AIM: Lipoprotein (a) [Lp(a)] is a well-established risk factor for cardiovascular disease independent of low-density lipoprotein-cholesterol (LDL-C). The Lp(a) concentrations were inconsistent between the immunoassays. This study aimed to investigate whether harmonization of Lp(a) measurements can be achieved using a serum panel value assigned with the IFCC-endorsed mass spectrometry-based reference measurement procedure (IFCC-MS-RMP). METHODS: We measured the Lp(a) concentrations using five Lp(a) immunoassays in 40 panel sera provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and 500 Japanese subjects enrolled in the Bunkyo Health Study. Of the five immunoassays, only the Roche Lp(a) assay was traceable to the WHO-IFCC reference material SRM2B. Lp(a) concentrations in CDC samples were also determined by IFCC-MS-RMP, provisionally calibrated to SRM2B. Lp(a) concentrations were expressed in mass units (mg/dL) for most reagents, but in SI units (nmol/L) for Roche's reagent and IFCC-MS-RMP. RESULTS: In the CDC panel sera, all immunoassays, including Roche's reagent, showed good correlations with IFCC-MS-RMP. In the Bunkyo Health Study samples, all immunoassays showed good correlations with Roche's reagent (r(s), 0.986-0.998) although the slopes of the regression lines ranged from 0.292 to 0.579. After recalibration with the CDC's panel sera, Lp(a) results of Bunkyo Health Study samples were converted to the equivalent values determined by the IFCC-MS-RMP, thus resulting in a marked reduction in the intermethod CV among the assays. CONCLUSION: We achieved harmonization of Lp(a) measurements with five immunoassays using a serum panel value assigned with the IFCC-MS-RMP.

During the coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) supplemented traditional COVID-19 case and death reporting with COVID-19 aggregate case and death surveillance (ACS) to track daily cumulative numbers. Later, as public health jurisdictions (PHJs) revised the historical COVID-19 case and death data due to data reconciliation and updates, CDC devised a manual process to update these records in the ACS dataset for improving the accuracy of COVID-19 case and death data. Automatic data transfer via an application programming interface (API), an intermediary that enables software applications to communicate, reduces the time and effort in transferring data from PHJs to CDC. However, APIs must meet specific content requirements for use by CDC. As of March 2022, CDC has integrated APIs from 3 jurisdictions for COVID-19 ACS. Expanded use of APIs may provide efficiencies for COVID-19 and other emergency response planning efforts as evidenced by this proof-of-concept. In this article, we share the utility of APIs in COVID-19 ACS.

Infants, children, and adolescents can be exposed unexpectedly to ionizing radiation from nuclear power plant events, improvised nuclear or radiologic dispersal device explosions, or inappropriate disposal of radiotherapy equipment. Children are likely to experience higher external and internal radiation exposure levels than adults because of their smaller body and organ size and other physiologic characteristics as well as their tendency to pick up contaminated items and consume contaminated milk or foodstuffs. This technical report accompanies the revision of the 2003 American Academy of Pediatrics policy statement on pediatric radiation emergencies by summarizing newer scientific data from studies of the Chernobyl and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant events, use of improvised radiologic dispersal devices, exposures from inappropriate disposal of radiotherapy equipment, and potential health effects from residential proximity to nuclear plants. Also included are recommendations from epidemiological studies and biokinetic models to address mitigation efforts. The report includes major emphases on acute radiation syndrome, acute and long-term psychological effects, cancer risks, and other late tissue reactions after low-to-high levels of radiation exposure. Results, along with public health and clinical implications, are described from studies of the Japanese atomic bomb survivors, nuclear plant accidents (eg, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima), improper disposal of radiotherapy equipment in Goiania, Brazil, and residence in proximity to nuclear plants. Measures to reduce radiation exposure in the immediate aftermath of a radiologic or nuclear disaster are described, including the diagnosis and management of external and internal contamination, use of potassium iodide, and actions in relation to breastfeeding.

BACKGROUND: The disasters at Seveso, Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Chernobyl, the World Trade Center (WTC) and Fukushima had historic health and economic sequelae for large populations of workers, responders and community members. METHODS: Comparative data from these events were collected to derive indications for future preparedness. Information from the primary sources and a literature review addressed: i) exposure assessment; ii) exposed populations; iii) health surveillance; iv) follow-up and research outputs; v) observed physical and mental health effects; vi) treatment and benefits; and vii) outreach activities. RESULTS: Exposure assessment was conducted in Seveso, Chernobyl and Fukushima, although none benefited from a timely or systematic strategy, yielding immediate and sequential measurements after the disaster. Identification of exposed subjects was overall underestimated. Health surveillance, treatment and follow-up research were implemented in Seveso, Chernobyl, Fukushima, and at the WTC, mostly focusing on the workers and responders, and to a lesser extent on residents. Exposure-related physical and mental health consequences were identified, indicating the need for a long-term health care of the affected populations. Fukushima has generated the largest scientific output so far, followed by the WTCHP and Chernobyl. Benefits programs and active outreach figured prominently in only the WTC Health Program. The analysis of these programs yielded the following lessons: 1) Know who was there; 2) Have public health input to the disaster response; 3) Collect health and needs data rapidly; 4) Take care of the affected; 5) Emergency preparedness; 6) Data driven, needs assessment, advocacy. CONCLUSIONS: Given the long-lasting health consequences of natural and man-made disasters, health surveillance and treatment programs are critical for management of health conditions, and emergency preparedness plans are needed to prevent or minimize the impact of future threats.

We describe development of a portable aerosol mobility spectrometer (PAMS) for size distribution measurement of submicrometer aerosol. The spectrometer is designed for use in personal or mobile aerosol characterization studies and measures approximately 22.5×22.5×15 cm and weighs about 4.5 kg including the battery. PAMS uses electrical mobility technique to measure number-weighted particle size distribution of aerosol in the 10–855 nm range. Aerosol particles are electrically charged using a dual-corona bipolar corona charger, followed by classification in a cylindrical miniature differential mobility analyzer. A condensation particle counter is used to detect and count particles. The mobility classifier was operated at an aerosol flow rate of 0.05 L/min, and at two different user-selectable sheath flows of 0.2 L/min (for wider size range 15–855 nm) and 0.4 L/min (for higher size resolution over the size range of 10.6–436 nm). The instrument was operated in voltage stepping mode to retrieve the size distribution in approximately 1–2 min. Sizing accuracy and resolution were probed and found to be within the 25% limit of NIOSH criterion for direct-reading instruments. Comparison of size distribution measurements from PAMS and other commercial mobility spectrometers showed good agreement. The instrument offers unique measurement capability for on-person or mobile size distribution measurement of ultrafine and nanoparticle aerosol.

Following a radiological or nuclear emergency, first responders and the public may become internally contaminated with radioactive materials, as demonstrated during the Goiania, Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. Timely monitoring of the affected populations for potential internal contamination, assessment of radiation dose and the provision of necessary medical treatment are required to minimize the health risks from the contamination. This paper summarizes the guidelines and tools that have been developed, and identifies the gaps and priorities for future projects.

On 11 March 2011, northern Japan was struck by first a magnitude 9.0 earthquake off the eastern coast and then by an ensuing tsunami. At the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), these twin disasters initiated a cascade of events that led to radionuclide releases. Radioactive material from Japan was subsequently transported to locations around the globe, including the U.S. The levels of radioactive material that arrived in the U.S. were never large enough to cause health effects, but the presence of this material in the environment was enough to require a response from the public health community. Events during the response illustrated some U.S. preparedness challenges that previously had been anticipated and others that were newly identified. Some of these challenges include the following: (1) Capacity, including radiation health experts, for monitoring potentially exposed people for radioactive contamination are limited and may not be adequate at the time of a large-scale radiological incident; (2) there is no public health authority to detain people contaminated with radioactive materials; (3) public health and medical capacities for response to radiation emergencies are limited; (4) public health communications regarding radiation emergencies can be improved to enhance public health response; (5) national and international exposure standards for radiation measurements (and units) and protective action guides lack uniformity; (6) access to radiation emergency monitoring data can be limited; and (7) the Strategic National Stockpile may not be currently prepared to meet the public health need for KI in the case of a surge in demand from a large-scale radiation emergency. Members of the public health community can draw on this experience to improve public health preparedness.

Natural disasters, infectious disease epidemics, terrorism, and major events like the nuclear incident at Fukushima all pose major potential challenges to public health and security. Events such as the anthrax letters of 2001, Hurricanes Katrina, Irene, and Sandy, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and West Nile virus outbreaks, and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic have demonstrated that public health, emergency management, and national security efforts are interconnected. These and other events have increased the national resolve and the resources committed to improving the national health security infrastructure. However, as fiscal pressures force federal, state, and local governments to examine spending, there is a growing need to demonstrate both what the investment in public health preparedness has bought and where gaps remain in our nation's health security. To address these needs, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), through a cooperative agreement with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response (PHPR), is creating an annual measure of health security and preparedness at the national and state levels: the National Health Security Preparedness Index (NHSPI). "In the past year, I have been struck by how important measurement is to improving the human condition. You can achieve incredible progress if you set a clear goal and find a measure that will drive progress toward that goal. ..." -Bill Gates 1 "What gets measured gets done." -Peter Drucker 2.

The events surrounding the nuclear power plant accident in Fukushima, Japan, uncovered a number of questions and issues that need to be addressed in the United States (US) regarding the preparedness and response to similar potential incidents. A recent commentary discussed some of these issues, including the lack of a sufficient number of radiation subject matter experts that are needed to provide guidance to other public health planners and responders. 1 Indeed, although no health effects from the exposure to radiation were expected to occur in the US, the Emergency Operation Center at the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta operated at full capacity to support the needs of State and Federal partners both at home and abroad, particularly in Japan. During such events, the public will seek answers to numerous questions that can overwhelm existing resources like the CDC Info Line and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) emergency line. 2 In March and April 2011, a number of CDC toxicologists participated in the Japan Earthquake response in various roles while poison centers provided public health partners with daily updates on radiation exposure and information based on queries relating to radiation exposure and the use of potassium iodide.3 | The role of poison centers in a nuclear power plant or other radiation emergency is well supported by a long and successful record of involvement during other public health incidents that range from infectious disease epidemics like West Nile virus to environmental disasters like the British Petroleum oil spill. In a radiation emergency, poison centers can educate callers about the proper use of medical countermeasures or antidotes, monitor for patterns of use and misuse of these therapies, and detect potential secondary adverse events from their use. Because of their existing technical resources and their experience in operating as a call center, they can assist in communicating important health messages and protective action measures to the public. Currently, the American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC) collaborates closely with CDC in the area of surveillance and belongs to the recently formed National Alliance for Radiation Readiness whose mission is to enhance the Nation’s radiological preparedness. 4 Additionally, the AAPCC participated in the response to the Fukushima and the CardioGen Rubidium-82 contamination incidents. 5 Further steps need to be taken by poison centers and their local and state partners to establish or solidify collaborations and formalize the role of poison centers in radiation preparedness and response alongside other stakeholders like Radiation Control Programs and Emergency Management Agencies.

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami damaged nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi complex in Japan, resulting in radionuclide release. In response, US officials augmented existing radiological screening at its ports of entry (POEs) to detect and decontaminate travelers contaminated with radioactive materials. During March 12 to 16, radiation screening protocols detected 3 travelers from Japan with external radioactive material contamination at 2 air POEs. Beginning March 23, federal officials collaborated with state and local public health and radiation control authorities to enhance screening and decontamination protocols at POEs. Approximately 543 000 (99%) travelers arriving directly from Japan at 25 US airports were screened for radiation contamination from March 17 to April 30, and no traveler was detected with contamination sufficient to require a large-scale public health response. The response highlighted synergistic collaboration across government levels and leveraged screening methods already in place at POEs, leading to rapid protocol implementation. Policy development, planning, training, and exercising response protocols and the establishment of federal authority to compel decontamination of travelers are needed for future radiological responses. Comparison of resource-intensive screening costs with the public health yield should guide policy decisions, given the historically low frequency of contaminated travelers arriving during radiological disasters.

BACKGROUND: In March of 2011, an earthquake struck Japan causing a tsunami that resulted in a radiological release from the damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Surveillance for potential radiological and any iodine/iodide product exposures was initiated on the National Poison Data System (NPDS) to target public health messaging needs within the United States (US). Our objectives are to describe self-reported exposures to radiation, potassium iodide (KI) and other iodine/iodide products which occurred during the US federal response and discuss its public health impact. METHODS: All calls to poison centers associated with the Japan incident were identified from March 11, 2011 to April 18, 2011 in NPDS. Exposure, demographic and health outcome information were collected. Calls about reported radiation exposures and KI or other iodine/iodide product ingestions were then categorized with regard to exposure likelihood based on follow-up information obtained from the PC where each call originated. Reported exposures were subsequently classified as probable exposures (high likelihood of exposure), probable non-exposures (low likelihood of exposure), and suspect exposure (unknown likelihood of exposure). RESULTS: We identified 400 calls to PCs associated with the incident, with 340 information requests (no exposure reported) and 60 reported exposures. The majority (n = 194; 57%) of the information requests mentioned one or more substances. Radiation was inquired about most frequently (n = 88; 45%), followed by KI (n = 86; 44%) and other iodine/iodide products (n = 47; 24%). Of the 60 reported exposures, KI was reported most frequently (n = 25; 42%), followed by radiation (n = 22; 37%) and other iodine/iodide products (n = 13; 22%). Among reported KI exposures, most were classified as probable exposures (n = 24; 96%); one was a probable non-exposure. Among reported other iodine/iodide product exposures, most were probable exposures (n = 10, 77%) and the rest were suspect exposures (n = 3; 23%). The reported radiation exposures were classified as suspect exposures (n = 16, 73%) or probable non-exposures (n = 6; 27%). No radiation exposures were classified as probable exposures. A small number of the probable exposures to KI and other iodide/iodine products reported adverse signs or symptoms (n = 9; 26%). The majority of probable exposures had no adverse outcomes (n = 28; 82%). These data identified a potential public health information gap regarding KI and other iodine/iodide products which was then addressed through public health messaging activities. CONCLUSION: During the Japan incident response, surveillance activities using NPDS identified KI and other iodine/iodide products as potential public health concerns within the US, which guided CDC's public health messaging and communication activities. Regional PCs can provide timely and additional information during a public health emergency to enhance data collected from surveillance activities, which in turn can be used to inform public health decision-making.

On 11 March 2011, northern Japan was rocked by first a magnitude 9.0 earthquake off the eastern coast and then an ensuing tsunami. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant complex was hit by these twin disasters, and a cascade of events was initiated that led to radionuclide releases causing widespread radioactive contamination of residential areas, agricultural land, and coastal waters. Radioactive material from Japan was subsequently transmitted to locations around the globe, including the U.S. The levels of radioactive material that arrived in the U.S. were never large enough to be a concern for health effects, but the presence of this material in the environment was enough to create a public health emergency in the U.S. The radiation safety and public health communities in the U.S. are identifying challenges they faced in responding to this incident. This paper discusses three of those challenges: (1) The growing shortage of trained radiation subject matter experts in the field of environmental transport and dosimetry of radionuclides; (2) the need to begin expressing all radiation-related quantities in terms of the International System of Units; and (3) the need to define when a radiation dose is or is not one of "public health concern." This list represents only a small subset of the list of challenges being identified by public health agencies that responded to the Fukushima incident. However, these three challenges are fundamental to any radiological emergency response. Addressing them will have a significant positive impact on how the U.S. responds to the next radiological emergency.

The report by Dr. Takeo Ohnishi in this issue of Radiation Research (1) is a comprehensive detailing of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) disaster. We have chosen for the title of this commentary “combined disaster,” which is emphasized by both Dr. Ohnishi and Dr. Makoto Akashi from the National Institute of Radiological Sciences (2), who was involved in the management of the incident. Dr. Akashi and others emphasize the catastrophic loss of life and damage primarily from the earthquake and tsunami and that the NPP disaster was the consequence of the loss of infrastructure, including power supply and access to the facility. There are lessons observed regarding NPP issues, and there is now broad worldwide discussion on the future of energy sources. The consequences of the NPP disaster will take years to better understand as the Fukushima-Daiichi incident plays out. In addition, nuclear power issues will take decades to be addressed, given the complexity of worldwide energy needs, potential sources and suppliers of alternative forms of energy, and the environmental impact of the rising worldwide energy demand. Furthermore, energy policy complicates matters as decisions by one country can have an enormous impact on its neighbors and the entire world. | This commentary is from the personal and professional perspective of the four coauthors, who were directly involved in the response at the U.S. Embassy in Japan (CNC and MAN) and in the U.S. at the National Security Staff (CBM) at the White House and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (RCW). In that the number of radiation experts within the U.S. government (USG) is small and there are many ongoing interagency collaborations [e.g., Planning Guidance (3)], the overall U.S. response involved people who worked tirelessly over the first month to provide their expertise and support for the international and domestic aspects of the response, including supporting the Japanese. This NPP disaster is unique in the enormity of the overall infrastructure damage, the sophisticated response and monitoring ability, the breadth of the media attention, the presence of multiple potential sources for radiation release, and the stepwise evolution with real-time monitoring of an environmental radionuclide release. While comparisons are made with Chernobyl, this incident was certainly different in terms of the type of reactor, character of radionuclide release, and timeliness of reporting in regard to the onset of the incident (2).