ); range, < LLQ-43.3 mcg/mL). Significant differences and associations were identified between case status and the following: 1) serum oxalic acid and serum HEAA (both OR = 14.6; 95% C I = 2.8-100.9); 2) serum diglycolic acid and urine diglycolic acid (both OR > 999; exact p < 0.0001); and 3) urinary glycolic acid (OR = 0.057; 95% C I = 0.001-0.55). Two CSF sample results were excluded and two from the same case were averaged, yielding eight samples from eight cases. Diglycolic acid was detected in seven (88%) of case CSF samples (median, 2.03 mcg/mL; range, < LLQ, 7.47). Discussion. Significantly elevated HEAA (serum) and diglycolic acid (serum and urine) concentrations were identified among cases, which is consistent with animal data. Low urinary glycolic acid concentrations in cases may have been due to concurrent AKI. Although serum glycolic concentrations among cases may have initially increased, further metabolism to oxalic acid may have occurred thereby explaining the similar glycolic acid concentrations in cases and controls. The increased serum oxalic acid concentration results in cases versus controls are consistent with this hypothesis. CONCLUSION: Diglycolic acid is associated with human DEG poisoning and may be a biomarker for poisoning. These findings add to animal data suggesting a possible role for traditional antidotal therapies. The detection of HEAA and diglycolic acid in the CSF of cases suggests a possible association with signs and symptoms of DEG-associated neurotoxicity. Further work characterizing the pathophysiology of DEG-associated neurotoxicity and the role of traditional toxic alcohol therapies such as fomepizole and hemodialysis is needed.

Aflatoxins contaminate approximately 25% of agricultural products worldwide. They can cause liver failure and liver cancer. Kenya has experienced multiple aflatoxicosis outbreaks in recent years, often resulting in fatalities. However, the full extent of aflatoxin exposure in Kenya has been unknown. Our objective was to quantify aflatoxin exposure across Kenya. We analysed aflatoxin levels in serum specimens from the 2007 Kenya AIDS Indicator Survey - a nationally representative, cross-sectional serosurvey. KAIS collected 15,853 blood specimens. Of the 3180 human immunodeficiency virus-negative specimens with ≥1 mL sera, we randomly selected 600 specimens stratified by province and sex. We analysed serum specimens for aflatoxin albumin adducts by using isotope dilution MS/MS to quantify aflatoxin B1-lysine, and normalised with serum albumin. Aflatoxin concentrations were then compared by demographic, socioeconomic and geographic characteristics. We detected serum aflatoxin B1-lysine in 78% of serum specimens (range = <LOD-211 pg/mg albumin, median = 1.78 pg/mg albumin). Aflatoxin exposure did not vary by sex, age group, marital status, religion or socioeconomic characteristics. Aflatoxin exposure varied by province (p < 0.05); it was highest in Eastern (median = 7.87 pg/mg albumin) and Coast (median = 3.70 pg/mg albumin) provinces and lowest in Nyanza (median = <LOD) and Rift Valley (median = 0.70 pg/mg albumin) provinces. Our findings suggest that aflatoxin exposure is a public health problem throughout Kenya, and it could be substantially impacting human health. Wide-scale, evidence-based interventions are urgently needed to decrease exposure and subsequent health effects.

Diethylene glycol (DEG), a chemical that has been implicated in multiple medication-associated mass poisonings, can result in renal and neurological toxicity if ingested. Three previous such mass poisonings implicated Chinese manufacturers as the origin of contaminated ingredients. No literature exists on potential DEG or triethylene glycol (TEG), a related compound, contamination of health products imported from Asian countries to the USA. Our primary objective was to quantitatively assess the amount of DEG present in a convenience sampling of these health products. The study's secondary objectives were to: (1) evaluate for, and quantify TEG levels in these samples; (2) compare DEG and TEG levels in these products directly to levels in medications implicated in previous similar mass poisonings; and (3) to estimate DEG dose (in mg/kg) based on the manufacturer's instructions and compare these values to toxic doses from past mass poisonings and the literature. A quantitative assessment of DEG and TEG was performed in a convenience sampling of over-the-counter health products imported from Asian countries. Results were converted to volume to volume (v/v) % and compared with DEG levels in medications implicated in previous mass poisonings. Estimated doses (based on the manufacturer's instructions) of each product with detectable levels of DEG for a 70 kg adult were compared to toxic doses of DEG reported in the literature. Seventeen of 85 (20%) samples were not able to be analyzed for DEG or TEG due to technical reasons. Fifteen of 68 (22%) samples successfully tested had detectable levels of DEG (mean, 18.8 mug/ml; range, 0.791-110.1 mug/ml; and volume to volume (v/v) range, 0.00007-0.01%). Two of 68 (3%) samples had TEG levels of 12.8 and 20.2 mug/ml or 0.0012% and 0.0018% TEG v/v. The product with the highest DEG% by v/v was 810 times less than the product involved in the Panama DEG mass poisoning (8.1%). The lowest reported toxic dose from a past DEG mass poisoning (14 mg/kg) was more than 150 times higher than the highest daily dose estimated in our study (0.09 mg/kg). Sixty-eight of 85 (80%) samples were able to be successfully analyzed for DEG and TEG. DEG and TEG were detectable in 15/68 (22%) and 2/68 (3%) samples, respectively. Based on current standards, these levels probably do not represent an acute public health threat. Additional research focusing on why DEG is found in these products and on the minimum amount of DEG needed to result in toxicity is needed.

BACKGROUND: Poison control centers and clinical toxicologists serve many roles within public health; however, the degree to which these entities collaborate is unknown. PURPOSE: The objective of this survey was to identify successful collaborations of public health agencies with clinical toxicologists and poison control centers. Four areas including outbreak identification, syndromic surveillance, terrorism preparedness, and daily public health responsibilities amenable to poison control center resources were assessed. METHODS: An online survey was sent to the directors of poison control centers, state epidemiologists, and the most senior public health official in each state and selected major metropolitan areas. This survey focused on three areas: service, structure within the local or state public health system, and remuneration. Questions regarding remuneration and poison control center location within the public health structure were asked to assess if these were critical factors of successful collaborations. Senior state and local public health officials were excluded because of a low response rate. The survey was completed in October 2007. RESULTS: A total of 111 respondents, 61 poison control centers and 50 state epidemiologists, were eligible for the survey. Sixty-nine (62%) of the 111 respondents, completed and returned the survey. Thirty-three (54%) of the 61 poison control centers responded, and 36 of the 50 state epidemiologists (72%) responded. The most frequent collaborations were terrorism preparedness and epidemic illness reporting. Additional collaborations also exist. Important collaborations exist outside of remuneration or poison control centers being a formal part of the public health structure. CONCLUSIONS: Poison control centers have expanded their efforts to include outbreak identification, syndromic surveillance, terrorism preparedness, and daily public health responsibilities amenable to poison control center resources. Collaboration in these areas and others should be expanded.

BACKGROUND: Department of Transportation (DOT) mandates reporting of all serious hazardous materials incidents. Hazardous material exposures may result in secondary contamination of emergency departments, or delayed clinical effects. Poison control centers specialize in the management of patients exposed to toxic substances; however, poison control center notification is not required. PURPOSE: The objective is to determine the frequency of poison control center notification after serious hazardous materials incidents when patients were transported to a hospital. METHODS: A retrospective analysis was conducted of serious hazardous materials incidents as reported by DOT, matched with data from the American Association of Poison Control Centers from 2002 through 2006 that involved patient transport. Incidents were divided into four groups: those reported to a poison control center within 0-360 minutes of the incident; those reported within 361-1440 minutes of the incident; those reported within 1441-4320 minutes of the incident; and no poison control center notification. Analyses were performed on variables including date, time, substance, and time to notification. Data were received in January 2008. RESULTS: One hundred fifty-four serious incidents met inclusion criteria. One hundred thirty-four incidents (87%) occurred without poison control center notification. Poison control centers were notified in 20 incidents (12.9%); 15 incidents (9.7%) were reported within 0-360 minutes of the incident (M=115 minutes, range=5-359 minutes); four incidents (2.6%) were reported within 361-1440 minutes of the incident (M=652 minutes, range=566-750 minutes); and one incident (0.7%) was reported after 4320 minutes following the incident. CONCLUSIONS: Most serious hazardous materials incidents involving patient transport are not reported to poison control centers. Opportunities exist to increase utilization of poison control center resources without increasing financial burdens of the hazardous materials incident.