Public health disease surveillance can guide a range of decisions related to the protection of populations. Economic analysis can be used to assess how surveillance for specific diseases can substitute for or complement other public health interventions and how to structure surveillance most efficiently. Assessing the value and costs of different disease surveillance options as part of broader disease prevention and control efforts is important for both using available resources efficiently to protect populations and communicating the need for additional resources as appropriate.

Efforts to control and eliminate measles and rubella are aided by high-quality surveillance data-supported by laboratory confirmation-to guide decision-making on routine immunization strategies and locations for conducting preventive supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) and outbreak response. Important developments in rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) for measles and rubella present new opportunities for the global measles and rubella surveillance program to greatly improve the ability to rapidly detect and respond to outbreaks. Here, we review the status of RDTs for measles and rubella Immunoglobulin M (IgM) testing, as well as ongoing questions and challenges regarding the operational use and deployment of RDTs as part of global measles and rubella surveillance. Efforts to develop IgM RDTs that can be produced at scale are underway. Once validated RDTs are available, clear information on the benefits, challenges, and costs of their implementation will be critical for shaping deployment guidance and informing country plans for sustainably deploying such tests. The wide availability of RDTs could provide new programmatic options for measles and rubella elimination efforts, potentially enabling improvements and flexibility for testing, surveillance, and vaccination.

BACKGROUND: To inform the introduction of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV) and rotavirus vaccine, the World Health Organization (WHO) established the Global Invasive Bacterial Vaccine-Preventable Disease Surveillance Network (GISN) and the Global Rotavirus Surveillance Network (GRSN) in 2008. We investigated whether participation in these networks or other surveillance was associated with vaccine introduction. METHODS: Between 2006 and 2018, among all WHO member states, we used multivariable models adjusting for economic status to assess (1) the association between surveillance for pneumococcal disease or rotavirus disease, including participation in GISN or GRSN and the introduction of the PCV or the rotavirus vaccine, respectively, and (2) the association between the rotavirus disease burden and the rotavirus vaccine introduction among 56 countries participating in GRSN from 2008 to 2018. RESULTS: Countries that participated in or conducted surveillance for invasive pneumococcal disease or rotavirus disease were 3.5 (95% confidence interval [CI], 1.7-7.1) and 4.2 (95% CI, 2.1-8.6) times more likely to introduce PCV or rotavirus respectively, compared to those without surveillance. Among countries participating in GRSN, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate an association between countries with higher rotavirus positivity and vaccine introduction. CONCLUSIONS: Surveillance should be incorporated into advocacy strategies to encourage the introduction of vaccines, with countries benefiting from data from, support for, and coordination of international disease surveillance networks.

Background: The introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) to the Philippines’ national immunization schedule meant the addition of a third injectable vaccine at a child's 14-week immunization visit. Although previous studies have shown that providing multiple vaccines at the same time affected neither the risk of severe adverse events nor vaccine efficacy, concerns were raised that providing three injections at a single visit, with two injections in one leg, might be unacceptable to health care providers (HCP) and infant caregivers. Methods: We conducted pre- and post-IPV introduction surveys on the acceptance and acceptability of the additional injectable vaccine in three of the Philippines’ 17 administrative regions. Regions 3 and 6 were included in the pre-introduction phase and Regions 3, 6 and 10 were included in the post-introduction phase. Thirty public health centers (PHCs) were randomly sampled from each region. HCPs and infant caregivers were interviewed. In addition, vaccination records from a minimum of 20 eligible children pre-introduction and 10 children post-introduction per PHC were reviewed. Results and discussion: We interviewed 89 HCPs and 286 infant caregivers during the pre-introduction phase and 137 HCPs and 455 caregivers during the post-introduction phase. Among 986 vaccination records reviewed post-introduction, 84% (n = 826) of children received all three recommended injections at one visit, with a range from 61% (209/342) in Region 10 to 100% (328/328) in Region 3. The proportion of HCPs reporting that they had administered three or more injectable vaccines and the proportion of caregivers that would be comfortable with their child receiving three or more injectable vaccines at one visit increased from pre- to post-introduction (p < 0.0001 for both). Eighty-seven percent of HCPs that had administered three or more injectable vaccines post-introduction reported being comfortable or very comfortable with the number of vaccines they had administered.

Clinical Trials Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov [NCT02378753] and Pan African Clinical Trials Registry [PACTR201502001037220].

BACKGROUND: Oral polio vaccine (OPV) containing attenuated serotype 2 polioviruses was globally withdrawn in 2016, and bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing attenuated serotype 1 and 3 polioviruses needs to be withdrawn after the certification of eradication of all wild polioviruses to eliminate future risks from vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). To minimize risks from VDPVs, the planning and implementation of bOPV withdrawal should build on the experience with withdrawing OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses while taking into account similarities and differences between the three poliovirus serotypes. METHODS: We explored the risks from (i) a failure to synchronize OPV cessation and (ii) unauthorized post-cessation OPV use for serotypes 1 and 3 in the context of globally-coordinated future bOPV cessation and compared the results to similar analyses for serotype 2 OPV cessation. RESULTS: While the risks associated with a failure to synchronize cessation and unauthorized post-cessation OPV use appear to be substantially lower for serotype 3 polioviruses than for serotype 2 polioviruses, the risks for serotype 1 appear similar to those for serotype 2. Increasing population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus transmission using pre-cessation bOPV supplemental immunization activities and inactivated poliovirus vaccine in routine immunization reduces the risks of circulating VDPVs associated with non-synchronized cessation or unauthorized OPV use. CONCLUSIONS: The Global Polio Eradication Initiative should synchronize global bOPV cessation during a similar window of time as occurred for the global cessation of OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses and should rigorously verify the absence of bOPV in immunization systems after its cessation.

Due to security, access, and programmatic challenges in areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, both countries continue to sustain indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission and threaten the success of global polio eradication and oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation. We fitted an existing differential-equation-based poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to Pakistan and Afghanistan using four subpopulations to characterize the well-vaccinated and undervaccinated subpopulations in each country. We explored retrospective and prospective scenarios for using inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in routine immunization or supplemental immunization activities (SIAs). The undervaccinated subpopulations sustain the circulation of serotype 1 WPV and serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus. We find a moderate impact of past IPV use on polio incidence and population immunity to transmission mainly due to (1) the boosting effect of IPV for individuals with preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection and (2) the effect of IPV-only on oropharyngeal transmission for individuals without preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection. Future IPV use may similarly yield moderate benefits, particularly if access to undervaccinated subpopulations dramatically improves. However, OPV provides a much greater impact on transmission and the incremental benefit of IPV in addition to OPV remains limited. This study suggests that despite the moderate effect of using IPV in SIAs, using OPV in SIAs remains the most effective means to stop transmission, while limited IPV resources should prioritize IPV use in routine immunization.

Introduction: In 2010, the Global Vaccine Action Plan called on all countries to reach and sustain 90% national coverage and 80% coverage in all districts for the third dose of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine (DTP3) by 2015 and for all vaccines in national immunization schedules by 2020. The aims of this study are to analyze recent trends in national vaccination coverage in the World Health Organization African Region andto assess how these trends differ by country income category. Methods: We compared national vaccination coverage estimates for DTP3 and the first dose of measles-containing vaccine (MCV) obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO)/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) joint estimates of national immunization coverage for all African Region countries. Using United Nations (UN) population estimates of surviving infants and country income category for the corresponding year, we calculated population-weighted average vaccination coverage by country income category (i.e., low, lower middle, and upper middle-income) for the years 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015. Results: DTP3 coverage in the African Region increased from 52% in 2000 to 76% in 2015,and MCV1 coverage increased from 53% to 74% during the same period, but with considerable differences among countries. Thirty-six African Region countries were low income in 2000 with an average DTP3 coverage of 50% while 26 were low income in 2015 with an average coverage of 80%. Five countries were lower middle-income in 2000 with an average DTP3 coverage of 84% while 12 were lower middle-income in 2015 with an average coverage of 69%. Five countries were upper middle-income in 2000 with an average DTP3 coverage of 73% and eight were upper middle-income in 2015 with an average coverage of 76%. Conclusion: Disparities in vaccination coverage by country persist in the African Region, with countries that were lower middle-income having the lowest coverage on average in 2015. Monitoring and addressing these disparities is essential for meeting global immunization targets.

In 2015, the Global Commission for the Certification of Polio Eradication certified the eradication of type 2 wild poliovirus, 1 of 3 wild poliovirus serotypes causing paralytic polio since the beginning of recorded history. This milestone was one of the key criteria prompting the Global Polio Eradication Initiative to begin withdrawal of oral polio vaccines (OPV), beginning with the type 2 component (OPV2), through a globally synchronized initiative in April and May 2016 that called for all OPV using countries and territories to simultaneously switch from use of trivalent OPV (tOPV; containing types 1, 2, and 3 poliovirus) to bivalent OPV (bOPV; containing types 1 and 3 poliovirus), thus withdrawing OPV2. Before the switch, immunization programs globally had been using approximately 2 billion tOPV doses per year to immunize hundreds of millions of children. Thus, the globally synchronized withdrawal of tOPV was an unprecedented achievement in immunization and was part of a crucial strategy for containment of polioviruses. Successful implementation of the switch called for intense global coordination during 2015-2016 on an unprecedented scale among global public health technical agencies and donors, vaccine manufacturers, regulatory agencies, World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) regional offices, and national governments. Priority activities included cessation of tOPV production and shipment, national inventories of tOPV, detailed forecasting of tOPV needs, bOPV licensing, scaling up of bOPV production and procurement, developing national operational switch plans, securing funding, establishing oversight and implementation committees and teams, training logisticians and health workers, fostering advocacy and communications, establishing monitoring and validation structures, and implementing waste management strategies. The WHO received confirmation that, by mid May 2016, all 155 countries and territories that had used OPV in 2015 had successfully withdrawn OPV2 by ceasing use of tOPV in their national immunization programs. This article provides an overview of the global efforts and challenges in successfully implementing this unprecedented global initiative, including (1) coordination and tracking of key global planning milestones, (2) guidance facilitating development of country specific plans, (3) challenges for planning and implementing the switch at the global level, and (4) best practices and lessons learned in meeting aggressive switch timelines. Lessons from this monumental public health achievement by countries and partners will likely be drawn upon when bOPV is withdrawn after polio eradication but also could be relevant for other global health initiatives with similarly complex mandates and accelerated timelines.

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative has reduced the global incidence of polio by 99% and the number of countries with endemic polio from 125 to 3 countries. The Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 (Endgame Plan) was developed to end polio disease. Key elements of the endgame plan include strengthening immunization systems using polio assets, introducing inactivated polio vaccine (IPV), and replacing trivalent oral polio vaccine with bivalent oral polio vaccine ("the switch"). Although coverage in the Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMR) with the third dose of a vaccine containing diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis antigens (DTP3) was >=90% in 14 countries in 2015, DTP3 coverage in EMR dropped from 86% in 2010 to 80% in 2015 due to civil disorder in multiple countries. To strengthen their immunization systems, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Somalia developed draft plans to integrate Polio Eradication Initiative assets, staff, structure, and activities with their Expanded Programmes on Immunization, particularly in high-risk districts and regions. Between 2014 and 2016, 11 EMR countries introduced IPV in their routine immunization program, including all of the countries at highest risk for polio transmission (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen). As a result, by the end of 2016 all EMR countries were using IPV except Egypt, where introduction of IPV was delayed by a global shortage. The switch was successfully implemented in EMR due to the motivation, engagement, and cooperation of immunization staff and decision makers across all national levels. Moreover, the switch succeeded because of the ability of even the immunization systems operating under hardship conditions of conflict to absorb the switch activities.

Background. Albania introduced inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) into its immunization system in May 2014, increasing the maximum recommended number of injectable vaccines given in a single visit from 2 to 3. Methods. Health-care providers and caregivers were interviewed at 42 health facilities in Albania to assess knowledge, attitudes, and practices regarding injectable vaccine administration. Immunization register data were abstracted from December 2014 to July 2015 at the same facilities to explore the number of injectable vaccines children received during their 2- and 4-month visits. Results. The majority of children (87%) identified in the record review at either their 2- or 4-month immunization visit received all 3 injectable vaccines in a single visit. Almost all children who did not receive the vaccines in a single visit were subsequently fully immunized, most within a 2-week period. Over half of caregivers whose children got 3 or more injectable vaccines in a single visit reported being only comfortable with 1 or 2 injectable vaccines in a single visit. Conclusions. Despite most caregivers expressing hesitation regarding children receiving multiple injectable vaccines in a single visit, most children received vaccines according to the recommended schedule. Almost all children eventually received all recommended vaccines.

Background. In 2013, the World Health Organization's (WHO's) Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) recommended that all 126 countries using only oral polio vaccine (OPV) introduce at least 1 dose of inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) into their routine immunization schedules by the end of 2015. In many countries, the addition of IPV would necessitate delivery of multiple injectable vaccines (hereafter, "multiple injections") during a single visit, with infants receiving IPV alongside pentavalent vaccine (which covers diphtheria, tetanus, and whole-cell pertussis; hepatitis B; and Haemophilus influenzae type b) and pneumococcal vaccine. Unanticipated concerns emerged from countries over acceptability of multiple injections, sites of administration, and safety. We contextualized the issues surrounding multiple injections by documenting concerns associated with administration of >=3 injections, existing evidence in the published literature, and findings of a systematic review on administration practices and techniques. Methods. Concerns associated with multiple-injection visits were documented from meetings and personal communications with immunization program managers. Published literature on the acceptability of multiple injections by providers and caregivers was summarized, and a systematic review of the literature on administration practices was completed on the following topics: spacing between injection sites (ie, vaccine spacing), site of injection, route of injection, and procedural preparedness. WHO and United Nations Children's Fund data from 2013-2015 were used to assess multiple-injection visits included in national immunization schedules. Results. Healthcare provider and caregiver attitudes and practices indicated concerns about infant pain, potential adverse effects, and uncertainty about vaccine effectiveness with multiple-injection visits. Published literature reinforced the record of safety and acceptance of the recommended schedule of IPV by the SAGE, but the evidence was largely from developed countries. Parental acceptance of multiple injections was associated with a positive provider recommendation to the caregiver. Findings of the systematic review identified that the intramuscular route is preferred over the subcutaneous route for vaccine administration and that the vastus lateralis muscle is preferred over the deltoid muscle for intramuscular injections. Recommendations on vaccine spacing and procedural preparedness were based on practical necessities, but comparative evidence was not identified. During 2013-2015, 85 countries added IPV to their immunization schedules, 46 (55%) of which adopted a schedule resulting in 3 injectable vaccines being administered in a single visit. Conclusion. The multiple-injection experience identified gaps in guidance for future vaccine introductions. Global partner organizations quickly mobilized to assess, document, and communicate the existing global experience on multiple-injection visits. This evidence-based approach provided reassurance to opinion leaders, health workers, and professional societies, thus encouraging uptake of IPV as a second or third injection in an accelerated manner globally.

Background. Introduction of inactivated polio vaccine creates challenges in maintaining the cold chain for vaccine storage and distribution. Methods. We evaluated the cold chain in 23 health facilities and 36 outreach vaccination sessions in 8 districts and cities of Bangladesh, using purposive sampling during August-October 2015. We interviewed immunization and cold-chain staff, assessed equipment, and recorded temperatures during vaccine storage and transportation. Results. All health facilities had functioning refrigerators, and 96% had freezers. Temperature monitors were observed in all refrigerators and freezers but in only 14 of 66 vaccine transporters (21%). Recorders detected temperatures >8degreeC for >60 minutes in 5 of 23 refrigerators (22%), 3 of 6 cold boxes (50%) transporting vaccines from national to subnational depots, and 8 of 48 vaccine carriers (17%) used in outreach vaccination sites. Temperatures <2degreeC were detected in 4 of 19 cold boxes (21%) transporting vaccine from subnational depots to health facilities and 14 of 48 vaccine carriers (29%). Conclusions. Bangladesh has substantial cold-chain storage and transportation capacity after inactivated polio vaccine introduction, but temperature fluctuations during vaccine transport could cause vaccine potency loss that could go undetected. Bangladesh and other countries should strive to ensure consistent and sufficient cold-chain storage and monitor the cold chain during vaccine transportation at all levels.

Eliminating the risk of polio from vaccine-derived polioviruses is essential for creating a polio-free world, and eliminating that risk will require stopping use of all oral polio vaccines (OPVs) once all types of wild polioviruses have been eradicated. In many ways, the experience with the global switch from trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) can inform the eventual full global withdrawal of OPV. Significant preparation will be needed for a thorough, synchronized, and full withdrawal of OPV, and such preparation would be aided by setting a reasonably firm date for OPV withdrawal as far in advance as possible, ideally at least 24 months. A shorter lead time would provide valuable flexibility for decisions about when to stop use of OPV in the context of uncertainty about whether or not all types of wild polioviruses had been eradicated, but it might increase the cost of OPV withdrawal.

Until recently, waste management for national immunization programs was limited to sharps waste, empty vaccine vials, or vaccines that had expired or were no longer usable. However, because wild-type 2 poliovirus has been eradicated, the World Health Organization's (WHO's) Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization deemed that all countries must simultaneously cease use of the type 2 oral polio vaccine and recommended that all countries and territories using oral polio vaccine (OPV) "switch" from trivalent OPV (tOPV; types 1, 2, and 3 polioviruses) to bivalent OPV (bOPV; types 1 and 3 polioviruses) during a 2-week period in April 2016. Use of tOPV after the switch would risk outbreaks of paralysis related to type 2-circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2). To minimize risk of vaccine-derived polio countries using OPV were asked to dispose of all usable, unexpired tOPV after the switch to bOPV. In this paper, we review the rationale for tOPV disposal and describe the global guidelines provided to countries for the safe and appropriate disposal of tOPV. These guidelines gave countries flexibility in implementing this important task within the confines of their national regulations, capacities, and resources. Steps for appropriate disposal of tOPV included removal of all tOPV vials from the cold chain, placement in appropriate bags or containers, and disposal using a recommended approach (ie, autoclaving, boiling, chemical inactivation, incineration, or encapsulation) followed by burial or transportation to a designated waste facility. This experience with disposal of tOPV highlights the adaptability of national immunization programs to new procedures, and identifies gaps in waste management policies and strategies with regard to disposal of unused vaccines. The experience also provides a framework for future policies and for developing programmatic guidance for the ultimate disposal of all OPV after the eradication of polio.

Background. We present an empirical economic cost analysis of the April 2016 switch from trivalent (tOPV) to bivalent (bOPV) oral polio vaccine at the national-level and 3 provinces (Bali, West Sumatera and Nusa Tenggara) for Indonesia's Expanded Program on Immunization. Methods. Data on the quantity and prices of resources used in the 4 World Health Organization guideline phases of the switch were collected at the national-level and in each of the sampled provinces, cities/districts, and health facilities. Costs were calculated as the sum of the value of resources reportedly used in each sampled unit by switch phase. Results. Estimated national-level costs were $46 791. Costs by health system level varied from $9062 to $34 256 at the province-level, from $4576 to $11 936 at the district-level, and from $3488 to $29 175 at the city-level. Estimated national costs ranged from $4 076 446 (Bali, minimum cost scenario) to $28 120 700 (West Sumatera, maximum cost scenario). Conclusions. Our findings suggest that the majority of tPOV to bOPV switch costs were borne at the subnational level. Considerable variation in reported costs among health system levels surveyed indicates a need for flexibility in budgeting for globally synchronized public health activities.

The Immunization Systems Management Group (IMG) was established as a time-limited entity, responsible for the management and coordination of Objective 2 of the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan. This objective called for the introduction of at least 1 dose of inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) into the routine immunization programs of all countries using oral polio vaccine (OPV) only. Despite global vaccine shortages, which limited countries' abilities to access IPV in a timely manner, 105 of 126 countries using OPV only introduced IPV within a 2.5-year period, making it the fastest rollout of a new vaccine in history. This achievement can be attributed to several factors, including the coordination work of the IMG; high-level engagement and advocacy across partners; the strong foundations of the Expanded Programme on Immunization at all levels; Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance's vaccine introduction experiences and mechanisms; innovative approaches; and proactive communications. In many ways, the IMG's work on IPV introduction can serve as a model for other vaccine introductions, especially in an accelerated context.

Background We assessed programmatic adaptations and infants' uptake of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) after its introduction into the routine immunization schedule in Bangladesh. Methods Using convenience and probability sampling, we selected 23 health facilities, 36 vaccinators, and 336 caregivers, within 5 districts and 3 city corporations. We collected data during August-October 2015 by conducting interviews, reviewing vaccination records, and observing activities. Results Knowledge about IPV was high among vaccinators (94%). No problems with IPV storage, transport, or waste disposal were detected, but shortages were reported in 20 health facilities (87%). Wastage per 5-dose vaccine vial was above the recommended 30% in 20 health facilities (87%); all were related to providing <5 doses per open vial. Among eligible infants, 87% and 86% received the third dose of pentavalent and oral poliovirus vaccine, respectively, but only 65% received IPV at the same visit. Among 73 infants not vaccinated with IPV, 58% of caregivers reported that vaccine was unavailable. Conclusions Bangladesh successfully introduced IPV, but shortages related to insufficient global supply and high vaccine wastage in small outreach immunization sessions might reduce its impact on population immunity. Minimizing wastage and use of a 2-dose fractional-IPV schedule could extend IPV immunization to more children.

The phased withdrawal of oral polio vaccine (OPV) associated with the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 began with the synchronized global replacement of trivalent OPV (tOPV) with bivalent OPV (bOPV) during April - May 2016, a transition referred to as the "switch." The World Health Organization's (WHO) Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Immunization recommended conducting this synchronized switch in all 155 OPV-using countries and territories (which collectively administered several hundred million doses of tOPV each year via several hundred thousand facilities) to reduce risks of re-emergence of vaccine-derived polioviruses. Safe execution of this switch required implementation of an associated independent monitoring strategy, the primary objective of which was verification that tOPV was no longer available for administration post-switch. This strategy had to be both practical and rigorous such that tOPV withdrawal could be reasonably employed and confirmed in all countries and territories within a discreet timeframe. Following these principles, WHO recommended that designated monitors in each of the 155 countries and territories visit all vaccine stores as well as a 10% sample of highest-risk health facilities within two weeks of the national switch date, removing any tOPV vials found. National governments were required to provide the WHO with formal validation of execution and monitoring of the switch. In practice, all countries reported cessation of tOPV by 12 May 2016 and 95% of countries and territories submitted detailed monitoring data to WHO. According to these data, 272 out of 276 (99%) national stores, 3,741 out of 3.968 (94%) regional stores, 16,144 out of 22,372 (72%) district level stores, and 143,050 out of 595,401 (24%) of health facilities were monitored. These data, along with field reports suggest that monitoring and validation of the switch was efficient and effective, and that the strategies used during the process could be adapted to future stages of OPV withdrawal.

The World Health Organization (WHO) Western Pacific Region (WPR) has maintained its polio-free status since 2000. The emergence of vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs), however, remains a risk, as oral polio vaccine (OPV) is still used in many of the region's countries, and pockets of unimmunized or underimmunized children exist in some countries. From 2014 to 2016, the region participated in the globally coordinated efforts to introduce inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) into all countries that did not yet include it in their national immunization schedules, and to "switch" from trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) in all countries still using OPV in 2016. As of September 2016, 15 of 17 countries and areas that did not use IPV by the end of 2014 had introduced IPV. Introduction in the remaining 2 countries has been delayed because of the global shortage of IPV, making it unavailable to select lower-risk countries until the fourth quarter of 2017. All 16 countries using OPV as of 2016 successfully withdrew tOPV during the globally synchronized switch from April to May 2016, and 15 of 16 countries introduced bOPV at the same time, with the remaining country introducing it within 30 days. While countries were primarily responsible for self-funding these activities, additional support was provided. The main challenges encountered in the Western Pacific Region with both IPV introduction and the tOPV-bOPV switch were related to overcoming regulatory policies and challenges with vaccine procurement. As a result, substantial lead time was needed to resolve procurement and regulatory issues before the introductions of IPV and bOPV. As the global community prepares for the full removal of all OPV from immunization programs, this need for lead time and consideration of the impact on national policies should be considered.

The global switch from trivalent oral polio vaccine (tOPV) to bivalent oral polio vaccine (bOPV) ("the switch") presented an unprecedented challenge to countries. In order to mitigate the risks associated with country-level delays in implementing the switch, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative provided catalytic financial support to specific countries for operational costs unique to the switch. Between November 2015 and February 2016, a total of approximately US$19.4 million in financial support was provided to 67 countries. On average, country budgets allocated 20% to human resources, 23% to trainings and meetings, 8% to communications and advocacy, 9% to logistics, 15% to monitoring, and 5% to waste management. All 67 funded countries successfully switched from tOPV to bOPV during April-May 2016. This funding provided target countries with the necessary catalytic support to facilitate the execution of the switch on an accelerated timeline, and the mechanism offers a model for similar support to future global health efforts, such as the eventual global withdrawal of bOPV.

PROBLEM: Many countries have weak disease surveillance and immunization systems. The elimination of polio creates an opportunity to use staff and assets from the polio eradication programme to control other vaccine-preventable diseases and improve disease surveillance and immunization systems. APPROACH: In 2003, the active surveillance system of Nepal's polio eradication programme began to report on measles and neonatal tetanus cases. Japanese encephalitis and rubella cases were added to the surveillance system in 2004. Staff from the programme aided the development and implementation of government immunization policies, helped launch vaccination campaigns, and trained government staff in reporting practices and vaccine management. LOCAL SETTING: Nepal eliminated indigenous polio in 2000, and controlled outbreaks caused by polio importations between 2005 and 2010. RELEVANT CHANGES: In 2014, the surveillance activities had expanded to 299 sites, with active surveillance for measles, rubella and neonatal tetanus, including weekly visits from 15 surveillance medical officers. Sentinel surveillance for Japanese encephalitis consisted of 132 sites. Since 2002, staff from the eradication programme have helped to introduce six new vaccines and helped to secure funding from Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. Staff have also assisted in responding to other health events in the country. LESSON LEARNT: By expanding the activities of its polio eradication programme, Nepal has improved its surveillance and immunization systems and increased vaccination coverage of other vaccine-preventable diseases. Continued donor support, a close collaboration with the Expanded Programme on Immunization, and the retention of the polio eradication programme's skilled workforce were important for this expansion.

During September 2–October 4, 2016, four sewage samples collected during August 3–September 19 (Hyderabad, Telangana State, India) and one sewage sample collected on August 30 (Ahmedabad, Gujarat State, India) tested positive for Sabin-like type 2 polioviruses. These polioviruses were detected approximately 4 months after April 25, 2016, when India officially ceased use of trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV), containing Sabin attenuated types 1, 2, and 3 polioviruses, and switched to bivalent OPV (bOPV), containing Sabin attenuated types 1 and 3 polioviruses (1). | Detection of Sabin-like type 2 poliovirus approximately 4 months after the switch from tOPV to bOPV suggested that tOPV use might have continued after it was supposed to stop globally, creating a risk for emergence of new type 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPV2s), which can cause paralysis. Genetic sequencing of the 903-nucleotide VP1 region of the isolated viruses showed zero, one, two, and four nucleotide changes in the four Hyderabad isolates and one nucleotide change in the Ahmedabad isolate, compared with the type 2 polioviruses in tOPV. These findings indicated that the isolated polioviruses had not replicated sufficiently to accumulate more than a few mutations on a potential pathway to becoming VDPV2s, and that the tOPV they originated from had likely been used during the preceding 4 months. | In accordance with global guidelines for responding to poliovirus events (2), detailed investigations were initiated within 48 hours of detection of the type 2 poliovirus in Hyderabad and the neighboring Rangareddy district, and in Ahmedabad (Box). As part of global poliovirus containment efforts (3), laboratories in those areas potentially storing type 2 polioviruses had previously been found to not have such polioviruses, so they were not searched. Telangana and Gujarat state officials met with immunization program stakeholders in the affected districts and other districts in their states regarding the need to reconfirm withdrawal of all tOPV.

OBJECTIVE: To examine the impact of different bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) supplemental immunization activity (SIA) strategies on population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus transmission and circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) risks before and after globally-coordinated cessation of serotype 1 and 3 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV13 cessation). METHODS: We adapt mathematical models that previously informed vaccine choices ahead of the trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine to bOPV switch to estimate the population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus transmission needed at the time of OPV13 cessation to prevent subsequent cVDPV outbreaks. We then examine the impact of different frequencies of SIAs using bOPV in high risk populations on population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 transmission, on the risk of serotype 1 and 3 cVDPV outbreaks, and on the vulnerability to any imported bOPV-related polioviruses. RESULTS: Maintaining high population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 transmission using bOPV SIAs significantly reduces 1) the risk of outbreaks due to imported serotype 1 and 3 viruses, 2) the emergence of indigenous cVDPVs before or after OPV13 cessation, and 3) the vulnerability to bOPV-related polioviruses in the event of non-synchronous OPV13 cessation or inadvertent bOPV use after OPV13 cessation. CONCLUSION: Although some reduction in global SIA frequency can safely occur, countries with suboptimal routine immunization coverage should each continue to conduct at least one annual SIA with bOPV, preferably more, until global OPV13 cessation. Preventing cVDPV risks after OPV13 cessation requires investments in bOPV SIAs now through the time of OPV13 cessation.

In 1974, the World Health Organization (WHO) established the Expanded Program on Immunization* to provide protection against six vaccine-preventable diseases through routine infant immunization (1). Based on 2015 WHO and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimates, global coverage with the third dose of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine (DTP3), the first dose of measles-containing vaccine (MCV1) and the third dose of polio vaccine (Pol3) has remained stable (84%-86%) since 2010. From 2014 to 2015, estimated global coverage with the second MCV dose (MCV2) increased from 39% to 43% by the end of the second year of life and from 58% to 61% when older age groups were included. Global coverage was higher in 2015 than 2010 for newer or underused vaccines, including rotavirus vaccine, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV), rubella vaccine, Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) vaccine, and 3 doses of hepatitis B (HepB3) vaccine. Coverage estimates varied widely by WHO Region, country, and district; in addition, for the vaccines evaluated (MCV, DTP3, Pol3, HepB3, Hib3), wide disparities were found in coverage by country income classification. Improvements in equity of access are necessary to reach and sustain higher coverage and increase protection from vaccine-preventable diseases for all persons.

BACKGROUND: As the World Health Organization (WHO) currently recommends that children be protected against 11 different pathogens, it is becoming increasingly necessary to administer multiple injectable vaccines during a single immunization visit. In this study we assess Gambian healthcare providers' and infant caregivers' attitudes and practices related to the administration of multiple injectable vaccines to a child at a single immunization visit before and after the 2015 introduction of inactivated polio vaccine (IPV). IPV introduction increased the number of injectable vaccines recommended for the 4-month immunization visit from two to three in The Gambia. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional questionnaire-based survey before and after the introduction of IPV at 4months of age in a representative sample of all health facilities providing immunizations in The Gambia. Healthcare providers who administer vaccines at the selected health facilities and caregivers who brought infants for their 4month immunization visit were surveyed. FINDINGS: Prior to IPV introduction, 9.9% of healthcare providers and 35.7% of infant caregivers expressed concern about a child receiving more than 2 injections in a single visit. Nevertheless, 98.8% and 90.9% of infants received all required vaccinations for the visit before and after IPV introduction, respectively. The only reason why vaccines were not received was vaccine stock-outs. Infant caregivers generally agreed that vaccinators could be trusted to provide accurate information regarding the number of vaccines that a child needed. CONCLUSION: Healthcare providers and infant caregivers in this resource limited setting accepted an increase in the number of injectable vaccines administered at a single visit even though some expressed concerns about the increase.

Background. A Legionnaires' disease (LD) outbreak at a resort on Cozumel Island in Mexico was investigated by a joint Mexico-United States team in 2010. This is the first reported LD outbreak in Mexico, where LD is not a reportable disease. Methods. Reports of LD among travelers were solicited from US health departments and the European Working Group for Legionella Infections. Records from the resort and Cozumel Island health facilities were searched for possible LD cases. In April 2010, the resort was searched for possible Legionella exposure sources. The temperature and total chlorine of the water at 38 sites in the resort were measured, and samples from those sites were tested for Legionella. Results. Nine travelers became ill with laboratory-confirmed LD within 2 weeks of staying at the resort between May 2008 and April 2010. The resort and its potable water system were the only common exposures. No possible LD cases were identified among resort workers. Legionellae were found to have extensively colonized the resort's potable water system. Legionellae matching a case isolate were found in the resort's potable water system. Conclusions. Medical providers should test for LD when treating community-acquired pneumonia that is severe or affecting patients who traveled in the 2 weeks before the onset of symptoms. When an LD outbreak is detected, the source should be identified and then aggressively remediated. Because LD can occur in tropical and temperate areas, all countries should consider making LD a reportable disease if they have not already done so.

Since the 1988 World Health Assembly resolution to eradicate poliomyelitis, transmission of the three types of wild poliovirus (WPV) has been sharply reduced. WPV type 2 (WPV2) has not been detected since 1999 and was declared eradicated in September 2015. Because WPV type 3 has not been detected since November 2012, WPV type 1 (WPV1) is likely the only WPV that remains in circulation. This marked progress has been achieved through widespread use of oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs), most commonly trivalent OPV (tOPV), which contains types 1, 2, and 3 live, attenuated polioviruses and has been a mainstay of efforts to prevent polio since the early 1960s. However, attenuated polioviruses in OPV can undergo genetic changes during replication, and in communities with low vaccination coverage, can result in vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) that can cause paralytic polio indistinguishable from the disease caused by WPVs. Among the 721 polio cases caused by circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs*) detected during January 2006-May 2016, type 2 cVDPVs (cVDPV2s) accounted for >94%. Eliminating the risk for polio caused by VDPVs will require stopping all OPV use. The first stage of OPV withdrawal involved a global, synchronized replacement of tOPV with bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing only types 1 and 3 attenuated polioviruses, planned for April 18-May 1, 2016, thereby withdrawing OPV type 2 from all immunization activities. Complementing the switch from tOPV to bOPV, introduction of at least 1 dose of injectable, trivalent inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) into childhood immunization schedules reduces risks from and facilitates responses to cVDPV2 outbreaks. All 155 countries and territories that were still using OPV in immunization schedules in 2015 have reported that they had ceased use of tOPV by mid-May 2016. As of August 31, 2016, 173 (89%) of 194 World Health Organization (WHO) countries included IPV in their immunization schedules. The cessation of tOPV use is a major milestone toward the global goal of eradicating polio; however, careful surveillance for polioviruses and prompt, aggressive responses to polio outbreaks are still needed to realize a polio-free world.

BACKGROUND: The endgame for polio eradication includes coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), starting with the cessation of vaccine containing OPV serotype 2 (OPV2) by switching all trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV). The logistics associated with this global switch represent a significant undertaking, with some possibility of inadvertent tOPV use after the switch. METHODS: We used a previously developed poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to explore the relationships between the extent of inadvertent tOPV use, the time after the switch of the inadvertent tOPV use and corresponding population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission, and the ability of the inadvertently introduced viruses to cause a serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreak in a hypothetical population. We then estimated the minimum time until inadvertent tOPV use in a supplemental immunization activity (SIA) or in routine immunization (RI) can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak in realistic populations with properties like those of northern India, northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, northern Nigeria, and Ukraine. RESULTS: At low levels of inadvertent tOPV use, the minimum time after the switch for the inadvertent use to cause a cVDPV2 outbreak decreases sharply with increasing proportions of children inadvertently receiving tOPV. The minimum times until inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA or in RI can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak varies widely among populations, with higher basic reproduction numbers, lower tOPV-induced population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission prior to the switch, and a lower proportion of transmission occurring via the oropharyngeal route all resulting in shorter times. In populations with the lowest expected immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission after the switch, inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if it occurs as soon as 9 months after the switch with 0.5 % of children aged 0-4 years inadvertently receiving tOPV, and as short as 6 months after the switch with 10-20 % of children aged 0-1 years inadvertently receiving tOPV. In the same populations, inadvertent tOPV use in RI leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if 0.5 % of OPV RI doses given use tOPV instead of bOPV for at least 20 months after the switch, with the minimum length of use dropping to at least 9 months if inadvertent tOPV use occurs in 50 % of OPV RI doses. CONCLUSIONS: Efforts to ensure timely and complete tOPV withdrawal at all levels, particularly from locations storing large amounts of tOPV, will help minimize risks associated with the tOPV-bOPV switch. Under-vaccinated populations with poor hygiene become at risk of a cVDPV2 outbreak in the event of inadvertent tOPV use the soonest after the tOPV-bOPV switch and therefore should represent priority areas to ensure tOPV withdrawal from all OPV stocks.

BACKGROUND: The endgame for polio eradication involves coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) with cessation of serotype 2 OPV (OPV2 cessation) implemented in late April and early May 2016 and cessation of serotypes 1 and 3 OPV (OPV13 cessation) currently planned for after 2018. The logistics associated with globally switching all use of trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) represent a significant undertaking, which may cause some complications, including delays that lead to different timing of the switch across shared borders. METHODS: Building on an integrated global model for long-term poliovirus risk management, we consider the expected vulnerability of different populations to transmission of OPV2-related polioviruses as a function of time following the switch. We explore the relationship between the net reproduction number (Rn) of OPV2 at the time of the switch and the time until OPV2-related viruses imported from countries still using OPV2 can establish transmission. We also analyze some specific situations modeled after populations at high potential risk of circulating serotype 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreaks in the event of a non-synchronous switch. RESULTS: Well-implemented tOPV immunization activities prior to the tOPV to bOPV switch (i.e., tOPV intensification sufficient to prevent the creation of indigenous cVDPV2 outbreaks) lead to sufficient population immunity to transmission to cause die-out of any imported OPV2-related viruses for over 6 months after the switch in all populations in the global model. Higher Rn of OPV2 at the time of the switch reduces the time until imported OPV2-related viruses can establish transmission and increases the time during which indigenous OPV2-related viruses circulate. Modeling specific connected populations suggests a relatively low vulnerability to importations of OPV2-related viruses that could establish transmission in the context of a non-synchronous switch from tOPV to bOPV, unless the gap between switch times becomes very long (>6 months) or a high risk of indigenous cVDPV2s already exists in the importing and/or the exporting population. CONCLUSIONS: Short national discrepancies in the timing of the tOPV to bOPV switch will likely not significantly increase cVDPV2 risks due to the insurance provided by tOPV intensification efforts, although the goal to coordinate national switches within the globally agreed April 17-May 1, 2016 time window minimized the risks associated with cross-border importations.