Lead is a metal that has developmental neurotoxic properties for humans and is found naturally in the environment. The effects of lead poisoning—including death, cognitive and central nervous system impairment, and sterility—have been recognized for thousands of years. The industrial revolution increased usage of lead and the atmospheric spread of aerosolized lead particles significantly, contributing to increased blood lead levels among US children from 1900 to 1975. In response, exposure to specific sources were addressed with 1970s’ and 1980s’ federal policies to remove lead in paint and passenger car gasoline. As a result, childhood lead poisoning rates plunged during 1975 to 2000, from previously observed peaks, giving the impression that the problem was solved.

Opportunities for lead exposure are common in the United States. The American Academy of Pediatrics, in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, launched the Increasing Capacity for Blood Lead Testing Extension for Community Healthcare Outcomes (ECHO) project to educate pediatricians on the importance of testing children for lead exposure and to assess practice behavior change. We found that two weeks to one month after receiving training, more than 80% of participants reported increased lead testing and practice changes. Our results support use of the ECHO model as a mechanism for practice change. (Am J Public Health. 2022;112(S7):S647-S650. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2022.307084).

Scholars have produced a flow of published research confirming the harmful effects of lead at lower and lower exposure levels. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention currently uses a blood lead reference value of 3.5 micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood. Children with blood lead levels at or above the reference value are among the top 2.5% of US children with the highest blood lead levels. | Lead poisoning prevention is complex and requires a recalibration of current public health approaches and perspectives. Lead poisoning prevention, as a model for the future of public health, forces us to boldly confront health equity issues such as safe housing, clean drinking water, safe schools and childcare facilities, environmental justice, community infrastructure repair, occupational risks, and so on. We must protect young children from exposure to lead to ensure that future leaders have the mental capacity to confront the challenges ahead. Thus, childhood lead exposure prevention should be a national priority.

The negative impact of lead exposure on young children and those who become pregnant is well documented but is not well known by those at highest risk from this hazard. Scientific evidence suggests that there is no known safe blood lead level (BLL), because even small amounts of lead can be harmful to a child's developing brain (1). In 2012, CDC introduced the population-based blood lead reference value (BLRV) to identify children exposed to more lead than most other children in the United States. The BLRV should be used as a guide to 1) help determine whether medical or environmental follow-up actions should be initiated for an individual child and 2) prioritize communities with the most need for primary prevention of exposure and evaluate the effectiveness of prevention efforts. The BLRV is based on the 97.5th percentile of the blood lead distribution in U.S. children aged 1-5 years from National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) data. NHANES is a complex, multistage survey designed to provide a nationally representative assessment of health and nutritional status of the noninstitutionalized civilian adult and child populations in the United States (2). The initial BLRV of 5 μg/dL, established in 2012, was based on data from the 2007-2008 and 2009-2010 NHANES cycles. Consistent with recommendations from a former advisory committee, this report updates CDC's BLRV in children to 3.5 μg/dL using NHANES data derived from the 2015-2016 and 2017-2018 cycles and provides helpful information to support adoption by state and local health departments, health care providers (HCPs), clinical laboratories, and others and serves as an opportunity to advance health equity and environmental justice related to preventable lead exposure. CDC recommends that public health and clinical professionals focus screening efforts on populations at high risk based on age of housing and sociodemographic risk factors. Public health and clinical professionals should collaborate to develop screening plans responsive to local conditions using local data. In the absence of such plans, universal BLL testing is recommended. In addition, jurisdictions should follow the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services requirement that all Medicaid-enrolled children be tested at ages 12 and 24 months or at age 24-72 months if they have not previously been screened (3).

OBJECTIVES: When Hurricane Harvey struck the coastline of Texas in 2017, it caused 88 fatalities and over US $125 billion in damage, along with increased emergency department visits in Houston and in cities receiving hurricane evacuees, such as the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex (DFW).This study explored demographic indicators of vulnerability for patients from the Hurricane Harvey impact area who sought medical care in Houston and in DFW. The objectives were to characterize the vulnerability of affected populations presenting locally, as well as those presenting away from home, and to determine whether more vulnerable communities were more likely to seek medical care locally or elsewhere. METHODS: We used syndromic surveillance data alongside the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Social Vulnerability Index to calculate the percentage of patients seeking care locally by zip code tabulation area. We used this variable to fit a spatial lag regression model, controlling for population density and flood extent. RESULTS: Communities with more patients presenting for medical care locally were significantly clustered and tended to have greater socioeconomic vulnerability, lower household composition vulnerability, and more extensive flooding. CONCLUSIONS: These findings suggest that populations remaining in place during a natural disaster event may have needs related to income, education, and employment, while evacuees may have more needs related to age, disability, and single-parent household status.

The rise of social media has transformed the way individuals share and consume information. Approximately two-thirds of Americans receive at least some of their news from social media channels such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and Snapchat.1 During an emergency, public health practitioners need to understand how to effectively use social media to rapidly disseminate information, so that the public health message goes viral,* instead of the disease. We propose a novel framework using a 3 Rs principle—Review, Recognize, and Respond—to help public health practitioners design tailored messages that prevent disease and promote health before, during, and after a public health emergency.

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral respiratory illness caused by SARS-CoV-2. During January 21-July 25, 2020, in response to official requests for assistance with COVID-19 emergency public health response activities, CDC deployed 208 teams to assist 55 state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments. CDC deployment data were analyzed to summarize activities by deployed CDC teams in assisting state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments to identify and implement measures to contain SARS-CoV-2 transmission (1). Deployed teams assisted with the investigation of transmission in high-risk congregate settings, such as long-term care facilities (53 deployments; 26% of total), food processing facilities (24; 12%), correctional facilities (12; 6%), and settings that provide services to persons experiencing homelessness (10; 5%). Among the 208 deployed teams, 178 (85%) provided assistance to state health departments, 12 (6%) to tribal health departments, 10 (5%) to local health departments, and eight (4%) to territorial health departments. CDC collaborations with health departments have strengthened local capacity and provided outbreak response support. Collaborations focused attention on health equity issues among disproportionately affected populations (e.g., racial and ethnic minority populations, essential frontline workers, and persons experiencing homelessness) and through a place-based focus (e.g., persons living in rural or frontier areas). These collaborations also facilitated enhanced characterization of COVID-19 epidemiology, directly contributing to CDC data-informed guidance, including guidance for serial testing as a containment strategy in high-risk congregate settings, targeted interventions and prevention efforts among workers at food processing facilities, and social distancing.

OBJECTIVE: When 2017 Hurricane Harvey struck the coastline of Texas on August 25, 2017, it resulted in 88 fatalities and more than US $125 billion in damage to infrastructure. The floods associated with the storm created a toxic mix of chemicals, sewage and other biohazards, and over 6 million cubic meters of garbage in Houston alone. The level of biohazard exposure and injuries from trauma among persons residing in affected areas was widespread and likely contributed to increases in emergency department (ED) visits in Houston and cities receiving hurricane evacuees. We investigated medical surge resulting from these evacuations in Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) metroplex EDs. METHODS: We used data sourced from the North Texas Syndromic Surveillance Region 2/3 in ESSENCE to investigate ED visit surge following the storm in DFW hospitals because this area received evacuees from the 60 counties with disaster declarations due to the storm. We used the interrupted time series (ITS) analysis to estimate the magnitude and duration of the ED surge. ITS was applied to all ED visits in DFW and visits made by patients residing in any of the 60 counties with disaster declarations due to the storm. The DFW metropolitan statistical area included 55 hospitals. Time series analyses examined data from March 1, 2017-January 6, 2018 with focus on the storm impact period, August 14-September 15, 2017. Data from before, during, and after the storm were visualized spatially and temporally to characterize magnitude, duration, and spatial variation of medical surge attributable to Hurricane Harvey. RESULTS: During the study period overall, ED visits in the DFW area rose immediately by about 11% (95% CI: 9%, 13%), amounting to ~16 500 excess total visits before returning to the baseline on September 21, 2017. Visits by patients identified as residing in disaster declaration counties to DFW hospitals rose immediately by 127% (95% CI: 125%, 129%), amounting to 654 excess visits by September 29, 2017, when visits returned to the baseline. A spatial analysis revealed that evacuated patients were strongly clustered (Moran's I = 0.35, P < 0.0001) among 5 of the counties with disaster declarations in the 11-day window during the storm surge. CONCLUSIONS: The observed increase in ED visits in DFW due to Hurricane Harvey and ensuing evacuation was significant. Anticipating medical surge following large-scale hurricanes is critical for community preparedness planning. Coordinated planning across stakeholders is necessary to safeguard the population and for a skillful response to medical surge needs. Plans that address hurricane response, in particular, should have contingencies for support beyond the expected disaster areas.

OBJECTIVES: To demonstrate the performance of 53 laboratories required to submit 90% or more of their pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) subtyping results for Escherichia coli O157:H7 (E coli O157:H7) and Listeria monocytogenes (L monocytogenes) to the PulseNet national databases at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) within 4 working days of receiving isolates. METHODS: We examined data from 53 laboratories during 2013-2017 to ascertain whether E. coli O157:H7 and L monocytogenes PFGE data were reported to the PulseNet national databases within 4 working days. RESULTS: In the study period, 45 laboratories that submitted reports during the period (86.8%) met the target for timely submission of 10 606 (94.85%) E coli O157:H7 isolates into the PulseNet national database. For L monocytogenes isolates, 32 laboratories submitted reports (76.95%) that achieved timely submission of 3119 (93.35%) isolates. CONCLUSIONS: This study uncovered areas for improvement to advance public health in the CDC-funded laboratories.

Although there are a number of definitions of “community preparedness,” we conceptualize it as the ability of communities to prepare for, withstand, and recover from natural or human-made disasters.1 Community preparedness has no bounds; a crisis, whether contained at the local level or as far reaching as a pandemic, will affect diverse community populations. Preparedness planning must account for and use the multitude of complex organizational and socioeconomic components that contribute to building community resilience following a large-scale tragedy. This supplement samples the broad-ranging topics that comprise the body of scientific and programmatic information available on the subject.

Communities are societal extensions of family. Since early times, humans banded together for mutual aid, companionship, and protection from threats.1 Communities were forged by people living in the same geographic area with shared attitudes, interests, and goals for cultures, religions, and occupations.1 However, social scientists expressed concerns during the Industrial Revolution about changes observed in the human experience as populations retreated from rural areas and close-knit family units in favor of big cities and life among strangers.1 | | Sometime in the latter part of the 20th century, the way people interacted began to shift dramatically.2 In the United States, a decline in marriage and birthrates changed family dynamics and increased the number of adults living alone.2 In 2018, there were 35.7 million single-person households, composing 28% of all United States households—a significant increase from 13% in 1960.3 Social isolation is becoming more acute, with less community engagement as people rely on advances in technology to feel connected.2

Objectives. To determine the level of preparedness among New York City community-based organizations by using a needs assessment.Methods. We distributed online surveys to 582 human services and 6017 faith-based organizations in New York City from March 17, 2016 through May 11, 2016. We calculated minimal indicators of preparedness to determine the proportion of organizations with preparedness indicators. We used bivariate analyses to examine associations between agency characteristics and minimal preparedness indicators.Results. Among the 210 human service sector respondents, 61.9% reported emergency management plans and 51.9% emergency communications systems in place. Among the 223 faith-based respondents, 23.9% reported emergency management plans and 92.4% emergency communications systems in place. Only 10.0% of human services and 18.8% of faith-based organizations reported having funds allocated for emergency response. Only 2.9% of human services sector and 39.5% of faith-based sector respondents reported practicing emergency communication alerts.Conclusions. New York City human service and faith-based sector organizations are striving to address emergency preparedness concerns, although notable gaps are evident.Public Health Implications. Our results can inform the development of metrics for community-based organizational readiness.

Community-based organizations have a long history of engagement with public health issues; these relationships can contribute to disaster preparedness (1,2). Preparedness training improves response capacity and strengthens overall resilience (1). Recognizing the importance of community-based organizations in community preparedness, the Office of Emergency Preparedness and Response in New York City's (NYC's) Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) launched a community preparedness program in 2016 (3), which engaged two community sectors (human services and faith-based). To strengthen community preparedness for public health emergencies in human services organizations and faith-based organizations, the community preparedness program conducted eight in-person preparedness trainings. Each training focused on preparedness topics, including developing plans for 1) continuity of operations, 2) emergency management, 3) volunteer management, 4) emergency communications, 5) emergency notification systems, 6) communication with persons at risk, 7) assessing emergency resources, and 8) establishing dedicated emergency funds (2,3). To evaluate training effectiveness, data obtained through online surveys administered during June-September 2018 were analyzed using multivariate logistic regression. Previously described preparedness indicators among trained human services organizations and faith-based organizations were compared with those of organizations that were not trained (3). Participation in the community preparedness program training was associated with increased odds of meeting preparedness indicators. NYC's community preparedness program can serve as a model for other health departments seeking to build community preparedness through partnership with community-based organizations.

BACKGROUND: Hurricane Sandy made landfall on the eastern coast of the United States on October 29, 2012 resulting in 117 deaths and 71.4 billion dollars in damage. Persons with undiagnosed HIV infection might experience delays in diagnosis testing, status confirmation, or access to care due to service disruption in storm-affected areas. The objective of this study is to describe the impact of Hurricane Sandy on HIV testing rates in affected areas and estimate the magnitude and duration of disruption in HIV testing associated with storm damage intensity. METHODS: Using MarketScan data from January 2011December 2013, this study examined weekly time series of HIV testing rates among privately insured enrollees not previously diagnosed with HIV; 95 weeks pre- and 58 weeks post-storm. Interrupted time series (ITS) analyses were estimated by storm impact rank (using FEMA's Final Impact Rank mapped to Core Based Statistical Areas) to determine the extent that Hurricane Sandy affected weekly rates of HIV testing immediately and the duration of that effect after the storm. RESULTS: HIV testing rates declined significantly across storm impact rank areas. The mean decline in rates detected ranged between -5% (95% CI: -9.3, -1.5) in low impact areas and -24% (95% CI: -28.5, -18.9) in very high impact areas. We estimated at least 9,736 (95% CI: 7,540, 11,925) testing opportunities were missed among privately insured persons following Hurricane Sandy. Testing rates returned to baseline in low impact areas by 6 weeks post event (December 9, 2012); by 15 weeks post event (February 10, 2013) in moderate impact areas; and by 17 weeks after the event (February 24, 2013) in high and very high impact areas. CONCLUSIONS: Hurricane Sandy resulted in a detectable and immediate decline in HIV testing rates across storm-affected areas. Greater storm damage was associated with greater magnitude and duration of testing disruption. Disruption of basic health services, like HIV testing and treatment, following large natural and man-made disasters is a public health concern. Disruption in testing services availability for any length of time is detrimental to the efforts of the current HIV prevention model, where status confirmation is essential to control disease spread.

On March 20, 1995, Sarin gas was released during morning rush hour in the Tokyo, Japan, subway system, killing 13 individuals and causing illness among thousands.1 The event received significant media coverage and signaled a call for action among officials in charge of national security. As a component of preparedness efforts against acts of bioterrorism, then President Clinton launched the first national biological weapons defense initiative, and in 1999, Congress appropriated $50 million dollars for the Department of Health and Humans Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to mobilize the public health system for protection against harmful biological agents.2 Ensuring safety of the public’s health led to the development of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, a repository of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies available for rapid deployment, and provision of direct support to local, state, and territorial health departments in the event of a large-scale public health emergency.3

Medical countermeasures (MCMs) are critical for minimizing morbidity and mortality in the event of a large-scale public health emergency. MCMs involve a broad spectrum of medical assets, including biological products and personal protective equipment. Whether the emergency results from a chemical, biological, radiological, or natural disaster or from widespread infectious disease and contagions, a well-prepared public health community will readily access and deploy lifesaving MCMs. Ensuring appropriate distribution and dispensing of MCMs can be logistically complex, but coordinated planning between local, state, and federal agencies facilitates an efficient public health response.

OBJECTIVES: To describe results of points of dispensing (POD) medical countermeasure drill performance among local jurisdictions. METHODS: To compare POD setup times for each year, we calculated descriptive statistics of annual jurisdictional POD setup data submitted by over 400 local jurisdictions across 50 states and 8 US territories to a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) program monitoring database from July 2012 to June 2016. RESULTS: In data collected from July 2012 to June 2015, fewer than 5% of PODs required more than 240 minutes to set up, although the proportion increased from July 2015 to June 2016 to almost 12%. From July 2012 to June 2016, more than 60% of PODs were set up in less than 90 minutes, with 60 minutes as the median setup time during the period. CONCLUSIONS: Our results yield evidence of national progress for response to a mass medical emergency. Technical assistance may be required to aid certain jurisdictions for improvement. Public Health Implications. The results of this study may inform future target times for performance on POD setup activities and highlight jurisdictions in need of technical assistance.

Imagine this fictional scenario: an airline passenger returning to the United States after working in a foreign country suddenly develops chills, headache, muscle pains, and a high fever in flight. Seeking immediate medical attention after landing, the index patient discovers she has a novel strain of influenza. Meanwhile, the virus is transmitted in flight by the recirculated air on-board, exposure to coughing, touching contaminated bathroom door knobs, and at least 180 other passengers. The disease continues to spread as the other infected passengers encounter more people after disembarking.

Introduction: Using Interrupted Time Series Analysis and generalized estimating equations, this study identifies factors that influence the size and significance of Hurricane Sandy's estimated impact on HIV testing in 90 core-based statistical areas from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2013. Methods: Generalized estimating equations were used to examine the effects of sociodemographic and storm-related variables on relative change in HIV testing resulting from Interrupted Time Series analyses. Results: There is a significant negative relationship between HIV prevalence and the relative change in testing at all time periods. A one unit increase in HIV prevalence corresponds to a 35% decrease in relative testing the week of the storm and a 14% decrease in relative testing at week twelve. Building loss was also negatively associated with relative change for all time points. For example, a one unit increase in building loss at week 0 corresponds with an 8% decrease in the relative change in testing (p=0.0001) and a 2% at week twelve (p=0.001). Discussion: Our results demonstrate that HIV testing can be negatively affected during public health emergencies. Communities with high percentages of building loss and significant HIV disease burden should prioritize resumption of testing to support HIV prevention.

Background: The first Ebola virus disease (EVD) case in the United States (US) was confirmed September 30, 2014 in a man 45 years old. This event created considerable media attention and there was fear of an EVD outbreak in the US. Methods: This study examined whether emergency department (ED) visits changed in metropolitan Dallas-Fort Worth--, Texas (DFW) after this EVD case was confirmed. Using Texas Health Services Region 2/3 syndromic surveillance data and focusing on DFW, interrupted time series analyses were conducted using segmented regression models with autoregressive errors for overall ED visits and rates of several chief complaints, including fever with gastrointestinal distress (FGI). Date of fatal case confirmation was the "event." Results: Results indicated the event was highly significant for ED visits overall (P<0.05) and for the rate of FGI visits (P<0.0001). An immediate increase in total ED visits of 1,023 visits per day (95% CI: 797.0, 1,252.8) was observed, equivalent to 11.8% (95% CI: 9.2%, 14.4%) increase ED visits overall. Visits and the rate of FGI visits in DFW increased significantly immediately after confirmation of the EVD case and remained elevated for several months even adjusting for seasonality both within symptom specific chief complaints as well as overall. Conclusions: These results have implications for ED surge capacity as well as for public health messaging in the wake of a public health emergency.

Spatial proximity to infrastructural damage from natural disasters may pose a threat to established HIV testing services and contribute to delays in knowledge of one's disease status. Physical vulnerabilities such as spatial proximity to a level 4 FEMA impact zone, are defined in this study as natural and infrastructural barriers that can impede access to care. We analyzed the storm effects and community characteristics that contributed to the changes in HIV testing rates post Hurricane Sandy. Univariate and bivariate Moran's I tests were conducted to test for spatial autocorrelation. Combined spatial lag and error models accounted for lagged effects and alternatives in error distribution. Bivariate local Moran's I identified many significant clusters of more extreme negative relative change in HIV testing rates in areas with high FEMA impact ranks. Spatial lag and error models highlighted a significant relationship between CBSAs closer to a level 4 FEMA impact zone and the increased effect of Hurricane Sandy on HIV testing. Additionally, as the number of habitable buildings increased, there was significantly less change in HIV testing rates. Physical vulnerability had a significant effect on HIV testing rates. However all findings became less significant over time, highlighting the recovery process. Factors including: increased communication concerning preventative measures prior to the disaster, a prompt response to mitigate infrastructural damage and resumption of HIV testing services, are essential at the government and community levels to mitigate infection risk.

OBJECTIVES: To assess whether Primary Care Emergency Preparedness Network member sites reported indicators of preparedness for public health emergencies compared with nonmember sites. The network-a collaboration between government and New York City primary care associations-offers technical assistance to primary care sites to improve disaster preparedness and response. METHODS: In 2015, we administered an online questionnaire to sites regarding facility characteristics and preparedness indicators. We estimated differences between members and nonmembers with natural logarithm-linked binomial models. Open-ended assessments identified preparedness gaps. RESULTS: One hundred seven sites completed the survey (23.3% response rate); 47 (43.9%) were nonmembers and 60 (56.1%) were members. Members were more likely to have completed hazard vulnerability analysis (risk ratio [RR] = 1.94; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.28, 2.93), to have identified essential services for continuity of operations (RR = 1.39; 95% CI = 1.03, 1.86), to have memoranda of understanding with external partners (RR = 2.49; 95% CI = 1.42, 4.36), and to have completed point-of-dispensing training (RR = 4.23; 95% CI = 1.76, 10.14). Identified preparedness gaps were improved communication, resource availability, and train-the-trainer programs. Public Health Implications. Primary Care Emergency Preparedness Network membership is associated with improved public health emergency preparedness among primary care sites.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program's progress toward meeting public health preparedness capability standards in state, local, and territorial health departments. METHODS: All 62 PHEP awardees completed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's self-administered PHEP Impact Assessment as part of program review measuring public health preparedness capability before September 11, 2001 (9/11), and in 2014. We collected additional self-reported capability self-assessments from 2016. We analyzed trends in congressional funding for public health preparedness from 2001 to 2016. RESULTS: Before 9/11, most PHEP awardees reported limited preparedness capabilities, but considerable progress was reported by 2016. The number of jurisdictions reporting established capability functions within the countermeasures and mitigation domain had the largest increase, almost 200%, by 2014. However, more than 20% of jurisdictions still reported underdeveloped coordination between the health system and public health agencies in 2016. Challenges and barriers to building PHEP capabilities included lack of trained personnel, plans, and sustained resources. CONCLUSIONS: Considerable progress in public health preparedness capability was observed from before 9/11 to 2016. Support, sustainment, and advancement of public health preparedness capability is critical to ensure a strong public health infrastructure.

The events of September 11, 2001, forever altered how disaster preparedness was perceived and understood in the United States.1 Rapidly evolving technology, increasing globalization, social and economic crises, and the natural evolution of infectious diseases increased the complexity of public health preparedness and emergency response.2 In 2011, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published the Public Health Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local Planning3 as the foundation for successful public health preparedness programs. The articles in this volume of AJPH provide detailed accounts of preparedness in action, showcasing competencies in 15 capabilities that are summarized across six domains: biosurveillance, incident management, community resilience, information management, countermeasures and mitigation, and surge management.

Whether natural, accidental, or intentional, public health threats are ever present and can lead to national emergencies. Before our current understanding of catastrophic events, and as early as 1930, AJPH published an article on predisaster preparedness (http://bit.ly/2tDkhTO) highlighting many points that are still relevant today. Even then, the authors recognized that disasters were “no longer minor or chance occurrences but each year they are more widespread, more devastating and more demanding of harmonious assistance”—a sentiment that still resonates. Furthermore, the authors professed a need for dedicated funds for staffing, equipment, and resources that are necessary to advance predisaster emergency work. | Our current frame of reference is shaped by the events of September 11, 2001. In response to the terrorist attack, the US Congress set up appropriations to support state, local, tribal, and territorial public health departments nationwide; these funds are administered through a cooperative agreement from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to fortify national security. The Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative agreement helps health departments strengthen their abilities to effectively respond to a range of public health threats, including infectious diseases; natural disasters; and biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological events.

The number of persons under correctional supervision in the United States increased in the mid-1970s and peaked in 2009 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013). Though in subsequent years, incarcerated populations declined slightly, the United States continues to have one of the highest rates of incarceration among developed nations, and in the world, with 1 in 4 American adults behind bars (Pew Center on the States, 2012). Though detained populations are predominantly male, in the past 30 years, the number of women inmates in correctional facilities has increased dramatically. From 1977–2004, the number of U.S. female prisoners serving more than a year grew by 757%, while during the same period, the number of male prisoners grew by 388% (Frost, Greene, & Pranis, 2006). The growth of women in jails and prisons has surpassed male inmate population growth in 50 states (Frost, Greene, & Pranis, 2006). From 2000 to 2009, the number of women incarcerated in state or federal prisons rose by 21.6%, compared to a 15.6% increase for men (Mauer, 2013). | Nationally, there are more than eight times as many women under correctional supervision as there were in 1980 (American Civil Liberties Union, 2006). The United States has the highest incarceration rate for women in the world. In 2006, the rate was approximately 123 per 100,000 for women, which is much higher than those of England (17 per 100,000), France (6 per 100,000), Russia (73 per 100,000), and Thailand (88 per 100,000) (Hartney, 2006).