Objectives: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention launched the Temporary Epidemiology Field Assignee (TEFA) Program to help state and local jurisdictions respond to the risk of Ebola virus importation during the 2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. We describe steps taken to launch the 2-year program, its outcomes and lessons learned. Methods: State and local health departments submitted proposals for a TEFA to strengthen local capacity in four key public health preparedness areas: 1) epidemiology and surveillance, 2) health systems preparedness, 3) health communications, and 4) incident management. TEFAs and jurisdictions were selected through a competitive process. Descriptions of TEFA activities in their quarterly reports were reviewed to select illustrative examples for each preparedness area. Results: Eleven TEFAs began in the fall of 2015, assigned to 7 states, 2 cities, 1 county and the District of Columbia. TEFAs strengthened epidemiologic capacity, investigating routine and major outbreaks in addition to implementing event-based and syndromic surveillance systems. They supported improvements in health communications, strengthened healthcare coalitions, and enhanced collaboration between local epidemiology and emergency preparedness units. Several TEFAs deployed to United States territories for the 2016 Zika Outbreak response. Conclusion: TEFAs made important contributions to their jurisdictions' preparedness. We believe the TEFA model can be a significant component of a national strategy for surging state and local capacity in future high-consequence events.

RATIONALE: As part of the End TB Strategy, the World Health Organization calls for low-tuberculosis (TB) incidence settings to achieve pre-elimination (<10 cases per million) and elimination (<1 case per million) by 2035 and 2050, respectively. These targets require testing and treatment for latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI). OBJECTIVES: To estimate the ability and costs of testing and treatment for LTBI to reach pre-elimination and elimination targets in California. METHODS: We created an individual-based epidemic model of TB, calibrated to historical cases. We evaluated the effects of increased testing (QuantiFERON-TB Gold) and treatment (three months of isoniazid and rifapentine). We analyzed four test and treat targeting strategies: (1) individuals with medical risk factors (MRF), (2) non-USB, (3) both non-USB and MRF, and (4) all Californians. For each strategy, we estimated the effects of increasing test and treat by a factor of 2, 4, or 10 from the base case. We estimated the number of TB cases occurring and prevented, and net and incremental costs from 2017 to 2065 in 2015 U.S. dollars. Efficacy, costs, adverse events, and treatment dropout were estimated from published data. We estimated the cost per case averted and per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained. MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS: In the base case, 106,000 TB cases are predicted to 2065. Pre-elimination was achieved by 2065 in three scenarios: a 10-fold increase in the non-USB and persons with MRF (by 2052), and 4- or 10-fold increase in all Californians (by 2058 and 2035, respectively). TB elimination was not achieved by any intervention scenario. The most aggressive strategy, 10-fold in all Californians, achieved a case rate of 8 (95% UI 4-16) per million by 2050. Of scenarios that reached pre-elimination, the incremental net cost was $20 billion (non-USB and MRF) to $48 billion. These had an incremental cost per QALY of $657,000 to $3.1 million. A more efficient but somewhat less effective single-lifetime test strategy reached as low as $80,000 per QALY. CONCLUSIONS: Substantial gains can be made in TB control in coming years by scaling-up current testing and treatment in non-USB and those with medical risks.

Studies assessing the economic burden of a mumps outbreak in a highly vaccinated population are limited. The Orange County Health Department (OCHD), New York State Department of Health (NYS DOH), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducted a mumps investigation in an affected village with a highly vaccinated population. To understand the epidemiology, standardized mumps case definition and active surveillance were used to identify mumps cases. In addition, an economic assessment of a combined outbreak investigation and third dose measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine intervention conducted by OCHD and NYS DOH was performed; estimated by retrospectively evaluating public health response-related activities including use of a third dose of MMR vaccine. From September 24, 2009, through June 15, 2010, 790 mumps cases were reported-64% were male and highest attack rate was among 11-17 year age group (99.1 cases per 1000 individuals). Of the 658 cases with known vaccination history, 83.6% had documentation of two doses of mumps containing vaccine. No deaths were reported. The two major exposure settings were schools (71.8%) and households (22.5%). Approximately 7736 h of public health personnel time were expended with the total approximate cost of US $463 000, including US $34 392 for MMR vaccine-the estimated cost per household was US $827. Mumps continues to be endemic in many parts of the world, resulting in importations into the United States. Large mumps outbreaks similar to this in highly vaccinated populations may require considerable investigation and control activities.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: During 2009-2010, a northeastern US religious community experienced a large mumps outbreak despite high 2-dose measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine coverage. A third dose of MMR vaccine was offered to students in an affected community in an effort to control the outbreak. METHODS: Eligible sixth- to 12th-grade students in 3 schools were offered a third dose of MMR vaccine. Baseline and follow-up surveys and physician case reports were used to monitor mumps attack rates (ARs). We calculated ARs for defined 3-week periods before and after the intervention. RESULTS: Of 2265 eligible students, 2178 (96.2%) provided documentation of having received 2 previous doses of MMR vaccine, and a high proportion (1755 or 80.6%) chose to receive an additional vaccine dose. The overall AR for all sixth- to 12th-grade students declined from 4.93% in the prevaccination period to 0.13% after vaccination (P < .001). Villagewide, overall AR declined by 75.6% after the intervention. A decline occurred in all age groups but was significantly greater (96.0%) among 11- to 17-year-olds, the age group targeted for vaccination, than among all other age groups. The proportions of adverse events reported were lower than or within the range of those in previous reports of first- and second-dose MMR vaccine studies. CONCLUSIONS: This is the first study to assess the impact of a third MMR vaccine dose for mumps outbreak control. The decline in incidence shortly after the intervention suggests that a third dose of MMR vaccine may help control mumps outbreaks among populations with preexisting high 2-dose vaccine coverage.

Host populations for the plague bacterium, Yersinia pestis, are highly variable in their response to plague ranging from near deterministic extinction (i.e., epizootic dynamics) to a low probability of extinction despite persistent infection (i.e., enzootic dynamics). Much of the work to understand this variability has focused on specific host characteristics, such as population size and resistance, and their role in determining plague dynamics. Here, however, we advance the idea that the relative importance of alternative transmission routes may vary causing shifts from epizootic to enzootic dynamics. We present a model that incorporates host and flea ecology with multiple transmission hypotheses to study how transmission shifts determine population responses to plague. Our results suggest enzootic persistence relies on infection of an off-host flea reservoir and epizootics rely on transiently maintained flea infection loads through repeated infectious feeds by fleas. In either case, early-phase transmission by fleas (i.e., transmission immediately following an infected blood meal) has been observed in laboratory studies, and we show that it is capable of driving plague dynamics at the population level. Sensitivity analysis of model parameters revealed that host characteristics (e.g., population size and resistance) vary in importance depending on transmission dynamics, suggesting that host ecology may scale differently through different transmission routes enabling prediction of population responses in a more robust way than using either host characteristics or transmission shifts alone.