Last data update: Jun 17, 2024. (Total: 47034 publications since 2009)
Records 1-3 (of 3 Records) |
Query Trace: Chung CL [original query] |
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COVID-19 Case Investigation and Contact Tracing Efforts from Health Departments - United States, June 25-July 24, 2020.
Spencer KD , Chung CL , Stargel A , Shultz A , Thorpe PG , Carter MW , Taylor MM , McFarlane M , Rose D , Honein MA , Walke H . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021 70 (3) 83-87 Case investigation and contact tracing are core public health tools used to interrupt transmission of pathogens, including SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19); timeliness is critical to effectiveness (1,2). In May 2020, CDC funded* 64 state, local, and territorial health departments(†) to support COVID-19 response activities. As part of the monitoring process, case investigation and contact tracing metrics for June 25-July 24, 2020, were submitted to CDC by 62 health departments. Descriptive analyses of case investigation and contact tracing load, timeliness, and yield (i.e., the number of contacts elicited divided by the number of patients prioritized for interview) were performed. A median of 57% of patients were interviewed within 24 hours of report of the case to a health department (interquartile range [IQR] = 27%-82%); a median of 1.15 contacts were identified per patient prioritized for interview(§) (IQR = 0.62-1.76), and a median of 55% of contacts were notified within 24 hours of identification by a patient (IQR = 32%-79%). With higher caseloads, the percentage of patients interviewed within 24 hours of case report was lower (Spearman coefficient = -0.68), and the number of contacts identified per patient prioritized for interview also decreased (Spearman coefficient = -0.60). The capacity to conduct timely contact tracing varied among health departments, largely driven by investigators' caseloads. Incomplete identification of contacts affects the ability to reduce transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Enhanced staffing capacity and ability and improved community engagement could lead to more timely interviews and identification of more contacts. |
Building biosafety capacity in our nation's laboratories
Chung CL , Bellis KS , Pullman A , O'Connor A , Shultz A . Health Secur 2019 17 (5) 353-363 The 2014 Ebola outbreak revealed biosafety vulnerabilities across the United States. We distributed $24.1 million to health departments to support public health laboratories (PHLs) and sentinel clinical laboratory partners to improve biosafety practices. We used 9 indicators to evaluate PHLs and associated clinical laboratories from March 2015 through April 2018 using descriptive statistics. On average, over 6 reporting periods, 59 awardee PHLs and 4,040 clinical laboratories responded. By April 2018, 92% (57 of 62) of PHLs had conducted at least 1 risk assessment for work with Ebola and another highly infectious disease. The number of PHLs having a policy for risk assessments increased from 32 of 61 (52%) to 49 of 54 (91%). The percentage of awardees meeting the target (80%) for associated clinical laboratories with staff certifications to package/ship rose from 32% (19 of 60) to 46% (25 of 54). The percentage of awardees meeting the target (70%) for associated clinical laboratories with risk assessment policies increased from 18% (8 of 44) to 28% (15 of 54). Awardees reported improvement among Ebola treatment centers/Ebola assessment hospitals with policies to perform risk assessments from 48% (20 of 42) to 67% (34 of 51). Public health laboratories and their clinical partners made progress on their abilities to address biosafety concerns and implement consistent biosafety practices, improving their ability to work safely with biological threats. More attention is needed to address gaps in the clinical community. Support for biosafety activities is critical to continuing to achieve progress. |
Strengthening rural states' capacity to prepare for and respond to emerging infectious diseases, 2013-2015
Santibanez S , Bellis KS , Bay A , Chung CL , Bradley K , Gibson D , Shultz A . South Med J 2019 112 (2) 101-105 Because clinicians may be the first to encounter cases of emerging infectious diseases, they need to be able to work together with public health departments to quickly identify and respond to infectious disease outbreaks. Infectious diseases are a constant threat in many parts of the United States, including rural areas. For example, from 2004 to 2016 reports of diseases from mosquito, tick, and flea bites—which are known to affect rural areas—have tripled in the United States.1 During this period, 9 new pathogens spread by infected mosquitoes and ticks were discovered or introduced, and >640,000 cases of these diseases were reported in the United States. Although state and local health departments and vector control organizations are the nation’s main defense against this threat, 84% of local vector control organizations lack at least 1 of 5 core vector control competencies.1 |
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