Changes in the epidemiology and ecology of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza are devastating wild bird and poultry populations, farms and communities, and wild mammals worldwide. Having originated in farmed poultry, H5N1 viruses are now spread globally by wild birds, with transmission to many mammal and avian species, resulting in 2024 in transmission among dairy cattle with associated human cases. These ecological changes pose challenges to mitigating the impacts of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza on wildlife, ecosystems, domestic animals, food security, and humans. H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza highlights the need for One Health approaches to pandemic prevention and preparedness, emphasising multisectoral collaborations among animal, environmental, and public health sectors. Action is needed to reduce future pandemic risks by preventing transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza among domestic and wild animals and people, focusing on upstream drivers of outbreaks, and ensuring rapid responses and risk assessments for zoonotic outbreaks. Political commitment and sustainable funding are crucial to implementing and maintaining prevention programmes, surveillance, and outbreak responses.

Farmed mink are one of few animals in which infection with SARS-CoV-2 has resulted in sustained transmission among a population and spillback from mink to people. In September 2020, mink on a Michigan farm exhibited increased morbidity and mortality rates due to confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. We conducted an epidemiologic investigation to identify the source of initial mink exposure, assess the degree of spread within the facility's overall mink population, and evaluate the risk of further viral spread on the farm and in surrounding wildlife habitats. Three farm employees reported symptoms consistent with COVID-19 the same day that increased mortality rates were observed among the mink herd. One of these individuals, and another asymptomatic employee, tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription PCR (RT-qPCR) 9 days later. All but one mink sampled on the farm were positive for SARS-CoV-2 based on nucleic acid detection from at least one oral, nasal, or rectal swab tested by RT-qPCR (99%). Sequence analysis showed high degrees of similarity between sequences from mink and the two positive farm employees. Epidemiologic and genomic data, including the presence of F486L and N501T mutations believed to arise through mink adaptation, support the hypothesis that the two employees with SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid detection contracted COVID-19 from mink. However, the specific source of virus introduction onto the farm was not identified. Three companion animals living with mink farm employees and 31 wild animals of six species sampled in the surrounding area were negative for SARS-CoV-2 by RT-qPCR. Results from this investigation support the necessity of a One Health approach to manage the zoonotic spread of SARS-CoV-2 and underscores the critical need for multifaceted public health approaches to prevent the introduction and spread of respiratory viruses on mink farms.

Background Approximately 67% of U.S. households have pets. Limited data are available on SARS-CoV-2 in pets. We assessed SARS-CoV-2 infection in pet cohabitants as a sub-study of an ongoing COVID-19 household transmission investigation.Methods Mammalian pets from households with ≥1 person with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 were eligible for inclusion from April–May 2020. Demographic/exposure information, oropharyngeal, nasal, rectal, and fur swabs, feces, and blood were collected from enrolled pets and tested by rRT-PCR and virus neutralization assays.Findings We enrolled 37 dogs and 19 cats from 34 of 41 eligible households. All oropharyngeal, nasal, and rectal swabs tested negative by rRT-PCR; one dog’s fur swabs (2%) tested positive by rRT-PCR at the first animal sampling. Among 47 pets with serological results from 30 households, eight (17%) pets (4 dogs, 4 cats) from 6 (20%) households had detectable SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies. In households with a seropositive pet, the proportion of people with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 was greater (median 79%; range: 40–100%) compared to households with no seropositive pet (median 37%; range: 13–100%) (p=0.01). Thirty-three pets with serologic results had frequent daily contact (≥1 hour) with the human index patient before the person’s COVID-19 diagnosis. Of these 33 pets, 14 (42%) had decreased contact with the human index patient after diagnosis and none (0%) were seropositive; of the 19 (58%) pets with continued contact, 4 (21%) were seropositive.Interpretations Seropositive pets likely acquired infection from humans, which may occur more frequently than previously recognized. People with COVID-19 should restrict contact with animals.Funding Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of AgricultureCompeting Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.

Multisectoral, One Health collaboration is essential for addressing national and international health threats that arise at the human-animal-environment interface. Thanks to the efforts of multiple organisations, countries now have an array of One Health tools available to assess capacities within and between sectors, plan and prioritise activities, and strengthen multisectoral, One Health coordination, communication, and collaboration. By doing so, they are able to address health threats at the human-animal-environment interface, including emerging zoonotic and infectious diseases, more efficiently. However, to ensure optimal outcomes for the countries using these One Health tools, the partners responsible for implementation should regularly collaborate and share information such as implementation timelines, results and lessons learned, so that one process can inform the next. This paper presents a consensus framework on how commonly implemented One Health tools might align to best support countries in strengthening One Health systems. Twelve One Health tools were selected based on their high implementation rates, authors' experience with these tools and their focus on multisectoral, One Health coordination. Through a four-step process, the authors: a) jointly carried out a landscape analysis of One Health tools, using a Cloudbased spreadsheet to share the unique characteristics and applications of each tool; b) performed an implementation analysis to identify and share implementation dynamics and identify respective outcomes and synergies; c) jointly created a consensus conceptual model of how the authors suggest the tools might logically work together; and d) extrapolated from steps 1-3 an agreed-upon overarching conceptual framework for how current and future One Health tools could be categorised to best support One Health system strengthening at the national level. Highlighted One Health tools include the States Parties Annual Reporting Tool under the International Health Regulations (IHR), the World Organisation for Animal Health Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathway, the Joint External Evaluation process, IHR/PVS National Bridging Workshops, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization Tool, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Laboratory Mapping Tool, the FAO Assessment Tool for Laboratories and Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Systems, the FAO Surveillance Evaluation Tool, the One Health Systems Mapping and Analysis Resource Toolkit, the National Action Plan for Health Security, and IHR Monitoring and Evaluation Framework tools for After Action Reviews and Simulation Exercises. A new guidance document entitled, Taking a Multisectoral, One Health Approach: A Tripartite Guide to Addressing Zoonotic Diseases in Countries was also included as a framework that provides guidance to support the implementation of the outputs of the tools described.

From July-November 2020, mink (Neogale vison) on 12 Utah farms experienced an increase in mortality rates due to confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. We conducted epidemiologic investigations on six farms to identify the source of virus introduction, track cross-species transmission, and assess viral evolution. Interviews were conducted and specimens were collected from persons living or working on participating farms and from multiple animal species. Swabs and sera were tested by SARS-CoV-2 real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) and serological assays, respectively. Whole genome sequencing was attempted for specimens with cycle threshold values <30. Evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection was detected by rRT-PCR or serology in ≥1 person, farmed mink, dog, and/or feral cat on each farm. Sequence analysis showed high similarity between mink and human sequences on corresponding farms. On farms sampled at multiple time points, mink tested rRT-PCR positive up to 16 weeks post-onset of increased mortality. Workers likely introduced SARS-CoV-2 to mink, and mink transmitted SARS-CoV-2 to other animal species; mink-to-human transmission was not identified. Our findings provide critical evidence to support interventions to prevent and manage SARS-CoV-2 in people and animals on mink farms and emphasizes the importance of a One Health approach to address emerging zoonoses.

Effectively preventing and controlling zoonotic diseases requires a One Health approach that involves collaboration across sectors responsible for human health, animal health (both domestic and wildlife), and the environment, as well as other partners. Here we describe the Generalizable One Health Framework (GOHF), a five-step framework that provides structure for using a One Health approach in zoonotic disease programs being implemented at the local, sub-national, national, regional, or international level. Part of the framework is a toolkit that compiles existing resources and presents them following a stepwise schematic, allowing users to identify relevant resources as they are required. Coupled with recommendations for implementing a One Health approach for zoonotic disease prevention and control in technical domains including laboratory, surveillance, preparedness and response, this framework can mobilize One Health and thereby enhance and guide capacity building to combat zoonotic disease threats at the human-animal-environment interface.

SARS-CoV-2 infection has been described in a wide range of species, including domestic animals such as dogs and cats. Illness in dogs is usually self-limiting, and further diagnostics may not be pursued if clinical signs resolve or they respond to empirical treatment. As new variants emerge, the clinical presentation and role in transmission may vary in animals. This report highlights different clinical presentations and immunological responses in two SARS-CoV-2 Delta-variant-positive dogs with similar exposure to the same fully vaccinated human with a SARS-CoV-2 infection and emphasizes the need for active surveillance and additional One Health research on SARS-CoV-2 variant infections in companion animals and other species.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) causes respiratory disease in mink similar to human COVID-19. We characterized the pathological findings in 72 mink from US farms with SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks, localized SARS-CoV-2 and its host cellular receptor angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) in mink respiratory tissues, and evaluated the utility of various test methods and specimens for SARS-CoV-2 detection in necropsy tissues. Of SARS-CoV-2-positive animals found dead, 74% had bronchiolitis and diffuse alveolar damage (DAD). Of euthanized SARS-CoV-2-positive animals, 72% had only mild interstitial pneumonia or minimal nonspecific lung changes (congestion, edema, macrophages); similar findings were seen in SARS-CoV-2-negative animals. Suppurative rhinitis, lymphocytic perivascular inflammation in the lungs, and lymphocytic infiltrates in other tissues were common in both SARS-CoV-2-positive and SARS-CoV-2-negative animals. In formalin-fixed paraffin-embedded (FFPE) upper respiratory tract (URT) specimens, conventional reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (cRT-PCR) was more sensitive than in situ hybridization (ISH) or immunohistochemistry (IHC) for detection of SARS-CoV-2. FFPE lung specimens yielded less detection of virus than FFPE URT specimens by all test methods. By IHC and ISH, virus localized extensively to epithelial cells in the nasal turbinates, and prominently within intact epithelium; olfactory mucosa was mostly spared. The SARS-CoV-2 receptor ACE2 was extensively detected by IHC within turbinate epithelium, with decreased detection in lower respiratory tract epithelium and alveolar macrophages. This study expands on the knowledge of the pathology and pathogenesis of natural SARS-CoV-2 infection in mink and supports their further investigation as a potential animal model of SARS-CoV-2 infection in humans.

In summer 2020, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) was detected on mink farms in Utah. An interagency One Health response was initiated to assess the extent of the outbreak and included sampling animals from on or near affected mink farms and testing them for SARS-CoV-2 and non-SARS coronaviruses. Among the 365 animals sampled, including domestic cats, mink, rodents, raccoons, and skunks, 261 (72%) of the animals harbored at least one coronavirus. Among the samples that could be further characterized, 127 alphacoronaviruses and 88 betacoronaviruses (including 74 detections of SARS-CoV-2 in mink) were identified. Moreover, at least 10% (n = 27) of the coronavirus-positive animals were found to be co-infected with more than one coronavirus. Our findings indicate an unexpectedly high prevalence of coronavirus among the domestic and wild free-roaming animals tested on mink farms. These results raise the possibility that mink farms could be potential hot spots for future trans-species viral spillover and the emergence of new pandemic coronaviruses.

Approximately 67% of U.S. households have pets. Limited data are available on SARS-CoV-2 in pets. We assessed SARS-CoV-2 infection in pets during a COVID-19 household transmission investigation. Pets from households with ≥1 person with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 were eligible for inclusion from April-May 2020. We enrolled 37 dogs and 19 cats from 34 households. All oropharyngeal, nasal, and rectal swabs tested negative by rRT-PCR; one dog's fur swabs (2%) tested positive by rRT-PCR at the first sampling. Among 47 pets with serological results, eight (17%) pets (four dogs, four cats) from 6/30 (20%) households had detectable SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies. In households with a seropositive pet, the proportion of people with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 was greater (median 79%; range: 40-100%) compared to households with no seropositive pet (median 37%; range: 13-100%) (p = 0.01). Thirty-three pets with serologic results had frequent daily contact (≥1 h) with the index patient before the person's COVID-19 diagnosis. Of these 33 pets, 14 (42%) had decreased contact with the index patient after diagnosis and none were seropositive; of the 19 (58%) pets with continued contact, four (21%) were seropositive. Seropositive pets likely acquired infection after contact with people with COVID-19. People with COVID-19 should restrict contact with pets and other animals.

Human-to-animal and animal-to-animal transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been documented; however, investigations into SARS-CoV-2 transmission in congregate animal settings are lacking. We investigated four animal shelters in the United States that had identified animals with exposure to shelter employees with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19. Of the 96 cats and dogs with specimens collected, only one dog had detectable SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies; no animal specimens had detectable viral RNA. These data indicate a low probability of human-to-animal transmission events in cats and dogs in shelter settings with early implementation of infection prevention interventions.

Understanding the ecological and epidemiological roles of pets in the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is critical for animal and human health, identifying household reservoirs, and predicting the potential enzootic maintenance of the virus. We conducted a longitudinal household transmission study of 76 dogs and cats living with at least one SARS-CoV-2-infected human in Texas and found that 17 pets from 25.6% of 39 households met the national case definition for SARS-CoV-2 infections in animals. This includes three out of seventeen (17.6%) cats and one out of fifty-nine (1.7%) dogs that were positive by RT-PCR and sequencing, with the virus successfully isolated from the respiratory swabs of one cat and one dog. Whole-genome sequences of SARS-CoV-2 obtained from all four PCR-positive animals were unique variants grouping with genomes circulating among people with COVID-19 in Texas. Re-sampling showed persistence of viral RNA for at least 25 d-post initial test. Additionally, seven out of sixteen (43.8%) cats and seven out of fifty-nine (11.9%) dogs harbored SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies upon initial sampling, with relatively stable or increasing titers over the 2-3 months of follow-up and no evidence of seroreversion. The majority (82.4%) of infected pets were asymptomatic. 'Reverse zoonotic' transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from infected people to animals may occur more frequently than recognized.

As part of a longitudinal household transmission study of pets living with persons with COVID-19 in Texas, two pets were confirmed to be infected with the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 variant of concern (VOC). The pets were a dog and a cat from the same household, sampled two days after their owner tested positive for COVID-19. The oral, nasal, and fur swabs for both pets tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 by qRT-PCR and consensus whole genome sequences from the dog and cat were 100 % identical and matched the B.1.1.7 VOC. Virus was isolated from the cat's nasal swab. One month after initial detection of infection, the pets were re-tested twice at which time only the fur swabs (both pets) and oral swab (dog only) remained positive, and neutralizing antibodies for SARS-CoV-2 were present in both animals. Sneezing by both pets was noted by the owner in the weeks between initial and follow-up testing. This study documents the first detection of B.1.1.7. in companion animals in the United States, and the first genome recovery and isolation of B.1.1.7 variant of concern globally in any animal.

On April 22, CDC and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reported cases of two domestic cats with confirmed infection with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). These are the first reported companion animals (including pets and service animals) with SARS-CoV-2 infection in the United States, and among the first findings of SARS-CoV-2 symptomatic companion animals reported worldwide. These feline cases originated from separate households and were epidemiologically linked to suspected or confirmed human COVID-19 cases in their respective households. Notification of presumptive positive animal test results triggered a One Health* investigation by state and federal partners, who determined that no further transmission events to other animals or persons had occurred. Both cats fully recovered. Although there is currently no evidence that animals play a substantial role in spreading COVID-19, CDC advises persons with suspected or confirmed COVID-19 to restrict contact with animals during their illness and to monitor any animals with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection and separate them from other persons and animals at home (1).

Reptiles are one of the fastest growing sectors in the United States pet industry. Reptile-associated salmonellosis (RAS) continues to be an important public health problem, especially among children. We investigated an outbreak of human Salmonella infections resulting from serotypes Cotham and Kisarawe, predominately occurring among children. An outbreak of illnesses was identified in persons with exposure to pet bearded dragon lizards. Human and animal health officials, in cooperation with the pet industry, conducted epidemiologic, traceback and laboratory investigations. Onsite sampling was conducted at two US breeding facilities, one foreign breeding facility, and a large pet retail chain. A total of 166 patients in 36 states were identified with illness onset dates from 02/2012-06/2014. The median patient age was 3 years (range, <1-79 years), 57% were aged </=5 years, and 37% were aged </=1 year. Forty-four patients (37%) were hospitalized, predominantly children. Sampling at breeding facilities and a national pet store chain resulted in isolation of outbreak serotypes at each facility; isolation proportions ranged from 2%-24% of samples collected at each facility.Epidemiologic, microbiologic and traceback evidence linked an outbreak of uncommon Salmonella serotypes to contact with pet bearded dragons. The high proportion of infants involved in this outbreak highlights the need to educate owners about the risk of RAS in children and the potential for household contamination by pet reptiles or their habitats. Strategies should be developed to improve breeding practices, biosecurity and monitoring protocols to reduce Salmonella in the pet reptile trade.

Portions of northern Mexico are experiencing a re-emergence of Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF), a tickborne disease caused by Rickettsia rickettsii, a member of the spotted fever group of rickettsiae (SFGR). Infection with R. rickettsii can result in serious and life-threatening illness in people and dogs. Canine seroprevalence has been used as a sentinel for human RMSF in previous studies. This study aims to quantify SFGR seroprevalence in canines in three northern Mexican states and identify risk factors associated with seropositivity. A total of 1,136 serum samples and 942 ticks were obtained from dogs participating in government sterilization campaigns and from animal control facilities in 14 Mexican cities in three states. SFGR antibodies were detected using indirect immunofluorescence antibody assays at titre values >/=1/64. Six per cent (69 dogs) showed antibodies to SFGR, with the highest seroprevalence reported in Baja California (12%), Coahuila (4%) and Sonora (4%). Dogs from Baja California had three times higher odds of having SFGR antibodies compared to dogs from Sonora (OR = 3.38, 95% CI, 1.81-6.37). Roughly one quarter (25%) of surveyed dogs were parasitized by ticks (Rhipicephalus sanguineus sensu lato) at the time of sample collection. A portion of collected ticks were tested for rickettsial DNA using polymerase chain reaction. Positive samples were then sequenced, showing evidence of SFGR including R. massiliae, R. parkeri and R. rickettsii. Dogs that spent the majority of time on the street, such as free-roaming or community-owned dogs, showed a greater risk of tick infestation, seropositivity, bearing seropositive ticks, and may play a pivotal role in the spread of SFGR among communities. Estimating the seroprevalence of SFGR in the canine population can help public health campaigns target high-risk communities for interventions to reduce human RMSF cases.

A One Health approach is critical to strengthening health security at country, regional, and global levels. However, operationally its uptake remains limited. Recent momentum in assessing capacity to effectively prevent, detect, and respond to disease threats has resulted in identification of gaps that require dedicated action. This article highlights relevant tools, standards, and guidance to assist countries and institutions in meeting the collective vision articulated at the 2018 Prince Mahidol Award Conference on "Making the World Safe from the Threats of Emerging Infectious Diseases." Taking stock of assessment findings, resources, priorities, and implementation initiatives across human and animal health, environment and disaster risk reduction sectors can help expand participation in global health security, target risk drivers, and form synergies for collective action and shared gains for both emerging and endemic disease challenges. In addition to health security gains, a multisectoral, One Health approach can drive benefits for wider health sector and global development goals.

BACKGROUND: Zoonotic diseases continue to be a public health burden globally. Uganda is especially vulnerable due to its location, biodiversity, and population. Given these concerns, the Ugandan government in collaboration with the Global Health Security Agenda conducted a One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization Workshop to identify zoonotic diseases of greatest national concern to the Ugandan government. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization tool, a semi-quantitative tool developed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, was used for the prioritization of zoonoses. Workshop participants included voting members and observers representing multiple government and non-governmental sectors. During the workshop, criteria for prioritization were selected, and questions and weights relevant to each criterion were determined. We used a decision tree to provide a ranked list of zoonoses. Participants then established next steps for multisectoral engagement for the prioritized zoonoses. A sensitivity analysis demonstrated how criteria weights impacted disease prioritization. RESULTS: Forty-eight zoonoses were considered during the workshop. Criteria selected to prioritize zoonotic diseases were (1) severity of disease in humans in Uganda, (2) availability of effective control strategies, (3) potential to cause an epidemic or pandemic in humans or animals, (4) social and economic impacts, and (5) bioterrorism potential. Seven zoonotic diseases were identified as priorities for Uganda: anthrax, zoonotic influenza viruses, viral hemorrhagic fevers, brucellosis, African trypanosomiasis, plague, and rabies. Sensitivity analysis did not indicate significant changes in zoonotic disease prioritization based on criteria weights. DISCUSSION: One Health approaches and multisectoral collaborations are crucial to the surveillance, prevention, and control strategies for zoonotic diseases. Uganda used such an approach to identify zoonoses of national concern. Identifying these priority diseases enables Uganda's National One Health Platform and Zoonotic Disease Coordination Office to address these zoonoses in the future with a targeted allocation of resources.

Zoonotic diseases represent critical threats to global health security. Effective mitigation of the impact of endemic and emerging zoonotic diseases of public health importance requires multisectoral collaboration and interdisciplinary partnerships. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention created the One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization Tool to help countries identify zoonotic diseases of greatest national concern using input from representatives of human health, agriculture, environment, and wildlife sectors. We review 7 One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization Tool workshops conducted during 2014-2016, highlighting workshop outcomes, lessons learned, and shared themes from countries implementing this process. We also describe the tool's ability to help countries focus One Health capacity-building efforts to appropriately prevent, detect, and respond to zoonotic disease threats.

Most infectious diseases that recently emerged in humans originated in animals. Besides close contact between animals and humans, other factors probably contribute to the cross-species transmission of infectious diseases. It is critical to establish effective mechanisms for coordination and collaboration between the animal, human, and environmental health sectors before new threats emerge by bringing the different sectors together to tackle endemic zoonotic diseases of greatest concern. Such multisectoral partnerships should begin by identifying priority zoonotic diseases for national engagement with equal input from the different sectors. Improvements in surveillance and data sharing for prioritized zoonotic diseases and enhancements of laboratory testing and joint outbreak response capacities in the human and animal health sectors will create and strengthen the mechanisms necessary to effectively detect and respond to emerging health threats, and thereby enhance global health security.

Zoonotic Salmonella infections cause approximately 130 000 illnesses annually in the United States. Of 72.9 million US households owning at least one pet, five million own small mammals; 3000 hedgehogs were documented by USDA in USDA-licensed breeding facilities and pet stores in 2012. State health department collaborators and PulseNet, the national bacterial subtyping network, identified human infections of a Salmonella Typhimurium outbreak strain, which were investigated by CDC, USDA-APHIS and state public and animal health officials. A case was defined as an illness in a person infected with the outbreak strain identified between 1 December 2011 and 3 June 2013. Investigators collected information on patient exposures, cultured animal and environmental specimens for Salmonella, and conducted traceback investigations of USDA-licensed hedgehog facilities. There were 26 cases in 12 states. Illness onset dates ranged from 26 December 2011 to 8 April 2013. The median patient age was 15 years (range = <1-91 years); 58% were female. Among 23 persons with available information, 8 (35%) were hospitalized and one outbreak strain-associated death was reported. Of 25 patients with available information, 20 (80%) reported pet hedgehog contact in the week before illness onset. The outbreak strain was isolated from animal and environmental samples collected from three ill persons' homes in three states. Hedgehogs were purchased in geographically distant states from USDA-licensed breeders (10/17, 59%); a USDA-licensed pet store (1/17, 6%); unlicensed or unknown status breeders (3/17, 18%); and private individuals (3/17, 18%). Traceback investigations of USDA-licensed facilities did not reveal a single source of infection. Public and animal health collaboration linked pet hedgehog contact to human infections of Salmonella Typhimurium, highlighting the importance of a One Health investigative approach to zoonotic salmonellosis outbreaks. More efforts are needed to increase awareness among multiple stakeholders on the risk of illness associated with pet hedgehogs.

Live poultry-associated salmonellosis is an emerging public health issue in the United States. Public and animal health officials collaborated to investigate one of the largest (356 cases, 39 states) of these outbreaks reported to date. A case was defined as illness in a person infected with the outbreak strain of Salmonella Typhimurium with illness onset between 1 March and 22 October 2013. The median patient age was seven years (range: < 1–87 years); 58% of ill persons were children ≤ 10 years, 51% were female, 25% were hospitalized; 189 (76%) of 250 patients reported live poultry exposure in the week before illness; and 149 (95%) of 157 reported purchasing live poultry from agricultural feed stores. Traceback investigations identified 18 live poultry sources, including 16 mail-order hatcheries. Environmental sampling was conducted at two mail-order hatcheries. One (2.5%) of 40 duplicate samples collected at one hatchery yielded the outbreak strain. Live poultry are an important source of human salmonellosis, particularly among children, highlighting the need for educational campaigns and comprehensive interventions at the mail-order hatchery and agricultural feed store levels. Prevention and control efforts depend on a One Health approach, involving cooperation between public and animal health officials, industry, health professionals, and consumers.

While most human Salmonella infections result from exposure to contaminated foods, an estimated 11% of all Salmonella infections are attributed to animal exposures, including both direct animal handling and indirect exposures such as cleaning cages and handling contaminated pet food. This report describes the epidemiologic, environmental and laboratory investigations conducted in the United States as part of the response to an international outbreak of tetracycline-resistant Salmonella enterica serotype I 4,[5],12:i:- infections with over 500 illnesses occurring from 2008 to 2010. This investigation found that illness due to the outbreak strain was significantly associated with exposure to pet reptiles and frozen feeder rodents used as food for pet reptiles. Salmonella isolates indistinguishable from the outbreak strain were isolated from a frozen feeder mice-fed reptile owned by a case patient, as well as from frozen feeder mice and environmental samples collected from a rodent producing facility (Company A). An international voluntary recall of all Company A produced frozen feeder animals sold between May 2009 and July 2010 occurred. Only 13% of cases in our investigation were aware of the association between Salmonella infection and mice or rats. Consumers, the pet industry, healthcare providers and veterinarians need to be aware of the potential health risk posed by feeder rodents, whether live or frozen. Frozen feeder rodent producers, suppliers and distributors should follow the animal food labelling requirements as described in 21 CFR section sign501.5, and all packages of frozen feeder rodents should include safe handling instructions. Persons should wash their hands thoroughly with soap and water after handling live or frozen feeder rodents, as well as reptiles or anything in the area where the animals live. Continued opportunities exist for public health officials, the pet industry, veterinarians and consumers to work together to prevent salmonellosis associated with pet food, pets and other animals.

On 23 May 2011, CDC identified a multistate cluster of Salmonella Heidelberg infections and two multidrug-resistant (MDR) isolates from ground turkey retail samples with indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. We defined cases as isolation of outbreak strains in persons with illness onset between 27 February 2011 and 10 November 2011. Investigators collected hypothesis-generating questionnaires and shopper-card information. Food samples from homes and retail outlets were collected and cultured. We identified 136 cases of S. Heidelberg infection in 34 states. Shopper-card information, leftover ground turkey from a patient's home containing the outbreak strain and identical antimicrobial resistance profiles of clinical and retail samples pointed to plant A as the source. On 3 August, plant A recalled 36 million pounds of ground turkey. This outbreak increased consumer interest in MDR Salmonella infections acquired through United States-produced poultry and played a vital role in strengthening food safety policies related to Salmonella and raw ground poultry.

INTRODUCTION: The interstate commerce of unpasteurized fluid milk, also known as raw milk, is illegal in the United States, and intrastate sales are regulated independently by each state. However, U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations allow the interstate sale of certain types of cheeses made from unpasteurized milk if specific aging requirements are met. We describe characteristics of these outbreaks, including differences between outbreaks linked to cheese made from pasteurized or unpasteurized milk. METHODS: We reviewed reports of outbreaks submitted to the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System during 1998-2011 in which cheese was implicated as the vehicle. We describe characteristics of these outbreaks, including differences between outbreaks linked to cheese made from pasteurized versus unpasteurized milk. RESULTS: During 1998-2011, 90 outbreaks attributed to cheese were reported; 38 (42%) were due to cheese made with unpasteurized milk, 44 (49%) to cheese made with pasteurized milk, and the pasteurization status was not reported for the other eight (9%). The most common cheese-pathogen pairs were unpasteurized queso fresco or other Mexican-style cheese and Salmonella (10 outbreaks), and pasteurized queso fresco or other Mexican-style cheese and Listeria (6 outbreaks). The cheese was imported from Mexico in 38% of outbreaks caused by cheese made with unpasteurized milk. In at least five outbreaks, all due to cheese made from unpasteurized milk, the outbreak report noted that the cheese was produced or sold illegally. Outbreaks caused by cheese made from pasteurized milk occurred most commonly (64%) in restaurant, delis, or banquet settings where cross-contamination was the most common contributing factor. CONCLUSIONS: In addition to using pasteurized milk to make cheese, interventions to improve the safety of cheese include limiting illegal importation of cheese, strict sanitation and microbiologic monitoring in cheese-making facilities, and controls to limit food worker contamination.

Poultry are well-recognized as possible carriers of Salmonella species. As part of the local foods movement backyard poultry flocks have increased in popularity in recent years. Between 1996 and 2012, forty-five outbreaks of human Salmonella infections linked to live poultry from mail-order hatcheries were documented. This review examines the history of live poultry-associated salmonellosis in humans in the USA, the current status of the issue, and what can be done to help prevent these illnesses. An integrated One Health approach involving the mail-order hatchery industry, feed stores, health care providers, veterinarians, and backyard flock owners is needed to help prevent live poultry-associated salmonellosis.

SUMMARY: In November 2009, we initiated a multistate investigation of Salmonella Montevideo infections with pulsed-field gel electrophoresis pattern JIXX01.0011. We identified 272 cases in 44 states with illness onset dates ranging from 1 July 2009 to 14 April 2010. To help generate hypotheses, warehouse store membership card information was collected to identify products consumed by cases. These records identified 19 ill persons who purchased company A salami products before onset of illness. A case-control study was conducted. Ready-to-eat salami consumption was significantly associated with illness (matched odds ratio 8.5, 95% confidence interval 2.1-75.9). The outbreak strain was isolated from company A salami products from an environmental sample from one manufacturing plant, and sealed containers of black and red pepper at the facility. This outbreak illustrates the importance of using membership card information to assist in identifying suspect vehicles, the potential for spices to contaminate ready-to-eat products, and preventing raw ingredient contamination of these products.

BACKGROUND: On July 7 and 11, 2007, respectively, health officials in Texas and Indiana reported 4 possible cases of type A foodborne botulism to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Foodborne botulism is a rare and sometimes fatal illness caused by consuming foods containing botulinum neurotoxin. METHODS: Investigators reviewed patients' medical charts and food histories. Clinical specimens and food samples were tested for botulinum toxin and neurotoxin-producing Clostridium spp. Investigators conducted inspections of the cannery that produced the implicated product. RESULTS: Eight confirmed outbreak associated cases were identified from Indiana (2), Texas (3), and Ohio (3). Botulinum toxin type A was identified in leftover chili sauce consumed by the Indiana patients and one of the Ohio patients. Cannery inspectors found violations of federal canned-food regulations that could have led to survival of C. botulinum spores during sterilization. The company recalled 39 million cans of chili. Following the outbreak, the US Food and Drug Administration inspected other canneries with similar canning systems and issued warnings to the industry about the danger of C. botulinum and the importance of compliance with canned food manufacturing regulations. CONCLUSION: Commercially produced hot dog chili sauce caused these cases of type A botulism. This is the first US foodborne botulism outbreak involving a commercial cannery in more than 30 years. Sharing of epidemiologic and laboratory findings allowed for the rapid identification of implicated food items and swift removal of potentially deadly products from the market by US food regulatory authorities.

BACKGROUND: Outbreaks of human salmonella infections are increasingly associated with contact with live poultry, but effective control measures are elusive. In 2005, a cluster of human salmonella Montevideo infections with a rare pattern on pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (the outbreak strain) was identified by PulseNet, a national subtyping network. METHODS: In cooperation with public health and animal health agencies, we conducted multistate investigations involving patient interviews, trace-back investigations, and environmental testing at a mail-order hatchery linked to the outbreak in order to identify the source of infections and prevent additional illnesses. A case was defined as an infection with the outbreak strain between 2004 and 2011. RESULTS: From 2004 through 2011, we identified 316 cases in 43 states. The median age of the patient was 4 years. Interviews were completed with 156 patients (or their caretakers) (49%), and 36 of these patients (23%) were hospitalized. Among the 145 patients for whom information was available, 80 (55%) had bloody diarrhea. Information on contact with live young poultry was available for 159 patients, and 122 of these patients (77%) reported having such contact. A mail-order hatchery in the western United States was identified in 81% of the trace-back investigations, and the outbreak strain was isolated from samples collected at the hatchery. After interventions at the hatchery, the number of human infections declined, but transmission continued. CONCLUSIONS: We identified a prolonged multistate outbreak of salmonellosis, predominantly affecting young children and associated with contact with live young poultry from a mail-order hatchery. Interventions performed at the hatchery reduced, but did not eliminate, associated human infections, demonstrating the difficulty of eliminating salmonella transmission from live poultry.

BACKGROUND: Foodborne diseases are typically mild and self-limiting but can cause severe illness and death. We describe the epidemiology of deaths associated with bacterial pathogens using data from the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) in the United States. METHODS: We analyzed FoodNet data from 1996-2005 to determine the numbers and rates of deaths occurring within 7-days of laboratory-confirmation. RESULTS: During 1996-2005, FoodNet ascertained 121,536 cases of laboratory-confirmed bacterial infections, including 552 (.5%) deaths, of which 215 (39%) and 168 (30%) were among persons infected with Salmonella and Listeria, respectively. The highest age-specific average annual population mortality rates were in older adults (≥65 years) for all pathogens except Shigella, for which the highest age-specific average annual population mortality rate was in children <5 years (.2/1 million population). Overall, most deaths (58%; 318) occurred in persons ≥65 years old. Listeria had the highest case fatality rate overall (16.9%), followed by Vibrio (5.8%), Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O157 (0.8%), Salmonella (0.5%), Campylobacter (0.1%), and Shigella (0.1%). CONCLUSIONS: Salmonella and Listeria remain the leading causes of death in the United States due to bacterial pathogens transmitted commonly through food. Most such deaths occurred in persons ≥65 years old, indicating that this age group could benefit from effective food safety interventions.