During responses to outbreaks, the collection and analysis of data on employed case patients' industry and occupation are necessary to better understand the relationship between work and health outcomes. The occurrence of mpox by occupation and industry has not previously been assessed in the context of the 2022 outbreak. We analyzed employment data from 2548 mpox cases reported to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from surveillance systems in seven U.S. jurisdictions and population-based reference data on employment patterns from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to describe the differential proportionate distribution of cases across occupation and industry groups using the proportionate morbidity ratio. In gender-specific analyses, we found that men employed in certain occupations and industries had a higher relative risk of mpox than others. While occupational transmission cannot be ruled out, it is more likely that individuals with personal and behavioral risk factors for mpox were more likely to work in these occupations and industries. This analysis provides an example of collecting and analyzing occupation and industry data in case reports to understand possible differences in risk by occupation and industry in infectious disease outbreak investigation and help inform resource allocation, messaging, and response.

NEHA strives to provide up-to-date and relevant information on environmental health and to build partnerships in the profession. In pursuit of these goals, we feature this column on environmental health services from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in every issue of the Journal. In these columns, authors from CDC's Water, Food, and Environmental Health Services Branch, as well as guest authors, will share insights and information about environmental health programs, trends, issues, and resources. The conclusions in these columns are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of CDC. Kerton Victory is an environmental health specialist and emergency coordinator with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health's (NIOSH) Emergency Preparedness and Response Office (EPRO). Jill Shugart is a senior environmental health specialist and the Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance coordinator with NIOSH EPRO. Sherry Burrer is a senior epidemiologist and emergency coordinator with NIOSH EPRO. Chad Dowell is the NIOSH deputy associate director for emergency preparedness and response. Lisa Delaney is the NIOSH associate director for emergency preparedness and response.

In July 2021, we conducted environmental sampling at the residence of a person in Dallas, Texas, USA, who had travel-associated human West African monkeypox virus (MPXV-WA). Targeted environmental swab sampling was conducted 15 days after the person who had monkeypox left the household. Results indicate extensive MPXV-WA DNA contamination, and viable virus from 7 samples was successfully isolated in cell culture. There was no statistical difference (p = 0.94) between MPXV-WA PCR positivity of porous (9/10, 90%) vs. nonporous (19/21, 90.5%) surfaces, but there was a significant difference (p<0.01) between viable virus detected in cultures of porous (6/10, 60%) vs. nonporous (1/21, 5%) surfaces. These findings indicate that porous surfaces (e.g., bedding, clothing) may pose more of a MPXV exposure risk than nonporous surfaces (e.g., metal, plastic). Viable MPXV was detected on household surfaces after at least 15 days. However, low titers (<10(2) PFU) indicate a limited potential for indirect transmission.

N95 respirators are the personal protective equipment most often used to control exposures to infections transmitted via the airborne route. Supplies of N95 respirators can become depleted during pandemics or when otherwise in high demand. In this paper, we offer strategies for optimizing supplies of N95 respirators in healthcare settings while maximizing the level of protection offered to healthcare personnel when there is limited supply in the United States during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The strategies are intended for use by professionals who manage respiratory protection programs, occupational health services, and infection prevention programs in healthcare facilities to protect healthcare personnel from job-related risks of exposure to infectious respiratory illnesses. Consultation with federal, state, and local public health officials is also important. We use the framework of surge capacity and the occupational health and safety hierarchy of controls approach to discuss specific engineering control, administrative control, and personal protective equipment measures that may help in optimizing N95 respirator supplies.

Congregate work and residential locations are at increased risk for infectious disease transmission including respiratory illness outbreaks. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is primarily spread person to person through respiratory droplets. Nationwide, the meat and poultry processing industry, an essential component of the U.S. food infrastructure, employs approximately 500,000 persons, many of whom work in proximity to other workers (1). Because of reports of initial cases of COVID-19, in some meat processing facilities, states were asked to provide aggregated data concerning the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19 and the number of workers with COVID-19 in these facilities, including COVID-19-related deaths. Qualitative data gathered by CDC during on-site and remote assessments were analyzed and summarized. During April 9-27, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases among 115 meat or poultry processing facilities in 19 states were reported to CDC. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,913 (approximately 3%) workers, and 20 COVID-19-related deaths were reported. Facility barriers to effective prevention and control of COVID-19 included difficulty distancing workers at least 6 feet (2 meters) from one another (2) and in implementing COVID-19-specific disinfection guidelines.* Among workers, socioeconomic challenges might contribute to working while feeling ill, particularly if there are management practices such as bonuses that incentivize attendance. Methods to decrease transmission within the facility include worker symptom screening programs, policies to discourage working while experiencing symptoms compatible with COVID-19, and social distancing by workers. Source control measures (e.g., the use of cloth face covers) as well as increased disinfection of high-touch surfaces are also important means of preventing SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Mitigation efforts to reduce transmission in the community should also be considered. Many of these measures might also reduce asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission (3). Implementation of these public health strategies will help protect workers from COVID-19 in this industry and assist in preserving the critical meat and poultry production infrastructure (4).

BACKGROUND: The causative agents for the current national outbreak of electronic-cigarette, or vaping, product use-associated lung injury (EVALI) have not been established. Detection of toxicants in bronchoalveolar-lavage (BAL) fluid from patients with EVALI can provide direct information on exposure within the lung. METHODS: BAL fluids were collected from 51 patients with EVALI in 16 states and from 99 healthy participants who were part of an ongoing study of smoking involving nonsmokers, exclusive users of e-cigarettes or vaping products, and exclusive cigarette smokers that was initiated in 2015. Using the BAL fluid, we performed isotope dilution mass spectrometry to measure several priority toxicants: vitamin E acetate, plant oils, medium-chain triglyceride oil, coconut oil, petroleum distillates, and diluent terpenes. RESULTS: State and local health departments assigned EVALI case status as confirmed for 25 patients and as probable for 26 patients. Vitamin E acetate was identified in BAL fluid obtained from 48 of 51 case patients (94%) in 16 states but not in such fluid obtained from the healthy comparator group. No other priority toxicants were found in BAL fluid from the case patients or the comparator group, except for coconut oil and limonene, which were found in 1 patient each. Among the case patients for whom laboratory or epidemiologic data were available, 47 of 50 (94%) had detectable tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or its metabolites in BAL fluid or had reported vaping THC products in the 90 days before the onset of illness. Nicotine or its metabolites were detected in 30 of 47 of the case patients (64%). CONCLUSIONS: Vitamin E acetate was associated with EVALI in a convenience sample of 51 patients in 16 states across the United States. (Funded by the National Cancer Institute and others.).

CDC, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), state and local health departments, and public health and clinical stakeholders are investigating a nationwide outbreak of e-cigarette, or vaping, product use-associated lung injury (EVALI) (1). CDC has published recommendations for health care providers regarding EVALI (2-4). Recently, researchers from Utah and New York published proposed diagnosis and treatment algorithms for EVALI (5,6). EVALI remains a diagnosis of exclusion because, at present, no specific test or marker exists for its diagnosis, and evaluation should be guided by clinical judgment. Because patients with EVALI can experience symptoms similar to those associated with influenza or other respiratory infections (e.g., fever, cough, headache, myalgias, or fatigue), it might be difficult to differentiate EVALI from influenza or community-acquired pneumonia on initial assessment; EVALI might also co-occur with respiratory infections. This report summarizes recommendations for health care providers managing patients with suspected or known EVALI when respiratory infections such as influenza are more prevalent in the community than they have been in recent months (7). Recommendations include 1) asking patients with respiratory, gastrointestinal, or constitutional symptoms about the use of e-cigarette, or vaping, products; 2) evaluating those suspected to have EVALI with pulse oximetry and obtaining chest imaging, as clinically indicated; 3) considering outpatient management for clinically stable EVALI patients who meet certain criteria; 4) testing patients for influenza, particularly during influenza season, and administering antimicrobials, including antivirals, in accordance with established guidelines; 5) using caution when considering prescribing corticosteroids for outpatients, because this treatment modality has not been well studied among outpatients, and corticosteroids could worsen respiratory infections; 6) recommending evidence-based treatment strategies, including behavioral counseling, to help patients discontinue using e-cigarette, or vaping, products; and 7) emphasizing the importance of annual influenza vaccination for all persons aged >/=6 months, including patients who use e-cigarette, or vaping products.

CDC, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), state and local health departments, and public health and clinical stakeholders are investigating a nationwide outbreak of e-cigarette, or vaping, product use-associated lung injury (EVALI) (1). As of November 13, 2019, 49 states, the District of Columbia, and two U.S. territories (Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands) have reported 2,172 EVALI cases to CDC, including 42 (1.9%) EVALI-associated deaths. To inform EVALI surveillance, including during the 2019-20 influenza season, case report information supplied by states for hospitalized and nonhospitalized patients with EVALI were analyzed using data collected as of November 5, 2019. Among 2,016 EVALI patients with available data on hospitalization status, 1,906 (95%) were hospitalized, and 110 (5%) were not hospitalized. Demographic characteristics of hospitalized and nonhospitalized patients were similar; most were male (68% of hospitalized versus 65% of nonhospitalized patients), and most were aged <35 years (78% of hospitalized versus 74% of nonhospitalized patients). These patients also reported similar use of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)-containing products (83% of hospitalized versus 84% of nonhospitalized patients). Given the similarity between hospitalized and nonhospitalized EVALI patients, the potential for large numbers of respiratory infections during the emerging 2019-20 influenza season, and the potential difficulty in distinguishing EVALI from respiratory infections, CDC will no longer collect national data on nonhospitalized EVALI patients. Further collection of data on nonhospitalized patients will be at the discretion of individual state, local, and territorial health departments. Candidates for outpatient management of EVALI should have normal oxygen saturation (>/=95% while breathing room air), no respiratory distress, no comorbidities that might compromise pulmonary reserve, reliable access to care, strong social support systems, and should be able to ensure follow-up within 24-48 hours of initial evaluation and to seek medical care promptly if respiratory symptoms worsen. Health care providers should emphasize the importance of annual influenza vaccination for all persons aged >/=6 months, including persons who use e-cigarette, or vaping, products (2,3).

During a pandemic caused by a novel strain of influenza virus, it is estimated that more than 68 million people in the United States may seek acute medical care.1-3 Providing protection for healthcare personnel who care for patients is essential to ensure continuity of healthcare services during a public health emergency, including a pandemic.4 However, at the onset of a pandemic, a well-matched vaccine may not be available, and limited supplies of antiviral medications will likely be reserved primarily for treatment of ill patients, instead of prophylaxis. While a hierarchy of infection prevention measures will be widely used, surges of infectious patients may leave many healthcare personnel to use respiratory protective devices (RPDs) as a primary means of self-protection.5 To promote healthcare worker protection against occupational exposures, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has sought to understand the optimal roles of RPDs, such as N95 filtering facepiece respirators (N95) and surgical masks (sometimes called medical masks), in the context of a pandemic. Prioritization of RPD allocation to healthcare personnel to limit exposures will require critical deliberation as demand outstrips RPD availability. To arrive at a rational, equitable, and transparent allocation process, stakeholders should build on lessons learned about personal protective equipment (PPE) supply chain from recent outbreaks, such as the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, the 2013-14 H7N9 influenza outbreak, and the 2014 Ebola epidemic.6

CDC is investigating reports of potential occupational exposure to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and Mycobacterium tuberculosis among workers performing preparation and dissection procedures on human nontransplant anatomical materials at a nontransplant anatomical donation center in Arizona. CDC is working with Arizona public health officials to inform persons exposed to these potentially infected materials. Nontransplant anatomical centers around the United States process thousands of donated cadavers annually. These materials (which might be fresh, frozen, or chemically preserved) are used by universities and surgical instrument and pharmaceutical companies for medical education and research. The American Association of Tissue Banks has developed accreditation policies for nontransplant anatomical donation organizations. It also has written standards that specify exclusion criteria for donor material, as well as use of proper environmental controls and safe work practices to prevent transmission of infectious agents during receipt and handling of nontransplant anatomical materials. At the center under investigation, which is now closed, these standards might not have been consistently implemented.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate both the cholinesterase monitoring program and newer field methods of determining coumaphos exposure among tick eradication workers. METHODS: Measured blood cholinesterase by the Ellman and field testing methods and tested urine for chlorferon pre- and postshift; conducted personal air sampling, patch sampling of clothing, and wipe sampling of hands for coumaphos. RESULTS: Fifteen workers had normal plasma cholinesterase and acetylcholinesterase levels. No significant changes occurred pre- to postshift. High correlation was found between plasma cholinesterase and acetylcholinesterase levels by field testing and Ellman methods (r = 0.91, P < 0.01 and r = 0.63, P < 0.01, respectively). Chlorferon levels rose 4 to 6 hours after use (P < 0.01). Airborne coumaphos was detected in only one sample, in a trace amount. The majority of patch and hand wipe samples detected coumaphos. CONCLUSIONS: Dermal exposure to coumaphos resulted in significant increases in urinary metabolites of coumaphos.