Meningococcal disease is a life-threatening invasive infection caused by Neisseria meningitidis. Two quadrivalent (serogroups A, C, W, and Y) meningococcal conjugate vaccines (MenACWY) (MenACWY-CRM [Menveo, GSK] and MenACWY-TT [MenQuadfi, Sanofi Pasteur]) and two serogroup B meningococcal vaccines (MenB) (MenB-4C [Bexsero, GSK] and MenB-FHbp [Trumenba, Pfizer Inc.]), are licensed and available in the United States and have been recommended by CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). On October 20, 2023, the Food and Drug Administration approved the use of a pentavalent meningococcal vaccine (MenACWY-TT/MenB-FHbp [Penbraya, Pfizer Inc.]) for prevention of invasive disease caused by N. meningitidis serogroups A, B, C, W, and Y among persons aged 10-25 years. On October 25, 2023, ACIP recommended that MenACWY-TT/MenB-FHbp may be used when both MenACWY and MenB are indicated at the same visit for the following groups: 1) healthy persons aged 16-23 years (routine schedule) when shared clinical decision-making favors administration of MenB vaccine, and 2) persons aged ≥10 years who are at increased risk for meningococcal disease (e.g., because of persistent complement deficiencies, complement inhibitor use, or functional or anatomic asplenia). Different manufacturers' serogroup B-containing vaccines are not interchangeable; therefore, when MenACWY-TT/MenB-FHbp is used, subsequent doses of MenB should be from the same manufacturer (Pfizer Inc.). This report summarizes evidence considered for these recommendations and provides clinical guidance for the use of MenACWY-TT/MenB-FHbp.

BACKGROUND: College students are at increased risk for invasive meningococcal disease, but which students are most at risk is unclear. METHODS: US meningococcal disease cases in persons aged 18-24 years during 2014-2017 were included. Patients were classified as undergraduate students or other persons. Incidence in different student and non-student populations was compared. RESULTS: During 2014-2017, 229 meningococcal disease cases were reported in persons aged 18-24 years; 120 were in undergraduate students. Serogroup B accounted for 74% of cases in students. Serogroup B disease incidence was 4-fold higher in undergraduate students, 11.8-fold higher among first-year undergraduate students, and 8.6-fold higher among residence hall residents versus non-undergraduates. During outbreaks, students affiliated with Greek life had a 9.8-fold higher risk of disease compared to other students. A significantly higher party school ranking was observed for schools with sporadic or outbreak cases when compared to schools with no cases. CONCLUSIONS: The findings of increased disease risk among first-year students and those living on campus or affiliated with Greek life can inform shared clinical decision-making for serogroup B vaccines to prevent this rare but serious disease. These data also can inform school serogroup B vaccination policies and outbreak response measures.

Meningococcal disease is a serious but rare disease in the United States. Prior publications suggest incidence differs among privately vs publicly-insured persons, and that incidence is higher among persons experiencing homelessness (PEH) than persons not known to be experiencing homelessness (non-PEH). Using insurance claims data for persons aged <1 to 64 years, we calculated meningococcal disease incidence among a population with employer-sponsored commercial insurance and persons enrolled in state Medicaid programs nationwide. We also examined meningococcal disease incidence by PEH status in Medicaid data. From 2016 through 2019, persons who met our study inclusion criteria contributed a total of 84,460,548 person-years (PYs) to our analysis of commercial insurance data and 253,496,622 PYs to our analysis of Medicaid data. Incidence was higher among persons enrolled in Medicaid (0.12 cases per 100,000 PYs) than persons with commercial insurance (0.06 cases per 100,000 PYs). Incidence was 3.17 cases per 100,000 PYs among PEH in Medicaid, 27 times higher than among non-PEH in Medicaid. Understanding the underlying drivers of the higher meningococcal disease incidence among PEH and persons enrolled in Medicaid may inform prevention strategies for populations experiencing a higher burden of disease.

Three vaccines are routinely recommended for adolescents to prevent pertussis, meningococcal disease, and cancers caused by human papillomavirus (HPV). CDC analyzed data from the 2022 National Immunization Survey-Teen for 16,043 adolescents aged 13-17 years to assess vaccination coverage. Birth cohort analyses were conducted to assess trends in vaccination coverage by age 13 years (i.e., before the 13th birthday) and by age 14 years (i.e., before the 14th birthday) among adolescents who were due for routine vaccination before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Cross-sectional analysis was used to assess coverage estimates among adolescents aged 13-17 years. In 2022, vaccination coverage by age 14 years among adolescents born in 2008 continued to lag that of earlier birth cohorts and varied by sociodemographic factors and access to health care compared with coverage among earlier birth cohorts. Vaccination coverage by age 13 years among adolescents born in 2009 was similar to coverage estimates obtained before the COVID-19 pandemic. Among all adolescents aged 13-17 years, 2022 vaccination coverage levels did not differ from 2021 levels; however, initiation of the HPV vaccination series decreased among those who were insured by Medicaid. Coverage with ≥1 dose of tetanus, diphtheria, and acellular pertussis vaccine and ≥1 dose meningococcal conjugate vaccine was high and stable (around 90%). Providers should review adolescent vaccination records, especially among those born in 2008 and those in populations eligible for the Vaccines for Children program, to ensure adolescents are up to date with all recommended vaccines.

CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends routine vaccination of persons aged 11–12 years with tetanus, diphtheria, and acellular pertussis vaccine (Tdap), human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine, and quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine (MenACWY). A second (booster) dose of MenACWY is recommended at age 16 years. On the basis of shared clinical decision-making, adolescents aged 16–23 years may receive a serogroup B meningococcal vaccine (MenB) series. Catch-up vaccination is recommended for hepatitis A vaccine (HepA); hepatitis B vaccine (HepB); measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine (MMR); and varicella vaccine (VAR) for adolescents whose childhood vaccinations are not up to date (1). Although COVID-19 vaccination and influenza vaccination coverage estimates are not presented in this report, vaccination with a COVID-19 vaccine and annual influenza vaccination are also recommended by ACIP for adolescents* (2). To estimate vaccination coverage, CDC analyzed data for 18,002 adolescents aged 13–17 years from the 2021 National Immunization Survey-Teen (NIS-Teen).† Coverage with ≥1 dose of Tdap§ (89.6%) and ≥1 dose of MenACWY¶ (89.0%) remained high and stable compared with the previous year. Increases in coverage with the following vaccines occurred from 2020 to 2021: ≥1 dose of HPV** vaccine (from 75.1% to 76.9%); adolescents who were up to date with HPV vaccination (HPV UTD)†† (from 58.6% to 61.7%); and ≥2 MenACWY doses among adolescents aged 17 years (from 54.4% to 60.0%). Coverage with MenACWY, HPV vaccine, and ≥2 HepA doses was lower among adolescents living in nonmetropolitan statistical areas (non-MSAs)§§ than among those living in MSA principal cities. The potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was assessed by comparing vaccination coverage by age and birth year before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Coverage with ≥1 MenACWY dose by age 13 years was 5.1 percentage points lower among adolescents who reached age 13 years during the pandemic (2021) compared with those who reached age 13 in 2019. Coverage with ≥1 Tdap dose by age 12 years was 4.1 percentage points lower among children who reached age 12 years during the pandemic (2020) compared with those who reached age 12 before the pandemic. Coverage with ≥1 HPV vaccine dose by ages 12 and 13 years among children and adolescents who reached age 12 or 13 during the pandemic did not differ from coverage before the pandemic. Many children and adolescents might have missed routine medical care and recommended vaccinations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Review of patient vaccination records is important for providers to ensure that children and adolescents are up to date with all recommended vaccinations.

Novel outbreak-associated food vehicles (i.e., foods not implicated in past outbreaks) can emerge as a result of evolving pathogens and changing consumption trends. To identify these foods, we examined data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System and found 14,216 reported outbreaks with information on implicated foods. We compared foods implicated in outbreaks during 2007-2016 with those implicated in outbreaks during 1973-2006. We identified 28 novel food vehicles, of which the most common types were fish, nuts, fruits, and vegetables; one third were imported. Compared with other outbreaks, those associated with novel food vehicles were more likely to involve illnesses in multiple states and food recalls and were larger in terms of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. Two thirds of novel foods did not require cooking after purchase. Prevention efforts targeting novel foods cannot rely solely on consumer education but require industry preventive measures.

About 800 foodborne disease outbreaks are reported in the United States annually. Few are associated with food recalls. We compared 226 outbreaks associated with food recalls with those not associated with recalls during 2006-2016. Recall-associated outbreaks had, on average, more illnesses per outbreak and higher proportions of hospitalisations and deaths than non-recall-associated outbreaks. The top confirmed aetiology for recall-associated outbreaks was Salmonella. Pasteurised and unpasteurised dairy products, beef and molluscs were the most frequently implicated foods. The most common pathogen-food pairs for outbreaks with recalls were Escherichia coli-beef and norovirus-molluscs; the top pairs for non-recall-associated outbreaks were scombrotoxin-fish and ciguatoxin-fish. For outbreaks with recalls, 48% of the recalls occurred after the outbreak, 27% during the outbreak, 3% before the outbreak, and 22% were inconclusive or had unknown recall timing. Fifty per cent of recall-associated outbreaks were multistate, compared with 2% of non-recall-associated outbreaks. The differences between recall-associated outbreaks and non-recall-associated outbreaks help define the types of outbreaks and food vehicles that are likely to have a recall. Improved outbreak vehicle identification and traceability of rarely recalled foods could lead to more recalls of these products, resulting in fewer illnesses and deaths.

Campylobacter causes an estimated 1.3 million diarrheal illnesses in the United States annually (1). In August 2017, the Florida Department of Health notified CDC of six Campylobacter jejuni infections linked to company A, a national pet store chain based in Ohio. CDC examined whole-genome sequencing (WGS) data and identified six isolates from company A puppies in Florida that were highly related to an isolate from a company A customer in Ohio. This information prompted a multistate investigation by local and state health and agriculture departments and CDC to identify the outbreak source and prevent additional illness. Health officials from six states visited pet stores to collect puppy fecal samples, antibiotic records, and traceback information. Nationally, 118 persons, including 29 pet store employees, in 18 states were identified with illness onset during January 5, 2016-February 4, 2018. In total, six pet store companies were linked to the outbreak. Outbreak isolates were resistant by antibiotic susceptibility testing to all antibiotics commonly used to treat Campylobacter infections, including macrolides and quinolones. Store record reviews revealed that among 149 investigated puppies, 142 (95%) received one or more courses of antibiotics, raising concern that antibiotic use might have led to development of resistance. Public health authorities issued infection prevention recommendations to affected pet stores and recommendations for testing puppies to veterinarians. This outbreak demonstrates that puppies can be a source of multidrug-resistant Campylobacter infections in humans, warranting a closer look at antimicrobial use in the commercial dog industry.

PROBLEM/CONDITION: Known foodborne disease agents are estimated to cause approximately 9.4 million illnesses each year in the United States. Although only a small subset of illnesses are associated with recognized outbreaks, data from outbreak investigations provide insight into the foods and pathogens that cause illnesses and the settings and conditions in which they occur. REPORTING PERIOD: 2009-2015 DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM: The Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System (FDOSS) collects data on foodborne disease outbreaks, which are defined as the occurrence of two or more cases of a similar illness resulting from the ingestion of a common food. Since the early 1960s, foodborne outbreaks have been reported voluntarily to CDC by state, local, and territorial health departments using a standard form. Beginning in 2009, FDOSS reporting was made through the National Outbreak Reporting System, a web-based platform launched that year. RESULTS: During 2009-2015, FDOSS received reports of 5,760 outbreaks that resulted in 100,939 illnesses, 5,699 hospitalizations, and 145 deaths. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and CDC reported outbreaks. Among 2,953 outbreaks with a single confirmed etiology, norovirus was the most common cause of outbreaks (1,130 outbreaks [38%]) and outbreak-associated illnesses (27,623 illnesses [41%]), followed by Salmonella with 896 outbreaks (30%) and 23,662 illnesses (35%). Outbreaks caused by Listeria, Salmonella, and Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) were responsible for 82% of all hospitalizations and 82% of deaths reported. Among 1,281 outbreaks in which the food reported could be classified into a single food category, fish were the most commonly implicated category (222 outbreaks [17%]), followed by dairy (136 [11%]) and chicken (123 [10%]). The food categories responsible for the most outbreak-associated illnesses were chicken (3,114 illnesses [12%]), pork (2,670 [10%]), and seeded vegetables (2,572 [10%]). Multistate outbreaks comprised only 3% of all outbreaks reported but accounted for 11% of illnesses, 34% of hospitalizations, and 54% of deaths. INTERPRETATION: Foodborne disease outbreaks provide information about the pathogens and foods responsible for illness. Norovirus remains the leading cause of foodborne disease outbreaks, highlighting the continued need for food safety improvements targeting worker health and hygiene in food service settings. Outbreaks caused by Listeria, Salmonella, and STEC are important targets for public health intervention efforts, and improving the safety of chicken, pork, and seeded vegetables should be a priority. PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION: The causes of foodborne illness should continue to be tracked and analyzed to inform disease prevention policies and initiatives. Strengthening the capacity of state and local health departments to investigate and report outbreaks will assist with these efforts through identification of the foods, etiologies, and settings linked to these outbreaks.

BACKGROUND: From December 2014 to September 2016, a cholera outbreak in Kenya, the largest since 2010, caused 16,840 reported cases and 256 deaths. The outbreak affected 30 of Kenya's 47 counties and occurred shortly after the decentralization of many healthcare services to the county level. This mixed-methods study, conducted June-July 2015, assessed cholera preparedness in Homa Bay, Nairobi, and Mombasa counties and explored clinic- and community-based health care workers' (HCW) experiences during outbreak response. METHODS: Counties were selected based on cumulative cholera burden and geographic characteristics. We conducted 44 health facility cholera preparedness checklists (according to national guidelines) and 8 focus group discussions (FGDs). Frequencies from preparedness checklists were generated. To determine key themes from FGDs, inductive and deductive codes were applied; MAX software for qualitative data analysis (MAXQDA) was used to identify patterns. RESULTS: Some facilities lacked key materials for treating cholera patients, diagnosing cases, and maintaining infection control. Overall, 82% (36/44) of health facilities had oral rehydration salts, 65% (28/43) had IV fluids, 27% (12/44) had rectal swabs, 11% (5/44) had Cary-Blair transport media, and 86% (38/44) had gloves. A considerable number of facilities lacked disease reporting forms (34%, 14/41) and cholera treatment guidelines (37%, 16/43). In FDGs, HCWs described confusion regarding roles and reporting during the outbreak, which highlighted issues in coordination and management structures within the health system. Similar to checklist findings, FGD participants described supply challenges affecting laboratory preparedness and infection prevention and control. Perceived successes included community engagement, health education, strong collaboration between clinic and community HCWs, and HCWs' personal passion to help others. CONCLUSIONS: The confusion over roles, reporting, and management found in this evaluation highlights a need to adapt, implement, and communicate health strategies at the county level, in order to inform and train HCWs during health system transformations. International, national, and county stakeholders could strengthen preparedness and response for cholera and other public health emergencies in Kenya, and thereby strengthen global health security, through further investment in the existing Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response structure and national cholera prevention and control plan, and the adoption of county-specific cholera control plans.

Background In 2016, a multijurisdictional team investigated an outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) serogroup O121 and O26 infections linked to contaminated flour from a large domestic producer. Methods A case was defined as infection with an outbreak strain in which illness onset was between December 21, 2015, and September 5, 2016. To identify exposures associated with the outbreak, outbreak cases were compared with non-STEC enteric illness cases, matched according to age group, sex, and state of residence. Products suspected to be related to the outbreak were collected for STEC testing, and a common point of contamination was sought. Whole-genome sequencing was performed on isolates from clinical and food samples. Results A total of 56 cases were identified in 24 states. Univariable exact conditional logistic-regression models of 22 matched sets showed that infection was significantly associated with the use of one brand of flour (odds ratio, 21.04; 95% confidence interval [CI], 4.69 to 94.37) and with tasting unbaked homemade dough or batter (odds ratio, 36.02; 95% CI, 4.63 to 280.17). Laboratory testing isolated the outbreak strains from flour samples, and whole-genome sequencing revealed that the isolates from clinical and food samples were closely related to one another genetically. Trace-back investigation identified a common flour-production facility. Conclusions This investigation implicated raw flour as the source of an outbreak of STEC infections. Although it is a low-moisture food, raw flour can be a vehicle for foodborne pathogens.

High consumption rates and a multitude of brands make multistate foodborne outbreaks of Salmonella infections associated with chicken challenging to investigate, but whole genome sequencing is a powerful tool that can be used to assist investigators. Whole genome sequencing of pathogens isolated from clinical, environmental, and food samples is increasingly being used in multistate foodborne outbreak investigations to determine with unprecedented resolution how closely related these isolates are to one another genetically. In 2014, federal and state health officials investigated an outbreak of 146 Salmonella Heidelberg infections in 24 states. A follow-up analysis was conducted after the conclusion of the investigation in which 27 clinical and 24 food isolates from the outbreak underwent whole genome sequencing. These isolates formed seven clades, the largest of which contained clinical isolates from a subcluster of case patients who attended a catered party. One isolate from a chicken processed by a large producer was closely related genetically (zero to three single-nucleotide polymorphism differences) to the clinical isolates from these subcluster case patients. Chicken from this large producer was also present in the kitchen of the caterer on the day before the event, thus providing additional evidence that the chicken from this producer was the outbreak source. This investigation highlights how whole genome sequencing can be used with epidemiologic and traceback evidence to identify chicken sources of foodborne outbreaks.

During the Ebola virus outbreak of 2013-2016, the Viral Special Pathogens Branch field laboratory in Sierra Leone tested approximately 26 000 specimens between August 2014 and October 2015. Analysis of the B2M endogenous control Ct values showed its utility in monitoring specimen quality, comparing results with different specimen types, and interpretation of results. For live patients, blood is the most sensitive specimen type and oral swabs have little diagnostic utility. However, swabs are highly sensitive for diagnostic testing of corpses.

Toxigenic strains of Vibrio cholerae serogroups O1 and O139 have caused cholera epidemics, but other serogroups - such as O75 or O141 - can also produce cholera toxin and cause severe watery diarrhoea similar to cholera. We describe 31 years of surveillance for toxigenic non-O1, non-O139 infections in the United States and map these infections to the state where the exposure probably originated. While serogroups O75 and O141 are closely related pathogens, they differ in how and where they infect people. Oysters were the main vehicle for O75 infection. The vehicles for O141 infection include oysters, clams, and freshwater in lakes and rivers. The patients infected with serogroup O75 who had food traceback information available ate raw oysters from Florida. Patients infected with O141 ate oysters from Florida and clams from New Jersey, and those who only reported being exposed to freshwater were exposed in Arizona, Michigan, Missouri, and Texas. Improving the safety of oysters, specifically, should help prevent future illnesses from these toxigenic strains and similar pathogenic Vibrio species. Post-harvest processing of raw oysters, such as individual quick freezing, heat-cool pasteurization, and high hydrostatic pressurization, should be considered.

In 2015, community event-based surveillance (CEBS) was implemented in Sierra Leone to assist with the detection of Ebola virus disease (EVD) cases. We assessed the sensitivity of CEBS for finding EVD cases during a 7-month period, and in a 6-week subanalysis, we assessed the timeliness of reporting cases with no known epidemiologic links at time of detection. Of the 12,126 CEBS reports, 287 (2%) met the suspected case definition, and 16 were confirmed positive. CEBS detected 30% (16/53) of the EVD cases identified during the study period. During the subanalysis, CEBS staff identified 4 of 6 cases with no epidemiologic links. These CEBS-detected cases were identified more rapidly than those detected by the national surveillance system; however, too few cases were detected to determine system timeliness. Although CEBS detected EVD cases, it largely generated false alerts. Future versions of community-based surveillance could improve case detection through increased staff training and community engagement.

To determine whether 2 readily available indicators predicted survival among patients with Ebola virus disease in Sierra Leone, we evaluated information for 216 of the 227 patients in Bo District during a 4-month period. The indicators were time from symptom onset to healthcare facility admission and quantitative real-time reverse transcription PCR cycle threshold (Ct), a surrogate for viral load, in first Ebola virus-positive blood sample tested. Of these patients, 151 were alive when detected and had reported healthcare facility admission dates and Ct values available. Time from symptom onset to healthcare facility admission was not associated with survival, but viral load in the first Ebola virus-positive blood sample was inversely associated with survival: 52 (87%) of 60 patients with a Ct of >24 survived and 20 (22%) of 91 with a Ct of <24 survived. Ct values may be useful for clinicians making treatment decisions or managing patient or family expectations.

On January 6, 2015, a man aged 40 years was admitted to Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi, Kenya, with acute watery diarrhea. The patient was found to be infected with toxigenic Vibrio cholerae serogroup O1, serotype Inaba. A subsequent review of surveillance reports identified four patients in Nairobi County during the preceding month who met either of the Kenya Ministry of Health suspected cholera case definitions: 1) severe dehydration or death from acute watery diarrhea (more than four episodes in 12 hours) in a patient aged ≥5 years, or 2) acute watery diarrhea in a patient aged ≥2 years in an area where there was an outbreak of cholera. An outbreak investigation was immediately initiated. A confirmed cholera case was defined as isolation of V. cholerae O1 or O139 from the stool of a patient with suspected cholera or a suspected cholera case that was epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case. By January 15, 2016, a total of 11,033 suspected or confirmed cases had been reported from 22 of Kenya's 47 counties. The outbreak is ongoing.

INTRODUCTION: Millions of U.S. residents become ill from foodborne pathogens each year. Most foodborne outbreaks occur among small groups of persons in a localized area. However, because many foods are distributed widely and rapidly, and because detection methods have improved, outbreaks that occur in multiple states and that even span the entire country are being recognized with increasing frequency. METHODS: This report analyzes data from CDC's Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System to describe multistate foodborne outbreaks that occurred in the United States during 2010-2014. RESULTS: During this 5-year period, 120 multistate foodborne disease outbreaks (with identified pathogen and food or common setting) were reported to CDC. These multistate outbreaks accounted for 3% (120 of 4,163) of all reported foodborne outbreaks, but were responsible for 11% (7,929 of 71,747) of illnesses, 34% (1,460 of 4,247) of hospitalizations, and 56% (66 of 118) of deaths associated with foodborne outbreaks. Salmonella (63 outbreaks), Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (34), and Listeria monocytogenes (12) were the leading pathogens. Fruits (17), vegetable row crops (15), beef (13), sprouts (10), and seeded vegetables (nine) were the most commonly implicated foods. Traceback investigations to identify the food origin were conducted for 87 outbreaks, of which 55 led to a product recall. Imported foods were linked to 18 multistate outbreaks. CONCLUSIONS: Multistate foodborne disease outbreaks account for a disproportionate number of outbreak-associated illnesses, hospitalizations, and deaths relative to their occurrence. Working together, food industries and public health departments and agencies can develop and implement more effective ways to identify and to trace contaminated foods linked to multistate outbreaks. Lessons learned during outbreak investigations can help improve food safety practices and regulations, and might prevent future outbreaks.