Health care personnel (HCP) are at increased risk for infection with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), as a result of their exposure to patients or community contacts with COVID-19 (1,2). Since the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Minnesota was reported on March 6, 2020, the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) has required health care facilities* to report HCP(†) exposures to persons with confirmed COVID-19 for exposure risk assessment and to enroll HCP with higher-risk exposures into quarantine and symptom monitoring. During March 6-July 11, MDH and 1,217 partnering health care facilities assessed 21,406 HCP exposures; among these, 5,374 (25%) were classified as higher-risk(§) (3). Higher-risk exposures involved direct patient care (66%) and nonpatient care interactions (e.g., with coworkers and social and household contacts) (34%). Within 14 days following a higher-risk exposure, nearly one third (31%) of HCP who were enrolled in monitoring reported COVID-19-like symptoms,(¶) and more than one half (52%) of enrolled HCP with symptoms received positive SARS-CoV-2 test results. Among all HCP with higher-risk exposures, irrespective of monitoring enrollment, 7% received positive SARS-CoV-2 test results. Compared with HCP with higher-risk exposures working in acute care settings, those working in congregate living or long-term care settings more often returned to work (57%), worked while symptomatic (5%), and received a positive test result (10%) during 14-day postexposure monitoring than did HCP working outside of such settings. These data highlight the need for awareness of nonpatient care SARS-CoV-2 exposure risks and for targeted interventions to protect HCP, in addition to residents, in congregate living and long-term care settings. To minimize exposure risk among HCP, health care facilities need improved infection prevention and control, consistent personal protective equipment (PPE) availability and use, flexible sick leave, and SARS-CoV-2 testing access. All health care organizations and HCP should be aware of potential exposure risk from coworkers, household members, and social contacts.

Healthcare personnel (HCP) are at potential risk for SARS-CoV-2 infection in occupational and non-occupational settings, even when fully vaccinated. This risk has increased during Delta variant circulation. SARS-CoV-2 testing of fully vaccinated HCP working in the 14 days after exposure is important to prevent virus introduction into healthcare settings.

OBJECTIVE: Describe a severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) hospital outbreak and the role of serial testing of patients and healthcare personnel (HCP) in interrupting SARS-CoV-2 transmission. DESIGN: Outbreak investigation. SETTING: Medical floor of a tertiary-care center in Minnesota. METHODS: Serial testing for SARS-CoV-2 and whole-genome sequencing (WGS) of positive specimens from HCP and patients were used. An outbreak-associated case was defined as a positive SARS-CoV-2 molecular test in an HCP who worked on the floor prior to testing positive or in a patient who was hospitalized on the medical floor bewteen October 27 and December 1, 2020. WGS was used to determine potential routes of transmission. RESULTS: The outbreak was detected after a patient hospitalized for 12 days tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. Serial testing of patients and HCP was conducted in response. Overall, 247 HCP and 41 patients participated in serial SARS-CoV-2 testing; 52 HCP (21%) and 19 hospitalized patients (46%) tested positive. One additional HCP tested positive outside serial testing. The WGS of specimens from 27 (51%) HCP and 15 (79%) patients identified 3 distinct transmission clusters. WGS and epidemiologic evidence suggested intrafacility transmission. The proportions of asymptomatic and presymptomatic patients who tested positive (63%) and HCP who worked during their infectious period (75%) highlight the need for serial testing of asymptomatic patients and HCP during outbreaks. CONCLUSIONS: Coupled with preventive measures such as personal protective equipment use and physical distancing, serial testing of HCP and patients could help detect and prevent transmission within healthcare facilities during outbreaks and when nosocomial transmission is suspected.

Since December 2020, the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) Public Health Laboratory has been receiving 100 specimens per week (50 from each of two clinical partners) with low cycle threshold (Ct) values for routine surveillance for SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. On January 25, 2021, MDH identified the SARS-CoV-2 variant P.1 in one specimen through this surveillance system using whole genome sequencing, representing the first identified case of this variant in the United States. The P.1 variant was first identified in travelers from Brazil during routine airport screening in Tokyo, Japan, in early January 2021 (1). This variant has been associated with increased transmissibility (2), and there are concerns that mutations in the spike protein receptor-binding domain might disrupt both vaccine-induced and natural immunity (3,4). As of February 28, 2021, a total of 10 P.1 cases had been identified in the United States, including the two cases described in this report, followed by one case each in Alaska, Florida, Maryland, and Oklahoma (5).

SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), can spread rapidly in high-risk congregate settings such as skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) (1). In Minnesota, SNF-associated cases accounted for 3,950 (8%) of 48,711 COVID-19 cases reported through July 21, 2020; 35% of SNF-associated cases involved health care personnel (HCP*), including six deaths. Facility-wide, serial testing in SNFs has been used to identify residents with asymptomatic and presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection to inform mitigation efforts, including cohorting of residents with positive test results and exclusion of infected HCP from the workplace (2,3). During April-June 2020, the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH), with CDC assistance, conducted weekly serial testing at two SNFs experiencing COVID-19 outbreaks. Among 259 tested residents, and 341 tested HCP, 64% and 33%, respectively, had positive reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) SARS-CoV-2 test results. Continued SARS-CoV-2 transmission was potentially facilitated by lapses in infection prevention and control (IPC) practices, up to 12-day delays in receiving HCP test results (53%) at one facility, and incomplete HCP participation (71%). Genetic sequencing demonstrated that SARS-CoV-2 viral genomes from HCP and resident specimens were clustered by facility, suggesting facility-based transmission. Residents and HCP working in SNFs are at risk for infection with SARS-CoV-2. As part of comprehensive COVID-19 preparation and response, including early identification of cases, SNFs should conduct serial testing of residents and HCP, maximize HCP testing participation, ensure availability of personal protective equipment (PPE), and enhance IPC practices(†) (4-5).

Antimicrobial drugs are a precious resource, responsible for saving millions of lives since their discovery. Unfortunately, some antimicrobials are rapidly losing their effectiveness due to the development and spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), a multi-faceted and complex problem affecting humans, animals, plants and the environment. While AMR is a global problem, in this paper, the authors briefly highlight some ongoing efforts in the United States of America aimed at integrating a One Health approach into policies and programmes that address this important health threat.

Foreign animal diseases (FADs) are recognized as a threat to agriculture, with potential devastating effects on our nation's livestock and poultry industries. As weapons of bioterrorism, FADs also represent a threat to our nation's homeland security. Veterinarians play a vital role in protecting our nation's agricultural resources through their ability to identify and promptly respond to FADs, some of which are of public health concern. Veterinarians working in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were surveyed to assess their awareness of FADs and their preparedness to recognize and respond to potential cases. Two hundred thirty-seven veterinary practitioners completed an online questionnaire which included demographic and practice characteristics, federal accreditation status, awareness of FAD history in the United States, awareness of current FAD threats, training, and professional experiences with FADs. In the analysis, we identified topics respondents were most familiar, and those which they feel pose the greatest disease threat. We also assessed respondents' interest in receiving supplemental training on FADs. Results of this survey indicate that most participating Pennsylvania veterinarians are familiar with FADs and have had educational exposure to FADs either during their formal veterinary education or through the United States Department of Agriculture veterinary accreditation program. However, the majority feels unprepared to recognize FADs. Most survey respondents expressed an interest in receiving supplemental training on FADs, and were willing to travel to receive the training.

BACKGROUND: Scabies, a highly pruritic and contagious mite infestation of the skin, is endemic among tropical regions and causes a substantial proportion of skin disease among lower-income countries. Delayed treatment can lead to bacterial superinfection, and treatment of close contacts is necessary to prevent reinfestation. We describe scabies incidence and superinfection among children in American Samoa (AS) to support scabies control recommendations. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We reviewed 2011-2012 pharmacy records from the only AS pharmacy to identify children aged ≤14 years with filled prescriptions for permethrin, the only scabicide available in AS. Medical records of identified children were reviewed for physician-diagnosed scabies during January 1, 2011-December 31, 2012. We calculated scabies incidence, bacterial superinfection prevalence, and reinfestation prevalence during 14-365 days after first diagnosis. We used log binomial regression to calculate incidence ratios for scabies by age, sex, and county. Medical record review identified 1,139 children with scabies (incidence 29.3/1,000 children aged ≤14 years); 604 (53%) had a bacterial superinfection. Of 613 children who received a scabies diagnosis during 2011, 94 (15.3%) had one or more reinfestation. Scabies incidence varied significantly among the nine counties (range 14.8-48.9/1,000 children). Children aged <1 year had the highest incidence (99.9/1,000 children). Children aged 0-4 years were 4.9 times more likely and those aged 5-9 years were 2.2 times more likely to have received a scabies diagnosis than children aged 10-14 years. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: Scabies and its sequelae cause substantial morbidity among AS children. Bacterial superinfection prevalence and frequent reinfestations highlight the importance of diagnosing scabies and early treatment of patients and close contacts. Investigating why certain AS counties have a lower scabies incidence might help guide recommendations for improving scabies control among counties with a higher incidence. We recommend interventions targeting infants and young children who have frequent close family contact.

Acute rheumatic fever is a nonsuppurative, immune-mediated consequence of group A streptococcal pharyngitis (strep throat). Recurrent or severe acute rheumatic fever can cause permanent cardiac valve damage and rheumatic heart disease, which increases the risk for cardiac conditions (e.g., infective endocarditis, stroke, and congestive heart failure). Antibiotics can prevent acute rheumatic fever if administered no more than 9 days after symptom onset. Long-term benzathine penicillin G (BPG) injections are effective in preventing recurrent acute rheumatic fever attacks and are recommended to be administered every 3-4 weeks for 10 years or until age 21 years to children who receive a diagnosis of acute rheumatic fever. During August 2013, in response to anecdotal reports of increasing rates of acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease, CDC collaborated with the American Samoa Department of Health and the Lyndon B. Johnson Tropical Medical Center (the only hospital in American Samoa) to quantify the number of cases of pediatric acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease in American Samoa and to assess the potential roles of missed pharyngitis diagnosis, lack of timely prophylaxis prescription, and compliance with prescribed BPG prophylaxis. Using data from medical records, acute rheumatic fever incidence was calculated as 1.1 and 1.5 cases per 1,000 children aged ≤18 years in 2011 and 2012, respectively; 49% of those with acute rheumatic fever subsequently received a diagnosis of rheumatic heart disease. Noncompliance with recommended prophylaxis with BPG after physician-diagnosed acute rheumatic fever was noted for 22 (34%) of 65 patients. Rheumatic heart disease point prevalence was 3.2 cases per 1,000 children in August 2013. Establishment of a coordinated acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease control program in American Samoa, likely would improve diagnosis, treatment, and patient compliance with BPG prophylaxis.

BACKGROUND: Healthcare-associated Legionnaires' disease (LD) is a preventable pneumonia with a 30% case-fatality rate. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines recommend a high index of suspicion for the diagnosis of healthcare-associated LD. We characterized an outbreak and evaluated contributing factors in a hospital using copper-silver ionization for prevention of Legionella growth in water. METHODS: Through medical chart review at a large, urban tertiary care hospital in November 2012, we identified patients diagnosed with LD during 2011-2012. Laboratory-confirmed cases were categorized as definite, probable, and not healthcare-associated based on time spent in the hospital during the incubation period. We performed an environmental assessment of the hospital, including collection of samples for Legionella culture. Clinical and environmental isolates were compared by genotyping. Copper and silver ion concentrations were measured in 11 water samples. RESULTS: We identified five definite and 17 probable healthcare-associated LD cases; six case-patients died. Of 25 locations (mostly potable water) where environmental samples were obtained for Legionella-specific culture, all but two showed Legionella growth; eleven isolates were identical to three clinical isolates by sequence-based typing. Mean copper and silver concentrations were at or above the manufacturer's recommended target for Legionella control. Despite this, all samples where copper and silver concentrations were tested showed Legionella growth. CONCLUSIONS: This outbreak was linked to the hospital's potable water system and highlights the importance of maintaining a high index of suspicion for healthcare-associated LD, even in the setting of a long-term disinfection program.

We investigated whether Strongyloides infection remains endemic in rural Kentucky's Appalachian regions; 7 of 378 (1.9%) participants tested positive for Strongyloides antibodies. We identified no statistically significant association between a positive test and travel to a known endemic country (P = 0.58), indicating that transmission in rural Kentucky might be ongoing.

IMPORTANCE: Liposuction is one of the most common cosmetic surgery procedures in the United States. Tumescent liposuction, in which crystalloid fluids, lidocaine, and epinephrine are infused subcutaneously before cannula-assisted aspiration of fat, can be performed without intravenous or general anesthesia, often at outpatient facilities. However, some of these facilities are not subject to state or federal regulation and may not adhere to appropriate infection control practices. OBJECTIVE: To describe an outbreak of severe group A Streptococcus (GAS) infections among persons undergoing tumescent liposuction at 2 outpatient cosmetic surgery facilities not subject to state or federal regulation. DESIGN: Outbreak investigation (including cohort analysis of at-risk patients), interviews using a standardized questionnaire, medical record review, facility assessment, and laboratory analysis of GAS isolates. SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: Patients undergoing liposuction at 2 outpatient facilities, one in Maryland and the other in Pennsylvania, between July 1 and September 14, 2012. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Confirmed invasive GAS infections (isolation of GAS from a normally sterile site or wound of a patient with necrotizing fasciitis or streptococcal toxic shock syndrome), suspected GAS infections (inflamed surgical site and either purulent discharge or fever and chills in a patient with no alternative diagnosis), postsurgical symptoms and patient-reported experiences related to his or her procedure, and emm types, T-antigen types, and antimicrobial susceptibility of GAS isolates. RESULTS: We identified 4 confirmed cases and 9 suspected cases, including 1 death (overall attack rate, 20% [13 of 66]). One instance of likely secondary GAS transmission to a household member occurred. All confirmed case patients had necrotizing fasciitis and had undergone surgical debridement. Procedures linked to illness were performed by a single surgical team that traveled between the 2 locations; 2 team members (1 of whom reported recent cellulitis) were colonized with a GAS strain that was indistinguishable by laboratory analysis of the isolates from the case patients. Facility assessments and patient reports indicated substandard infection control, including errors in equipment sterilization and infection prevention training. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: This outbreak of severe GAS infections was likely caused by transmission from colonized health care workers to patients during liposuction procedures. Additional oversight of outpatient cosmetic surgery facilities is needed to assure that they maintain appropriate infection control practices and other patient protections.

In August 2013, the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (MDHMH) was notified of two persons with rapidly growing nontuberculous mycobacterial (RG-NTM) surgical-site infections. Both patients had undergone surgical procedures as medical tourists at the same private surgical clinic (clinic A) in the Dominican Republic the previous month. Within 7 days of returning to the United States, both sought care for symptoms that included surgical wound abscesses, clear fluid drainage, pain, and fever. Initial antibiotic therapy was ineffective. Material collected from both patients' wounds grew Mycobacterium abscessus exhibiting a high degree of antibiotic resistance characteristic of this organism.

BACKGROUND: Variant influenza virus infections are rare but may have pandemic potential if person-to-person transmission is efficient. We describe the epidemiology of a multistate outbreak of an influenza A(H3N2) variant virus (H3N2v) first identified in 2011. METHODS: We identified laboratory-confirmed cases of H3N2v and used a standard case report form to characterize illness and exposures. We considered illness to result from person-to-person H3N2v transmission if swine contact was not identified within 4 days prior to illness onset. RESULTS: From 9 July to 7 September 2012, we identified 306 cases of H3N2v in 10 states. The median age of all patients was 7 years. Commonly reported signs and symptoms included fever (98%), cough (85%), and fatigue (83%). Sixteen patients (5.2%) were hospitalized, and 1 fatal case was identified. The majority of those infected reported agricultural fair attendance (93%) and/or contact with swine (95%) prior to illness. We identified 15 cases of possible person-to-person transmission of H3N2v. Viruses recovered from patients were 93%-100% identical and similar to viruses recovered from previous cases of H3N2v. All H3N2v viruses examined were susceptible to oseltamivir and zanamivir and resistant to adamantane antiviral medications. CONCLUSIONS: In a large outbreak of variant influenza, the majority of infected persons reported exposures, suggesting that swine contact at an agricultural fair was a risk for H3N2v infection. We identified limited person-to-person H3N2v virus transmission, but found no evidence of efficient or sustained person-to-person transmission. Fair managers and attendees should be aware of the risk of swine-to-human transmission of influenza viruses in these settings.