IMPORTANCE: Despite modest reductions in the incidence of hospital-onset Clostridioides difficile infection (HO-CDI), CDI remains a leading cause of health care-associated infection. As no single intervention has proven highly effective on its own, a multifaceted approach to controlling HO-CDI is needed. OBJECTIVE: To assess the effectiveness of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Strategies to Prevent Clostridioides difficile Infection in Acute Care Facilities Framework (hereafter, the Framework) in reducing HO-CDI incidence. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: This quality improvement study was performed within the Duke Infection Control Outreach Network from July 1, 2019, through March 31, 2022. In all, 20 hospitals in the network participated in an implementation study of the Framework recommendations, and 26 hospitals did not participate and served as controls. The Framework has 39 discrete intervention categories organized into 5 focal areas for CDI prevention: (1) isolation and contact precautions, (2) CDI confirmation, (3) environmental cleaning, (4) infrastructure development, and (5) antimicrobial stewardship engagement. EXPOSURES: Monthly teleconferences supporting Framework implementation for the participating hospitals. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Primary outcomes were HO-CDI incidence trends at participating hospitals compared with controls and postintervention HO-CDI incidence at intervention sites compared with rates during the 24 months before the intervention. RESULTS: The study sample included a total of 2184 HO-CDI cases and 7 269 429 patient-days. In the intervention cohort of 20 participating hospitals, there were 1403 HO-CDI cases and 3 513 755 patient-days, with a median (IQR) HO-CDI incidence of 2.8 (2.0-4.3) cases per 10 000 patient-days. The first analysis included an additional 3 755 674 patient-days and 781 HO-CDI cases among the 26 controls, with a median (IQR) HO-CDI incidence of 1.1 (0.7-2.7) case per 10 000 patient-days. The second analysis included an additional 2 538 874 patient-days and 1751 HO-CDI cases, with a median (IQR) HO-CDI incidence of 5.9 (2.7-8.9) cases per 10 000 patient-days, from participating hospitals 24 months before the intervention. In the first analysis, intervention sites had a steeper decline in HO-CDI incidence over time relative to controls (yearly incidence rate ratio [IRR], 0.79 [95% CI, 0.67-0.94]; P = .01), but the decline was not temporally associated with study participation. In the second analysis, HO-CDI incidence was declining in participating hospitals before the intervention, and the rate of decline did not change during the intervention. The degree to which hospitals implemented the Framework was associated with steeper declines in HO-CDI incidence (yearly IRR, 0.95 [95% CI, 0.90-0.99]; P = .03). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: In this quality improvement study of a regional hospital network, implementation of the Framework was not temporally associated with declining HO-CDI incidence. Further study of the effectiveness of multimodal prevention measures for controlling HO-CDI is warranted.

This report updates the previously published summary of recommendations for vaccinating health-care personnel (HCP) in the United States (CDC. Immunization of health-care workers: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP] and the Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee [HICPAC]. MMWR 1997;46[No. RR-18]). This report was reviewed by and includes input from the Healthcare (formerly Hospital) Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee. These updated recommendations can assist hospital administrators, infection-control practitioners, employee health clinicians, and HCP in optimizing infection prevention and control programs. The recommendations for vaccinating HCP are presented by disease in two categories: 1) those diseases for which vaccination or documentation of immunity is recommended because of risks to HCP in their work settings for acquiring disease or transmitting to patients and 2) those for which vaccination might be indicated in certain circumstances. Background information for each vaccine-preventable disease and specific recommendations for use of each vaccine are presented. Certain infection-control measures that relate to vaccination also are included in this report. In addition, ACIP recommendations for the remaining vaccines that are recommended for certain or all adults are summarized, as are considerations for catch-up and travel vaccinations and for work restrictions. This report summarizes all current ACIP recommendations for vaccination of HCP and does not contain any new recommendations or policies. The recommendations provided in this report apply, but are not limited, to HCP in acute-care hospitals; long-term-care facilities (e.g., nursing homes and skilled nursing facilities); physician's offices; rehabilitation centers; urgent care centers, and outpatient clinics as well as to persons who provide home health care and emergency medical services.

The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommends that health care personnel (HCP) receive an annual influenza vaccine and that everyone aged ≥6 months stay up to date with recommended COVID-19 vaccination. Health care facilities report vaccination of HCP against influenza and COVID-19 to CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). During January-June 2023, NHSN defined up-to-date COVID-19 vaccination as receipt of a bivalent COVID-19 mRNA vaccine dose or completion of a primary series within the preceding 2 months. This analysis describes influenza and up-to-date COVID-19 vaccination coverage among HCP working in acute care hospitals and nursing homes during the 2022-23 influenza season (October 1, 2022-March 31, 2023). Influenza vaccination coverage was 81.0% among HCP at acute care hospitals and 47.1% among those working at nursing homes. Up-to-date COVID-19 vaccination coverage was 17.2% among HCP working at acute care hospitals and 22.8% among those working at nursing homes. There is a need to promote evidence-based strategies to improve vaccination coverage among HCP. Tailored strategies might also be useful to reach all HCP with recommended vaccines and protect them and their patients from vaccine-preventable respiratory diseases.

Health care personnel (HCP) are recommended to receive annual vaccination against influenza to reduce influenza-related morbidity and mortality. Every year, acute care hospitals report receipt of influenza vaccination among HCP to CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). This analysis used NHSN data to describe changes in influenza vaccination coverage among HCP in acute care hospitals before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Influenza vaccination among HCP increased during the prepandemic period from 88.6% during 2017-18 to 90.7% during 2019-20. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the percentage of HCP vaccinated against influenza decreased to 85.9% in 2020-21 and 81.1% in 2022-23. Additional efforts are needed to implement evidence-based strategies to increase vaccination coverage among HCP and to identify factors associated with recent declines in influenza vaccination coverage.

Central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) are common healthcare-associated infections in pediatrics. Children's hospital CLABSI standardized infection ratios decreased when comparing 2016 to 2019 (-26%, 95% CI [-31%, -20%]), and increased from 2019 and 2022 (18%, 95% CI [9%, 26%]). Resilient pediatric CLABSI prevention initiatives are needed.

Data from the National Healthcare Safety Network were analyzed to assess the impact of COVID-19 on the incidence of healthcare-associated infections (HAI) during 2021. Standardized infection ratios were significantly higher than those during the prepandemic period, particularly during 2021-Q1 and 2021-Q3. The incidence of HAI was elevated during periods of high COVID-19 hospitalizations.

IMPORTANCE: Two-step testing for Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) aims to improve diagnostic specificity, but may also influence reported epidemiology and patterns of treatment. Some providers fear that two-step testing may result in adverse outcomes if C. difficile is under-diagnosed. OBJECTIVE: Our primary objective was to assess the impact of two-step testing on reported incidence of hospital-onset CDI (HO-CDI). As secondary objectives, we assessed the impact of two-step testing on C. difficile-specific antibiotic use and colectomy rates as proxies for harm from underdiagnosis or delayed treatment. DESIGN: This longitudinal cohort study included 2,657,324 patient-days across eight regional hospitals from July 2017 through March 2022. Impact of two-step testing was assessed by time series analysis with generalized estimating equation regression models. RESULTS: Two-step testing was associated with a level decrease in HO-CDI incidence (incidence rate ratio 0.53, 95% CI 0.48-0.60, p<.0.001), a similar level decrease in utilization rates for oral vancomycin and fidaxomicin (utilization rate ratio 0.63, 95% CI 0.58-0.70, p<0.001), and no significant level (rate ratio 1.16, 95% CI 0.93-1.43, p=0.18) or trend (rate ratio 0.85, 95% CI 0.52-1.39, p=0.51) change in emergent colectomy rates. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: Two-step testing is associated with decreased reported incidence of HO-CDI, likely by improving diagnostic specificity. The parallel decrease in C. difficile specific antibiotic use offers indirect reassurance against under-diagnosis of C. difficile infections still requiring treatment by clinician assessment. Similarly, the absence of any significant change in colectomy rates offers indirect reassurance against any rise in fulminant C. difficile requiring surgical management.

This article summarizes what is currently known about the 2019 novel coronavirus and offers interim guidance.

Previously published guidelines provided comprehensive recommendations for detecting and preventing healthcare-associated infections (HAIs). The intent of this document is to highlight practical recommendations in a concise format designed to assist acute-care hospitals to implement and prioritize their Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) prevention efforts. This document updates the Strategies to Prevent Clostridium difficile Infections in Acute Care Hospitals published in 2014.Reference Dubberke, Carling and Carrico1 This expert guidance document is sponsored by the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) and is the product of a collaborative effort led by SHEA, the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA), the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC), the American Hospital Association (AHA), and The Joint Commission.

OBJECTIVE: To assist hospitals in reducing Clostridioides difficile infections (CDI), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) implemented a collaborative using the CDC CDI prevention strategies and the Targeted Assessment for Prevention (TAP) Strategy as foundational frameworks. SETTING: Acute-care hospitals. METHODS: We invited 400 hospitals with the highest cumulative attributable differences (CADs) to the 12-month collaborative, with monthly webinars, coaching calls, and deployment of the CDC CDI TAP facility assessments. Infection prevention barriers, gaps identified, and interventions implemented were qualitatively coded by categorizing them to respective CDI prevention strategies. Standardized infection ratios (SIRs) were reviewed to measure outcomes. RESULTS: Overall, 76 hospitals participated, most often reporting CDI testing as their greatest barrier to achieving reduction (61%). In total, 5,673 TAP assessments were collected across 46 (61%) hospitals. Most hospitals (98%) identified at least 1 gap related to testing and at least 1 gap related to infrastructure to support prevention. Among 14 follow-up hospitals, 64% implemented interventions related to infrastructure to support prevention (eg, establishing champions, reviewing individual CDIs) and 86% implemented testing interventions (eg, 2-step testing, testing algorithms). The SIR decrease between the pre-collaborative and post-collaborative periods was significant among participants (16.7%; P < .001) but less than that among nonparticipants (25.1%; P < .001). CONCLUSIONS: This article describes gaps identified and interventions implemented during a comprehensive CDI prevention collaborative in targeted hospitals, highlighting potential future areas of focus for CDI prevention efforts as well as reported challenges and barriers to prevention of one of the most common healthcare-associated infections affecting hospitals and patients nationwide.

The risk for monkeypox transmission to health care personnel (HCP) caring for symptomatic patients is thought to be low but has not been thoroughly assessed in the context of the current global outbreak (1). Monkeypox typically spreads through close physical (often skin-to-skin) contact with lesions or scabs, body fluids, or respiratory secretions of a person with an active monkeypox infection. CDC currently recommends that HCP wear a gown, gloves, eye protection, and an N95 (or higher-level) respirator while caring for patients with suspected or confirmed monkeypox to protect themselves from infection(†) (1,2). The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) evaluated HCP exposures and personal protective equipment (PPE) use in health care settings during care of patients who subsequently received a diagnosis of Orthopoxvirus infection (presumptive monkeypox determined by a polymerase chain reaction [PCR] DNA assay) or monkeypox (real-time PCR assay and genetic sequencing performed by CDC). During May 1-July 31, 2022, a total of 313 HCP interacted with patients with subsequently diagnosed monkeypox infections while wearing various combinations of PPE; 23% wore all recommended PPE during their exposures. Twenty-eight percent of exposed HCP were considered to have had high- or intermediate-risk exposures and were therefore eligible to receive postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) with the JYNNEOS vaccine(§); among those, 48% (12% of all exposed HCP) received the vaccine. PPE use varied by facility type: HCP in sexually transmitted infection (STI) clinics and community health centers reported the highest adherence to recommended PPE use, and primary and urgent care settings reported the lowest adherence. No HCP developed a monkeypox infection during the 21 days after exposure. These results suggest that the risk for transmission of monkeypox in health care settings is low. Infection prevention training is important in all health care settings, and these findings can guide future updates to PPE recommendations and risk classification in health care settings.

BACKGROUND: Nursing homes (NHs) provide care in a congregate setting for residents at high risk of severe outcomes from SARS-CoV-2 infection. In spring 2020, NHs were implementing new guidance to minimize SARS-CoV-2 spread among residents and staff. OBJECTIVE: To assess whether telephone and video-based infection control assessment and response (TeleICAR) strategies could efficiently assess NH preparedness and help resolve gaps. DESIGN: We incorporated Centers for Disease Control and Prevention COVID-19 guidance for NH into an assessment tool covering 6 domains: visitor restrictions; health care personnel COVID-19 training; resident education, monitoring, screening, and cohorting; personal protective equipment supply; core infection prevention and control (IPC); and communication to public health. We performed TeleICAR consultations on behalf of health departments. Adherence to each element was documented and recommendations provided to the facility. SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: Health department-referred NHs that agreed to TeleICAR consultation. METHODS: We assessed overall numbers and proportions of NH that had not implemented each infection control element (gap) and proportion of NH that reported making ≥1 change in practice following the assessment. RESULTS: During April 13 to June 12, 2020, we completed TeleICAR consultations in 629 NHs across 19 states. Overall, 524 (83%) had ≥1 implementation gaps identified; the median number of gaps was 2 (interquartile range: 1-4). The domains with the greatest number of facilities with gaps were core IPC practices (428/625; 68%) and COVID-19 education, monitoring, screening, and cohorting of residents (291/620; 47%). CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: TeleICAR was an alternative to onsite infection control assessments that enabled public health to efficiently reach NHs across the United States early in the COVID-19 pandemic. Assessments identified widespread gaps in core IPC practices that put residents and staff at risk of infection. TeleICAR is an important strategy that leverages infection control expertise and can be useful in future efforts to improve NH IPC.

Monkeypox is a rare, sometimes life-threatening zoonotic infection that occurs in west and central Africa. It is caused by Monkeypox virus, an orthopoxvirus similar to Variola virus (the causative agent of smallpox) and Vaccinia virus (the live virus component of orthopoxvirus vaccines) and can spread to humans. After 39 years without detection of human disease in Nigeria, an outbreak involving 118 confirmed cases was identified during 2017-2018 (1); sporadic cases continue to occur. During September 2018-May 2021, six unrelated persons traveling from Nigeria received diagnoses of monkeypox in non-African countries: four in the United Kingdom and one each in Israel and Singapore. In July 2021, a man who traveled from Lagos, Nigeria, to Dallas, Texas, became the seventh traveler to a non-African country with diagnosed monkeypox. Among 194 monitored contacts, 144 (74%) were flight contacts. The patient received tecovirimat, an antiviral for treatment of orthopoxvirus infections, and his home required large-scale decontamination. Whole genome sequencing showed that the virus was consistent with a strain of Monkeypox virus known to circulate in Nigeria, but the specific source of the patient's infection was not identified. No epidemiologically linked cases were reported in Nigeria; no contact received postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) with the orthopoxvirus vaccine ACAM2000.

Data reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) were analyzed to understand the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) in acute care hospitals. Descriptive analysis of the Standardized Infection Ratio (SIR) was conducted by locations, location type, geographic area, and bed size.

BACKGROUND: Catheter associated urinary tract infections (CAUTI) and central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) represent a substantial portion of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) reported in the United States. The Targeted Assessment for Prevention (TAP) Strategy is a quality improvement framework to reduce HAIs. Data from the TAP Facility Assessments were used to determine common infection prevention gaps for CAUTI and CLABSI. METHODS: Data from 2,044 CAUTI and 1,680 CLABSI Assessments were included in the analysis. Items were defined as potential gaps if ≥33% respondents answered Unknown, ≥33% No, or ≥50% No or Unknown or Never, Rarely, Sometimes, or Unknown to questions pertaining to those areas. Review of response frequencies and stratification by respondent role were performed to highlight opportunities for improvement. RESULTS: Across CAUTI and CLABSI Assessments, lack of physician champions (<35% Yes) and nurse champions (<55% Yes), along with lack of awareness of competency assessments, audits, and feedback were reported. Lack of practices to facilitate timely removal of urinary catheters were identified for CAUTI and issues with select device insertion practices, such as maintaining aseptic technique, were perceived as areas for improvement for CLABSI. CONCLUSIONS: These data suggest common gaps in critical components of infection prevention and control programs. The identification of these gaps has the potential to inform targeted CAUTI and CLABSI prevention efforts.

In July 2020, the Florida Department of Health was alerted to three Candida auris bloodstream infections and one urinary tract infection in four patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) who received care in the same dedicated COVID-19 unit of an acute care hospital (hospital A). C. auris is a multidrug-resistant yeast that can cause invasive infection. Its ability to colonize patients asymptomatically and persist on surfaces has contributed to previous C. auris outbreaks in health care settings (1-7). Since the first C. auris case was identified in Florida in 2017, aggressive measures have been implemented to limit spread, including contact tracing and screening upon detection of a new case. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, hospital A conducted admission screening for C. auris and admitted colonized patients to a separate dedicated ward.

As of September 21, 2020, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic had resulted in 6,786,352 cases and 199,024 deaths in the United States.* Health care personnel (HCP) are essential workers at risk for exposure to patients or infectious materials (1). The impact of COVID-19 on U.S. HCP was first described using national case surveillance data in April 2020 (2). Since then, the number of reported HCP with COVID-19 has increased tenfold. This update describes demographic characteristics, underlying medical conditions, hospitalizations, and intensive care unit (ICU) admissions, stratified by vital status, among 100,570 HCP with COVID-19 reported to CDC during February 12-July 16, 2020. HCP occupation type and job setting are newly reported. HCP status was available for 571,708 (22%) of 2,633,585 cases reported to CDC. Most HCP with COVID-19 were female (79%), aged 16-44 years (57%), not hospitalized (92%), and lacked all 10 underlying medical conditions specified on the case report form(†) (56%). Of HCP with COVID-19, 641 died. Compared with nonfatal COVID-19 HCP cases, a higher percentage of fatal cases occurred in males (38% versus 22%), persons aged ≥65 years (44% versus 4%), non-Hispanic Asians (Asians) (20% versus 9%), non-Hispanic Blacks (Blacks) (32% versus 25%), and persons with any of the 10 underlying medical conditions specified on the case report form (92% versus 41%). From a subset of jurisdictions reporting occupation type or job setting for HCP with COVID-19, nurses were the most frequently identified single occupation type (30%), and nursing and residential care facilities were the most common job setting (67%). Ensuring access to personal protective equipment (PPE) and training, and practices such as universal use of face masks at work, wearing masks in the community, and observing social distancing remain critical strategies to protect HCP and those they serve.

Exposure to hepatitis viruses is a recognized occupational risk for health care personnel (HCP). This report establishes new CDC guidance that includes recommendations for a testing algorithm and clinical management for HCP with potential occupational exposure to hepatitis C virus (HCV). Baseline testing of the source patient and HCP should be performed as soon as possible (preferably within 48 hours) after the exposure. A source patient refers to any person receiving health care services whose blood or other potentially infectious material is the source of the HCP's exposure. Two options are recommended for testing the source patient. The first option is to test the source patient with a nucleic acid test (NAT) for HCV RNA. This option is preferred, particularly if the source patient is known or suspected to have recent behaviors that increase risk for HCV acquisition (e.g., injection drug use within the previous 4 months) or if risk cannot be reliably assessed. The second option is to test the source patient for antibodies to hepatitis C virus (anti-HCV), then if positive, test for HCV RNA. For HCP, baseline testing for anti-HCV with reflex to a NAT for HCV RNA if positive should be conducted as soon as possible (preferably within 48 hours) after the exposure and may be simultaneous with source-patient testing. If follow-up testing is recommended based on the source patient's status (e.g., HCV RNA positive or anti-HCV positive with unavailable HCV RNA or if the HCV infection status is unknown), HCP should be tested with a NAT for HCV RNA at 3-6 weeks postexposure. If HCV RNA is negative at 3-6 weeks postexposure, a final test for anti-HCV at 4-6 months postexposure is recommended. A source patient or HCP found to be positive for HCV RNA should be referred to care. Postexposure prophylaxis of hepatitis C is not recommended for HCP who have occupational exposure to blood and other body fluids. This guidance was developed based on expert opinion (CDC. Updated U.S. Public Health Service guidelines for the management of occupational exposures to HBV, HCV, and HIV and recommendations for postexposure prophylaxis. MMWR Recommend Rep 2001;50[No. RR-11]; Supplementary Figure, https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/90288) and reflects updated guidance from professional organizations that recommend treatment for acute HCV infection. Health care providers can use this guidance to update their procedures for postexposure testing and clinical management of HCP potentially exposed to hepatitis C virus.

N95 respirators are the personal protective equipment most often used to control exposures to infections transmitted via the airborne route. Supplies of N95 respirators can become depleted during pandemics or when otherwise in high demand. In this paper, we offer strategies for optimizing supplies of N95 respirators in healthcare settings while maximizing the level of protection offered to healthcare personnel when there is limited supply in the United States during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The strategies are intended for use by professionals who manage respiratory protection programs, occupational health services, and infection prevention programs in healthcare facilities to protect healthcare personnel from job-related risks of exposure to infectious respiratory illnesses. Consultation with federal, state, and local public health officials is also important. We use the framework of surge capacity and the occupational health and safety hierarchy of controls approach to discuss specific engineering control, administrative control, and personal protective equipment measures that may help in optimizing N95 respirator supplies.

As of April 9, 2020, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic had resulted in 1,521,252 cases and 92,798 deaths worldwide, including 459,165 cases and 16,570 deaths in the United States (1,2). Health care personnel (HCP) are essential workers defined as paid and unpaid persons serving in health care settings who have the potential for direct or indirect exposure to patients or infectious materials (3). During February 12-April 9, among 315,531 COVID-19 cases reported to CDC using a standardized form, 49,370 (16%) included data on whether the patient was a health care worker in the United States; including 9,282 (19%) who were identified as HCP. Among HCP patients with data available, the median age was 42 years (interquartile range [IQR] = 32-54 years), 6,603 (73%) were female, and 1,779 (38%) reported at least one underlying health condition. Among HCP patients with data on health care, household, and community exposures, 780 (55%) reported contact with a COVID-19 patient only in health care settings. Although 4,336 (92%) HCP patients reported having at least one symptom among fever, cough, or shortness of breath, the remaining 8% did not report any of these symptoms. Most HCP with COVID-19 (6,760, 90%) were not hospitalized; however, severe outcomes, including 27 deaths, occurred across all age groups; deaths most frequently occurred in HCP aged ≥65 years. These preliminary findings highlight that whether HCP acquire infection at work or in the community, it is necessary to protect the health and safety of this essential national workforce.

OBJECTIVE: To describe pathogen distribution and rates for central-line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) from different acute-care locations during 2011-2017 to inform prevention efforts. METHODS: CLABSI data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) were analyzed. Percentages and pooled mean incidence density rates were calculated for a variety of pathogens and stratified by acute-care location groups (adult intensive care units [ICUs], pediatric ICUs [PICUs], adult wards, pediatric wards, and oncology wards). RESULTS: From 2011 to 2017, 136,264 CLABSIs were reported to the NHSN by adult and pediatric acute-care locations; adult ICUs and wards reported the most CLABSIs: 59,461 (44%) and 40,763 (30%), respectively. In 2017, the most common pathogens were Candida spp/yeast in adult ICUs (27%) and Enterobacteriaceae in adult wards, pediatric wards, oncology wards, and PICUs (23%-31%). Most pathogen-specific CLABSI rates decreased over time, excepting Candida spp/yeast in adult ICUs and Enterobacteriaceae in oncology wards, which increased, and Staphylococcus aureus rates in pediatric locations, which did not change. CONCLUSIONS: The pathogens associated with CLABSIs differ across acute-care location groups. Learning how pathogen-targeted prevention efforts could augment current prevention strategies, such as strategies aimed at preventing Candida spp/yeast and Enterobacteriaceae CLABSIs, might further reduce national rates.

BACKGROUND: Prevention of Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) is a national priority and may be facilitated by deployment of the Targeted Assessment for Prevention (TAP) Strategy, a quality improvement framework providing a focused approach to infection prevention. This article describes the process and outcomes of TAP Strategy implementation for CDI prevention in a healthcare system. METHODS: Hospital A was identified based on CDI surveillance data indicating an excess burden of infections above the national goal; hospitals B and C participated as part of systemwide deployment. TAP facility assessments were administered to staff to identify infection control gaps and inform CDI prevention interventions. Retrospective analysis was performed using negative-binomial, interrupted time series (ITS) regression to assess overall effect of targeted CDI prevention efforts. Analysis included hospital-onset, laboratory-identified C. difficile event data for 18 months before and after implementation of the TAP facility assessments. RESULTS: The systemwide monthly CDI rate significantly decreased at the intervention (beta2, -44%; P = .017), and the postintervention CDI rate trend showed a sustained decrease (beta1 + beta3; -12% per month; P = .008). At an individual hospital level, the CDI rate trend significantly decreased in the postintervention period at hospital A only (beta1 + beta3, -26% per month; P = .003). CONCLUSIONS: This project demonstrates TAP Strategy implementation in a healthcare system, yielding significant decrease in the laboratory-identified C. difficile rate trend in the postintervention period at the system level and in hospital A. This project highlights the potential benefit of directing prevention efforts to facilities with the highest burden of excess infections to more efficiently reduce CDI rates.

BACKGROUND: Presenteeism, or working while ill, by healthcare personnel (HCP) experiencing influenza-like illness (ILI) puts patients and coworkers at risk. However, hospital policies and practices may not consistently facilitate HCP staying home when ill. OBJECTIVE AND METHODS: We conducted a mixed-methods survey in March 2018 of Emerging Infections Network infectious diseases physicians, describing institutional experiences with and policies for HCP working with ILI. RESULTS: Of 715 physicians, 367 (51%) responded. Of 367, 135 (37%) were unaware of institutional policies. Of the remaining 232 respondents, 206 (89%) reported institutional policies regarding work restrictions for HCP with influenza or ILI, but only 145 (63%) said these were communicated at least annually. More than half of respondents (124, 53%) reported that adherence to work restrictions was not monitored or enforced. Work restrictions were most often not perceived to be enforced for physicians-in-training and attending physicians. Nearly all (223, 96%) reported that their facility tracked laboratory-confirmed influenza (LCI) in patients; 85 (37%) reported tracking ILI. For employees, 109 (47%) reported tracking of LCI and 53 (23%) reported tracking ILI. For independent physicians, not employed by the facility, 30 (13%) reported tracking LCI and 11 (5%) ILI. CONCLUSION: More than one-third of respondents were unaware of whether their institutions had policies to prevent HCP with ILI from working; among those with knowledge of institutional policies, dissemination, monitoring, and enforcement of these policies was highly variable. Improving communication about work-restriction policies, as well as monitoring and enforcement, may help prevent the spread of infections from HCP to patients.

Health care continues to change rapidly, growing increasingly complex with greater acuity of patients, delivery of more care outside of traditional acute care settings, and ongoing challenges related to staffing and personnel turnover. Despite this, we remain determined to provide safe care for every patient and a safe workplace for each of our staff. Such determination requires every health care facility, whether an urban tertiary care center or a critical access hospital, an ambulatory surgery center or a skilled-nursing facility, to ensure that everyone providing patient care or working to support the environment of care is prepared to do their part to prevent the spread of infections. Not only does each facility need to do its part, the frequent movement of patients from one care setting to the next means that infection prevention and control (IPC) efforts must also be coordinated across the range of facility types that make up modern health care.

Unrecognized transmission of pathogens in healthcare settings can lead to colonization and infection of both patients and healthcare personnel. The use of personal protective equipment (PPE) is an important strategy to protect healthcare personnel from contamination and to prevent the spread of pathogens to subsequent patients. However, optimal PPE use is difficult, and healthcare personnel may alter delivery of care because of the PPE. Here, we summarize recent research from the Prevention Epicenters Program on healthcare personnel contamination and improvement of the routine use of PPE as well as Ebola-specific PPE. Future efforts to optimize the use of PPE should include increasing adherence to protocols for PPE use, improving PPE design, and further research into the risks, benefits, and best practices of PPE use.

A nationwide survey indicated that screening for asymptomatic carriers of C. difficile is an uncommon practice in US healthcare settings. Better understanding of the role of asymptomatic carriage in C. difficile transmission, and of the measures available to reduce that risk, are needed to inform best practices regarding the management of carriers.

The 2005 CDC guidelines for preventing Mycobacterium tuberculosis transmission in health care settings include recommendations for baseline tuberculosis (TB) screening of all U.S. health care personnel and annual testing for health care personnel working in medium-risk settings or settings with potential for ongoing transmission (1). Using evidence from a systematic review conducted by a National Tuberculosis Controllers Association (NTCA)-CDC work group, and following methods adapted from the Guide to Community Preventive Services (2,3), the 2005 CDC recommendations for testing U.S. health care personnel have been updated and now include 1) TB screening with an individual risk assessment and symptom evaluation at baseline (preplacement); 2) TB testing with an interferon-gamma release assay (IGRA) or a tuberculin skin test (TST) for persons without documented prior TB disease or latent TB infection (LTBI); 3) no routine serial TB testing at any interval after baseline in the absence of a known exposure or ongoing transmission; 4) encouragement of treatment for all health care personnel with untreated LTBI, unless treatment is contraindicated; 5) annual symptom screening for health care personnel with untreated LTBI; and 6) annual TB education of all health care personnel.

Healthcare organizations are required to provide workers with respiratory protection (RP) to mitigate hazardous airborne inhalation exposures. This study sought to better identify gaps that exist between RP guidance and clinical practice to understand issues that would benefit from additional research or clarification.

In January 2018, a woman admitted to a Delaware hospital tested positive for New World hantavirus immunoglobulin M (IgM) and immunoglobulin G (IgG) by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). Subsequent testing by CDC’s Viral Special Pathogens Branch detected New World hantavirus by nested reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and Andes virus by nucleic acid sequencing. This case represents the first confirmed importation of Andes virus infection into the United States; two imported cases have also been reported in Switzerland (1). Before her illness, the patient had traveled to the Andes region of Argentina and Chile from December 20, 2017, to January 3, 2018. She stayed in cabins and youth hostels in reportedly poor condition. No rodent exposures were reported. After returning to the United States on January 10, she developed fever, malaise, and myalgias on January 14. On January 17, while ill, she traveled on two commercial domestic flights. She was hospitalized during January 20–25 in Delaware and discharged to her home after clinical recovery.

Although transmission of hepatitis A virus (HAV) through blood transfusion has been documented, transmission through organ transplantation has not been reported. In August 2015, state health officials in Texas, USA, were notified of 2 home health nurses with HAV infection whose only common exposure was a child who had undergone multi-visceral organ transplantation 9 months earlier. Specimens from the nurses, organ donor, and all organ recipients were tested and medical records reviewed to determine a possible infection source. Identical HAV RNA sequences were detected from the serum of both nurses and the organ donor, as well as from the multi-visceral organ recipient's serum and feces; this recipient's posttransplant liver and intestine biopsy specimens also had detectable virus. The other organ recipients tested negative for HAV RNA. Vaccination of the donor might have prevented infection in the recipient and subsequent transmission to the healthcare workers.