This article summarizes what is currently known about the 2019 novel coronavirus and offers interim guidance.

Law enforcement officers (LEOs) often encounter rapidly changing and uncontrolled situations that expose them to various hazards. A law enforcement agency requested an evaluation by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) when multiple LEOs reported illness after executing a search warrant and taking a suspect into custody. NIOSH investigators interviewed LEOs and reviewed medical records, forensic laboratory results for collected evidence, and environmental testing results of samples taken after the operation. Two-thirds (25 of 38) of LEOs who participated in the operation reported 1 symptom. Eleven LEOs met a case definition for influenza-like illness (ILI). Members of one unit were more likely to have ILI than non-members (prevalence ratio (PR), 4.1; 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.3-13.0; p=0.01). Influenza vaccination was associated with a lower prevalence of ILI (PR, 0.2; 95% CI, 0.1-0.9; p =0.02). Preventing employees from working while ill and annual influenza vaccination might prevent similar occurrences.

Congregate work and residential locations are at increased risk for infectious disease transmission including respiratory illness outbreaks. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is primarily spread person to person through respiratory droplets. Nationwide, the meat and poultry processing industry, an essential component of the U.S. food infrastructure, employs approximately 500,000 persons, many of whom work in proximity to other workers (1). Because of reports of initial cases of COVID-19, in some meat processing facilities, states were asked to provide aggregated data concerning the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19 and the number of workers with COVID-19 in these facilities, including COVID-19-related deaths. Qualitative data gathered by CDC during on-site and remote assessments were analyzed and summarized. During April 9-27, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases among 115 meat or poultry processing facilities in 19 states were reported to CDC. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,913 (approximately 3%) workers, and 20 COVID-19-related deaths were reported. Facility barriers to effective prevention and control of COVID-19 included difficulty distancing workers at least 6 feet (2 meters) from one another (2) and in implementing COVID-19-specific disinfection guidelines.* Among workers, socioeconomic challenges might contribute to working while feeling ill, particularly if there are management practices such as bonuses that incentivize attendance. Methods to decrease transmission within the facility include worker symptom screening programs, policies to discourage working while experiencing symptoms compatible with COVID-19, and social distancing by workers. Source control measures (e.g., the use of cloth face covers) as well as increased disinfection of high-touch surfaces are also important means of preventing SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Mitigation efforts to reduce transmission in the community should also be considered. Many of these measures might also reduce asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission (3). Implementation of these public health strategies will help protect workers from COVID-19 in this industry and assist in preserving the critical meat and poultry production infrastructure (4).

Recent increases in the rate of drug overdose-related deaths, the emergence of potent opioids such as carfentanil, and media reports of incidents have raised concerns about the potential for work-related exposure to a variety of illicit drugs among law enforcement officers (LEOs), other emergency responders, and other workers in the United States. To characterize the risk associated with unintentional occupational exposure to drugs, we retrospectively investigated two incidents that occurred in 2017 and 2018 where LEOs were exposed to opioid and stimulant drugs and experienced health effects. We interviewed five affected LEOs and others. We reviewed records, including emergency department documentation, incident reports, forensic laboratory results, and when available, body camera footage. Multiple drug types, including opioids and nonopioids, were present at each incident. Potential routes of exposure varied among LEOs and were difficult to characterize with certainty. Health effects were not consistent with severe, life-threatening opioid toxicity, but temporarily precluded affected LEOs from performing their essential job duties. While health risks from occupational exposure to drugs during law enforcement activities cannot currently be fully characterized with certainty, steps to prevent such exposures should be implemented now. The creation and implementation of appropriate controls plus education and training are both important to protecting first responders from these hazardous agents. To more fully characterize potential exposures, timely prospective toxicological evaluation of affected responders is recommended.

Opioids have many beneficial uses in medicine, but, taken inappropriately, they can cause life-threatening health effects. The increasing use of physician-prescribed and illicit opioids, including highly potent fentanyl and its analogs, have contributed to a significant increase in opioid-related drug overdoses in the United States, leading to a public health emergency. There have been a number of reports describing adverse health effects experienced by police officers, fire-fighter emergency medical services providers, and private sector ambulance personnel when responding to drug overdose incidents. Several sets of exposure prevention recommendations for first responders are available from government and the private sector. Understanding the scientific basis for these recommendations, increasing awareness by responders of the potential risks associated with opioid exposure during a response, and educating responders about safe work practices when exposure to opioids is suspected or confirmed are all critical prevention measures that can keep first responders safe.

Toxicologists are often called upon to assist in environmental, industrial, occupational and public health assessments. Accordingly, medical toxicologists may find it prudent to be aware of applicable federal toxicological regulations and reporting requirements and of the roles of relevant federal agencies. These regulations are numerous, complex, and have evolved and expanded over time, making it difficult for toxicologists to sustain a current knowledge base. This article reviews the pertinent federal toxicological reporting requirements with regards to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Department of Transportation, and information about the National Response Center. We reference internet-based government resources and offer direct links to applicable websites in an attempt to offer rapid and current sources of practical information. The format of the article is a series of hypothetical scenarios followed by commentary. Discussions of the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act are beyond the scope of this paper. For those desiring a more in depth discussion of the relevant federal environmental laws and statutes, and applicable case law, the reader is directed to resources such as the Environmental Law Handbook, the websites of individual laws found at www.epa.gov and the decisions of individual courts of appeal. It is our hope that this article provides not only useful practical information for the practicing toxicologist, but also serves as a key reference for Medical Toxicology core content on environmental laws and regulations.

Toxicologists are often called upon to assist in environmental, industrial, occupational and public health assessments. Accordingly, medical toxicologists may find it prudent to be aware of applicable federal toxicological regulations and reporting requirements and of the roles of relevant federal agencies. These regulations are numerous, complex, and have evolved and expanded over time, making it difficult for toxicologists to sustain a current knowledge base. This article reviews the pertinent federal toxicological reporting requirements with regard to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Department of Transportation, and information about the National Response Center. We reference internet-based government resources and offer direct links to applicable websites in an attempt to offer rapid and current sources of practical information. The format of the article is a series of hypothetical scenarios followed by commentary. Discussions of the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act are beyond the scope of this paper. For those desiring a more in-depth discussion of the relevant federal environmental laws and statutes and applicable case law, the reader is directed to resources such as the Environmental Law Handbook, the websites of individual laws found at www.epa.gov and the decisions of individual courts of appeal. It is our hope that this article provides not only useful practical information for the practicing toxicologist but also serves as a key reference for medical toxicology core content on environmental laws and regulations.

We are aware of the controversy that Dr. Gold's report of trace levels of fentanyl and propofol in the air of surgical rooms has evoked.Citation1 , Citation2 , Citation3 , Citation4 Drug dependence among surgical and anesthesiology staff is a serious and complex issue, and we acknowledge the potential for generation of bioaerosol containing narcotics during surgery. Our study was an examination of room air during cardiovascular surgeries in a local hospital to quantify the level of “second hand” fentanyl,Citation 5 a similar setting to that previously reported.Citation 6 | Our findings are relevant to fentanyl only; we did not study or attempt to measure propofol. Our manuscript carefully detailed our sampling and analytical methodologies. We sampled an approximate 780-fold greater air volume and used instrumentation of equal sensitivity and better specificity to that reported by Dr. Gold. We are confident that if fentanyl-containing bioaerosol were present in the vicinity of the anesthesiology station at levels previously reported,Citation 5 we would have been able to quantify it.

In 2001, envelopes loaded with Bacillus anthracis spores were mailed to Senators Daschle and Leahy as well as to the New York Post and NBC News. Additional letters may have been mailed to other news agencies because there was confirmed anthrax infection of employees at these locations. These events heightened the awareness of the lack of understanding of the mechanism(s) by which objects contaminated with a biological agent might spread disease. This understanding is crucial for the estimatation of the potential for exposure to ensure the appropriate response in the event of future attacks. In this study, equipment was developed to simulate interactions between envelopes and procedures were developed to analyze the spread of spores from a "payload" envelope onto neighboring envelopes. Another process was developed to determine whether an aerosol could be generated by opening contaminated envelopes. Subsequent generations of contaminated envelopes originating from a single payload envelope showed a consistent two-log decrease in the number of spores transferred from one generation to the next. Opening a tertiary contaminated envelope resulted in an aerosol containing 10(3) B. anthracis spores. A procedure was developed for sampling contaminated letters by a non-destructive method aimed at providing information useful for consequence management while preserving the integrity of objects contaminated during the incident and preserving evidence for law enforcement agencies.

Second-hand exposure to aerosols containing fentanyl and other opiates during surgical procedures has been implicated as possibly contributing to maintenance of addiction among medical professionals, specifically anesthesiologists. This article outlines a pilot study that was conducted to verify a reported finding fentanyl in the air of operating suites. Environmental fentanyl air sampling and analysis methods were developed and evaluated for this study. Multiple sampling media and extraction solvents were evaluated for trace fentanyl air sampling. Non-specific binding losses were reduced by using silanized binder-free glass fiber sampling media with subsequent methanol extraction. Filtration air samples were then collected in surgical suites during the entire operation time from two cardiovascular surgical procedures. Both surgical procedures were conducted at the same hospital but on different days. Samples were extracted and analyzed by high-performance liquid chromatography/tandem mass spectrometry using a capillary high-performance liquid chromatography coupled to a quadrupole time-of-flight mass spectrometer. The total air volume collected per surgery was 290 to 300 L at a rate of 1 LPM giving an limit of quantification for fentanyl of 57 pg/m3 air (17 pg/filter). No fentanyl was detected in the air during cardiovascular surgical operations from either surgical suite.