As of March 1, 2021, persons aged <18 years accounted for approximately 11% of 28.4 million reported COVID-19 cases in the United States*; however, data on pediatric infections with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, are limited (1). Surveys of SARS-CoV-2 antibody seroprevalence suggest that cumulative incidence of infection is much higher than that ascertained by reported COVID-19 cases (2,3). Evidence of previous SARS-CoV-2 infections among young persons in Mississippi was assessed by testing for antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 on a convenience sample of residual serum specimens collected for routine testing by an academic medical center laboratory during May 17–September 19, 2020. Seroprevalence by calendar month was standardized to the state population by race/ethnicity; cumulative numbers of infections were estimated by extrapolating seroprevalence to all persons aged <18 years in Mississippi. Serum specimens from 1,603 persons were tested; 175 (10.9%) were positive for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies. Among 1,579 (98.5%) specimens for which the race/ethnicity of the person tested was known, specimens from 16 (23.2%) of 69 Hispanic persons, 117 (13.0%) of 901 non-Hispanic Black persons, and 30 (5.3%) of 565 non-Hispanic White persons tested positive. Population-weighted seroprevalence estimates among persons aged <18 years increased from 2.5% in May to 16.3% in September 2020. Based on these estimates, 113,842 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 90,096–153,652) persons aged <18 years in Mississippi might have been infected with SARS-CoV-2 by mid-September 2020. The number of COVID-19 cases reported in this age group through August 31, 2020 was 8,993. Serosurveys that include pediatric age groups can help provide evidence of cumulative disease incidence, estimate frequency of undiagnosed cases of SARS-CoV-2 among young persons, and guide prevention efforts.

We compared symptoms and characteristics of 4961 ambulatory patients with and without laboratory-confirmed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 infection. Findings indicate that clinical symptoms alone would be insufficient to distinguish between coronavirus disease 2019 and other respiratory infections (eg, influenza) and/or to evaluate the effects of preventive interventions (eg, vaccinations).

BACKGROUND: Symptoms of mild COVID-19 illness are non-specific and may persist for prolonged periods. Effects on quality of life of persistent poor physical or mental health associated with COVID-19 are not well understood. METHODS: Adults aged ≥18 years with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 and matched control patients who tested negative for SARS-CoV-2 infection at outpatient facilities associated with 11 medical centers in the United States were interviewed to assess symptoms, illness duration, and health-related quality of life. Duration of symptoms, health-related quality of life measures, and days of poor physical health by symptoms experienced during illness were compared between case patients and controls using Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Symptoms associated with COVID-19 case status were evaluated by multivariable logistic regression. RESULTS: Among 320 participants included, 157 were COVID-19 cases and 163 were SARS-CoV-2 negative controls. Loss of taste or smell was reported by 63% of cases and 6% of controls and was strongly associated with COVID-19 in logistic regression models (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 32.4; 95% confidence interval [CI], 12.6-83.1). COVID-19 cases were more likely than controls to have experienced fever, body aches, weakness, or fatigue during illness, and to report ≥1 persistent symptom more than 14 days after symptom onset (50% vs 32%, P < .001). Cases reported significantly more days of poor physical health during the past 14 days than controls (P < .01). CONCLUSIONS: Differentiating COVID-19 from other acute illnesses will require widespread diagnostic testing, especially during influenza seasons. Persistent COVID-19-related symptoms may negatively affect quality of life, even among those initially presenting with mild illness.

BACKGROUND: At the start of the 2019-2020 influenza season, concern arose that circulating B/Victoria viruses of the globally emerging clade V1A.3 were antigenically drifted from the strain included in the vaccine. Intense B/Victoria activity was followed by circulation of genetically diverse A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, that were also antigenically drifted. We measured vaccine effectiveness (VE) in the United States against illness from these emerging viruses. METHODS: We enrolled outpatients aged ≥6 months with acute respiratory illness at five sites. Respiratory specimens were tested for influenza by reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). Using the test-negative design, we determined influenza VE by virus sub-type/lineage and genetic subclades by comparing odds of vaccination in influenza cases versus test-negative controls. RESULTS: Among 8,845 enrollees, 2,722 (31%) tested positive for influenza, including 1,209 (44%) for B/Victoria and 1,405 (51%) for A(H1N1)pdm09. Effectiveness against any influenza illness was 39% (95% confidence interval [CI]: 32-44), 45% (95%CI: 37-52) against B/Victoria and 30% (95%CI: 21-39) against A(H1N1)pdm09 associated illness. Vaccination offered no protection against A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses with antigenically drifted clade 6B.1A 183P-5A+156K HA genes (VE 7%; 95%CI: -14 to 23%) which predominated after January. CONCLUSIONS: Vaccination provided protection against influenza illness, mainly due to infections from B/Victoria viruses. Vaccine protection against illness from A(H1N1)pdm09 was lower than historically observed effectiveness of 40-60%, due to late-season vaccine mismatch following emergence of antigenically drifted viruses. The effect of drift on vaccine protection is not easy to predict and, even in drifted years, significant protection can be observed.

As of December 14, 2020, children and adolescents aged <18 years have accounted for 10.2% of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases reported in the United States.* Mitigation strategies to prevent infection with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, among persons of all ages, are important for pandemic control. Characterization of risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 infection among children and adolescents can inform efforts by parents, school and program administrators, and public health officials to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission. To assess school, community, and close contact exposures associated with pediatric COVID-19, a case-control study was conducted to compare exposures reported by parents or guardians of children and adolescents aged <18 years with SARS-CoV-2 infection confirmed by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing (case-patients) with exposures reported among those who received negative SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR test results (control participants). Among 397 children and adolescents investigated, in-person school or child care attendance ≤14 days before the SARS-CoV-2 test was reported for 62% of case-patients and 68% of control participants and was not associated with a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 0.8, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.5-1.3). Among 236 children aged ≥2 years who attended child care or school during the 2 weeks before SARS-CoV-2 testing, parents of 64% of case-patients and 76% of control participants reported that their child and all staff members wore masks inside the facility (aOR = 0.4, 95% CI = 0.2-0.8). In the 2 weeks preceding SARS-CoV-2 testing, case-patients were more likely to have had close contact with a person with known COVID-19 (aOR = 3.2, 95% CI = 2.0-5.0), have attended gatherings(†) with persons outside their household, including social functions (aOR = 2.4, 95% CI = 1.1-5.5) or activities with other children (aOR = 3.3, 95% CI = 1.3-8.4), or have had visitors in the home (aOR = 1.9, 95% CI = 1.2-2.9) than were control participants. Close contacts with persons with COVID-19 and gatherings contribute to SARS-CoV-2 infections in children and adolescents. Consistent use of masks, social distancing, isolation of infected persons, and quarantine of those who are exposed to the virus continue to be important to prevent COVID-19 spread.

Since March 2020, large-scale efforts to reduce transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), have continued. Mitigation measures to reduce workplace exposures have included work site policies to support flexible work site options, including telework, whereby employees work remotely without commuting to a central place of work.* Opportunities to telework have varied across industries among U.S. jobs where telework options are feasible (1). However, little is known about the impact of telework on risk for SARS-CoV-2 infection. A case-control investigation was conducted to compare telework between eligible symptomatic persons who received positive SARS-CoV-2 reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test results (case-patients, 153) and symptomatic persons with negative test results (control-participants, 161). Eligible participants were identified in outpatient health care facilities during July 2020. Among employed participants who reported on their telework status during the 2 weeks preceding illness onset (248), the percentage who were able to telework on a full- or part-time basis was lower among case-patients (35%; 42 of 120) than among control-participants (53%; 68 of 128) (p<0.01). Case-patients were more likely than were control-participants to have reported going exclusively to an office or school setting (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 1.8; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.2-2.7) in the 2 weeks before illness onset. The association was also observed when further restricting to the 175 participants who reported working in a profession outside the critical infrastructure(†) (aOR = 2.1; 95% CI = 1.3-3.6). Providing the option to work from home or telework when possible, is an important consideration for reducing the risk for SARS-CoV-2 infection. In industries where telework options are not available, worker safety measures should continue to be scaled up to reduce possible worksite exposures.

Community and close contact exposures continue to drive the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. CDC and other public health authorities recommend community mitigation strategies to reduce transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19 (1,2). Characterization of community exposures can be difficult to assess when widespread transmission is occurring, especially from asymptomatic persons within inherently interconnected communities. Potential exposures, such as close contact with a person with confirmed COVID-19, have primarily been assessed among COVID-19 cases, without a non-COVID-19 comparison group (3,4). To assess community and close contact exposures associated with COVID-19, exposures reported by case-patients (154) were compared with exposures reported by control-participants (160). Case-patients were symptomatic adults (persons aged ≥18 years) with SARS-CoV-2 infection confirmed by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing. Control-participants were symptomatic outpatient adults from the same health care facilities who had negative SARS-CoV-2 test results. Close contact with a person with known COVID-19 was more commonly reported among case-patients (42%) than among control-participants (14%). Case-patients were more likely to have reported dining at a restaurant (any area designated by the restaurant, including indoor, patio, and outdoor seating) in the 2 weeks preceding illness onset than were control-participants (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 2.4; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.5-3.8). Restricting the analysis to participants without known close contact with a person with confirmed COVID-19, case-patients were more likely to report dining at a restaurant (aOR = 2.8, 95% CI = 1.9-4.3) or going to a bar/coffee shop (aOR = 3.9, 95% CI = 1.5-10.1) than were control-participants. Exposures and activities where mask use and social distancing are difficult to maintain, including going to places that offer on-site eating or drinking, might be important risk factors for acquiring COVID-19. As communities reopen, efforts to reduce possible exposures at locations that offer on-site eating and drinking options should be considered to protect customers, employees, and communities.

A recent report by Rosenberg and colleagues highlights the importance of multiple sources of information for monitoring trends in the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic [1]. The authors used influenza-like illness (ILI) surveillance data and laboratory-confirmed influenza and COVID-19 cases to estimate population-based rates of illness during the beginning of the pandemic in New York state. Because severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) testing was rapidly increasing during this period in many areas of the United States, numbers of COVID-19 cases were likely underestimated. This raises the question of whether COVID-19 contributed to ILI trends prior to widespread testing.

From January 21 through February 23, 2020, public health agencies detected 14 U.S. cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), all related to travel from China (1,2). The first nontravel-related U.S. case was confirmed on February 26 in a California resident who had become ill on February 13 (3). Two days later, on February 28, a second nontravel-related case was confirmed in the state of Washington (4,5). Examination of four lines of evidence provides insight into the timing of introduction and early transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, into the United States before the detection of these two cases. First, syndromic surveillance based on emergency department records from counties affected early by the pandemic did not show an increase in visits for COVID-19-like illness before February 28. Second, retrospective SARS-CoV-2 testing of approximately 11,000 respiratory specimens from several U.S. locations beginning January 1 identified no positive results before February 20. Third, analysis of viral RNA sequences from early cases suggested that a single lineage of virus imported directly or indirectly from China began circulating in the United States between January 18 and February 9, followed by several SARS-CoV-2 importations from Europe. Finally, the occurrence of three cases, one in a California resident who died on February 6, a second in another resident of the same county who died February 17, and a third in an unidentified passenger or crew member aboard a Pacific cruise ship that left San Francisco on February 11, confirms cryptic circulation of the virus by early February. These data indicate that sustained, community transmission had begun before detection of the first two nontravel-related U.S. cases, likely resulting from the importation of a single lineage of virus from China in late January or early February, followed by several importations from Europe. The widespread emergence of COVID-19 throughout the United States after February highlights the importance of robust public health systems to respond rapidly to emerging infectious threats.

BACKGROUND: Current multivalent influenza vaccine products provide protection against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, A(H3N2), and B lineage viruses. The 2018-2019 influenza season in the US included prolonged circulation of both A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses well-matched to the vaccine strain, and A(H3N2) viruses the majority of which were mismatched to the vaccine. We estimate the number of vaccine-prevented influenza-associated illnesses, medical visits, hospitalizations, and deaths for the season. METHODS: We used a mathematical model and Monte Carlo algorithm to estimate numbers and 95% uncertainty intervals (UI) of influenza-associated outcomes prevented by vaccination in the US. The model incorporated age-specific estimates of national 2018-2019 influenza vaccine coverage, influenza virus-specific vaccine effectiveness from the US Influenza Vaccine Effectiveness Network, and disease burden estimated from population-based rates of influenza-associated hospitalizations through the Influenza Hospitalization Surveillance Network. RESULTS: Influenza vaccination prevented an estimated 4.4 million (95% UI: 3.4 million-7.1 million) illnesses, 2.3 million (95% UI: 1.8 million-3.8 million) medical visits, 58,000 (95% UI: 30,000-156,000) hospitalizations, and 3,500 (95% UI: 1,000-13,000) deaths due to influenza viruses during the US 2018-2019 influenza season. Vaccination prevented 14% of projected hospitalizations associated with A(H1N1)pdm09 overall and 43% among young children aged 6 months-4 years. CONCLUSIONS: Influenza vaccination averted substantial influenza-associated disease including hospitalizations and deaths in the US, primarily due to effectiveness against A(H1N1)pdm09. Our findings underscore the value of influenza vaccination, highlighting that vaccines measurably decrease illness and associated health care utilization even in a season in which a vaccine component does not match to a circulating virus.

Detection of influenza virus in respiratory specimens from ill individuals is the most commonly used method to identify influenza virus infection. A number of respiratory specimen types may be used, including swabs, brush, aspirate and wash, and specimens may be collected from numerous sites, including anterior and posterior nasopharynx, oropharynx and nares. Traditionally, respiratory specimens from the nasopharynx were considered to have highest sensitivity for viral detection. However, as molecular assays such as reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) have increased the sensitivity of viral detection from respiratory specimens, the use of less invasive and easier to obtain specimens has increased for the detection of influenza. This review presents and evaluates the sensitivities of respiratory specimen methods used in epidemiologic studies that used RT-PCR to detect influenza virus in respiratory specimens from ill patients. This literature review suggested that a combination of two less invasive swabbing methods, such as nasal and oropharyngeal swabs, had about the same sensitivity as nasopharyngeal specimens for influenza detection by RT-PCR. By combining two less invasive collection methods, it may be possible to reduce barriers to enrollment without compromising influenza detection sensitivity.

BACKGROUND: During the 2014-15 US influenza season, expanded genetic characterization of circulating influenza A(H3N2) viruses was used to assess the impact of genetic variability of influenza A(H3N2) viruses on influenza vaccine effectiveness (VE). METHODS: A novel pyrosequencing assay was used to determine genetic group based on hemagglutinin (HA) gene sequences of influenza A(H3N2) viruses from patients enrolled US Flu Vaccine Effectiveness network sites. Vaccine effectiveness was estimated using a test-negative design comparing vaccination among patients infected with influenza A(H3N2) viruses and uninfected patients. RESULTS: Among 9710 enrollees, 1868 (19%) tested positive for influenza A(H3N2); genetic characterization of 1397 viruses showed 1134 (81%) belonged to one HA genetic group (3C.2a) of antigenically drifted H3N2 viruses. Effectiveness of 2014-15 influenza vaccination varied by A(H3N2) genetic group from 1% (95% confidence interval [CI], -14% to 14%) against illness caused by antigenically drifted A(H3N2) group 3C.2a viruses versus 44% (95% CI, 16% to 63%) against illness caused by vaccine-like A(H3N2) group 3C.3b viruses. CONCLUSION: Effectiveness of 2014-15 influenza vaccination varied by genetic group of influenza A(H3N2) virus. Changes in hemagglutinin genes related to antigenic drift were associated with reduced vaccine effectiveness.

We evaluated the cycle threshold (CT) values of 1160 influenza A positive and 806 influenza B positive specimens from two seasons of the US Flu VE Network to identify factors associated with CT values. Low CT values (high genomic load) were associated with shorter intervals between illness onset and specimen collection, young age (ages 3-8 years old), and self-rated illness severity for both influenza A and B. Low CT values were also associated with reported fever/feverishness and age ≥65 years for influenza A.