During the 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa, CDC implemented travel and border health measures to prevent international spread of the disease, educate and protect travelers and communities, and minimize disruption of international travel and trade. CDC staff provided in-country technical assistance for exit screening in countries in West Africa with Ebola outbreaks, implemented an enhanced entry risk assessment and management program for travelers at U.S. ports of entry, and disseminated information and guidance for specific groups of travelers and relevant organizations. New and existing partnerships were crucial to the success of this response, including partnerships with international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Organization for Migration, and nongovernment organizations, as well as domestic partnerships with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and state and local health departments. Although difficult to assess, travel and border health measures might have helped control the epidemic's spread in West Africa by deterring or preventing travel by symptomatic or exposed persons and by educating travelers about protecting themselves. Enhanced entry risk assessment at U.S. airports facilitated management of travelers after arrival, including the recommended active monitoring. These measures also reassured airlines, shipping companies, port partners, and travelers that travel was safe and might have helped maintain continued flow of passenger traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region. Travel and border health measures implemented in the countries with Ebola outbreaks laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts related to borders and travel, including development of regional surveillance systems, cross-border coordination, and implementation of core capacities at designated official points of entry in accordance with the International Health Regulations (2005). New mechanisms developed during this response to target risk assessment and management of travelers arriving in the United States may enhance future public health responses. The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html).

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami damaged nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi complex in Japan, resulting in radionuclide release. In response, US officials augmented existing radiological screening at its ports of entry (POEs) to detect and decontaminate travelers contaminated with radioactive materials. During March 12 to 16, radiation screening protocols detected 3 travelers from Japan with external radioactive material contamination at 2 air POEs. Beginning March 23, federal officials collaborated with state and local public health and radiation control authorities to enhance screening and decontamination protocols at POEs. Approximately 543 000 (99%) travelers arriving directly from Japan at 25 US airports were screened for radiation contamination from March 17 to April 30, and no traveler was detected with contamination sufficient to require a large-scale public health response. The response highlighted synergistic collaboration across government levels and leveraged screening methods already in place at POEs, leading to rapid protocol implementation. Policy development, planning, training, and exercising response protocols and the establishment of federal authority to compel decontamination of travelers are needed for future radiological responses. Comparison of resource-intensive screening costs with the public health yield should guide policy decisions, given the historically low frequency of contaminated travelers arriving during radiological disasters.

BACKGROUND: Hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) is a life-threatening illness usually caused by infection with Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O157 (STEC O157). We evaluated the age-specific rate of HUS and death among persons with STEC O157 infection and the risk factors associated with developing HUS. MEHTODS: STEC O157 infections and HUS cases were reported from 8 sites participating in the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network during 2000-2006. For each case of STEC O157 infection and HUS, demographic and clinical outcomes were reported. The proportion of STEC O157 infections resulting in HUS was determined. RESULTS:. A total of 3464 STEC O157 infections were ascertained; 218 persons (6.3%) developed HUS. The highest proportion of HUS cases (15.3%) occurred among children aged <5 years. Death occurred in 0.6% of all patients with STEC O157 infection and in 4.6% of those with HUS. With or without HUS, persons aged 60 years had the highest rate of death due to STEC O157 infection. Twelve (3.1%) of 390 persons aged 60 years died, including 5 (33.3%) of 15 persons with HUS and 7 (1.9%) of 375 without. Among children aged <5 years, death occurred in 4 (3.0%) of those with HUS and 2 (0.3%) of those without. CONCLUSION: Young children and females had an increased risk of HUS after STEC O157 infection. With or without HUS, elderly persons had the highest proportion of deaths associated with STEC O157 infection. These data support recommendations for aggressive supportive care of young children and the elderly early during illness due to STEC O157.