INTRODUCTION: There is limited information about vaccine-preventable disease (VPD) surveillance cost. To address this gap, retrospective micro-costing studies of pre-COVID-19 pandemic VPD surveillance were conducted in Nepal and Ethiopia. Based on these evaluations-the sole cost evaluations on comprehensive VPD surveillance-this article provides methodological considerations and recommendations for other countries planning to conduct VPD surveillance costing studies to inform planning and budgeting. METHODS: The methods used for each study were systematically compared by key themes: costing perspective, cost categories, costing approach, allocation of shared costs, sampling criteria, extrapolation strategies, data collection, and analytic adjustments. For each theme, investigators identified methodologic challenges and potential strategies to address them, compared study methodologies to surveillance costing guidelines, and recommended practices for future such studies. RESULTS: The studies used similar perspectives and VPD inclusion criteria. Costs in Nepal were collected and analyzed by a subset of surveillance core and support functions, whereas the Ethiopia study categorized costs using surveillance support functions from the Global Strategy on Comprehensive VPD Surveillance. A mix of random and purposive sampling of surveillance sites was used in both studies. Surveillance sites were selected considering the strata of interest at each administrative level. Results from both studies were extrapolated country-wide using sampling weights and assumptions about the representativeness of purposively sampled units. DISCUSSION: The review highlighted potential methodologic tradeoffs in utility and precision of results based on the lessons learned from two country VPD surveillance cost studies. The advantages of collecting and using cost estimates by VPD surveillance core versus support function for program budgeting for varied audiences should be explored in future studies. Sampling strategies should be developed with consideration for the precision needed for the intended use of costing results. The resulting recommendations can improve and standardize the conduct and interpretation of future such studies.

BACKGROUND: In 2022, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention collaborated with implementing partners, African Field Epidemiology Network and Sydani Group, to support COVID-19 vaccination efforts in Nigeria. To characterize the costs of COVID-19 vaccination, this study evaluated financial costs per dose for activities implemented to support the intensification campaign for COVID-19 vaccination. METHODS: This retrospective evaluation collected secondary data from existing expenditure and programmatic records on resource utilization to roll out COVID-19 vaccination during 2022. The study included incremental financial costs of the activities implemented to support an intensification campaign for COVID-19 vaccination across nine states and six administrative levels in Nigeria from the perspective of the external donor (U.S. Government). Costs for vaccines and injection supplies, transport of vaccines, and any economic costs, including government in-kind contributions, were not included. All costs were converted from Nigerian Naira to 2022 U.S. Dollars (US$). RESULTS: The estimated financial delivery cost of the COVID-19 vaccination intensification campaign was US$0.84 per dose (total expenditure of US$6.29 million to administer 7,461,971 doses). Most of the financial resources were used for fieldwork activities (86%), followed by monitoring and supervision activities (8%), coordination activities (5%), and training-related activities (1%). Labor (58%) and travel (37%) were the resource inputs that accounted for the majority of the cost, while shares of other resource inputs were marginal (1% for each). Most labor costs (79%) were spent on payments for mass vaccination campaign teams, including pay-for-performance incentives. By administrative level, the largest share of costs (46%) was for pay-for-performance incentives at the community, health facility, or campus levels combined, followed by local government area level (24%), community level only (15%), state level (9%), national level (3%), campus level only (1%), and health facility level only (< 1%). CONCLUSIONS: Findings from the evaluation can help to inform resources needed for vaccination activities to respond to future outbreaks and pandemics in resource-limited settings, particularly to reach new target populations not regularly included in routine childhood immunization delivery.

BACKGROUND: Trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) was globally replaced with bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) in April 2016 ("the switch"). Many outbreaks of paralytic poliomyelitis associated with type 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) have been reported since this time. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) developed standard operating procedures (SOPs) to guide countries experiencing cVDPV2 outbreaks to implement timely and effective outbreak response (OBR). To assess the possible role of compliance with SOPs in successfully stopping cVDPV2 outbreaks, we analyzed data on critical timelines in the OBR process. METHODS: Data were collected on all cVDPV2 outbreaks detected for the period April 1, 2016 and December 31, 2020 and all outbreak responses to those outbreaks between April 1, 2016 and December 31, 2021. We conducted secondary data analysis using the GPEI Polio Information System database, records from the Anonymized Institution Poliovirus Laboratory, and meeting minutes of the monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2) Advisory Group. Date of notification of circulating virus was defined as Day 0 for this analysis. Extracted process variables were compared with indicators in the GPEI SOP version 3.1. RESULTS: One hundred and eleven cVDPV2 outbreaks resulting from 67 distinct cVDPV2 emergences were reported during April 1, 2016-December 31, 2020, affecting 34 countries across four World Health Organization Regions. Out of 65 OBRs with the first large-scale campaign (R1) conducted after Day 0, only 12 (18.5%) R1s were conducted by the target of 28 days after Day 0. Of the 89 OBRs with the second large-scale campaign (R2) conducted after Day 0, 30 (33.7%) R2s were conducted by the target of 56 days after Day 0. Twenty-three (31.9%) of the 72 outbreaks with isolates dated after Day 0 were stopped within the 120-day target. CONCLUSION: Since "the switch", delays in OBR implementation were evident in many countries, which may be related to the persistence of cVDPV2 outbreaks >120 days. To achieve timely and effective response, countries should follow GPEI OBR guidelines.