Balancing the control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission with the resumption of travel is a global priority. Current recommendations include mitigation measures before, during, and after travel. Pre- and post-travel strategies including symptom monitoring, testing, and quarantine can be combined in multiple ways considering different trade-offs in feasibility, adherence, effectiveness, cost and adverse consequences. Here we use a mathematical model to analyze the expected effectiveness of symptom monitoring, testing, and quarantine under different estimates of the infectious period, test-positivity relative to time of infection, and test sensitivity to reduce the risk of transmission from infected travelers during and after travel. If infection occurs 0-7 days prior to travel, immediate isolation following symptom onset prior to or during travel reduces risk of transmission while traveling by 26-30%. Pre-departure testing can further reduce risk if testing is close to the time of departure. For example, testing on the day of departure can reduce risk while traveling by 37-61%. For transmission risk after travel with infection time up to 7 days prior to arrival at the destination, isolation based on symptom monitoring reduced introduction risk at the destination by 42-56%. A 14-day quarantine after arrival, without symptom monitoring or testing, can reduce risk by 97-100% on its own. However, a shorter quarantine of 7 days combined with symptom monitoring and a test on day 3-4 after arrival is also effective (95-99%) at reducing introduction risk and is less burdensome, which may improve adherence. To reduce the risk of introduction without quarantine, optimal test timing after arrival is close to the time of arrival; with effective quarantine after arrival, testing a few days later optimizes sensitivity to detect those infected immediately before or while traveling. These measures can complement recommendations such as social distancing, using masks, and hand hygiene, to further reduce risk during and after travel.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.Funding StatementNo external funding supported this research.Author DeclarationsI confirm all relevant ethical guidelines have been followed, and any necessary IRB and/or ethics committee approvals have been obtained.YesThe details of the IRB/oversight body that provided approval or exemption for the research described are given below:Centers for Disease Control and PreventionAll necessary patient/participant consent has been obtained and the appropriate institutional forms have been archived.YesI understand that all clinical trials and any other prospective interventional studies must be registered with an ICMJE-approved registry, such as ClinicalTrials.gov. I confirm that any such study reported in the manuscript has been registered and the trial registration ID is provided (note: if posting a prospective study registered retrospectively, please provide a statement in the trial ID field explaining why the study was not registered in advance).YesI have followed all appropriate research reporting guidelines and uploaded the relevant EQUATOR Network research reporting checklist(s) and other pertinent material as supplementary files, if applicable.YesOnly publicly available data informed this research.

Background Despite layered mitigation measures, international travel during the COVID-19 pandemic continues to facilitate global spread of SARS-CoV-2, including novel variants of concern (VOCs). On November 26, 2021, B.1.1.529 (Omicron) was designated as a VOC by the World Health Organization [1]. On December 6, 2021, as part of measures to reduce the introduction and spread of Omicron, the requirement for a negative SARS-CoV-2 test taken before air travel to the United States was shortened from three days to one day pre-departure [1]. Although SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequencing has increased significantly during the pandemic [2], there is still a gap in early detection of emerging variants among arriving travelers. In September 2021, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in collaboration with private partners, implemented a voluntary SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance pilot program. Initially we enrolled arriving air travelers from India. On November 28, we expanded the program to include travelers arriving from countries with high travel volumes, including those where Omicron was first detected. Methods Design, Setting, and Participants During September 29-November 27, 2021, the surveillance program included travelers arriving on seven direct flights from India at three international airports: John F. Kennedy, New York (September 29), Newark Liberty, New Jersey (October 4), and San Francisco, California (October 12). During November 28-January 23, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Georgia was added, and participation was offered to travelers from South Africa, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Brazil, arriving on approximately 50 flights per day. Participants were 18 years or older, provided informed consent, and completed demographic, clinical, and travel history questions. Copyright The copyright holder for this preprint is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. This article is a US Government work. It is not subject to copyright under 17 USC 105 and is also made available for use under a CC0 license.

Beginning December 6, 2021, all international air passengers boarding flights to the United States were required to show either a negative result from a SARS-CoV-2 viral test taken ≤1 day before departure or proof of recovery from COVID-19 within the preceding 90 days (1). As of June 12, 2022, predeparture testing was no longer mandatory but remained recommended by CDC (2,3). Various modeling studies have estimated that predeparture testing the day before or the day of air travel reduces transmission or importation of SARS-CoV-2 by 31%-76% (4-7). Postarrival SARS-CoV-2 pooled testing data from CDC's Traveler-based Genomic Surveillance program were used to compare SARS-CoV-2 test results among volunteer travelers arriving at four U.S. airports during two 12-week periods: March 20-June 11, 2022, when predeparture testing was required, and June 12-September 3, 2022, when predeparture testing was not required. In a multivariable logistic regression model, pooled nasal swab specimens collected during March 20-June 11 were 52% less likely to be positive for SARS-CoV-2 than were those collected during June 12-September 3, after adjusting for COVID-19 incidence in the flight's country of origin, sample pool size, and collection airport (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 0.48, 95% CI = 0.39-0.58) (p<0.001). These findings support predeparture testing as a tool for reducing travel-associated SARS-CoV-2 transmission and provide important real-world evidence that can guide decisions for future outbreaks and pandemics.

We enrolled arriving international air travelers in a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 genomic surveillance program. We used molecular testing of pooled nasal swabs and sequenced positive samples for sublineage. Traveler-based surveillance provided early-warning variant detection, reporting the first US Omicron BA.2 and BA.3 in North America.

On August 29, 2021, the United States government oversaw the emergent establishment of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), led by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and implemented by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Department of State (DoS), to safely resettle U.S. citizens and Afghan nationals from Afghanistan to the United States. Evacuees were temporarily housed at several overseas locations in Europe and Asia* before being transported via military and charter flights through two U.S. international airports, and onward to eight U.S. military bases,(†) with hotel A used for isolation and quarantine of persons with or exposed to certain infectious diseases.(§) On August 30, CDC issued an Epi-X notice encouraging public health officials to maintain vigilance for measles among Afghan evacuees because of an ongoing measles outbreak in Afghanistan (25,988 clinical cases reported nationwide during January-November 2021) (1) and low routine measles vaccination coverage (66% and 43% for the first and second doses, respectively, in 2020) (2).

RATIONALE: Approximately two-thirds of new cases of tuberculosis (TB) in the United States are among non-U.S.-born persons. Culture-based overseas TB screening in U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees has substantially reduced the importation of TB into the United States, but it is unclear to what extent this program prevents the importation of multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB). OBJECTIVES: To study the epidemiology of MDR-TB in U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees, and to evaluate effect of culture-based overseas TB screening in U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees on reducing the importation of MDR-TB into the United States. METHODS: We analyzed data of immigrants and refugees who completed overseas treatment for culture-positive TB during 2015-2019. We also compared mean annual number of MDR-TB cases in non-U.S.-born persons within 1 year of arrival in the United States between 1996-2006 (when overseas screening followed a smear-based algorithm) and 2014-2019 (after full implementation of a culture-based algorithm). RESULTS: Of 3,300 culture-positive TB cases prevented by culture-based overseas TB screening in immigrants and refugees during 2015-2019, 122 (3.7%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 3.1-4.1) had MDR-TB, 20 (0.6%, 95% CI 0.3-0.9) had rifampicin-resistant TB, 382 (11.6%, 95% CI 10.5-12.7) had isoniazid-resistant TB, and 2,776 (84.1%, 95% CI 82.9-85.4) had rifampicin- and isoniazid-susceptible TB. None were diagnosed with extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB). Culture-based overseas TB screening in U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees prevented 24.4 MDR-TB cases per year from arriving in the United States, 18.2 cases more than smear-based overseas TB screening. Mean annual number of MDR-TB cases among non-U.S.-born persons within 1 year of arrival in the United States decreased from 34.6 cases in 1996-2006 to 19.5 cases in 2014-2019 (difference of 15.1, p<0.001). CONCLUSIONS: Culture-based overseas TB screening in U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees substantially reduced the importation of MDR-TB into the United States.

BACKGROUND: Cruise travel contributed to SARS-CoV-2 transmission when there were relatively few cases in the United States. By March 14, 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a No Sail Order suspending U.S. cruise operations; the last U.S. passenger ship docked on April 16. METHODS: We analyzed SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks on cruises in U.S. waters or carrying U.S. citizens and used regression models to compare voyage characteristics. We used compartmental models to simulate the potential impact of four interventions (screening for COVID-19 symptoms; viral testing on two days and isolation of positive persons; reduction of passengers by 40%, crew by 20%, and port visits to one) for 7-day and 14-day voyages. RESULTS: During January 19-April 16, 2020, 89 voyages on 70 ships had known SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks; 16 ships had recurrent outbreaks. There were 1,669 RT-PCR-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections and 29 confirmed deaths. Longer voyages were associated with more cases (adjusted incidence rate ratio, 1.10, 95% CI: 1.03-1.17, p < 0.0001). Mathematical models showed that 7-day voyages had about 70% fewer cases than 14-day voyages. On 7-day voyages, the most effective interventions were reducing the number of individuals onboard (43-49% reduction in total infections) and testing passengers and crew (42-43% reduction in total infections). All four interventions reduced transmission by 80%, but no single intervention or combination eliminated transmission. Results were similar for 14-day voyages. CONCLUSIONS: SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks on cruises were common during January-April 2020. Despite all interventions modeled, cruise travel still poses a significant SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk.

BACKGROUND: Balancing the control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission with the resumption of travel is a global priority. Current recommendations include mitigation measures before, during, and after travel. Pre- and post-travel strategies including symptom monitoring, antigen or nucleic acid amplification testing, and quarantine can be combined in multiple ways considering different trade-offs in feasibility, adherence, effectiveness, cost, and adverse consequences. METHODS: We used a mathematical model to analyze the expected effectiveness of symptom monitoring, testing, and quarantine under different estimates of the infectious period, test-positivity relative to time of infection, and test sensitivity to reduce the risk of transmission from infected travelers during and after travel. RESULTS: If infection occurs 0-7 days prior to travel, immediate isolation following symptom onset prior to or during travel reduces risk of transmission while traveling by 30-35%. Pre-departure testing can further reduce risk, with testing closer to the time of travel being optimal even if test sensitivity is lower than an earlier test. For example, testing on the day of departure can reduce risk while traveling by 44-72%. For transmission risk after travel with infection time up to 7 days prior to arrival at the destination, isolation based on symptom monitoring reduced introduction risk at the destination by 42-56%. A 14-day quarantine after arrival, without symptom monitoring or testing, can reduce post-travel risk by 96-100% on its own. However, a shorter quarantine of 7 days combined with symptom monitoring and a test on day 5-6 after arrival is also effective (97--100%) at reducing introduction risk and is less burdensome, which may improve adherence. CONCLUSIONS: Quarantine is an effective measure to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk from travelers and can be enhanced by the addition of symptom monitoring and testing. Optimal test timing depends on the effectiveness of quarantine: with low adherence or no quarantine, optimal test timing is close to the time of arrival; with effective quarantine, testing a few days later optimizes sensitivity to detect those infected immediately before or while traveling. These measures can complement recommendations such as social distancing, using masks, and hand hygiene, to further reduce risk during and after travel.

BACKGROUND: While persons who receive immigrant and refugee visas are screened for active tuberculosis before admission into the United States, nonimmigrant visa applicants (NIVs) are not routinely screened and may enter the United States with infectious tuberculosis. OBJECTIVES: We evaluated the costs and benefits of expanding pre-departure tuberculosis screening requirements to a subset of NIVs who arrive from a moderate (Mexico) or high (India) incidence tuberculosis country with temporary work visas. METHODS: We developed a decision tree model to evaluate the program costs and estimate the numbers of active tuberculosis cases that may be diagnosed in the United States in two scenarios: 1) "Screening": screening and treatment for tuberculosis among NIVs in their home country with recommended U.S. follow-up for NIVs at elevated risk of active tuberculosis; and, 2) "No Screening" in their home country so that cases would be diagnosed passively and treatment occurs after entry into the United States. Costs were assessed from multiple perspectives, including multinational and U.S.-only perspectives. RESULTS: Under "Screening" versus "No Screening", an estimated 179 active tuberculosis cases and 119 hospitalizations would be averted in the United States annually via predeparture treatment. From the U.S.-only perspective, this program would result in annual net cost savings of about $3.75 million. However, rom the multinational perspective, the screening program would cost $151,388 per U.S. case averted for Indian NIVs and $221,088 per U.S. case averted for Mexican NIVs. CONCLUSION: From the U.S.-only perspective, the screening program would result in substantial cost savings in the form of reduced treatment and hospitalization costs. NIVs would incur increased pre-departure screening and treatment costs.

Rationale: U.S. health departments routinely conduct post-arrival evaluation of immigrants and refugees at risk for tuberculosis (TB), but this important intervention has not been thoroughly studied.Objectives: To assess outcomes of the post-arrival evaluation intervention.Methods: We categorized at-risk immigrants and refugees as having had recent completion of treatment for pulmonary TB disease overseas (including in Mexico and Canada); as having suspected TB disease (chest radiograph/clinical symptoms suggestive of TB) but negative culture results overseas; or as having latent TB infection (LTBI) diagnosed overseas. Among 2.1 million U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees screened for TB overseas during 2013-2016, 90,737 were identified as at risk for TB. We analyzed a national data set of these at-risk immigrants and refugees and calculated rates of TB disease for those who completed post-arrival evaluation.Results: Among 4,225 persons with recent completion of treatment for pulmonary TB disease overseas, 3,005 (71.1%) completed post-arrival evaluation within 1 year of arrival; of these, TB disease was diagnosed in 22 (732 cases/100,000 persons), including 4 sputum culture-positive cases (133 cases/100,000 persons), 13 sputum culture-negative cases (433 cases/100,000 persons), and 5 cases with no reported sputum-culture results (166 cases/100,000 persons). Among 55,938 with suspected TB disease but negative culture results overseas, 37,089 (66.3%) completed post-arrival evaluation; of these, TB disease was diagnosed in 597 (1,610 cases/100,000 persons), including 262 sputum culture-positive cases (706 cases/100,000 persons), 281 sputum culture-negative cases (758 cases/100,000 persons), and 54 cases with no reported sputum-culture results (146 cases/100,000 persons). Among 30,574 with LTBI diagnosed overseas, 18,466 (60.4%) completed post-arrival evaluation; of these, TB disease was diagnosed in 48 (260 cases/100,000 persons), including 11 sputum culture-positive cases (60 cases/100,000 persons), 22 sputum culture-negative cases (119 cases/100,000 persons), and 15 cases with no reported sputum-culture results (81 cases/100,000 persons). Of 21,714 persons for whom treatment for LTBI was recommended at post-arrival evaluation, 14,977 (69.0%) initiated treatment and 8,695 (40.0%) completed treatment.Conclusions: Post-arrival evaluation of at-risk immigrants and refugees can be highly effective. To optimize the yield and impact of this intervention, strategies are needed to improve completion rates of post-arrival evaluation and treatment for LTBI.

In January 2020, with support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CDC instituted an enhanced entry risk assessment and management (screening) program for air passengers arriving from certain countries with widespread, sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The objectives of the screening program were to reduce the importation of COVID-19 cases into the United States and slow subsequent spread within states. Screening aimed to identify travelers with COVID-19-like illness or who had a known exposure to a person with COVID-19 and separate them from others. Screening also aimed to inform all screened travelers about self-monitoring and other recommendations to prevent disease spread and obtain their contact information to share with public health authorities in destination states. CDC delegated postarrival management of crew members to airline occupational health programs by issuing joint guidance with the Federal Aviation Administration.* During January 17-September 13, 2020, a total of 766,044 travelers were screened, 298 (0.04%) of whom met criteria for public health assessment; 35 (0.005%) were tested for SARS-CoV-2, and nine (0.001%) had a positive test result. CDC shared contact information with states for approximately 68% of screened travelers because of data collection challenges and some states' opting out of receiving data. The low case detection rate of this resource-intensive program highlighted the need for fundamental change in the U.S. border health strategy. Because SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission can occur in the absence of symptoms and because the symptoms of COVID-19 are nonspecific, symptom-based screening programs are ineffective for case detection. Since the screening program ended on September 14, 2020, efforts to reduce COVID-19 importation have focused on enhancing communications with travelers to promote recommended preventive measures, reinforcing mechanisms to refer overtly ill travelers to CDC, and enhancing public health response capacity at ports of entry. More efficient collection of contact information for international air passengers before arrival and real-time transfer of data to U.S. health departments would facilitate timely postarrival public health management, including contact tracing, when indicated. Incorporating health attestations, predeparture and postarrival testing, and a period of limited movement after higher-risk travel, might reduce risk for transmission during travel and translocation of SARS-CoV-2 between geographic areas and help guide more individualized postarrival recommendations.

BACKGROUND: The Diamond Princess cruise ship was the site of a large outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Of 437 Americans and their travel companions on the ship, 114 (26%) tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). METHODS: We interviewed 229 American passengers and crew after disembarkation following a ship-based quarantine to identify risk factors for infection and characterize transmission onboard the ship. RESULTS: The attack rate for passengers in single-person cabins or without infected cabinmates was 18% (58/329), compared with 63% (27/43) for those sharing a cabin with an asymptomatic infected cabinmate, and 81% (25/31) for those with a symptomatic infected cabinmate. Whole genome sequences from specimens from passengers who shared cabins clustered together. Of 66 SARS-CoV-2-positive American travelers with complete symptom information, 14 (21%) were asymptomatic while on the ship. Among SARS-CoV-2-positive Americans, 10 (9%) required intensive care, of whom 7 were ≥70 years. CONCLUSION: Our findings highlight the high risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission on cruise ships. High rates of SARS-CoV-2 positivity in cabinmates of individuals with asymptomatic infections suggest that triage by symptom status in shared quarters is insufficient to halt transmission. A high rate of intensive care unit admission among older individuals complicates the prospect of future cruise travel during the pandemic, given typical cruise passenger demographics. The magnitude and severe outcomes of this outbreak were major factors contributing to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's decision to halt cruise ship travel in U.S. waters in March 2020.

In 2016, a Zika virus epidemic swept across the Americas and resulted in the declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern because of the potentially devastating consequences of congenital infection.1,2 Globally, Zika virus transmission occurs at a much lower level today than in 2016; however, cases have been reported in 2017 and 2018 in Africa and India, and serological studies suggest nearly 10% of children younger than 5 years in Indonesia have evidence of Zika virus infection.3–5 Better international surveillance for Zika virus and Zika-associated birth defects is needed to appropriately counsel pregnant women, partners of pregnant women, and reproductive-aged couples living in or travelling to Zika virus-endemic areas.6 In The Lancet Infectious Diseases, Henrik Salje and colleagues7 compare the age distribution of confirmed Zika virus disease cases in Thailand with that during the Colombian Zika virus outbreak, and with the historical age distribution of dengue virus in Thailand.8 Although serosurveys typically establish levels of population immunity, cross-reactivity with other flaviviruses limits use of this method for Zika virus. Surveillance of confirmed, symptomatic cases, as presented by Salje and colleagues, can inform levels of population immunity, but might underestimate levels of population immunity from focal outbreaks. In settings with high levels of population immunity, recent cases would predominate in younger, previously unexposed populations, although exposure and health-care seeking can vary with age.7 Use of confirmed symptomatic cases to draw inferences about population immunity assumes that immunity is long lasting, protective of clinical disease, symptomatic attack rates are similar across age groups, and sufficient numbers in all age groups were tested.

In January 2018, a woman admitted to a Delaware hospital tested positive for New World hantavirus immunoglobulin M (IgM) and immunoglobulin G (IgG) by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). Subsequent testing by CDC’s Viral Special Pathogens Branch detected New World hantavirus by nested reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and Andes virus by nucleic acid sequencing. This case represents the first confirmed importation of Andes virus infection into the United States; two imported cases have also been reported in Switzerland (1). Before her illness, the patient had traveled to the Andes region of Argentina and Chile from December 20, 2017, to January 3, 2018. She stayed in cabins and youth hostels in reportedly poor condition. No rodent exposures were reported. After returning to the United States on January 10, she developed fever, malaise, and myalgias on January 14. On January 17, while ill, she traveled on two commercial domestic flights. She was hospitalized during January 20–25 in Delaware and discharged to her home after clinical recovery.

The body of knowledge needed to effectively practice travel medicine has expanded since the 1990s, as migrants begin to comprise an increasing proportion of the world's population. We describe the unique needs of migrants, and provide resources available to migration health practitioners. As the number of the world's migrants grows, collaboration across disciplines is key to achieving high-quality migration health practices.

SETTING: In 2007, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) revised its tuberculosis (TB) technical instructions for panel physicians who administer mandatory medical examinations among US-bound immigrants. Many US-bound immigrants come from the Philippines, a high TB prevalence country. OBJECTIVE: To quantify economic and health impacts of smear- vs. culture-based TB screening. DESIGN: Decision tree modeling was used to compare three Filipino screening programs: 1) no screening, 2) smear-based screening, and 3) culture-based screening. The model incorporated pre-departure TB screening results from Filipino panel physicians and CDC databases with post-arrival follow-up outcomes. Costs (2013 $US) were examined from societal, immigrant, US Public Health Department and hospitalization perspectives. RESULTS: With no screening, an annual cohort of 35 722 Filipino immigrants would include an estimated 450 TB patients with 264 hospitalizations, at a societal cost of US$9.90 million. Culture-based vs. smear-based screening would result in fewer imported cases (80.9 vs. 310.5), hospitalizations (19.7 vs. 68.1), and treatment costs (US$1.57 million vs. US$4.28 million). Societal screening costs, including US follow-up, were greater for culture-based screening (US$5.98 million) than for smear-based screening (US$3.38 million). Culture-based screening requirements increased immigrant costs by 61% (US$1.7 million), but reduced costs for the US Public Health Department (22%, US$750 000) and of hospitalization (70%, US$1 020 000). CONCLUSION: Culture-based screening reduced imported TB and US costs among Filipino immigrants.

OBJECTIVE: Despite increasing diversity in the US population, substantial gaps in collecting data on race, ethnicity, primary language, and nativity indicators persist in public health surveillance and monitoring systems. In addition, few systems provide questionnaires in foreign languages for inclusion of non-English speakers. We assessed (1) the extent of data collected on race, ethnicity, primary language, and nativity indicators (ie, place of birth, immigration status, and years in the United States) and (2) the use of data-collection instruments in non-English languages among Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)-supported public health surveillance and monitoring systems in the United States. METHODS: We identified CDC-supported surveillance and health monitoring systems in place from 2010 through 2013 by searching CDC websites and other federal websites. For each system, we assessed its website, documentation, and publications for evidence of the variables of interest and use of data-collection instruments in non-English languages. We requested missing information from CDC program officials, as needed. RESULTS: Of 125 data systems, 100 (80%) collected data on race and ethnicity, 2 more collected data on ethnicity but not race, 26 (21%) collected data on racial/ethnic subcategories, 40 (32%) collected data on place of birth, 21 (17%) collected data on years in the United States, 14 (11%) collected data on immigration status, 13 (10%) collected data on primary language, and 29 (23%) used non-English data-collection instruments. Population-based surveys and disease registries more often collected data on detailed variables than did case-based, administrative, and multiple-source systems. CONCLUSIONS: More complete and accurate data on race, ethnicity, primary language, and nativity can improve the quality, representativeness, and usefulness of public health surveillance and monitoring systems to plan and evaluate targeted public health interventions to eliminate health disparities.

Histoplasmosis is known to be endemic to the Midwestern United States, but cases have been reported throughout much of the world. Somali, Hmong, and Burmese (ethnically Karen) persons make up some of the largest refugee populations coming the United States in recent years. Yet, information about risk of Histoplasma capsulatum infection amongst these populations is limited. This study used the CDC Migrant Serum Bank to test ~100 samples from each of Somali, Burmese, and Hmong U.S.-bound refugees. Samples were tested by enzyme immunoassay for Histoplasma capsulatum IgG. Overall 1% (2/299) of refugee serum samples were positive for H. capsulatum IgG. One of 99 samples obtained from Hmong refugees was positive, and the other positive sample came from among 100 Burmese refugee samples. H capsulatum IgG positivity was detected at low levels in Hmong and Burmese refugees. No IgG positivity was detected among 100 Somali refugees.

Recent manufacturing problems resulted in a shortage of the only U.S.-licensed yellow fever vaccine. This shortage is expected to lead to a complete depletion of yellow fever vaccine available for the immunization of U.S. travelers by mid-2017. CDC, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Sanofi Pasteur are collaborating to ensure a continuous yellow fever vaccine supply in the United States. As part of this collaboration, Sanofi Pasteur submitted an expanded access investigational new drug (eIND) application to FDA in September 2016 to allow for the importation and use of an alternative yellow fever vaccine manufactured by Sanofi Pasteur France, with safety and efficacy comparable to the U.S.-licensed vaccine; the eIND was accepted by FDA in October 2016. The implementation of this eIND protocol included developing a systematic process for selecting a limited number of clinic sites to provide the vaccine. CDC and Sanofi Pasteur will continue to communicate with the public and other stakeholders, and CDC will provide a list of locations that will be administering the replacement vaccine at a later date.

THE ‘PERFECT STORM’ of 10.4 million tuberculosis (TB) cases globally, 1.4 million TB deaths | globally,1 and 244 million migrants crossing international borders annually,2 continues to generate | attention across the world. Whether it’s from news | headlines or from country surveillance reports, | epidemiologists and policy makers are increasingly | aware of the challenges of addressing TB in migrating | populations. With this awareness, one fact is clear: | World Health Organization (WHO) targets for TB | elimination cannot be met without addressing TB in | mobile populations.3 | In this issue, van Aart et al. add to our understanding of TB in migrating populations in the Netherlands.4 They find that a migrant population | originating from a high TB incidence area (Somalia) | experiences a time lag in TB diagnosis of 17 months | after arrival, while populations from lower incidence | areas (Turkey and Morocco) do not. Their findings | help elucidate a key principle about the burden of TB | in migrating populations. While there is much | concern about the potential for TB importation when | migrants arrive in new countries, there is less | understanding of the long-term TB burden after they | have lived in their destination countries for several | years. This research, which involves the application | of sophisticated modeling techniques, helps public | health professionals and policy makers to better | understand the epidemiologic features of TB in | mobile populations, thus informing best practices | for TB control in these populations.

Background: Zika virus has spread rapidly in the Americas and has been imported into many nonendemic countries by travelers. Objective: To describe clinical manifestations and epidemiology of Zika virus disease in travelers exposed in the Americas. Design: Descriptive, using GeoSentinel records. Setting: 63 travel and tropical medicine clinics in 30 countries. Patients: Ill returned travelers with a confirmed, probable, or clinically suspected diagnosis of Zika virus disease seen between January 2013 and 29 February 2016. Measurements: Frequencies of demographic, trip, and clinical characteristics and complications. Results: Starting in May 2015, 93 cases of Zika virus disease were reported. Common symptoms included exanthema (88%), fever (76%), and arthralgia (72%). Fifty-nine percent of patients were exposed in South America; 71% were diagnosed in Europe. Case status was established most commonly by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing of blood and less often by PCR testing of other body fluids or serology and plaque-reduction neutralization testing. Two patients developed Guillain-Barre syndrome, and 3 of 4 pregnancies had adverse outcomes (microcephaly, major fetal neurologic abnormalities, and intrauterine fetal death). Limitation: Surveillance data collected by specialized clinics may not be representative of all ill returned travelers, and denominator data are unavailable. Conclusion: These surveillance data help characterize the clinical manifestations and adverse outcomes of Zika virus disease among travelers infected in the Americas and show a need for global standardization of diagnostic testing. The serious fetal complications observed in this study highlight the importance of travel advisories and prevention measures for pregnant women and their partners. Travelers are sentinels for global Zika virus circulation and may facilitate further transmission. Primary Funding Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, International Society of Travel Medicine, and Public Health Agency of Canada.

The current global refugee crisis involves 65.3 million persons who have been displaced from their homes or countries of origin. While escaping immediate harm may be their first priority, displaced people go on to face numerous health risks, including trauma and injuries, malnutrition, infectious diseases, exacerbation of existing chronic diseases, and mental health conditions. This crisis highlights the importance of building capacity among health-care providers, scientists, and laboratorians to understand and respond to the health needs of refugees. The November 2016 American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene (ASTMH) conference in Atlanta will feature an interactive exhibit entitled "The Refugee Journey to Wellbeing" and three symposia about refugee health. The symposia will focus on tropical disease challenges in refugee populations, careers in refugee health, and recent experiences of governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations in responding to the global refugee crisis. We invite ASTMH attendees to attend the exhibit and symposia and consider contributions they could make to improve refugee health through tropical disease research or clinical endeavors.

Using data from travelers to 4 countries in the Middle East, we estimated 3,250 (95% CI 1,300-6,600) severe cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome occurred in this region during September 2012-January 2016. This number is 2.3-fold higher than the number of laboratory-confirmed cases recorded in these countries.

Approximately 70,000-90,000 refugees are resettled to the United States each year, and during the next 5 years, 50,000 Congolese refugees are expected to arrive in the United States. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) performs refugee medical examinations overseas for the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program. In 2014, IOM reported that a large number of U.S.-bound Congolese refugees from Uganda had spleens that were enlarged on examination. During two evaluations of refugee populations in western Uganda in March and July 2015, refugees with splenomegaly on physical examination were offered additional assessment and treatment, including abdominal ultrasonography and laboratory testing. Among 987 persons screened, 145 (14.7%) had splenomegaly and received further testing. Among the 145 patients with splenomegaly, 63.4% were aged 5-17 years (median = 14.8 years). There was some evidence of family clustering, with 33 (22.7%) of the 145 cases occurring in families.

BACKGROUND: Many U.S.-bound refugees travel from countries where intestinal parasites (hookworm, Trichuris trichuria, Ascaris lumbricoides, and Strongyloides stercoralis) are endemic. These infections are rare in the United States and may be underdiagnosed or misdiagnosed, leading to potentially serious consequences. This evaluation examined the costs and benefits of combinations of overseas presumptive treatment of parasitic diseases vs. domestic screening/treating vs. no program. METHODS: An economic decision tree model terminating in Markov processes was developed to estimate the cost and health impacts of four interventions on an annual cohort of 27,700 U.S.-bound Asian refugees: 1) "No Program," 2) U.S. "Domestic Screening and Treatment," 3) "Overseas Albendazole and Ivermectin" presumptive treatment, and 4) "Overseas Albendazole and Domestic Screening for Strongyloides". Markov transition state models were used to estimate long-term effects of parasitic infections. Health outcome measures (four parasites) included outpatient cases, hospitalizations, deaths, life years, and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). RESULTS: The "No Program" option is the least expensive ($165,923 per cohort) and least effective option (145 outpatient cases, 4.0 hospitalizations, and 0.67 deaths discounted over a 60-year period for a one-year cohort). The "Overseas Albendazole and Ivermectin" option ($418,824) is less expensive than "Domestic Screening and Treatment" ($3,832,572) or "Overseas Albendazole and Domestic Screening for Strongyloides" ($2,182,483). According to the model outcomes, the most effective treatment option is "Overseas Albendazole and Ivermectin," which reduces outpatient cases, deaths and hospitalization by around 80% at an estimated net cost of $458,718 per death averted, or $2,219/$24,036 per QALY/life year gained relative to "No Program". DISCUSSION: Overseas presumptive treatment for U.S.-bound refugees is a cost-effective intervention that is less expensive and at least as effective as domestic screening and treatment programs. The addition of ivermectin to albendazole reduces the prevalence of chronic strongyloidiasis and the probability of rare, but potentially fatal, disseminated strongyloidiasis.

Zika virus belongs to the genus Flavivirus of the family Flaviviridae; it is transmitted to humans primarily through the bite of an infected Aedes species mosquito (e.g., Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus) (1). Zika virus has been identified as a cause of congenital microcephaly and other serious brain defects (2). As of June 30, 2016, CDC had issued travel notices for 49 countries and U.S. territories across much of the Western hemisphere (3), including Brazil, where the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Games of the XXXI Olympiad, also known as Rio 2016; Games) will be hosted in Rio de Janeiro in August and September 2016. During the Games, mosquito-borne Zika virus transmission is expected to be low because August and September are winter months in Brazil, when cooler and drier weather typically reduces mosquito populations (4). CDC conducted a risk assessment to predict those countries susceptible to ongoing Zika virus transmission resulting from introduction by a single traveler to the Games. Whereas all countries are at risk for travel-associated importation of Zika virus, CDC estimated that 19 countries currently not reporting Zika outbreaks have the environmental conditions and population susceptibility to sustain mosquito-borne transmission of Zika virus if a case were imported from infection at the Games. For 15 of these 19 countries, travel to Rio de Janeiro during the Games is not estimated to increase substantially the level of risk above that incurred by the usual aviation travel baseline for these countries. The remaining four countries, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Yemen, are unique in that they do not have a substantial number of travelers to any country with local Zika virus transmission, except for anticipated travel to the Games. These four countries will be represented by a projected, combined total of 19 athletes (plus a projected delegation of about 60 persons), a tiny fraction of the 350,000-500,000 visitors expected at the Games.* Overall travel volume to the Games represents a very small fraction (<0.25%) of the total estimated 2015 travel volume to Zika-affected countries,dagger highlighting the unlikely scenario that Zika importation would be solely attributable to travel to the Games. To prevent Zika virus infection and its complications among athletes and visitors to the Games and importation of Zika virus into countries that could sustain local transmission, pregnant women should not travel to the Games, mosquito bites should be avoided while traveling and for 3 weeks after returning home, and measures should be taken to prevent sexual transmission (Box).

During the 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa, CDC implemented travel and border health measures to prevent international spread of the disease, educate and protect travelers and communities, and minimize disruption of international travel and trade. CDC staff provided in-country technical assistance for exit screening in countries in West Africa with Ebola outbreaks, implemented an enhanced entry risk assessment and management program for travelers at U.S. ports of entry, and disseminated information and guidance for specific groups of travelers and relevant organizations. New and existing partnerships were crucial to the success of this response, including partnerships with international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Organization for Migration, and nongovernment organizations, as well as domestic partnerships with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and state and local health departments. Although difficult to assess, travel and border health measures might have helped control the epidemic's spread in West Africa by deterring or preventing travel by symptomatic or exposed persons and by educating travelers about protecting themselves. Enhanced entry risk assessment at U.S. airports facilitated management of travelers after arrival, including the recommended active monitoring. These measures also reassured airlines, shipping companies, port partners, and travelers that travel was safe and might have helped maintain continued flow of passenger traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region. Travel and border health measures implemented in the countries with Ebola outbreaks laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts related to borders and travel, including development of regional surveillance systems, cross-border coordination, and implementation of core capacities at designated official points of entry in accordance with the International Health Regulations (2005). New mechanisms developed during this response to target risk assessment and management of travelers arriving in the United States may enhance future public health responses. The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html).

Applying qualitative historical methods, we examined the consideration and implementation of school closures as a nonpharmaceutical intervention (NPI) in thirty US cities during the spring 2009 wave of the pA(H1N1) influenza pandemic. We gathered and performed close textual readings of official federal, state, and municipal government documents; media coverage; and academic publications. Lastly, we conducted oral history interviews with public health and education officials in our selected cities. We found that several local health departments pursued school closure plans independent of CDC guidance, that uncertainty of action and the rapidly evolving understanding of pA(H1N1) contributed to tension and pushback from the public, that the media and public perception played a significant role in the response to school closure decisions, and that there were some notable instances of interdepartmental communication breakdown. We conclude that health departments should continue to develop and fine-tune their action plans while also working to develop better communication methods with the public, and work more closely with education officials to better understand the complexities involved in closing schools. Lastly, state and local governments should work to resolve lingering issues of legal authority for school closures in times of public health crises.

BACKGROUND: This study explored the effect of screening and treatment of refugees for latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI) before entrance to the United States as a strategy for reducing active tuberculosis (TB). The purpose of this study was to estimate the costs and benefits of LTBI screening and treatment in United States bound refugees prior to arrival. METHODS: Costs were included for foreign and domestic LTBI screening and treatment and the domestic treatment of active TB. A decision tree with multiple Markov nodes was developed to determine the total costs and number of active TB cases that occurred in refugee populations that tested 55, 35, and 20 % tuberculin skin test positive under two models: no overseas LTBI screening and overseas LTBI screening and treatment. For this analysis, refugees that tested 55, 35, and 20 % tuberculin skin test positive were divided into high, moderate, and low LTBI prevalence categories to denote their prevalence of LTBI relative to other refugee populations. RESULTS: For a hypothetical 1-year cohort of 100,000 refugees arriving in the United States from regions with high, moderate, and low LTBI prevalence, implementation of overseas screening would be expected to prevent 440, 220, and 57 active TB cases in the United States during the first 20 years after arrival. The cost savings associated with treatment of these averted cases would offset the cost of LTBI screening and treatment for refugees from countries with high (net cost-saving: $4.9 million) and moderate (net cost-saving: $1.6 million) LTBI prevalence. For low LTBI prevalence populations, LTBI screening and treatment exceed expected future TB treatment cost savings (net cost of $780,000). CONCLUSIONS: Implementing LTBI screening and treatment for United States bound refugees from countries with high or moderate LTBI prevalence would potentially save millions of dollars and contribute to United States TB elimination goals. These estimates are conservative since secondary transmission from tuberculosis cases in the United States was not considered in the model.

Dr. Challa suggests several limitations of the data in our analysis, raising doubts about the effect of a newly implemented, overseas, culture-based TB screening algorithm on reducing the importation of this condition to the United States. We discussed some of these limitations in our article but have reached a different conclusion. | | Newly arrived nonimmigrant visitors contribute to the TB burden in the United States (1). The mean annual admission of nonimmigrant visitors between 2007 and 2012 decreased by 8.5% compared with that between 2002 and 2006. However, during the same period, the mean annual number of reported TB cases among foreign-born persons within 1 year of arrival decreased by 24.7%. This discrepancy in reductions indicates that the decrease in admissions of nonimmigrant visitors alone could not account for the overall decline of TB cases in the newly arrived, foreign-born population. | | Dr. Challa suggests that more foreign-born persons were likely to have received treatment for latent TB infection between 2007 and 2012, causing the decline of TB among newly arrived, foreign-born persons. This assumption is not consistent with the results of previous studies. For example, within 1 year of arrival in the United States, only 5.8% of TB cases were likely due to reactivation of latent infection (2). Therefore, identifying and treating latent TB infection is unlikely to explain much of the observed decline in TB cases among foreign-born persons within 1 year of arrival.