The SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant emerged shortly after COVID-19 vaccines became available in 2021. We describe SARS-CoV-2 breakthrough infections in a highly vaccinated, well-monitored US Embassy community in Kampala, Uganda. Defining breakthrough infection rates in highly vaccinated populations can help determine public health messaging, guidance, and policy globally.

Yersinia enterocolitica (YE) bioserotype 1B/O:8 (YE 1B/O:8) was identified in routine culture of a variety of zoo species housed at Omaha's Henry Doorly Zoo and Aquarium (OHDZA) from April to July 2011. Animal cases representing 12 species had YE detected from 34 cases during routine fecal monitoring and/or during postmortem examination: Coquerel's sifakas (Propithecus coquereli, two cases), black & white (BW) ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata variegata, six cases), red ruffed lemurs (Varecia rubra, seven cases), white handed gibbon (Hylobates lar albimana, one case), black lemurs (Eulemur macaco, three cases), mongoose lemurs (Eulemur mongoz, two cases), African hunting dogs (Lycaon pictus, five cases), agile gibbons (Hylobates agilis, three cases), siamangs (Hylobates syndactylus, two cases), colobus monkey (Colobus angolensis palliates, one case), argus pheasant (Argusianus argus, one case), and orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus, one case). Most species were not symptomatic; however, three symptomatic cases in Coquerel's sifakas (two) and a white handed gibbon (one) showed clinical signs of diarrhea and lethargy that resulted in death for the Coquerel's sifakas. One unexpected death also occurred in a BW ruffed lemur. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first report of YE 1B/O:8 in such a large variety of zoo species. The source of the YE could not be identified, prompting the initiation of a diseases surveillance program to prevent further cases for the species that are sensitive to YE. To date, no additional cases have been identified, thus suggesting a single introduction of the YE 1B/O:8 strain into the zoo environment.

Global health security depends on effective surveillance for infectious diseases. In Uganda, resources are inadequate to support collection and reporting of data necessary for an effective and responsive surveillance system. We used a cross-cutting approach to improve surveillance and laboratory capacity in Uganda by leveraging an existing pediatric inpatient malaria sentinel surveillance system to collect data on expanded causes of illness, facilitate development of real-time surveillance, and provide data on antimicrobial resistance. Capacity for blood culture collection was established, along with options for serologic testing for select zoonotic conditions, including arboviral infection, brucellosis, and leptospirosis. Detailed demographic, clinical, and laboratory data for all admissions were captured through a web-based system accessible at participating hospitals, laboratories, and the Uganda Public Health Emergency Operations Center. Between July 2016 and December 2017, the expanded system was activated in pediatric wards of 6 regional government hospitals. During that time, patient data were collected from 30,500 pediatric admissions, half of whom were febrile but lacked evidence of malaria. More than 5,000 blood cultures were performed; 4% yielded bacterial pathogens, and another 4% yielded likely contaminants. Several WHO antimicrobial resistance priority pathogens were identified, some with multidrug-resistant phenotypes, including Acinetobacter spp., Citrobacter spp., Escherichia coli, Staphylococcus aureus, and typhoidal and nontyphoidal Salmonella spp. Leptospirosis and arboviral infections (alphaviruses and flaviviruses) were documented. The lessons learned and early results from the development of this multisectoral surveillance system provide the knowledge, infrastructure, and workforce capacity to serve as a foundation to enhance the capacity to detect, report, and rapidly respond to wide-ranging public health concerns in Uganda.

During the Ebola virus outbreak of 2013-2016, the Viral Special Pathogens Branch field laboratory in Sierra Leone tested approximately 26 000 specimens between August 2014 and October 2015. Analysis of the B2M endogenous control Ct values showed its utility in monitoring specimen quality, comparing results with different specimen types, and interpretation of results. For live patients, blood is the most sensitive specimen type and oral swabs have little diagnostic utility. However, swabs are highly sensitive for diagnostic testing of corpses.

In August 2014, the Viral Special Pathogens Branch of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention established a field laboratory in Sierra Leone in response to the ongoing Ebola virus outbreak. Through March 2015, this laboratory tested >12 000 specimens from throughout Sierra Leone. We describe the organization and procedures of the laboratory located in Bo, Sierra Leone.

The objective of this study was to develop a canonical, parsimoniously-informative SNP panel for subtyping Shiga-toxin producing Escherichia coli (STEC) O157:H7 that would be consistent with epidemiological, PFGE, and MLVA clustering of human specimens. Our group had previously identified 906 putative discriminatory SNPs, which were pared down to 391 SNPs based on their prevalence in a test set. The 391 SNPs were screened using a high-throughput form of TaqMan PCR against a set of clinical isolates that represent the most diverse collection of O157:H7 isolates from outbreaks and sporadic cases examined to date. Another 30 SNPs identified by others were also screened using the same method. Two additional targets were tested using standard TaqMan PCR endpoint analysis. These 423 SNPs were reduced to a 32 SNP panel with the almost the same discriminatory value. While the panel partitioned our diverse set of isolates in a manner that was consistent with epidemiological data and PFGE and MLVA phylogenies, it resulted in fewer subtypes than either existing method and insufficient epidemiological resolution in 10 of 47 clusters. Therefore, another round of SNP discovery was undertaken using comparative genomic resequencing of pooled DNA from the 10 clusters with insufficient resolution. This process identified 4,040 potential SNPs and suggested one of the ten clusters was incorrectly grouped. After its removal, there were 2,878 SNPs, of which only 63 were previously identified and 438 occurred across multiple clusters. Among highly clonal bacteria like STEC O157:H7, linkage disequilibrium greatly limits the number of parsimoniously informative SNPs. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that our panel accounted for the potential discriminatory value of numerous other SNPs reported in the literature. We concluded published O157:H7 SNPs are insufficient for effective epidemiological subtyping. However, the 438 multi-cluster SNPs we identified may provide the additional information required.

Although rare, typhoid fever cases acquired in the United States continue to be reported. Detection and investigation of outbreaks in these domestically acquired cases offer opportunities to identify chronic carriers. We searched surveillance and laboratory databases for domestically acquired typhoid fever cases, used a space-time scan statistic to identify clusters, and classified clusters as outbreaks or non-outbreaks. From 1999 to 2010, domestically acquired cases accounted for 18% of 3373 reported typhoid fever cases; their isolates were less often multidrug-resistant (2% vs. 15%) compared to isolates from travel-associated cases. We identified 28 outbreaks and two possible outbreaks within 45 space-time clusters of 2 domestically acquired cases, including three outbreaks involving 2 molecular subtypes. The approach detected seven of the ten outbreaks published in the literature or reported to CDC. Although this approach did not definitively identify any previously unrecognized outbreaks, it showed the potential to detect outbreaks of typhoid fever that may escape detection by routine analysis of surveillance data. Sixteen outbreaks had been linked to a carrier. Every case of typhoid fever acquired in a non-endemic country warrants thorough investigation. Space-time scan statistics, together with shoe-leather epidemiology and molecular subtyping, may improve outbreak detection.

In 2012, Sierra Leone experienced its worst cholera outbreak in over 15 years affecting 12 of the country's 13 districts. With limited diagnostic capability, particularly in bacterial culture, the cholera outbreak was initially confirmed by microbiological testing of clinical specimens outside of Sierra Leone. During 2012 - 2013, in direct response to the lack of diagnostic microbiology facilities, and to assist in investigating and monitoring the cholera outbreak, diagnostic and reference services were established in Sierra Leone at the Central Public Health Reference Laboratory focusing specifically on isolating and identifying Vibrio cholerae and other enteric bacterial pathogens. Sierra Leone is now capable of confirming cholera cases by reference laboratory testing.

Prior to the epidemic that emerged in Haiti in October of 2010, cholera had not been documented in this country. After its introduction, a strain of Vibrio cholerae O1 spread rapidly throughout Haiti, where it caused over 600,000 cases of disease and >7,500 deaths in the first two years of the epidemic. We applied whole-genome sequencing to a temporal series of V. cholerae isolates from Haiti to gain insight into the mode and tempo of evolution in this isolated population of V. cholerae O1. Phylogenetic and Bayesian analyses supported the hypothesis that all isolates in the sample set diverged from a common ancestor within a time frame that is consistent with epidemiological observations. A pangenome analysis showed nearly homogeneous genomic content, with no evidence of gene acquisition among Haiti isolates. Nine nearly closed genomes assembled from continuous-long-read data showed evidence of genome rearrangements and supported the observation of no gene acquisition among isolates. Thus, intrinsic mutational processes can account for virtually all of the observed genetic polymorphism, with no demonstrable contribution from horizontal gene transfer (HGT). Consistent with this, the 12 Haiti isolates tested by laboratory HGT assays were severely impaired for transformation, although unlike previously characterized noncompetent V. cholerae isolates, each expressed hapR and possessed a functional quorum-sensing system. Continued monitoring of V. cholerae in Haiti will illuminate the processes influencing the origin and fate of genome variants, which will facilitate interpretation of genetic variation in future epidemics. IMPORTANCE Vibrio cholerae is the cause of substantial morbidity and mortality worldwide, with over three million cases of disease each year. An understanding of the mode and rate of evolutionary change is critical for proper interpretation of genome sequence data and attribution of outbreak sources. The Haiti epidemic provides an unprecedented opportunity to study an isolated, single-source outbreak of Vibrio cholerae O1 over an established time frame. By using multiple approaches to assay genetic variation, we found no evidence that the Haiti strain has acquired any genes by horizontal gene transfer, an observation that led us to discover that it is also poorly transformable. We have found no evidence that environmental strains have played a role in the evolution of the outbreak strain.

During the 2010 cholera outbreak in Haiti, water and seafood samples were collected to detect Vibrio cholerae. The outbreak strain of toxigenic V. cholerae O1 serotype Ogawa was isolated from freshwater and seafood samples. The cholera toxin gene was detected in harbor water samples.

The segmented genome of rotaviruses provides an opportunity for rotavirus strains to generate a large genetic diversity through reassortment; however, this mechanism is considered to play little role in the generation of mosaic gene constellations between Wa-like and DS-1-like strains in genes other than the neutralization antigens. A pilot study was undertaken to analyze these two epidemiologically important strains at the genomic level in order to (i) identify intergenogroup reassortment and (ii) to make available additional reference genome sequences of G1P[8] and G2P[4] for future genomics analyses. The full or nearly complete coding region of all 11 genes for 3 G1P[8] (LB2719, LB2758, and LB2771) and 3 G2P[4] (LB2744, LB2764, and LB2772) strains isolated from children hospitalized with severe diarrhea in Long Beach, California, where these strains were circulating at comparable rates during 2005-2006 are described in this study. Based on the full-genome classification system, all G1P[8] strains had a conserved genomic constellation: G1-P[8]-I1-R1-C1-M1-A1-N1-T1-E1-E1-H1 and were mostly identical to the few Wa-like strains whose genome sequences have already been determined. Similarly, the genome sequences of the 3 G2P[4] strains were highly conserved: G2-P[4]-I2-R2-C2-M2-A2-N2-T2-E2-E2-H2 and displayed an overall lesser genetic divergence with reference DS-1-like strains. While intergenogroup reassortment was not seen between the G1P[8] and G2P[4] strains studied here, evidence for intragenogroup reassortment events was identified. Similar studies in the post-rotavirus genomic era will help uncover whether intergenogroup reassortment affecting the backbone genes could play a significant role in any potential vaccine breakthrough events by evading immunity of vaccinated children.

BACKGROUND: A live, attenuated rotavirus vaccine, RotaTeq(R), was approved in 2006 for immunization of infants in the United States. To monitor the distribution of rotavirus genotypes before and after vaccine introduction, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducted strain surveillance with the National Rotavirus Strain Surveillance System. METHODS: Over 3 rotavirus seasons, 2005-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008, National Rotavirus Strain Surveillance System laboratories collected rotavirus-positive stool specimens and submitted them to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Rotavirus strains were G- and P-genotyped by multiplex reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction or nucleotide sequencing. RESULTS: During 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 seasons, G1 was the dominant G-type but in the 2007-2008 season, G3 replaced G1 as the most frequently detected strain. Four genotypes, G1P[8], G2P[4], G3P[8], and G9P[8] were detected in every season. Uncommon strains observed during the study period were G2P[8], G1P[6], G2P[6], G4P[6], G1P[4], G3P[9], G12P [6], and G12P[8]. The mean age of rotavirus cases in the 2007-2008 season increased significantly in patients less than 3 years old compared with the 2 previous seasons. CONCLUSIONS: The increased overall prevalence of G3P [8] strains in 2007-2008, the first rotavirus season with reasonable rotavirus vaccine coverage, was consistent with Australian reports of G3 dominance following RotaTeq introduction. However, these strain changes in both countries have occurred in the context of large declines in severe rotavirus disease and we cannot rule out that they are simply the result of naturally occurring changes in rotavirus strain prevalence. These findings underscore the need for careful monitoring of strains to assess possible vaccine pressure-induced changes and vaccine effectiveness against various rotavirus genotypes.

BACKGROUND: Rotavirus vaccine was recommended for routine use among US infants in 2006. To provide prevaccine data, we conducted strain surveillance for 9 consecutive seasons during 1996-2005. METHODS: Using reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction genotyping and nucleotide sequencing, we determined P/G genotypes of >3100 rotavirus strains collected in up to 12 cities each year from different US regions. RESULTS: The most prevalent strain globally, P[8] G1, was the most prevalent each year in the United States (overall, 78.5% of strains; range, 60.0%-93.9%), and 9.2% of the samples were P[4] G2, 3.6% were P[8] G9, 1.7% were P[8] G3, and 0.8% were P[8] G4. Genotype P[6] G9, which emerged in 1995, was detected continuously for several seasons (from 1996-1997 to 2000-2001, 0.2%-5.4%) but was not identified in the subsequent 4 seasons. Single or a few detections of rare genotypes (eg, P[6] G12, P[9] G6, and P[9] G3) were observed during several rotavirus seasons at frequencies of 0.5%-1.7% and, overall, comprised 0.6% of all the samples from the entire surveillance period. Several globally common strains in addition to G1, especially G2 and G9, circulated at high prevalence (33%-62%) in some cities during certain years. CONCLUSIONS: Almost 85% of strains during 1996-2005 had either a G or P antigen that is present in both RotaTeq (Merck) and Rotarix (GlaxoSmithKline). Monitoring of strains after introduction of rotavirus vaccines is important.