BACKGROUND: On 20 September 2022, the Ugandan Ministry of Health declared an outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Sudan ebolavirus. METHODS: From 6 October 2022 to 10 January 2023, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) staff conducted public health assessments at five US ports of entry for travellers identified as having been in Uganda in the past 21 days. CDC also recommended that state, local and territorial health departments ('health departments') conduct post-arrival monitoring of these travellers. CDC provided traveller contact information, daily to 58 health departments, and collected health department data regarding monitoring outcomes. RESULTS: Among 11 583 travellers screened, 132 (1%) required additional assessment due to potential exposures or symptoms of concern. Fifty-three (91%) health departments reported receiving traveller data from CDC for 10 114 (87%) travellers, of whom 8499 (84%) were contacted for monitoring, 1547 (15%) could not be contacted and 68 (1%) had no reported outcomes. No travellers with high-risk exposures or Ebola disease were identified. CONCLUSION: Entry risk assessment and post-arrival monitoring of travellers are resource-intensive activities that had low demonstrated yield during this and previous outbreaks. The efficiency of future responses could be improved by incorporating an assessment of risk of importation of disease, accounting for individual travellers' potential for exposure, and expanded use of methods that reduce burden to federal agencies, health departments, and travellers.

This report summarizes new recommendation and updates previous recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) for postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) to prevent human rabies (CDC. Human rabies prevention---United States, 2008: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. MMWR 2008;57[No. RR-3]). Previously, ACIP recommended a 5-dose rabies vaccination regimen with human diploid cell vaccine (HDCV) or purified chick embryo cell vaccine (PCECV). These new recommendations reduce the number of vaccine doses to four. The reduction in doses recommended for PEP was based in part on evidence from rabies virus pathogenesis data, experimental animal work, clinical studies, and epidemiologic surveillance. These studies indicated that 4 vaccine doses in combination with rabies immune globulin (RIG) elicited adequate immune responses and that a fifth dose of vaccine did not contribute to more favorable outcomes. For persons previously unvaccinated with rabies vaccine, the reduced regimen of 4 1-mL doses of HDCV or PCECV should be administered intramuscularly. The first dose of the 4-dose course should be administered as soon as possible after exposure (day 0). Additional doses then should be administered on days 3, 7, and 14 after the first vaccination. ACIP recommendations for the use of RIG remain unchanged. For persons who previously received a complete vaccination series (pre- or postexposure prophylaxis) with a cell-culture vaccine or who previously had a documented adequate rabies virus-neutralizing antibody titer following vaccination with noncell-culture vaccine, the recommendation for a 2-dose PEP vaccination series has not changed. Similarly, the number of doses recommended for persons with altered immunocompetence has not changed; for such persons, PEP should continue to comprise a 5-dose vaccination regimen with 1 dose of RIG. Recommendations for pre-exposure prophylaxis also remain unchanged, with 3 doses of vaccine administered on days 0, 7, and 21 or 28. Prompt rabies PEP combining wound care, infiltration of RIG into and around the wound, and multiple doses of rabies cell-culture vaccine continue to be highly effective in preventing human rabies.

In the version of the article originally published, some of the oligonucleotide sequences in Supplementary Table 4, on the “21 viruses” and “RVP” tabs, were mislabeled. The Supplementary Tables file has now been corrected.

National estimates suggest that COVID-19 vaccination coverage among pregnant persons is lower among those identifying as Hispanic or Latino (Hispanic) and non-Hispanic Black or African American. When examining COVID-19 vaccination coverage during pregnancy by race and ethnicity, however, data are typically limited to large, aggregate categories that might obscure within-group inequities. To address this, Massachusetts examined COVID-19 vaccination coverage among pregnant persons by combinations of 12 racial and 34 ethnic groupings. Among 102,275 persons with a live birth in Massachusetts during May 1, 2021-October 31, 2022, receipt of ≥1 dose of a COVID-19 vaccine before or during pregnancy was 41.6% overall and was highest among persons who identified as Asian (55.0%) and lowest among those who identified as Hispanic (26.7%). However, within all broad racial and ethnic groupings, disparities in COVID-19 vaccination coverage were identified when the data were disaggregated into more granular categories; for example, COVID-19 vaccination coverage ranged from 10.8%-61.1% among pregnant persons who identified as Hispanic. Disaggregated analyses reveal diverse experiences within broad racial and ethnic groupings. This information can be used to guide outreach to pregnant persons in communities with lower rates of COVID-19 vaccination coverage during pregnancy.

Borrelia miyamotoi, transmitted by Ixodes spp. ticks, was recognized as an agent of hard tick relapsing fever in the United States in 2013. Nine state health departments in the Northeast and Midwest have conducted public health surveillance for this emerging condition by using a shared, working surveillance case definition. During 2013-2019, a total of 300 cases were identified through surveillance; 166 (55%) were classified as confirmed and 134 (45%) as possible. Median age of case-patients was 52 years (range 1-86 years); 52% were male. Most cases (70%) occurred during June-September, with a peak in August. Fever and headache were common symptoms; 28% of case-patients reported recurring fevers, 55% had arthralgia, and 16% had a rash. Thirteen percent of patients were hospitalized, and no deaths were reported. Ongoing surveillance will improve understanding of the incidence and clinical severity of this emerging disease.

Dog importation data from 2018-2020 were evaluated to ascertain whether the dog importation patterns in the United States changed during the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically with regard to denial of entry. Dog denial of entry reports from January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2020, stored within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Quarantine Activity Reporting System, were reviewed. Basic descriptive statistics were used to analyze the data. Reason for denial, country of origin, and month of importation were all examined to determine which countries of origin resulted in the largest number of denials, and whether there was a seasonal change in importations during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020), compared to previous years (2018 and 2019). During 2020, CDC denied entry to 458 dogs. This represents a 52% increase in dogs denied entry compared to the averages in 2018 and 2019. Dogs were primarily denied entry for falsified rabies vaccination certificates (56%). Three countries exported 74% of all dogs denied entry into the United States, suggesting that targeted interventions may be needed for certain countries. Increased attempts to import inadequately vaccinated dogs from countries with canine rabies in 2020 may have been due to the increased demand for domestic pets during the COVID-19 pandemic. Educational messaging should highlight the risk of rabies and the importance of making informed pet purchases from foreign entities to protect pet owners, their families, and the public.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.CBPCustoms and Border ProtectionCDCCenters for Disease Control and PreventionCFRCode of Federal RegulationsCOVID-19coronavirus disease 2019CRVVcanine rabies virus variantQARSQuarantine Activity Reporting SystemRVCrabies vaccination certificate

Background and Objectives Case-based surveillance of pediatric COVID-19 cases underestimates the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infections among children and adolescents. Our objectives were to: 1) estimate monthly SARS-CoV-2 antibody seroprevalence among children aged 0-17 years and 2) calculate ratios of SARS-CoV-2 infections to reported COVID-19 cases among children and adolescents in 14 U.S. states.Methods Using data from commercial laboratory seroprevalence surveys, we estimated monthly SARS-CoV-2 antibody seroprevalence among children aged 0-17 years from August 2020 through May 2021. Seroprevalence estimates were based on SARS-CoV-2 anti-nucleocapsid immunoassays from February to May 2021. We compared estimated numbers of children infected with SARS-CoV-2 by May 2021 to cumulative incidence of confirmed and probable COVID-19 cases from case-based surveillance, and calculated infection: case ratios by state and type of anti-SARS-CoV-2 nucleocapsid immunoassay used for seroprevalence testing.Results Analyses included 67,321 serum specimens tested for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies among children in 14 U.S. states. Estimated ratios of SARS-CoV-2 infections to reported confirmed and probable COVID-19 cases among children and adolescents varied by state and type of immunoassay, ranging from 0.8-13.3 in May 2021.Conclusions Through May 2021, the majority of children in selected states did not have detectable SARS-CoV-2 nucleocapsid antibodies. Case-based surveillance underestimated the number of children infected with SARS-CoV-2, however the predicted extent of the underestimate varied by state, immunoassay, and over time. Continued monitoring of pediatric SARS-CoV-2 antibody seroprevalence should inform prevention and vaccination strategies.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.Funding StatementFunding for this work was supported by CDC (Atlanta, Georgia).Author DeclarationsI confirm all relevant ethical guidelines have been followed, and any necessary IRB and/or ethics committee approvals have been obtained.YesThe details of the IRB/oversight body that provided approval or exemption for the research described are given below:This activity was reviewed by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and determined to be consistent with non human participant research activity. Informed consent was waived, as data were deidentified. All necessary patient/participant consent has been obtained and the appropriate institutional forms have been archived.YesI understand that all clinical trials and any other prospective interventional studies must be registered with an ICMJE-approved registry, such as ClinicalTrials.gov. I confirm that any such study reported in the manuscript has been registered and the trial registration ID is provided (note: if posting a prospective study registered retrospectively, please provide a statement in the trial ID field explaining why the study was not registered in advance).YesI have followed all appropriate research reporting guidelines and uploaded the relevant EQUATOR Network research reporting checklist(s) and other pertinent material as supplementary files, if applicable.YesDeidentified individual participant data will not be made available.CDCCenters of Disease Control and PreventionMIS-CMultisystem inflammatory syndrome in childrenEUAEmergency Use AuthorizationFDAU.S. Food and Drug AdministrationACIPAdvisory Committee on Immunizations PracticesNNucleocapsidSSpikeIgImmunoglobulinCIConfidence intervals

Balancing the control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission with the resumption of travel is a global priority. Current recommendations include mitigation measures before, during, and after travel. Pre- and post-travel strategies including symptom monitoring, testing, and quarantine can be combined in multiple ways considering different trade-offs in feasibility, adherence, effectiveness, cost and adverse consequences. Here we use a mathematical model to analyze the expected effectiveness of symptom monitoring, testing, and quarantine under different estimates of the infectious period, test-positivity relative to time of infection, and test sensitivity to reduce the risk of transmission from infected travelers during and after travel. If infection occurs 0-7 days prior to travel, immediate isolation following symptom onset prior to or during travel reduces risk of transmission while traveling by 26-30%. Pre-departure testing can further reduce risk if testing is close to the time of departure. For example, testing on the day of departure can reduce risk while traveling by 37-61%. For transmission risk after travel with infection time up to 7 days prior to arrival at the destination, isolation based on symptom monitoring reduced introduction risk at the destination by 42-56%. A 14-day quarantine after arrival, without symptom monitoring or testing, can reduce risk by 97-100% on its own. However, a shorter quarantine of 7 days combined with symptom monitoring and a test on day 3-4 after arrival is also effective (95-99%) at reducing introduction risk and is less burdensome, which may improve adherence. To reduce the risk of introduction without quarantine, optimal test timing after arrival is close to the time of arrival; with effective quarantine after arrival, testing a few days later optimizes sensitivity to detect those infected immediately before or while traveling. These measures can complement recommendations such as social distancing, using masks, and hand hygiene, to further reduce risk during and after travel.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.Funding StatementNo external funding supported this research.Author DeclarationsI confirm all relevant ethical guidelines have been followed, and any necessary IRB and/or ethics committee approvals have been obtained.YesThe details of the IRB/oversight body that provided approval or exemption for the research described are given below:Centers for Disease Control and PreventionAll necessary patient/participant consent has been obtained and the appropriate institutional forms have been archived.YesI understand that all clinical trials and any other prospective interventional studies must be registered with an ICMJE-approved registry, such as ClinicalTrials.gov. I confirm that any such study reported in the manuscript has been registered and the trial registration ID is provided (note: if posting a prospective study registered retrospectively, please provide a statement in the trial ID field explaining why the study was not registered in advance).YesI have followed all appropriate research reporting guidelines and uploaded the relevant EQUATOR Network research reporting checklist(s) and other pertinent material as supplementary files, if applicable.YesOnly publicly available data informed this research.

Inadvertent ingestion of recreational waters contaminated with feces containing Cryptosporidium spp., an extremely chlorine-tolerant parasite, can result in gastrointestinal illness. In early 2023, a Massachusetts college notified the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) that 19 of 50 (38%) members of the men’s and women’s swim teams had experienced diarrhea beginning 3 days after their return from a weeklong training trip to Puerto Rico. One ill swimmer reported receiving a positive ova and parasite test result for Cryptosporidium. On days 5 and 6 after return from Puerto Rico, symptomatic Massachusetts swimmers competed in two meets against New York and Rhode Island collegiate teams (meet 1 and meet 2, respectively), raising concern about the potential for secondary transmission.

The first three SARS-CoV-2 phylogenetic lineages classified as variants of concern (VOCs) in the United States (U.S.) from December 15, 2020 to February 28, 2021, Alpha (B.1.1.7), Beta (B.1.351), and Gamma (P.1) lineages, were initially detected internationally. This investigation examined available travel history of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases reported in the U.S. in whom laboratory testing showed one of these initial VOCs. Travel history, demographics, and health outcomes for a convenience sample of persons infected with a SARS-CoV-2 VOC from December 15, 2020 through February 28, 2021 were provided by 35 state and city health departments, and proportion reporting travel was calculated. Of 1,761 confirmed VOC cases analyzed, 1,368 had available data on travel history. Of those with data on travel history, 1,168 (85%) reported no travel preceding laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 and only 105 (8%) reported international travel during the 30 days preceding a positive SARS-CoV-2 test or symptom onset. International travel was reported by 92/1,304 (7%) of persons infected with the Alpha variant, 7/55 (22%) with Beta, and 5/9 (56%) with Gamma. Of the first three SARS-CoV-2 lineages designated as VOCs in the U.S., international travel was common only among the few Gamma cases. Most persons infected with Alpha and Beta variant reported no travel history, therefore, community transmission of these VOCs was likely common in the U.S. by March 2021. These findings underscore the importance of global surveillance using whole genome sequencing to detect and inform mitigation strategies for emerging SARS-CoV-2 VOCs.

Melioidosis, a potentially fatal infectious disease of humans and animals, including nonhuman primates (NHPs), is caused by the high-consequence pathogen Burkholderia pseudomallei. This environmental bacterium is found in the soil and water of tropical regions, such as Southeast Asia, where melioidosis is endemic. The global movement of humans and animals can introduce B. pseudomallei into nonendemic regions of the United States, where environmental conditions could allow establishment of the organism. Approximately 60% of NHPs imported into the United States originate in countries considered endemic for melioidosis. To prevent the introduction of infectious agents to the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) requires newly imported NHPs to be quarantined for at least 31 d, during which time their health is closely monitored. Most diseases of public health concern that are transmissible from imported NHPs have relatively short incubation periods that fall within the 31-d quarantine period. However, animals infected with B. pseudomallei may appear healthy for months to years before showing signs of illness, during which time they can shed the organism into the environment. Melioidosis presents diagnostic challenges because it causes nonspecific clinical signs, serologic screening can produce unreliable results, and culture isolates are often misidentified on rapid commercial testing systems. Here, we present a case of melioidosis in a cynomolgus macaque (Macaca fascicularis) that developed a subcutaneous abscess after importation from Cambodia to the United States. The bacterial isolate from the abscess was initially misidentified on a commercial test. This case emphasizes the possibility of melioidosis in NHPs imported from endemic countries and its associated diagnostic challenges. If melioidosis is suspected, diagnostic samples and culture isolates should be submitted to a laboratory in the CDC Laboratory Response Network for conclusive identification and characterization of the pathogen.

BACKGROUND: Early in the pandemic, cruise travel exacerbated the global spread of SARS-CoV-2. We report epidemiologic and molecular findings from an investigation of a cluster of travelers with confirmed COVID-19 returning to the U.S. from Nile River cruises in Egypt. METHODS: State health departments reported data on real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction-confirmed COVID-19 cases with a history of Nile River cruise travel during February-March 2020 to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Demographic and epidemiologic data were collected through routine surveillance channels. Sequences were obtained from either state health departments or from the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Flu Data (GISAID). We conducted descriptive analyses of epidemiologic data and explored phylogenetic relationships between sequences. RESULTS: We identified 149 Nile River cruise travelers with confirmed COVID-19 who returned to 67 different U.S. counties in 27 states: among those with complete data, 4.7% (6/128) died and 28.1% (38/135) were hospitalized. These individuals traveled on 20 different Nile River cruise voyages (12 unique vessels). Fifteen community transmission events were identified in four states, with 73.3% (11/15) of these occurring in Wisconsin (as the result of a more detailed contact investigation in that state). Phylogenetic analyses supported the hypothesis that travelers were most likely infected in Egypt, with most sequences in Nextstrain clade 20A 93% (87/94). We observed genetic clustering by Nile River cruise voyage and vessel. CONCLUSIONS: Nile River cruise travelers with COVID-19 introduced SARS-CoV-2 over a very large geographic range, facilitating transmission across the United States early in the pandemic. Travelers who participate in cruises, even on small river vessels as investigated in this study, are at increased risk of SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Therefore, history of river cruise travel should be considered in contact tracing and outbreak investigations.

THIS REPORT SUMMARIZES THE EVIDENCE AND RATIONALE SUPPORTING THE COMPONENTS OF THE CSTE/CDC MIS-C SURVEILLANCE CASE DEFINITION AND DESCRIBES THE METHODS USED TO DEVELOP THE DEFINITION. THESE METHODS INCLUDED CONVENING MIS-C CLINICAL EXPERTS (I.E., CONSULTANTS): regarding identification of MIS-C and its distinction from other pediatric conditions, a review of available literature comparing MIS-C phenotype with that of pediatric COVID-19 and other hyperinflammatory syndromes, and retrospective application of different criteria to data from MIS-C cases previously reported to CDC.

BACKGROUND: With the emergence of the delta variant, the United States experienced a rapid increase in Covid-19 cases in 2021. We estimated the risk of breakthrough infection and death by month of vaccination as a proxy for waning immunity during a period of delta variant predominance. METHODS: Covid-19 case and death data from 15 U.S. jurisdictions during January 3 to September 4, 2021 were used to estimate weekly hazard rates among fully vaccinated persons, stratified by age group and vaccine product. Case and death rates during August 1 to September 4, 2021 were presented across four cohorts defined by month of vaccination. Poisson models were used to estimate adjusted rate ratios comparing the earlier cohorts to July rates. RESULTS: During August 1 to September 4, 2021, case rates per 100,000 person-weeks among all vaccine recipients for the January to February, March to April, May to June, and July cohorts were 168.8 (95% confidence interval [CI], 167.5 to 170.1), 123.5 (95% CI, 122.8 to 124.1), 83.6 (95% CI, 82.9 to 84.3), and 63.1 (95% CI, 61.6 to 64.6), respectively. Similar trends were observed by age group for BNT162b2 (Pfizer-BioNTech) and mRNA-1273 (Moderna) vaccine recipients. Rates for the Ad26.COV2.S (Janssen-Johnson & Johnson) vaccine were higher; however, trends were inconsistent. BNT162b2 vaccine recipients 65 years of age or older had higher death rates among those vaccinated earlier in the year. Protection against death was sustained for the mRNA-1273 vaccine recipients. Across age groups and vaccine types, people who were vaccinated 6 months ago or longer (January-February) were 3.44 (3.36 to 3.53) times more likely to be infected and 1.70 (1.29 to 2.23) times more likely to die from COVID-19 than people vaccinated recently in July 2021. CONCLUSIONS: Our study suggests that protection from SARS-CoV-2 infection among all ages or death among older adults waned with increasing time since vaccination during a period of delta predominance. These results add to the evidence base that supports U.S. booster recommendations, especially for older adults vaccinated with BNT162b2 and recipients of the Ad26.COV2.S vaccine. (Funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.).

As of October 11, 2022, a total of 26,577 monkeypox cases had been reported in the United States.* Although most cases of monkeypox are self-limited, lesions that involve anatomically vulnerable sites can cause complications. Ocular monkeypox can occur when Monkeypox virus (MPXV) is introduced into the eye (e.g., from autoinoculation), potentially causing conjunctivitis, blepharitis, keratitis, and loss of vision (1). This report describes five patients who acquired ocular monkeypox during July-September 2022. All patients received treatment with tecovirimat (Tpoxx)(†); four also received topical trifluridine (Viroptic).(§) Two patients had HIV-associated immunocompromise and experienced delays between clinical presentation with monkeypox and initiation of monkeypox-directed treatment. Four patients were hospitalized, and one experienced marked vision impairment. To decrease the risk for autoinoculation, persons with monkeypox should be advised to practice hand hygiene and to avoid touching their eyes, which includes refraining from using contact lenses (2). Health care providers and public health practitioners should be aware that ocular monkeypox, although rare, is a sight-threatening condition. Patients with signs and symptoms compatible with ocular monkeypox should be considered for urgent ophthalmologic evaluation and initiation of monkeypox-directed treatment. Public health officials should be promptly notified of cases of ocular monkeypox. Increased clinician awareness of ocular monkeypox and of approaches to prevention, diagnosis, and treatment might reduce associated morbidity.

Dog-maintained rabies virus variant (DMRVV) was eliminated in the United States in 2007. During 2015–2019, three dogs with rabies were imported into the United States from Egypt, where DMRVV is endemic. CDC developed a risk mitigation strategy, in consultation with a diverse group of subject matter experts, that permitted 296 dogs to be imported from Egypt during May 10, 2019–December 31, 2020, minimizing the risk for future rabid dog importations. The broadly vetted risk mitigation strategy, which included serologic testing for rabies antibody titer, improved CDC’s ability to ensure that imported dogs from Egypt posed no public health risk in the United States. This strategy could be used to guide future policy decisions regarding dog importations.

On June 16, 2021, rabies virus infection was confirmed in a dog included in a shipment of rescue animals imported into the United States from Azerbaijan. A multistate investigation was conducted to prevent secondary rabies cases, avoid reintroduction of a dog-maintained rabies virus variant (DMRVV), identify persons who might have been exposed and would be recommended to receive rabies postexposure prophylaxis, and investigate the cause of importation control failures. Results of a prospective serologic monitoring (PSM) protocol suggested that seven of 32 (22%) animals from the same shipment as the dog with confirmed rabies virus infection and who had available titer results after rabies vaccine booster had not been adequately vaccinated against rabies before importation. A requirement for rabies vaccination certificates alone will not adequately identify improper vaccination practices or fraudulent paperwork and are insufficient as a stand-alone rabies importation prevention measure. Serologic titers before importation would mitigate the risk for importing DMRVV.

On August 29, 2021, the United States government oversaw the emergent establishment of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), led by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and implemented by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Department of State (DoS), to safely resettle U.S. citizens and Afghan nationals from Afghanistan to the United States. Evacuees were temporarily housed at several overseas locations in Europe and Asia* before being transported via military and charter flights through two U.S. international airports, and onward to eight U.S. military bases,(†) with hotel A used for isolation and quarantine of persons with or exposed to certain infectious diseases.(§) On August 30, CDC issued an Epi-X notice encouraging public health officials to maintain vigilance for measles among Afghan evacuees because of an ongoing measles outbreak in Afghanistan (25,988 clinical cases reported nationwide during January-November 2021) (1) and low routine measles vaccination coverage (66% and 43% for the first and second doses, respectively, in 2020) (2).

BACKGROUND: Many health departments and private enterprises began offering SARS-CoV-2 testing to travelers at US airports in 2020. Persons with positive SARS-CoV-2 test results who have planned upcoming travel may be subject to US federal public health travel restrictions. We assessed availability of testing for SARS-CoV-2 at major US airports. We then describe the management of cases and close contacts at Denver International Airport's testing site. METHODS: We selected 100 US airports. Online surveys were conducted during November-December 2020 and assessed availability of testing for air travelers, flight crew, and airport employees. Respondents included health department (HD) staff or airport directors. We analyzed testing data and management practices for persons who tested positive and their close contacts at one airport (Denver International) from 12/21/2020 to 3/31/2021. RESULTS: Among the 100 selected airports, we received information on 77 airports; 38 (49%) had a testing site and several more planned to offer one (N=7; 9%). Most sites began testing in the fall of 2020. The most frequently offered tests were RT-PCR or other NAAT tests (N=28). Denver International Airport offered voluntary SARS-CoV-2 testing. Fifty-four people had positive results among 5724 tests conducted from 12/21/2020 to 3/31/2021 for a total positivity of <1%. Of these, 15 were travelers with imminent flights. The Denver HD issued an order requiring the testing site to immediately report cases and notify airlines to cancel upcoming flight itineraries for infected travelers and their traveling close contacts, minimizing the use of federal travel restrictions. CONCLUSIONS: As of December 2020, nearly half of surveyed US airports had SARS-CoV-2 testing sites. Such large-scale adoption of airport testing for a communicable disease is unprecedented and presents new challenges for travelers, airlines, airports, and public health authorities. This assessment was completed before the US and other countries began enforcing entry testing requirements; testing at airports will likely increase as travel demand returns and test requirements for travel evolve. Lessons from Denver demonstrate how HDs can play a key role in engaging airport testing sites to ensure people who test positive for SARS-CoV-2 immediately before travel do not travel on commercial aircraft.

Historically, public health surveillance for Lyme disease has required clinical follow-up on positive laboratory reports for the purpose of case classification. In areas with sustained high incidence of the disease, this resource-intensive activity yields a limited benefit to public health practice. A range of burden-reducing strategies have been implemented in many states, creating inconsistencies that limit the ability to decipher trends. Laboratory-based surveillance, or surveillance based solely on positive laboratory reports without follow-up for clinical information on positive laboratory reports, emerged as a feasible alternative to improve standardization in already high-incidence areas. To inform expectations of a laboratory-based surveillance model, we conducted a retrospective analysis of Lyme disease data collected during 2012-2018 from 10 high-incidence states. The number of individuals with laboratory evidence of infection ranged from 1302 to 20,994 per state and year. On average, 55% of those were ultimately classified as confirmed or probable cases (range: 29%-86%). Among all individuals with positive laboratory evidence, 18% (range: 2%-37%) were determined to be 'not a case' upon investigation and 23% (range: 2%-52%) were classified as suspect cases due to lack of associated clinical information and thus were not reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The number of reported cases under a laboratory-based approach to surveillance in high-incidence states using recommended two-tier testing algorithms is likely to be, on average, 1.2 times higher (range: 0.6-1.8 times) than what was reported to CDC during 2012-2018. A laboratory-based surveillance approach for high-incidence states will improve standardization and reduce burden on public health systems, allowing public health resources to focus on prevention messaging, exploration of novel prevention strategies and alternative data sources to yield information on the epidemiology of Lyme disease.

BACKGROUND: Case-based surveillance of pediatric coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases underestimates the prevalence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections among children and adolescents. Our objectives were to estimate monthly SARS-CoV-2 antibody seroprevalence and calculate ratios of SARS-CoV-2 infections to reported COVID-19 cases among children and adolescents in 8 US states. METHODS: Using data from the Nationwide Commercial Laboratory Seroprevalence Survey, we estimated monthly SARS-CoV-2 antibody seroprevalence among children aged 0-17 years from August 2020 through May 2021. We calculated and compared cumulative incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection extrapolated from population-standardized seroprevalence of antibodies to SARS-CoV-2, cumulative COVID-19 case reports since March 2020, and infection-to-case ratios among persons of all ages and children aged 0-17 years for each state. RESULTS: Of 41 583 residual serum specimens tested, children aged 0-4, 5-11, and 12-17 years accounted for 1619 (3.9%), 10 507 (25.3%), and 29 457 (70.8%), respectively. Median SARS-CoV-2 antibody seroprevalence among children increased from 8% (range, 6%-20%) in August 2020 to 37% (range, 26%-44%) in May 2021. Estimated ratios of SARS-CoV-2 infections to reported COVID-19 cases in May 2021 ranged by state from 4.7-8.9 among children and adolescents to 2.2-3.9 for all ages combined. CONCLUSIONS: Through May 2021 in selected states, the majority of children with serum specimens included in serosurveys did not have evidence of prior SARS-CoV-2 infection. Case-based surveillance underestimated the number of children infected with SARS-CoV-2 more than among all ages. Continued monitoring of pediatric SARS-CoV-2 antibody seroprevalence should inform prevention and vaccination strategies.

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated a clear need for high-throughput, multiplexed, and sensitive assays for detecting SARS-CoV-2 and other respiratory viruses as well as their emerging variants. Here, we present a cost-effective virus and variant detection platform, called microfluidic CARMEN (mCARMEN), that combines CRISPR-based diagnostics and microfluidics with a streamlined workflow for clinical use. We developed the mCARMEN respiratory virus panel (RVP) to test for up to 21 viruses, including SARS-CoV-2, other coronaviruses and both influenza strains, and demonstrated its diagnostic-grade performance on 525 patient specimens in an academic setting and 166 specimens in a clinical setting. We further developed an mCARMEN panel to enable identification of 6 SARS-CoV-2 variant lineages, including Delta and Omicron, and evaluated it on 2,088 patient specimens, with near-perfect concordance to sequencing-based variant classification. Lastly, we implemented a combined Cas13 and Cas12 approach that enables quantitative measurement of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza A viral copies in samples. The mCARMEN platform enables high-throughput surveillance of multiple viruses and variants simultaneously, enabling rapid detection of SARS-CoV-2 variants.

During July 2021, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) B.1.617.2 variant infections, including vaccine breakthrough infections, occurred after large public gatherings in Provincetown, Massachusetts, USA, prompting a multistate investigation. Public health departments identified primary and secondary cases by using coronavirus disease surveillance data, case investigations, and contact tracing. A primary case was defined as SARS-CoV-2 detected <14 days after travel to or residence in Provincetown during July 3-17. A secondary case was defined as SARS-CoV-2 detected <14 days after close contact with a person who had a primary case but without travel to or residence in Provincetown during July 3-August 10. We identified 1,098 primary cases and 30 secondary cases associated with 26 primary cases among fully and non-fully vaccinated persons. Large gatherings can have widespread effects on SARS-CoV-2 transmission, and fully vaccinated persons should take precautions, such as masking, to prevent SARS-CoV-2 transmission, particularly during substantial or high transmission.

BACKGROUND: An evaluation of postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) surveillance has not been conducted in over 10 years in the United States. An accurate assessment would be important to understand current rabies trends and inform public health preparedness and response to human rabies. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPLE FINDINGS: To understand PEP surveillance, we sent a survey to public health leads for rabies in 50 U.S. states, Puerto Rico, Washington DC, Philadelphia, and New York City. Of leads from 54 jurisdictions, 39 (72%) responded to the survey; 12 reported having PEP-specific surveillance, five had animal bite surveillance that included data about PEP, four had animal bite surveillance without data about PEP, and 18 (46%) had neither. Although 12 jurisdictions provided data about PEP use, poor data quality and lack of national representativeness prevented use of this data to derive a national-level PEP estimate. We used national-level and state specific data from the Healthcare Cost & Utilization Project (HCUP) to estimate the number of people who received PEP based on emergency department (ED) visits. The estimated annual average of initial ED visits for PEP administration during 2012-2017 in the United States was 46,814 (SE: 1,697), costing upwards of 165 million USD. State-level ED data for initial visits for administration of PEP for rabies exposure using HCUP data was compared to state-level surveillance data from Maryland, Vermont, and Georgia between 2012-2017. In all states, state-level surveillance data was consistently lower than estimates of initial ED visits, suggesting even states with robust PEP surveillance may not adequately capture individuals who receive PEP. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that making PEP a nationally reportable condition may not be feasible. Other methods of tracking administration of PEP such as syndromic surveillance or identification of sentinel states should be considered to obtain an accurate assessment.

Dog importation data from 2018-2020 were evaluated to ascertain whether the dog importation patterns in the United States changed during the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically with regard to denial of entry. Dog denial of entry reports from January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2020, stored within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Quarantine Activity Reporting System (QARS), were reviewed. Basic descriptive statistics were used to analyze the data. Reason for denial, country of origin, and month of importation were all examined to determine which countries of origin resulted in the largest number of denials, and whether there was a seasonal change in importations during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020), compared to previous years (2018 and 2019). During 2020, CDC denied entry to 458 dogs. This represents a 52% increase in dogs denied entry compared to the averages in 2018 and 2019. Dogs were primarily denied entry for falsified rabies vaccination certificates (56%). Three countries exported 74% of all dogs denied entry into the United States, suggesting that targeted interventions may be needed for certain countries. Increased attempts to import inadequately vaccinated dogs from countries with canine rabies in 2020 may have been due to the increased demand for domestic pets during the COVID-19 pandemic. Educational messaging should highlight the risk of rabies and the importance of making informed pet purchases from foreign entities to protect pet owners, their families, and the public.

During July 2021, 469 cases of COVID-19 associated with multiple summer events and large public gatherings in a town in Barnstable County, Massachusetts, were identified among Massachusetts residents; vaccination coverage among eligible Massachusetts residents was 69%. Approximately three quarters (346; 74%) of cases occurred in fully vaccinated persons (those who had completed a 2-dose course of mRNA vaccine [Pfizer-BioNTech or Moderna] or had received a single dose of Janssen [Johnson & Johnson] vaccine ≥14 days before exposure). Genomic sequencing of specimens from 133 patients identified the B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, in 119 (89%) and the Delta AY.3 sublineage in one (1%). Overall, 274 (79%) vaccinated patients with breakthrough infection were symptomatic. Among five COVID-19 patients who were hospitalized, four were fully vaccinated; no deaths were reported. Real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) cycle threshold (Ct) values in specimens from 127 vaccinated persons with breakthrough cases were similar to those from 84 persons who were unvaccinated, not fully vaccinated, or whose vaccination status was unknown (median = 22.77 and 21.54, respectively). The Delta variant of SARS-CoV-2 is highly transmissible (1); vaccination is the most important strategy to prevent severe illness and death. On July 27, CDC recommended that all persons, including those who are fully vaccinated, should wear masks in indoor public settings in areas where COVID-19 transmission is high or substantial.* Findings from this investigation suggest that even jurisdictions without substantial or high COVID-19 transmission might consider expanding prevention strategies, including masking in indoor public settings regardless of vaccination status, given the potential risk of infection during attendance at large public gatherings that include travelers from many areas with differing levels of transmission.

Zika virus diagnostic testing and laboratory research increased considerably when Zika virus began spreading through the Americas in 2015, increasing the risk for potential Zika virus exposure of laboratory workers and biomedical researchers. We report 4 cases of laboratory-associated Zika virus disease in the United States during 2016-2019. Of these, 2 were associated with needlestick injuries; for the other 2 cases, the route of transmission was undetermined. In laboratories in which work with Zika virus is performed, good laboratory biosafety practices must be implemented and practiced to reduce the risk for infection among laboratory personnel.

BACKGROUND: Balancing the control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission with the resumption of travel is a global priority. Current recommendations include mitigation measures before, during, and after travel. Pre- and post-travel strategies including symptom monitoring, antigen or nucleic acid amplification testing, and quarantine can be combined in multiple ways considering different trade-offs in feasibility, adherence, effectiveness, cost, and adverse consequences. METHODS: We used a mathematical model to analyze the expected effectiveness of symptom monitoring, testing, and quarantine under different estimates of the infectious period, test-positivity relative to time of infection, and test sensitivity to reduce the risk of transmission from infected travelers during and after travel. RESULTS: If infection occurs 0-7 days prior to travel, immediate isolation following symptom onset prior to or during travel reduces risk of transmission while traveling by 30-35%. Pre-departure testing can further reduce risk, with testing closer to the time of travel being optimal even if test sensitivity is lower than an earlier test. For example, testing on the day of departure can reduce risk while traveling by 44-72%. For transmission risk after travel with infection time up to 7 days prior to arrival at the destination, isolation based on symptom monitoring reduced introduction risk at the destination by 42-56%. A 14-day quarantine after arrival, without symptom monitoring or testing, can reduce post-travel risk by 96-100% on its own. However, a shorter quarantine of 7 days combined with symptom monitoring and a test on day 5-6 after arrival is also effective (97--100%) at reducing introduction risk and is less burdensome, which may improve adherence. CONCLUSIONS: Quarantine is an effective measure to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk from travelers and can be enhanced by the addition of symptom monitoring and testing. Optimal test timing depends on the effectiveness of quarantine: with low adherence or no quarantine, optimal test timing is close to the time of arrival; with effective quarantine, testing a few days later optimizes sensitivity to detect those infected immediately before or while traveling. These measures can complement recommendations such as social distancing, using masks, and hand hygiene, to further reduce risk during and after travel.