Last data update: Nov 11, 2024. (Total: 48109 publications since 2009)
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Influenza and COVID-19 vaccination coverage among health care personnel - National Healthcare Safety Network, United States, 2023-24 respiratory virus season
Bell J , Meng L , Barbre K , Wong E , Lape-Newman B , Koech W , Soe MM , Woods A , Kuhar DT , Stuckey MJ , Dubendris H , Rowe T , Lindley MC , Kalayil EJ , Edwards J , Benin A , Reses HE . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024 73 (43) 966-972 The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends that health care personnel receive an annual influenza vaccine. In September 2023, ACIP recommended that everyone aged ≥6 months receive a 2023-2024 COVID-19 vaccine. Health care facilities, including acute care hospitals and nursing homes, report vaccination of health care personnel against influenza and COVID-19 to CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). During October 2023-March 2024, NHSN defined up-to-date COVID-19 vaccination as receipt of a 2023-2024 COVID-19 vaccine. This analysis describes influenza and 2023-2024 COVID-19 vaccination coverage among health care personnel working in acute care hospitals and nursing homes during the 2023-24 respiratory virus season (October 1, 2023-March 31, 2024). Influenza vaccination coverage was 80.7% among health care personnel at acute care hospitals and 45.4% among health care personnel at nursing homes. Coverage of 2023-2024 COVID-19 vaccination was 15.3% among health care personnel at acute care hospitals and 10.5% among health care personnel at nursing homes. Respiratory viral diseases including influenza and COVID-19 pose risks to health care personnel in U.S. health care settings, and vaccination of health care personnel is an effective strategy for maintaining a healthy workforce and improving health care system resiliency. |
CDC's hospital-onset Clostridioides difficile prevention framework in a regional hospital network
Turner NA , Krishnan J , Nelson A , Polage CR , Sinkowitz-Cochran RL , Fike L , Kuhar DT , Kutty PK , Snyder RL , Anderson DJ . JAMA Netw Open 2024 7 (3) e243846 IMPORTANCE: Despite modest reductions in the incidence of hospital-onset Clostridioides difficile infection (HO-CDI), CDI remains a leading cause of health care-associated infection. As no single intervention has proven highly effective on its own, a multifaceted approach to controlling HO-CDI is needed. OBJECTIVE: To assess the effectiveness of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Strategies to Prevent Clostridioides difficile Infection in Acute Care Facilities Framework (hereafter, the Framework) in reducing HO-CDI incidence. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: This quality improvement study was performed within the Duke Infection Control Outreach Network from July 1, 2019, through March 31, 2022. In all, 20 hospitals in the network participated in an implementation study of the Framework recommendations, and 26 hospitals did not participate and served as controls. The Framework has 39 discrete intervention categories organized into 5 focal areas for CDI prevention: (1) isolation and contact precautions, (2) CDI confirmation, (3) environmental cleaning, (4) infrastructure development, and (5) antimicrobial stewardship engagement. EXPOSURES: Monthly teleconferences supporting Framework implementation for the participating hospitals. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Primary outcomes were HO-CDI incidence trends at participating hospitals compared with controls and postintervention HO-CDI incidence at intervention sites compared with rates during the 24 months before the intervention. RESULTS: The study sample included a total of 2184 HO-CDI cases and 7 269 429 patient-days. In the intervention cohort of 20 participating hospitals, there were 1403 HO-CDI cases and 3 513 755 patient-days, with a median (IQR) HO-CDI incidence of 2.8 (2.0-4.3) cases per 10 000 patient-days. The first analysis included an additional 3 755 674 patient-days and 781 HO-CDI cases among the 26 controls, with a median (IQR) HO-CDI incidence of 1.1 (0.7-2.7) case per 10 000 patient-days. The second analysis included an additional 2 538 874 patient-days and 1751 HO-CDI cases, with a median (IQR) HO-CDI incidence of 5.9 (2.7-8.9) cases per 10 000 patient-days, from participating hospitals 24 months before the intervention. In the first analysis, intervention sites had a steeper decline in HO-CDI incidence over time relative to controls (yearly incidence rate ratio [IRR], 0.79 [95% CI, 0.67-0.94]; P = .01), but the decline was not temporally associated with study participation. In the second analysis, HO-CDI incidence was declining in participating hospitals before the intervention, and the rate of decline did not change during the intervention. The degree to which hospitals implemented the Framework was associated with steeper declines in HO-CDI incidence (yearly IRR, 0.95 [95% CI, 0.90-0.99]; P = .03). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: In this quality improvement study of a regional hospital network, implementation of the Framework was not temporally associated with declining HO-CDI incidence. Further study of the effectiveness of multimodal prevention measures for controlling HO-CDI is warranted. |
Immunization of health-care personnel: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)
Shefer A , Atkinson W , Friedman C , Kuhar DT , Mootrey G , Bialek SR , Cohn A , Fiore A , Grohskopf L , Liang JL , Lorick SA , Marin M , Mintz E , Murphy TV , Newton A , Parker Fiebelkorn A , Seward J , Wallace G . MMWR Recomm Rep 2011 60 1-45 This report updates the previously published summary of recommendations for vaccinating health-care personnel (HCP) in the United States (CDC. Immunization of health-care workers: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP] and the Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee [HICPAC]. MMWR 1997;46[No. RR-18]). This report was reviewed by and includes input from the Healthcare (formerly Hospital) Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee. These updated recommendations can assist hospital administrators, infection-control practitioners, employee health clinicians, and HCP in optimizing infection prevention and control programs. The recommendations for vaccinating HCP are presented by disease in two categories: 1) those diseases for which vaccination or documentation of immunity is recommended because of risks to HCP in their work settings for acquiring disease or transmitting to patients and 2) those for which vaccination might be indicated in certain circumstances. Background information for each vaccine-preventable disease and specific recommendations for use of each vaccine are presented. Certain infection-control measures that relate to vaccination also are included in this report. In addition, ACIP recommendations for the remaining vaccines that are recommended for certain or all adults are summarized, as are considerations for catch-up and travel vaccinations and for work restrictions. This report summarizes all current ACIP recommendations for vaccination of HCP and does not contain any new recommendations or policies. The recommendations provided in this report apply, but are not limited, to HCP in acute-care hospitals; long-term-care facilities (e.g., nursing homes and skilled nursing facilities); physician's offices; rehabilitation centers; urgent care centers, and outpatient clinics as well as to persons who provide home health care and emergency medical services. |
Influenza and up-to-date COVID-19 vaccination coverage among health care personnel - National Healthcare Safety Network, United States, 2022-23 Influenza Season
Bell J , Meng L , Barbre K , Haanschoten E , Reses HE , Soe M , Edwards J , Massey J , Tugu Yagama Reddy GR , Woods A , Stuckey MJ , Kuhar DT , Bolden K , Dubendris H , Wong E , Rowe T , Lindley MC , Kalayil EJ , Benin A . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2023 72 (45) 1237-1243 The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommends that health care personnel (HCP) receive an annual influenza vaccine and that everyone aged ≥6 months stay up to date with recommended COVID-19 vaccination. Health care facilities report vaccination of HCP against influenza and COVID-19 to CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). During January-June 2023, NHSN defined up-to-date COVID-19 vaccination as receipt of a bivalent COVID-19 mRNA vaccine dose or completion of a primary series within the preceding 2 months. This analysis describes influenza and up-to-date COVID-19 vaccination coverage among HCP working in acute care hospitals and nursing homes during the 2022-23 influenza season (October 1, 2022-March 31, 2023). Influenza vaccination coverage was 81.0% among HCP at acute care hospitals and 47.1% among those working at nursing homes. Up-to-date COVID-19 vaccination coverage was 17.2% among HCP working at acute care hospitals and 22.8% among those working at nursing homes. There is a need to promote evidence-based strategies to improve vaccination coverage among HCP. Tailored strategies might also be useful to reach all HCP with recommended vaccines and protect them and their patients from vaccine-preventable respiratory diseases. |
Declines in influenza vaccination coverage among health care personnel in acute care hospitals during the COVID-19 pandemic - United States, 2017-2023
Lymon H , Meng L , Reses HE , Barbre K , Dubendris H , Shafi S , Wiegand R , Reddy Grty , Woods A , Kuhar DT , Stuckey MJ , Lindley MC , Haas L , Qureshi I , Wong E , Benin A , Bell JM . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2023 72 (45) 1244-1247 Health care personnel (HCP) are recommended to receive annual vaccination against influenza to reduce influenza-related morbidity and mortality. Every year, acute care hospitals report receipt of influenza vaccination among HCP to CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). This analysis used NHSN data to describe changes in influenza vaccination coverage among HCP in acute care hospitals before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Influenza vaccination among HCP increased during the prepandemic period from 88.6% during 2017-18 to 90.7% during 2019-20. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the percentage of HCP vaccinated against influenza decreased to 85.9% in 2020-21 and 81.1% in 2022-23. Additional efforts are needed to implement evidence-based strategies to increase vaccination coverage among HCP and to identify factors associated with recent declines in influenza vaccination coverage. |
Continued increases in the incidence of healthcare-associated infection (HAI) during the second year of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
Lastinger LM , Alvarez CR , Kofman A , Konnor RY , Kuhar DT , Nkwata A , Patel PR , Pattabiraman V , Xu SY , Dudeck MA . Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2023 44 (6) 997-1001 Data from the National Healthcare Safety Network were analyzed to assess the impact of COVID-19 on the incidence of healthcare-associated infections (HAI) during 2021. Standardized infection ratios were significantly higher than those during the prepandemic period, particularly during 2021-Q1 and 2021-Q3. The incidence of HAI was elevated during periods of high COVID-19 hospitalizations. |
Assessing the impact of two-step clostridioides difficile testing at the healthcare facility level
Turner NA , Krishnan J , Nelson A , Polage CR , Cochran RL , Fike L , Kuhar DT , Kutty PK , Snyder RL , Anderson DJ . Clin Infect Dis 2023 77 (7) 1043-1049 IMPORTANCE: Two-step testing for Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) aims to improve diagnostic specificity, but may also influence reported epidemiology and patterns of treatment. Some providers fear that two-step testing may result in adverse outcomes if C. difficile is under-diagnosed. OBJECTIVE: Our primary objective was to assess the impact of two-step testing on reported incidence of hospital-onset CDI (HO-CDI). As secondary objectives, we assessed the impact of two-step testing on C. difficile-specific antibiotic use and colectomy rates as proxies for harm from underdiagnosis or delayed treatment. DESIGN: This longitudinal cohort study included 2,657,324 patient-days across eight regional hospitals from July 2017 through March 2022. Impact of two-step testing was assessed by time series analysis with generalized estimating equation regression models. RESULTS: Two-step testing was associated with a level decrease in HO-CDI incidence (incidence rate ratio 0.53, 95% CI 0.48-0.60, p<.0.001), a similar level decrease in utilization rates for oral vancomycin and fidaxomicin (utilization rate ratio 0.63, 95% CI 0.58-0.70, p<0.001), and no significant level (rate ratio 1.16, 95% CI 0.93-1.43, p=0.18) or trend (rate ratio 0.85, 95% CI 0.52-1.39, p=0.51) change in emergent colectomy rates. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: Two-step testing is associated with decreased reported incidence of HO-CDI, likely by improving diagnostic specificity. The parallel decrease in C. difficile specific antibiotic use offers indirect reassurance against under-diagnosis of C. difficile infections still requiring treatment by clinician assessment. Similarly, the absence of any significant change in colectomy rates offers indirect reassurance against any rise in fulminant C. difficile requiring surgical management. |
Strategies to prevent Clostridioides difficile infections in acute-care hospitals: 2022 update
Kociolek LK , Gerding DN , Carrico R , Carling P , Donskey CJ , Dumyati G , Kuhar DT , Loo VG , Maragakis LL , Pogorzelska-Maziarz M , Sandora TJ , Weber DJ , Yokoe D , Dubberke ER . Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2023 44 (4) 527-549 Previously published guidelines provided comprehensive recommendations for detecting and preventing healthcare-associated infections (HAIs). The intent of this document is to highlight practical recommendations in a concise format designed to assist acute-care hospitals to implement and prioritize their Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) prevention efforts. This document updates the Strategies to Prevent Clostridium difficile Infections in Acute Care Hospitals published in 2014.Reference Dubberke, Carling and Carrico1 This expert guidance document is sponsored by the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) and is the product of a collaborative effort led by SHEA, the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA), the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC), the American Hospital Association (AHA), and The Joint Commission. |
Making a C-DIFFerence: Implementation of a prevention collaborative to reduce hospital-onset Clostridioides difficile infection rates
White KA , Barnes LEA , Snyder RL , Fike LV , Kuhar DT , Cochran RL . Antimicrob Steward Healthc Epidemiol 2022 2 (1) e87 OBJECTIVE: To assist hospitals in reducing Clostridioides difficile infections (CDI), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) implemented a collaborative using the CDC CDI prevention strategies and the Targeted Assessment for Prevention (TAP) Strategy as foundational frameworks. SETTING: Acute-care hospitals. METHODS: We invited 400 hospitals with the highest cumulative attributable differences (CADs) to the 12-month collaborative, with monthly webinars, coaching calls, and deployment of the CDC CDI TAP facility assessments. Infection prevention barriers, gaps identified, and interventions implemented were qualitatively coded by categorizing them to respective CDI prevention strategies. Standardized infection ratios (SIRs) were reviewed to measure outcomes. RESULTS: Overall, 76 hospitals participated, most often reporting CDI testing as their greatest barrier to achieving reduction (61%). In total, 5,673 TAP assessments were collected across 46 (61%) hospitals. Most hospitals (98%) identified at least 1 gap related to testing and at least 1 gap related to infrastructure to support prevention. Among 14 follow-up hospitals, 64% implemented interventions related to infrastructure to support prevention (eg, establishing champions, reviewing individual CDIs) and 86% implemented testing interventions (eg, 2-step testing, testing algorithms). The SIR decrease between the pre-collaborative and post-collaborative periods was significant among participants (16.7%; P < .001) but less than that among nonparticipants (25.1%; P < .001). CONCLUSIONS: This article describes gaps identified and interventions implemented during a comprehensive CDI prevention collaborative in targeted hospitals, highlighting potential future areas of focus for CDI prevention efforts as well as reported challenges and barriers to prevention of one of the most common healthcare-associated infections affecting hospitals and patients nationwide. |
Health care personnel exposures to subsequently laboratory-confirmed monkeypox patients - Colorado, 2022
Marshall KE , Barton M , Nichols J , de Perio MA , Kuhar DT , Spence-Davizon E , Barnes M , Herlihy RK , Czaja CA . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2022 71 (38) 1216-1219 The risk for monkeypox transmission to health care personnel (HCP) caring for symptomatic patients is thought to be low but has not been thoroughly assessed in the context of the current global outbreak (1). Monkeypox typically spreads through close physical (often skin-to-skin) contact with lesions or scabs, body fluids, or respiratory secretions of a person with an active monkeypox infection. CDC currently recommends that HCP wear a gown, gloves, eye protection, and an N95 (or higher-level) respirator while caring for patients with suspected or confirmed monkeypox to protect themselves from infection(†) (1,2). The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) evaluated HCP exposures and personal protective equipment (PPE) use in health care settings during care of patients who subsequently received a diagnosis of Orthopoxvirus infection (presumptive monkeypox determined by a polymerase chain reaction [PCR] DNA assay) or monkeypox (real-time PCR assay and genetic sequencing performed by CDC). During May 1-July 31, 2022, a total of 313 HCP interacted with patients with subsequently diagnosed monkeypox infections while wearing various combinations of PPE; 23% wore all recommended PPE during their exposures. Twenty-eight percent of exposed HCP were considered to have had high- or intermediate-risk exposures and were therefore eligible to receive postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) with the JYNNEOS vaccine(§); among those, 48% (12% of all exposed HCP) received the vaccine. PPE use varied by facility type: HCP in sexually transmitted infection (STI) clinics and community health centers reported the highest adherence to recommended PPE use, and primary and urgent care settings reported the lowest adherence. No HCP developed a monkeypox infection during the 21 days after exposure. These results suggest that the risk for transmission of monkeypox in health care settings is low. Infection prevention training is important in all health care settings, and these findings can guide future updates to PPE recommendations and risk classification in health care settings. |
Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Central Line-Associated Bloodstream Infections During the Early Months of 2020, National Healthcare Safety Network.
Patel PR , Weiner-Lastinger LM , Dudeck MA , Fike LV , Kuhar DT , Edwards JR , Pollock D , Benin A . Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2021 43 (6) 1-8 Data reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) were analyzed to understand the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) in acute care hospitals. Descriptive analysis of the Standardized Infection Ratio (SIR) was conducted by locations, location type, geographic area, and bed size. |
Gaps in infection prevention practices for catheter-associated urinary tract infections and central line-associated blood stream infections as identified by the targeted assessment for prevention strategy
Snyder RL , White KA , Glowicz JB , Novosad SA , Soda EA , Hsu S , Kuhar DT , Cochran RL . Am J Infect Control 2021 49 (7) 874-878 BACKGROUND: Catheter associated urinary tract infections (CAUTI) and central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) represent a substantial portion of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) reported in the United States. The Targeted Assessment for Prevention (TAP) Strategy is a quality improvement framework to reduce HAIs. Data from the TAP Facility Assessments were used to determine common infection prevention gaps for CAUTI and CLABSI. METHODS: Data from 2,044 CAUTI and 1,680 CLABSI Assessments were included in the analysis. Items were defined as potential gaps if ≥33% respondents answered Unknown, ≥33% No, or ≥50% No or Unknown or Never, Rarely, Sometimes, or Unknown to questions pertaining to those areas. Review of response frequencies and stratification by respondent role were performed to highlight opportunities for improvement. RESULTS: Across CAUTI and CLABSI Assessments, lack of physician champions (<35% Yes) and nurse champions (<55% Yes), along with lack of awareness of competency assessments, audits, and feedback were reported. Lack of practices to facilitate timely removal of urinary catheters were identified for CAUTI and issues with select device insertion practices, such as maintaining aseptic technique, were perceived as areas for improvement for CLABSI. CONCLUSIONS: These data suggest common gaps in critical components of infection prevention and control programs. The identification of these gaps has the potential to inform targeted CAUTI and CLABSI prevention efforts. |
Update: Characteristics of Health Care Personnel with COVID-19 - United States, February 12-July 16, 2020.
Hughes MM , Groenewold MR , Lessem SE , Xu K , Ussery EN , Wiegand RE , Qin X , Do T , Thomas D , Tsai S , Davidson A , Latash J , Eckel S , Collins J , Ojo M , McHugh L , Li W , Chen J , Chan J , Wortham JM , Reagan-Steiner S , Lee JT , Reddy SC , Kuhar DT , Burrer SL , Stuckey MJ . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020 69 (38) 1364-1368 As of September 21, 2020, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic had resulted in 6,786,352 cases and 199,024 deaths in the United States.* Health care personnel (HCP) are essential workers at risk for exposure to patients or infectious materials (1). The impact of COVID-19 on U.S. HCP was first described using national case surveillance data in April 2020 (2). Since then, the number of reported HCP with COVID-19 has increased tenfold. This update describes demographic characteristics, underlying medical conditions, hospitalizations, and intensive care unit (ICU) admissions, stratified by vital status, among 100,570 HCP with COVID-19 reported to CDC during February 12-July 16, 2020. HCP occupation type and job setting are newly reported. HCP status was available for 571,708 (22%) of 2,633,585 cases reported to CDC. Most HCP with COVID-19 were female (79%), aged 16-44 years (57%), not hospitalized (92%), and lacked all 10 underlying medical conditions specified on the case report form(†) (56%). Of HCP with COVID-19, 641 died. Compared with nonfatal COVID-19 HCP cases, a higher percentage of fatal cases occurred in males (38% versus 22%), persons aged ≥65 years (44% versus 4%), non-Hispanic Asians (Asians) (20% versus 9%), non-Hispanic Blacks (Blacks) (32% versus 25%), and persons with any of the 10 underlying medical conditions specified on the case report form (92% versus 41%). From a subset of jurisdictions reporting occupation type or job setting for HCP with COVID-19, nurses were the most frequently identified single occupation type (30%), and nursing and residential care facilities were the most common job setting (67%). Ensuring access to personal protective equipment (PPE) and training, and practices such as universal use of face masks at work, wearing masks in the community, and observing social distancing remain critical strategies to protect HCP and those they serve. |
Implementation of the targeted assessment for prevention strategy in a healthcare system to reduce Clostridioides difficile infection rates
White KA , Soe MM , Osborn A , Walling C , Fike LV , Gould CV , Kuhar DT , Edwards JR , Cochran RL . Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2020 41 (3) 1-7 BACKGROUND: Prevention of Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) is a national priority and may be facilitated by deployment of the Targeted Assessment for Prevention (TAP) Strategy, a quality improvement framework providing a focused approach to infection prevention. This article describes the process and outcomes of TAP Strategy implementation for CDI prevention in a healthcare system. METHODS: Hospital A was identified based on CDI surveillance data indicating an excess burden of infections above the national goal; hospitals B and C participated as part of systemwide deployment. TAP facility assessments were administered to staff to identify infection control gaps and inform CDI prevention interventions. Retrospective analysis was performed using negative-binomial, interrupted time series (ITS) regression to assess overall effect of targeted CDI prevention efforts. Analysis included hospital-onset, laboratory-identified C. difficile event data for 18 months before and after implementation of the TAP facility assessments. RESULTS: The systemwide monthly CDI rate significantly decreased at the intervention (beta2, -44%; P = .017), and the postintervention CDI rate trend showed a sustained decrease (beta1 + beta3; -12% per month; P = .008). At an individual hospital level, the CDI rate trend significantly decreased in the postintervention period at hospital A only (beta1 + beta3, -26% per month; P = .003). CONCLUSIONS: This project demonstrates TAP Strategy implementation in a healthcare system, yielding significant decrease in the laboratory-identified C. difficile rate trend in the postintervention period at the system level and in hospital A. This project highlights the potential benefit of directing prevention efforts to facilities with the highest burden of excess infections to more efficiently reduce CDI rates. |
Reported variability in healthcare facility policies regarding healthcare personnel working while experiencing influenza-like illnesses: An emerging infections network survey
Babcock HM , Beekmann SE , Pillai SK , Santibanez S , Lee L , Kuhar DT , Campbell AP , Patel A , Polgreen PM . Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2019 41 (1) 1-6 BACKGROUND: Presenteeism, or working while ill, by healthcare personnel (HCP) experiencing influenza-like illness (ILI) puts patients and coworkers at risk. However, hospital policies and practices may not consistently facilitate HCP staying home when ill. OBJECTIVE AND METHODS: We conducted a mixed-methods survey in March 2018 of Emerging Infections Network infectious diseases physicians, describing institutional experiences with and policies for HCP working with ILI. RESULTS: Of 715 physicians, 367 (51%) responded. Of 367, 135 (37%) were unaware of institutional policies. Of the remaining 232 respondents, 206 (89%) reported institutional policies regarding work restrictions for HCP with influenza or ILI, but only 145 (63%) said these were communicated at least annually. More than half of respondents (124, 53%) reported that adherence to work restrictions was not monitored or enforced. Work restrictions were most often not perceived to be enforced for physicians-in-training and attending physicians. Nearly all (223, 96%) reported that their facility tracked laboratory-confirmed influenza (LCI) in patients; 85 (37%) reported tracking ILI. For employees, 109 (47%) reported tracking of LCI and 53 (23%) reported tracking ILI. For independent physicians, not employed by the facility, 30 (13%) reported tracking LCI and 11 (5%) ILI. CONCLUSION: More than one-third of respondents were unaware of whether their institutions had policies to prevent HCP with ILI from working; among those with knowledge of institutional policies, dissemination, monitoring, and enforcement of these policies was highly variable. Improving communication about work-restriction policies, as well as monitoring and enforcement, may help prevent the spread of infections from HCP to patients. |
An Introduction to STRIVE
Bell MR , Kuhar DT . Ann Intern Med 2019 171 S1 Health care continues to change rapidly, growing increasingly complex with greater acuity of patients, delivery of more care outside of traditional acute care settings, and ongoing challenges related to staffing and personnel turnover. Despite this, we remain determined to provide safe care for every patient and a safe workplace for each of our staff. Such determination requires every health care facility, whether an urban tertiary care center or a critical access hospital, an ambulatory surgery center or a skilled-nursing facility, to ensure that everyone providing patient care or working to support the environment of care is prepared to do their part to prevent the spread of infections. Not only does each facility need to do its part, the frequent movement of patients from one care setting to the next means that infection prevention and control (IPC) efforts must also be coordinated across the range of facility types that make up modern health care. |
Improving the use of personal protective equipment: Applying lessons learned
Reddy SC , Valderrama AL , Kuhar DT . Clin Infect Dis 2019 69 S165-s170 Unrecognized transmission of pathogens in healthcare settings can lead to colonization and infection of both patients and healthcare personnel. The use of personal protective equipment (PPE) is an important strategy to protect healthcare personnel from contamination and to prevent the spread of pathogens to subsequent patients. However, optimal PPE use is difficult, and healthcare personnel may alter delivery of care because of the PPE. Here, we summarize recent research from the Prevention Epicenters Program on healthcare personnel contamination and improvement of the routine use of PPE as well as Ebola-specific PPE. Future efforts to optimize the use of PPE should include increasing adherence to protocols for PPE use, improving PPE design, and further research into the risks, benefits, and best practices of PPE use. |
A national survey of testing and management of asymptomatic carriage of C. difficile
Kutty PK , Beekmann SE , Sinkowitz-Cochran RL , Dubberke ER , Kuhar DT , McDonald LC , Polgreen PM . Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2019 40 (7) 1-3 A nationwide survey indicated that screening for asymptomatic carriers of C. difficile is an uncommon practice in US healthcare settings. Better understanding of the role of asymptomatic carriage in C. difficile transmission, and of the measures available to reduce that risk, are needed to inform best practices regarding the management of carriers. |
Tuberculosis screening, testing, and treatment of U.S. health care personnel: Recommendations from the National Tuberculosis Controllers Association and CDC, 2019
Sosa LE , Njie GJ , Lobato MN , Bamrah Morris S , Buchta W , Casey ML , Goswami ND , Gruden M , Hurst BJ , Khan AR , Kuhar DT , Lewinsohn DM , Mathew TA , Mazurek GH , Reves R , Paulos L , Thanassi W , Will L , Belknap R . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2019 68 (19) 439-443 The 2005 CDC guidelines for preventing Mycobacterium tuberculosis transmission in health care settings include recommendations for baseline tuberculosis (TB) screening of all U.S. health care personnel and annual testing for health care personnel working in medium-risk settings or settings with potential for ongoing transmission (1). Using evidence from a systematic review conducted by a National Tuberculosis Controllers Association (NTCA)-CDC work group, and following methods adapted from the Guide to Community Preventive Services (2,3), the 2005 CDC recommendations for testing U.S. health care personnel have been updated and now include 1) TB screening with an individual risk assessment and symptom evaluation at baseline (preplacement); 2) TB testing with an interferon-gamma release assay (IGRA) or a tuberculin skin test (TST) for persons without documented prior TB disease or latent TB infection (LTBI); 3) no routine serial TB testing at any interval after baseline in the absence of a known exposure or ongoing transmission; 4) encouragement of treatment for all health care personnel with untreated LTBI, unless treatment is contraindicated; 5) annual symptom screening for health care personnel with untreated LTBI; and 6) annual TB education of all health care personnel. |
Opportunities to bridge gaps between respiratory protection guidance and practice in US health care
Braun BI , Tschurtz BA , Hafiz H , Novak DA , Montero MC , Alexander CM , Fauerbach LL , Gruden M , Isakari MT , Kuhar DT , Pompeii LA , Swift MD , Radonovich LJ . Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2019 40 (4) 1-6 Healthcare organizations are required to provide workers with respiratory protection (RP) to mitigate hazardous airborne inhalation exposures. This study sought to better identify gaps that exist between RP guidance and clinical practice to understand issues that would benefit from additional research or clarification. |
Notes from the Field: Contact tracing investigation after first case of Andes virus in the United States - Delaware, February 2018
Kofman A , Eggers P , Kjemtrup A , Hall R , Brown SM , Morales-Betoulle M , Graziano J , Zufan SE , Whitmer SLM , Cannon DL , Chiang CF , Choi MJ , Rollin PE , Cetron MS , Yaglom HD , Duwell M , Kuhar DT , Kretschmer M , Knust B , Klena JD , Alvarado-Ramy F , Shoemaker T , Towner JS , Nichol ST . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2018 67 (41) 1162-1163 In January 2018, a woman admitted to a Delaware hospital tested positive for New World hantavirus immunoglobulin M (IgM) and immunoglobulin G (IgG) by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). Subsequent testing by CDC’s Viral Special Pathogens Branch detected New World hantavirus by nested reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and Andes virus by nucleic acid sequencing. This case represents the first confirmed importation of Andes virus infection into the United States; two imported cases have also been reported in Switzerland (1). Before her illness, the patient had traveled to the Andes region of Argentina and Chile from December 20, 2017, to January 3, 2018. She stayed in cabins and youth hostels in reportedly poor condition. No rodent exposures were reported. After returning to the United States on January 10, she developed fever, malaise, and myalgias on January 14. On January 17, while ill, she traveled on two commercial domestic flights. She was hospitalized during January 20–25 in Delaware and discharged to her home after clinical recovery. |
Transmission of hepatitis A virus through combined liver-small intestine-pancreas transplantation
Foster MA , Weil LM , Jin S , Johnson T , Hayden-Mixson TR , Khudyakov Y , Annambhotla PD , Basavaraju SV , Kamili S , Ritter JM , Nelson N , Mazariegos G , Green M , Himes RW , Kuhar DT , Kuehnert MJ , Miller JA , Wiseman R , Moorman AC . Emerg Infect Dis 2017 23 (4) 590-596 Although transmission of hepatitis A virus (HAV) through blood transfusion has been documented, transmission through organ transplantation has not been reported. In August 2015, state health officials in Texas, USA, were notified of 2 home health nurses with HAV infection whose only common exposure was a child who had undergone multi-visceral organ transplantation 9 months earlier. Specimens from the nurses, organ donor, and all organ recipients were tested and medical records reviewed to determine a possible infection source. Identical HAV RNA sequences were detected from the serum of both nurses and the organ donor, as well as from the multi-visceral organ recipient's serum and feces; this recipient's posttransplant liver and intestine biopsy specimens also had detectable virus. The other organ recipients tested negative for HAV RNA. Vaccination of the donor might have prevented infection in the recipient and subsequent transmission to the healthcare workers. |
Early identification and prevention of the spread of Ebola - United States
Van Beneden CA , Pietz H , Kirkcaldy RD , Koonin LM , Uyeki TM , Oster AM , Levy DA , Glover M , Arduino MJ , Merlin TL , Kuhar DT , Kosmos C , Bell BP . MMWR Suppl 2016 65 (3) 75-84 In response to the 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa, CDC prepared for the potential introduction of Ebola into the United States. The immediate goals were to rapidly identify and isolate any cases of Ebola, prevent transmission, and promote timely treatment of affected patients. CDC's technical expertise and the collaboration of multiple partners in state, local, and municipal public health departments; health care facilities; emergency medical services; and U.S. government agencies were essential to the domestic preparedness and response to the Ebola epidemic and relied on longstanding partnerships. CDC established a comprehensive response that included two new strategies: 1) active monitoring of travelers arriving from countries affected by Ebola and other persons at risk for Ebola and 2) a tiered system of hospital facility preparedness that enabled prioritization of training. CDC rapidly deployed a diagnostic assay for Ebola virus (EBOV) to public health laboratories. Guidance was developed to assist in evaluation of patients possibly infected with EBOV, for appropriate infection control, to support emergency responders, and for handling of infectious waste. CDC rapid response teams were formed to provide assistance within 24 hours to a health care facility managing a patient with Ebola. As a result of the collaborations to rapidly identify, isolate, and manage Ebola patients and the extensive preparations to prevent spread of EBOV, the United States is now better prepared to address the next global infectious disease threat.The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html). |
Notes from the Field: Health Care-Associated Hepatitis A Outbreak - Texas, 2015
Wiseman R , Weil LM , Lozano C , Johnson TJ Jr , Jin S , Moorman AC , Foster MA , Mixson-Hayden T , Khudyakov Y , Kuhar DT , Graves J . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2016 65 (16) 425-426 On August 27-28, 2015, the Texas Department of State Health Services received calls from Fort Bend County and Harris County health departments requesting postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) recommendations for contacts of two nurses (patients A and B) with confirmed hepatitis A virus (HAV) infection. Both nurses had symptom onset during August 15-19 and worked for the same pediatric home health care agency in another jurisdiction. Because of the proximity of the onset dates, a common source exposure was suspected. The state and local health departments began an investigation to identify potentially exposed patients, their families, and other agency personnel; offer PEP; and identify the source of exposure. |
Active tracing and monitoring of contacts associated with the first cluster of Ebola in the United States
Chung WM , Smith JC , Weil LM , Hughes SM , Joyner SN , Hall EM , Ritch J , Srinath D , Goodman E , Chevalier MS , Epstein L , Hunter JC , Kallen AJ , Karwowski MP , Kuhar DT , Smith C , Petersen LR , Mahon BE , Lakey DL , Schrag SJ . Ann Intern Med 2015 163 (3) 164-73 BACKGROUND: Following hospitalization of the first patient with Ebola virus disease diagnosed in the United States on 28 September 2014, contact tracing methods for Ebola were implemented. OBJECTIVE: To identify, risk-stratify, and monitor contacts of patients with Ebola. DESIGN: Descriptive investigation. SETTING: Dallas County, Texas, September to November 2014. PARTICIPANTS: Contacts of symptomatic patients with Ebola. MEASUREMENTS: Contact identification, exposure risk classification, symptom development, and Ebola. RESULTS: The investigation identified 179 contacts, 139 of whom were contacts of the index patient. Of 112 health care personnel (HCP) contacts of the index case, 22 (20%) had known unprotected exposures and 37 (30%) did not have known unprotected exposures but interacted with a patient or contaminated environment on multiple days. Transmission was confirmed in 2 HCP who had substantial interaction with the patient while wearing personal protective equipment. These HCP had 40 additional contacts. Of 20 community contacts of the index patient or the 2 HCP, 4 had high-risk exposures. Movement restrictions were extended to all 179 contacts; 7 contacts were quarantined. Seven percent (14 of 179) of contacts (1 community contact and 13 health care contacts) were evaluated for Ebola during the monitoring period. LIMITATION: Data cannot be used to infer whether in-person direct active monitoring is superior to active monitoring alone for early detection of symptomatic contacts. CONCLUSION: Contact tracing and monitoring approaches for Ebola were adapted to account for the evolving understanding of risks for unrecognized HCP transmission. HCP contacts in the United States without known unprotected exposures should be considered as having a low (but not zero) risk for Ebola and should be actively monitored for symptoms. Core challenges of contact tracing for high-consequence communicable diseases included rapid comprehensive contact identification, large-scale direct active monitoring of contacts, large-scale application of movement restrictions, and necessity of humanitarian support services to meet nonclinical needs of contacts. PRIMARY FUNDING SOURCE: None. |
Measles in healthcare facilities in the United States during the post-elimination era, 2001- 2014
Parker Fiebelkorn A , Redd SB , Kuhar DT . Clin Infect Dis 2015 61 (4) 615-8 Between 2001 and 2014, 78 reported measles cases resulted from transmission in U.S. healthcare facilities and 29 healthcare personnel were infected from occupational exposure, of whom 1 transmitted measles to a patient. The economic impact of preventing and controlling measles transmission in healthcare facilities was $19,000- $114,286 per case. |
Strategies to prevent methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus transmission and infection in acute care hospitals: 2014 update
Calfee DP , Salgado CD , Milstone AM , Harris AD , Kuhar DT , Moody J , Aureden K , Huang SS , Maragakis LL , Yokoe DS . Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2014 35 (7) 772-96 Previously published guidelines are available that provide | comprehensive recommendations for detecting and preventing healthcare-associated infections (HAIs). The intent of this | document is to highlight practical recommendations in a concise format designed to assist acute care hospitals in implementing and prioritizing their methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) prevention efforts. This document | updates “Strategies to Prevent Transmission of MethicillinResistant Staphylococcus aureus in Acute Care Hospitals,”1 | published in 2008. This expert guidance document is sponsored by the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America | (SHEA) and is the product of a collaborative effort led by | SHEA, the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA), the | American Hospital Association (AHA), the Association for | Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC), | and The Joint Commission, with major contributions from | representatives of a number of organizations and societies | with content expertise. The list of endorsing and supporting | organizations is presented in the introduction to the 2014 | updates.2 |
Hospital-associated outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus: a serologic, epidemiologic, and clinical description
Al-Abdallat MM , Payne DC , Alqasrawi S , Rha B , Tohme RA , Abedi GR , Al Nsour M , Iblan I , Jarour N , Farag NH , Haddadin A , Al-Sanouri T , Tamin A , Harcourt JL , Kuhar DT , Swerdlow DL , Erdman DD , Pallansch MA , Haynes LM , Gerber SI . Clin Infect Dis 2014 59 (9) 1225-33 BACKGROUND: In April 2012, the Jordan Ministry of Health (JMoH) investigated an outbreak of lower respiratory illnesses at a hospital in Jordan; two fatal cases were retrospectively confirmed by rRT-PCR to be the first detected cases of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV). METHODS: Epidemiologic and clinical characteristics of selected potential cases were assessed through serum blood specimens, medical chart reviews and interviews with surviving outbreak members, household contacts, and healthcare personnel. Cases of MERS-CoV infection were identified using three U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) serologic tests for detection of anti-MERS-CoV antibodies. RESULTS: Specimens and interviews were obtained from 124 subjects. Seven previously unconfirmed individuals tested positive for anti-MERS-CoV antibodies by at least two of three serologic tests, in addition to two fatal cases identified by rRT-PCR. The case fatality rate among the nine total cases was 22%. Six cases were healthcare workers at the outbreak hospital, yielding an attack rate of 10% among potentially exposed outbreak hospital personnel. There was no evidence of MERS-CoV transmission at two transfer hospitals having acceptable infection control practices. CONCLUSION: Novel serological tests allowed for the detection of otherwise unrecognized cases of MERS-CoV infection among contacts of a Jordan hospital-associated respiratory illness outbreak in April 2012, resulting in a total of nine test-positive cases. Serologic results suggest that further spread of this outbreak to transfer hospitals did not occur. Most cases had no major, underlying medical conditions; none were on hemodialysis. Our observed case fatality was lower than has been reported from outbreaks elsewhere. |
First confirmed cases of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection in the United States, updated information on the epidemiology of MERS-CoV infection, and guidance for the public, clinicians, and public health authorities - May 2014
Bialek SR , Allen D , Alvarado-Ramy F , Arthur R , Balajee A , Bell D , Best S , Blackmore C , Breakwell L , Cannons A , Brown C , Cetron M , Chea N , Chommanard C , Cohen N , Conover C , Crespo A , Creviston J , Curns AT , Dahl R , Dearth S , DeMaria A , Echols F , Erdman DD , Feikin D , Frias M , Gerber SI , Gulati R , Hale C , Haynes LM , Heberlein-Larson L , Holton K , Ijaz K , Kapoor M , Kohl K , Kuhar DT , Kumar AM , Kundich M , Lippold S , Liu L , Lovchik JC , Madoff L , Martell S , Matthews S , Moore J , Murray LR , Onofrey S , Pallansch MA , Pesik N , Pham H , Pillai S , Pontones P , Poser S , Pringle K , Pritchard S , Rasmussen S , Richards S , Sandoval M , Schneider E , Schuchat A , Sheedy K , Sherin K , Swerdlow DL , Tappero JW , Vernon MO , Watkins S , Watson J . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2014 63 (19) 431-6 Since mid-March 2014, the frequency with which cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection have been reported has increased, with the majority of recent cases reported from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). In addition, the frequency with which travel-associated MERS cases have been reported and the number of countries that have reported them to the World Health Organization (WHO) have also increased. The first case of MERS in the United States, identified in a traveler recently returned from Saudi Arabia, was reported to CDC by the Indiana State Department of Health on May 1, 2014, and confirmed by CDC on May 2. A second imported case of MERS in the United States, identified in a traveler from Saudi Arabia having no connection with the first case, was reported to CDC by the Florida Department of Health on May 11, 2014. The purpose of this report is to alert clinicians, health officials, and others to increase awareness of the need to consider MERS-CoV infection in persons who have recently traveled from countries in or near the Arabian Peninsula. This report summarizes recent epidemiologic information, provides preliminary descriptions of the cases reported from Indiana and Florida, and updates CDC guidance about patient evaluation, home care and isolation, specimen collection, and travel as of May 13, 2014. |
Outbreak of Serratia marcescens bloodstream infections in patients receiving parenteral nutrition prepared by a compounding pharmacy
Gupta N , Hocevar SN , Moulton-Meissner H , Stevens KM , McIntyre MG , Jensen B , Kuhar DT , Noble-Wang J , Schnatz RG , Becker SC , Kastango ES , Shehab N , Kallen AJ . Clin Infect Dis 2014 59 (1) 1-8 BACKGROUND: Compounding pharmacies often prepare parenteral nutrition (PN) and must adhere to rigorous standards to avoid contamination of the sterile preparation. In March 2011, Serratia marcescens bloodstream infections (BSIs) were identified in five patients receiving PN from a single compounding pharmacy. An investigation was conducted to identify potential sources of contamination and prevent further infections. METHODS: Cases were defined as S. marcescens BSIs in patients receiving PN from the pharmacy between January and March 2011. We reviewed case-patient clinical records, evaluated pharmacy compounding practices, and obtained epidemiologically-directed environmental cultures. Molecular relatedness of available Serratia isolates was determined by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE). RESULTS: Nineteen case-patients were identified; nine died. The attack rate for patients receiving PN in March was 35%. No case-patients were younger than 18 years. In October 2010, the pharmacy began compounding and filter-sterilizing amino acid solution for adult PN using non-sterile amino acids due to a national manufacturer shortage. Review of this process identified breaches in mixing, filtration, and sterility testing practices. Serratia marcescens was identified from a pharmacy water faucet, mixing container, and opened amino acid powder. These isolates were indistinguishable from the outbreak strain by PFGE. CONCLUSIONS: Compounding of non-sterile amino acid components of PN was initiated due to a manufacturer shortage. Failure to follow recommended compounding standards contributed to an outbreak of S. marcescens BSIs. Improved adherence to sterile compounding standards, critical examination of standards for sterile compounding from non-sterile ingredients, and more rigorous oversight of compounding pharmacies is needed to prevent future outbreaks. |
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