BACKGROUND: Violence is a leading cause of death in North Carolina. The North Carolina Violent Death Reporting System (NC-VDRS) is part of the National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS), which monitors violent deaths and collects information about injuries and psychosocial contributors. Our objective was to describe and evaluate the quality, timeliness, and usefulness of the system. METHODS: We used the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems to assess the system. We performed subjective assessment of system attributes by reviewing system documents and interviewing stakeholders. We estimated NC-VDRS's reporting completeness using a capture-recapture method. RESULTS: Stakeholders considered data provided by NC-VDRS to be of high quality. Reporting to the national system has taken place before the specified 6-month and 18-month deadlines, but local stakeholder reports have been delayed up to 36 months. Stakeholders reported using NC-VDRS data for program planning and community education. The system is estimated to capture all NVDRS-defined cases, but law enforcement officers report only 61% of suicides. LIMITATIONS: The law enforcement agencies we interviewed may not be representative of all participating agencies in the state. Data sources used to assess completeness were not independent. CONCLUSION: NC-VDRS is useful and well-accepted. However, completeness of suicide reporting is limited, and reporting to local stakeholders has been delayed. Improving these limitations might improve the usefulness of the system for planning and appropriately targeting violence prevention interventions.

We investigated an outbreak initially attributed to norovirus; however, Clostridium perfringens toxicoinfection was subsequently confirmed. C. perfringens is an underrecognized but frequently observed cause of foodborne disease outbreaks. This investigation illustrates the importance of considering epidemiologic and laboratory data together when evaluating potential etiologies that might require unique control measures.

BACKGROUND: Oseltamivir resistance among 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) viruses (pH1N1) is rare. We investigated a cluster of oseltamivir-resistant pH1N1 infections in a hospital ward. METHODS: We reviewed patient records and infection control measures and interviewed health care personnel (HCP) and visitors. Oseltamivir-resistant pH1N1 infections were found with real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction and pyrosequencing for the H275Y neuraminidase (NA) mutation. We compared hemagglutinin (HA) sequences from clinical samples from the outbreak with those of other surveillance viruses. RESULTS: During the period 6-11 October 2009, 4 immunocompromised patients within a hematology-oncology ward exhibited symptoms of pH1N1 infection. The likely index patient became febrile 8 days after completing a course of oseltamivir; isolation was instituted 9 days after symptom onset. Three other case patients developed symptoms 1, 3, and 5 days after the index patient. Three case patients were located in adjacent rooms. HA and NA sequences from case patients were identical. Twelve HCP and 6 visitors reported influenza symptoms during the study period. No other pH1N1 isolates from the hospital or from throughout the state carried the H275Y mutation. CONCLUSIONS: Geographic proximity, temporal clustering, presence of H275Y mutation, and viral sequence homology confirmed nosocomial transmission of oseltamivir-resistant pH1N1. Diagnostic vigilance and prompt isolation may prevent nosocomial transmission of influenza.