In 2021, the US government undertook Operation Allies Welcome, in which evacuees from Afghanistan arrived at 2 US ports of entry in Virginia and Pennsylvania. Because of the rapid evacuation process, the US government granted evacuees an exemption to a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) requirement in place at that time-namely, that air passengers present a negative SARS-CoV-2 viral test result or documentation of recovery from COVID-19 before they boarded international flights bound for the United States. This study describes cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection detected among 65 068 evacuees who arrived at the 2 ports of entry in August and September 2021. Because evacuees were a population at increased risk for infection with diseases of public health concern, CDC staff helped coordinate on-site and on-arrival testing, visually observed evacuees for signs and symptoms of communicable disease, and referred evacuees for further evaluation and treatment as needed. CDC staff used antigen or nucleic acid amplification tests at the ports of entry to evaluate evacuees aged ≥2 years without documentation of recent SARS-CoV-2 infection. CDC staff isolated evacuees with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection and quarantined their close contacts, consistent with CDC guidance at the time, before evacuees rejoined the repatriation process. Of 65 068 evacuees, 214 (0.3%) were confirmed as having SARS-CoV-2 infection after port-of-entry testing. Cases of measles, varicella, pertussis, tuberculosis, hepatitis A, malaria, leishmaniasis, and diarrheal illness were also identified. Although the percentage of SARS-CoV-2 infection was low in this evacuated population, communicable disease detection at US ports of entry, along with vaccination efforts, was an important part of a multilayered approach to mitigate the transmission of disease in congregate housing facilities and into US communities.

Palau had no reported evidence of COVID-19 community spread until January 2022. We chart reviewed hospitalized patients who had a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result during early community transmission. Booster vaccinations and early outpatient treatment decreased hospitalizations. Inadequate hospital infection control practices contributed to iatrogenic COVID-19 and preventable deaths.

The first case of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Cambodia was confirmed on 27 January 2020 in a traveller from Wuhan. Cambodia subsequently implemented strict travel restrictions, and although intermittent cases were reported during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, no apparent widespread community transmission was detected. Investigating the routes of severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) introduction into the country was critical for evaluating the implementation of public health interventions and assessing the effectiveness of social control measures. Genomic sequencing technologies have enabled rapid detection and monitoring of emerging variants of SARS-CoV-2. Here, we detected 478 confirmed COVID-19 cases in Cambodia between 27 January 2020 and 14 February 2021, 81.3 per cent in imported cases. Among them, fifty-four SARS-CoV-2 genomes were sequenced and analysed along with representative global lineages. Despite the low number of confirmed cases, we found a high diversity of Cambodian viruses that belonged to at least seventeen distinct PANGO lineages. Phylogenetic inference of SARS-CoV-2 revealed that the genetic diversity of Cambodian viruses resulted from multiple independent introductions from diverse regions, predominantly, Eastern Asia, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Most cases were quickly isolated, limiting community spread, although there was an A.23.1 variant cluster in Phnom Penh in November 2020 that resulted in a small-scale local transmission. The overall low incidence of COVID-19 infections suggests that Cambodia's early containment strategies, including travel restrictions, aggressive testing and strict quarantine measures, were effective in preventing large community outbreaks of COVID-19.

On August 29, 2021, the United States government oversaw the emergent establishment of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), led by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and implemented by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Department of State (DoS), to safely resettle U.S. citizens and Afghan nationals from Afghanistan to the United States. Evacuees were temporarily housed at several overseas locations in Europe and Asia* before being transported via military and charter flights through two U.S. international airports, and onward to eight U.S. military bases,(†) with hotel A used for isolation and quarantine of persons with or exposed to certain infectious diseases.(§) On August 30, CDC issued an Epi-X notice encouraging public health officials to maintain vigilance for measles among Afghan evacuees because of an ongoing measles outbreak in Afghanistan (25,988 clinical cases reported nationwide during January-November 2021) (1) and low routine measles vaccination coverage (66% and 43% for the first and second doses, respectively, in 2020) (2).

Background: Effective prevention, detection, and response to disease threats at the human-animal-environment interface rely on a multisectoral, One Health workforce. Since 2009, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has supported Field Epidemiology Training Programs (FETPs) to train veterinarians and veterinary paraprofessionals (VPPs) alongside their human health counterparts in the principles of epidemiology, disease surveillance, and outbreak investigations. We aim to describe and evaluate characteristics of CDC-supported FETPs enrolling veterinarians/VPPs to understand these programs contribution to the strengthening of the global One Health workforce. Methods: We surveyed staff from CDC-supported FETPs that enroll veterinarians and VPPs regarding cohort demographics, graduate retention, and veterinary and One Health relevant curriculum inclusion. Descriptive data was analyzed using R Version 3.5.1. Results: Forty-seven FETPs reported veterinarian/VPP trainees, 68% responded to our questionnaire, and 64% reported veterinary/VPP graduates in 2017. The veterinary/VPP graduates in 2017 made up 12% of cohorts. Programs reported 74% of graduated veterinarians/VPPs retained employment within national ministries of agriculture. Common veterinary and One Health curriculum topics were specimen collection and submission (93%), zoonotic disease (90%) and biosafety practices (83%); least covered included animal/livestock production and health promotion (23%) and transboundary animal diseases (27%). Less than half (41%) of programs reported the curriculum being sufficient for veterinarians/VPPs to perform animal health specific job functions, despite most programs being linked to the ministry of agriculture (75%) and providing veterinary-specific mentorship (63%). Conclusions: Our results indicate that FETPs provide valuable training opportunities for animal health sector professionals, strengthening the epidemiology capacity within the ministries retaining them. While veterinary/VPP trainees could benefit from the inclusion of animal-specific curricula needed to fulfill their job functions, at present, FETPs continue to serve as multisectoral, competency-based, in-service training important in strengthening the global One Health workforce by jointly training the animal and human health sectors. © 2022

In 2017, the National Institute of Public Health in Cambodia collaborated with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to provide management and leadership training for 20 managers and senior staff from 10 health centers. We conducted a mixed methods evaluation of the program's outcomes and impact on the graduates and health centers. From June 2018 (baseline) to January 2019 (endpoint), we collected data from a competency assessment, observational visits, and interviews. From baseline to endpoint, all 20 participants reported increased competence in seven management areas. Comparing baseline and endpoint observational visits, we found improvements in leadership and governance, health workforce, water, sanitation, and hygiene, and health centers' use of medical products and technologies. When evaluating the improvements made by participants against the World Health Organization's key components of a well-functioning health system, the program positively contributed toward building four of the six components-leadership and governance, health information systems, human resources for health, and service delivery. While these findings are specific to the context of Cambodian health centers, we hope this evaluation adds to the growing body of research around the impact of skilled public health management on health systems.

Introduction of non-pharmaceutical interventions to control COVID-19 in early 2020 coincided with a global decrease in active influenza circulation. However, between July and November 2020, an influenza A(H3N2) epidemic occurred in Cambodia and in other neighboring countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion in Southeast Asia. We characterized the genetic and antigenic evolution of A(H3N2) in Cambodia and found that the 2020 epidemic comprised genetically and antigenically similar viruses of Clade3C2a1b/131K/94N, but they were distinct from the WHO recommended influenza A(H3N2) vaccine virus components for 2020-2021 Northern Hemisphere season. Phylogenetic analysis revealed multiple virus migration events between Cambodia and bordering countries, with Laos PDR and Vietnam also reporting similar A(H3N2) epidemics immediately following the Cambodia outbreak: however, there was limited circulation of these viruses elsewhere globally. In February 2021, a virus from the Cambodian outbreak was recommended by WHO as the prototype virus for inclusion in the 2021-2022 Northern Hemisphere influenza vaccine. IMPORTANCE The 2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has significantly altered the circulation patterns of respiratory diseases worldwide and disrupted continued surveillance in many countries. Introduction of control measures in early 2020 against Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection has resulted in a remarkable reduction in the circulation of many respiratory diseases. Influenza activity has remained at historically low levels globally since March 2020, even when increased influenza testing was performed in some countries. Maintenance of the influenza surveillance system in Cambodia in 2020 allowed for the detection and response to an influenza A(H3N2) outbreak in late 2020, resulting in the inclusion of this virus in the 2021-2022 Northern Hemisphere influenza vaccine.

Background: Black mothers in the United States have shorter breastfeeding (BF) durations and less exclusive breastfeeding (EBF) than others. The factors underlying these disparities require investigation. Methods: Using longitudinal data from a CDC-sponsored birth cohort in Cincinnati, Ohio, we analyzed the factors mediating racial disparity in BF outcomes. Study mothers were enrolled in prenatal clinics associated with two large birth hospitals. Analysis was restricted to racial groups with sufficient numbers in the cohort, non-Hispanic Black (n = 92) and White (n = 113) mothers, followed to at least 6 months postpartum. Results: Black mothers were 25 times more likely to reside in socioeconomically deprived neighborhoods and 20 times more likely to have an annual household income <$50,000/year than White mothers (p < 0.001). The gap in EBF for 6 weeks was 45 percentage points by racial group (13%-Black mothers versus 58%-White mothers, p < 0.001); in any BF at 6 months was 37 percentage points (28%-Black mothers versus 65%-White mothers, p < 0.001); and in mothers meeting their own intention to BF at least 6 months was 51 percentage points (29%-Black mothers versus 80%-White mothers, p < 0.001). Racial disparity in EBF at 6 weeks was mediated in logistic regression models by inequities in socioeconomic position, maternal hypertension, and BF intention. Racial disparities in BF at 6 months or meeting 6-month BF intention were mediated by inequities in socioeconomic position, maternal obesity, and EBF at 6 weeks. Not all BF disparities could be explained by models used in these analyses. Conclusions: Efforts to lessen BF disparities should address the underlying structural inequities that disproportionately affect Black mothers and children, should incorporate maternal health, and focus on breastfeeding exclusivity and duration. Few Black mothers achieved EBF at 6 weeks, which contributed to disparity in BF duration. Greater attention to Black mother-infant pairs is a public health priority.

BACKGROUND: Coinciding with the COVID-19 pandemic, global influenza virus circulation decreased, possibly due to widespread community mitigation measures. Cambodia eased some COVID-19 mitigation measures in June and July 2020. On Aug 20th a cluster of respiratory illnesses among residents of a pagoda included persons that had tested positive for influenza A, and none that were positive for SARS-CoV-2. METHODS: On Aug 25, a response team deployed. Persons with influenza-like illness (ILI) were asked questions on demographics, illness, personal prevention measures, and residential arrangements. Respiratory swabs were tested for influenza and SARS-Cov-2 by RT-PCR; viruses were sequenced. Sentinel surveillance data were analyzed to assess recent trends in influenza circulation in the community. RESULTS: Influenza A(H3N2) viruses were identified in sentinel surveillance in Cambodia in July 2020, prior to the reported pagoda outbreak. Among the 362 pagoda residents, 73(20.2%) ILI cases were identified; 40 were tested with 33/40 (82.5%) confirmed positive for influenza A(H3N2). All 40 were negative for SARS-CoV-2. Among 73 residents with ILI, none were vaccinated against influenza, 47 (64%) clustered in 3 of 8 sleeping quarters; 20 (27%) reported often wearing a mask; 27 (36%) reported often washing hands; and 11 (15%) reported practicing social distancing. All viruses clustered within clade 3c2.A1 close to strains circulating in Australia in 2020. CONCLUSIONS: Circulation of influenza viruses began in the community following a relaxing of national COVID-19 mitigation measures, and prior to this outbreak in a pagoda with limited social distancing. Continued surveillance and influenza vaccination remain needed to limit the impact of influenza globally.

Recent pandemics and rapidly spreading outbreaks of infectious diseases have illustrated the interconnectedness of the world and the importance of improving the international community's ability to effectively respond. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), building on a strong foundation of lessons learned through previous emergencies, international recognition, and human and technical expertise, has aspired to support nations around the world to strengthen their public health emergency management (PHEM) capacity. PHEM principles streamline coordination and collaboration in responding to infectious disease outbreaks, which align with the core capacities outlined in the International Health Regulations 2005. CDC supports PHEM by providing in-country technical assistance, aiding the development of plans and procedures, and providing fellowship opportunities for public health emergency managers. To this end, CDC partners with US agencies, international partners, and multilateral organizations to support nations around the world to reduce illness and death from outbreaks of infectious diseases.

BACKGROUND: The ongoing West African Ebola epidemic began in December 2013 in Guinea, probably from a single zoonotic introduction. As a result of ineffective initial control efforts, an Ebola outbreak of unprecedented scale emerged. As of 4 May 2015, it had resulted in more than 19,000 probable and confirmed Ebola cases, mainly in Guinea (3,529), Liberia (5,343), and Sierra Leone (10,746). Here, we present analyses of data collected during the outbreak identifying drivers of transmission and highlighting areas where control could be improved. METHODS AND FINDINGS: Over 19,000 confirmed and probable Ebola cases were reported in West Africa by 4 May 2015. Individuals with confirmed or probable Ebola ("cases") were asked if they had exposure to other potential Ebola cases ("potential source contacts") in a funeral or non-funeral context prior to becoming ill. We performed retrospective analyses of a case line-list, collated from national databases of case investigation forms that have been reported to WHO. These analyses were initially performed to assist WHO's response during the epidemic, and have been updated for publication. We analysed data from 3,529 cases in Guinea, 5,343 in Liberia, and 10,746 in Sierra Leone; exposures were reported by 33% of cases. The proportion of cases reporting a funeral exposure decreased over time. We found a positive correlation (r = 0.35, p < 0.001) between this proportion in a given district for a given month and the within-district transmission intensity, quantified by the estimated reproduction number (R). We also found a negative correlation (r = -0.37, p < 0.001) between R and the district proportion of hospitalised cases admitted within ≤4 days of symptom onset. These two proportions were not correlated, suggesting that reduced funeral attendance and faster hospitalisation independently influenced local transmission intensity. We were able to identify 14% of potential source contacts as cases in the case line-list. Linking cases to the contacts who potentially infected them provided information on the transmission network. This revealed a high degree of heterogeneity in inferred transmissions, with only 20% of cases accounting for at least 73% of new infections, a phenomenon often called super-spreading. Multivariable regression models allowed us to identify predictors of being named as a potential source contact. These were similar for funeral and non-funeral contacts: severe symptoms, death, non-hospitalisation, older age, and travelling prior to symptom onset. Non-funeral exposures were strongly peaked around the death of the contact. There was evidence that hospitalisation reduced but did not eliminate onward exposures. We found that Ebola treatment units were better than other health care facilities at preventing exposure from hospitalised and deceased individuals. The principal limitation of our analysis is limited data quality, with cases not being entered into the database, cases not reporting exposures, or data being entered incorrectly (especially dates, and possible misclassifications). CONCLUSIONS: Achieving elimination of Ebola is challenging, partly because of super-spreading. Safe funeral practices and fast hospitalisation contributed to the containment of this Ebola epidemic. Continued real-time data capture, reporting, and analysis are vital to track transmission patterns, inform resource deployment, and thus hasten and maintain elimination of the virus from the human population.

Persons who died of Ebola virus disease at home in rural communities in Liberia and Guinea resulted in more secondary infections than persons admitted to Ebola treatment units. Intensified monitoring of contacts of persons who died of this disease in the community is an evidence-based approach to reduce virus transmission in rural communities.

CDC's response to the 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa was the largest in the agency's history and occurred in a geographic area where CDC had little operational presence. Approximately 1,450 CDC responders were deployed to Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone since the start of the response in July 2014 to the end of the response at the end of March 2016, including 455 persons with repeat deployments. The responses undertaken in each country shared some similarities but also required unique strategies specific to individual country needs. The size and duration of the response challenged CDC in several ways, particularly with regard to staffing. The lessons learned from this epidemic will strengthen CDC's ability to respond to future public health emergencies. These lessons include the importance of ongoing partnerships with ministries of health in resource-limited countries and regions, a cadre of trained CDC staff who are ready to be deployed, and development of ongoing working relationships with U.S. government agencies and other multilateral and nongovernment organizations that deploy for international public health emergencies. CDC's establishment of a Global Rapid Response Team in June 2015 is anticipated to meet some of these challenges. The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html).

BACKGROUND: Community-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and methicillin-sensitive S. aureus infections are common to south-western Alaska and have been associated with traditional steambaths. More than a decade ago, recommendations were made to affected communities that included preventive skin care, cleaning methods for steambath surfaces, and the use of protective barriers while in steambaths to reduce the risk of S. aureus infection. OBJECTIVE: A review of community medical data suggested that the number of skin infection clinical encounters has increased steadily over the last 3 years and we designed a public health investigation to seek root causes. STUDY DESIGN: Using a mixed methods approach with in-person surveys, a convenience sample (n=492) from 3 rural communities assessed the range of knowledge, attitudes and practices concerning skin infections, skin infection education messaging, prevention activities and home self-care of skin infections. RESULTS: We described barriers to implementing previous recommendations and evaluated the acceptability of potential interventions. Prior public health messages appear to have been effective in reaching community members and appear to have been understood and accepted. We found no major misconceptions regarding what a boil was or how someone got one. Overall, respondents seemed concerned about boils as a health problem and reported that they were motivated to prevent boils. We identified current practices used to avoid skin infections, such as the disinfection of steambaths. We also identified barriers to engaging in protective behaviours, such as lack of access to laundry facilities. CONCLUSIONS: These findings can be used to help guide public health strategic planning and identify appropriate evidence-based interventions tailored to the specific needs of the region.

The largest recorded Ebola virus disease epidemic began in March 2014; as of July 2015, it continued in 3 principally affected countries: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Control efforts include contact tracing to expedite identification of the virus in suspect case-patients. We examined contact tracing activities during September 20-December 31, 2014, in 2 prefectures of Guinea using national and local data about case-patients and their contacts. Results show less than one third of case-patients (28.3% and 31.1%) were registered as contacts before case identification; approximately two thirds (61.1% and 67.7%) had no registered contacts. Time to isolation of suspected case-patients was not immediate (median 5 and 3 days for Kindia and Faranah, respectively), and secondary attack rates varied by relationships of persons who had contact with the source case-patient and the type of case-patient to which a contact was exposed. More complete contact tracing efforts are needed to augment control of this epidemic.