BACKGROUND: Assessing variant-specific COVID-19 vaccine effectiveness (VE) and severity can inform public health risk assessments and decisions about vaccine composition. BA.2.86 and its descendants, including JN.1 (referred to collectively as "JN lineages"), emerged in late 2023 and exhibited substantial divergence from co-circulating XBB lineages. METHODS: We analyzed patients hospitalized with COVID-19-like illness at 26 hospitals in 20 U.S. states admitted October 18, 2023-March 9, 2024. Using a test-negative, case-control design, we estimated effectiveness of an updated 2023-2024 (Monovalent XBB.1.5) COVID-19 vaccine dose against sequence-confirmed XBB and JN lineage hospitalization using logistic regression. Odds of severe outcomes, including intensive care unit (ICU) admission and invasive mechanical ventilation (IMV) or death, were compared for JN versus XBB lineage hospitalizations using logistic regression. RESULTS: 585 case-patients with XBB lineages, 397 case-patients with JN lineages, and 4,580 control-patients were included. VE in the first 7-89 days after receipt of an updated dose was 54.2% (95% CI = 36.1%-67.1%) against XBB lineage hospitalization and 32.7% (95% CI = 1.9%-53.8%) against JN lineage hospitalization. Odds of ICU admission (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 0.80; 95% CI = 0.46-1.38) and IMV or death (aOR 0.69; 95% CI = 0.34-1.40) were not significantly different among JN compared to XBB lineage hospitalizations. CONCLUSIONS: Updated 2023-2024 COVID-19 vaccination provided protection against both XBB and JN lineage hospitalization, but protection against the latter may be attenuated by immune escape. Clinical severity of JN lineage hospitalizations was not higher relative to XBB.

BACKGROUND: The endemic coronaviruses OC43, HKU1, NL63 and 229E cause cold-like symptoms and are related to SARS-CoV-2, but their natural histories are poorly understood. In a cohort of children followed from birth to 4 years, we documented all coronavirus infections, including SARS-CoV-2, to understand protection against subsequent infections with the same virus (homotypic immunity) or a different coronavirus (heterotypic immunity). METHODS: Mother-child pairs were enrolled in metropolitan Cincinnati during the third trimester of pregnancy in 2017-18. Mothers reported their child's socio-demographics, risk factors, and weekly symptoms. Mid-turbinate nasal swabs were collected weekly. Blood was collected at 6 weeks, 6, 12, 18, 24 months and annually thereafter. Infections were detected by testing nasal swabs by an RT-PCR multi-pathogen panel and by serum IgG responses. Health care visits were documented from pediatric records. Analysis was limited to 116 children with high sample adherence. Re-consent for monitoring SARS-CoV-2 infections from June 2020 through November 2021 was obtained for 74 (64%) children. RESULTS: We detected 345 endemic coronavirus infections (1.1 infections/child-year) and 21 SARS-CoV-2 infections (0.3 infections/child-year). Endemic coronavirus and SARS-CoV-2 infections were asymptomatic or mild. Significant protective homotypic immunity occurred after a single infection with OC43 (77%) and HKU1 (84%), and after two infections with NL63 (73%). No heterotypic protection against endemic coronaviruses or SARS-CoV-2 was identified. CONCLUSIONS: Natural coronavirus infections were common and resulted in strong homotypic immunity but not heterotypic immunity against other coronaviruses, including SARS-CoV-2. Endemic coronavirus and SARS-CoV-2 infections in this US cohort were typically asymptomatic or mild.

BACKGROUND: Prolonged SARS-CoV-2 infections in people who are immunocompromised might predict or source the emergence of highly mutated variants. The types of immunosuppression placing patients at highest risk for prolonged infection have not been systematically investigated. We aimed to assess risk factors for prolonged SARS-CoV-2 infection and associated intrahost evolution. METHODS: In this multicentre, prospective analysis, participants were enrolled at five US medical centres. Eligible patients were aged 18 years or older, were SARS-CoV-2-positive in the previous 14 days, and had a moderately or severely immunocompromising condition or treatment. Nasal specimens were tested by real-time RT-PCR every 2-4 weeks until negative in consecutive specimens. Positive specimens underwent viral culture and whole genome sequencing. A Cox proportional hazards model was used to assess factors associated with duration of infection. FINDINGS: From April 11, 2022, to Oct 1, 2022, 156 patients began the enrolment process, of whom 150 were enrolled and included in the analyses. Participants had B-cell malignancy or anti-B-cell therapy (n=18), solid organ transplantation or haematopoietic stem-cell transplantation (HSCT; n=59), AIDS (n=5), non-B-cell malignancy (n=23), and autoimmune or autoinflammatory conditions (n=45). 38 (25%) participants were real-time RT-PCR-positive and 12 (8%) were culture-positive 21 days or longer after initial SARS-CoV-2 detection or illness onset. Compared with the group with autoimmune or autoinflammatory conditions, patients with B-cell dysfunction (adjusted hazard ratio 0·32 [95% CI 0·15-0·64]), solid organ transplantation or HSCT (0·60 [0·38-0·94]), and AIDS (0·28 [0·08-1·00]) had longer duration of infection, defined as time to last positive real-time RT-PCR test. There was no significant difference in the non-B-cell malignancy group (0·58 [0·31-1·09]). Consensus de novo spike mutations were identified in five individuals who were real-time RT-PCR-positive longer than 56 days; 14 (61%) of 23 were in the receptor-binding domain. Mutations shared by multiple individuals were rare (<5%) in global circulation. INTERPRETATION: In this cohort, prolonged replication-competent omicron SARS-CoV-2 infections were uncommon. Within-host evolutionary rates were similar across patients, but individuals with infections lasting longer than 56 days accumulated spike mutations, which were distinct from those seen globally. Populations at high risk should be targeted for repeated testing and treatment and monitored for the emergence of antiviral resistance. FUNDING: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

During August 13–14, 2023, a new SARS-CoV-2 Omicron subvariant with a large number of mutations compared with previously circulating BA.2 variants (>30 amino acid differences in its spike protein) was identified by genomic sequencing in Denmark and Israel and subsequently designated BA.2.86 (1,2). Given near-simultaneous detections in multiple countries, including the United States, further information was needed regarding geographic spread of BA.2.86. Since January 2022, submissions to SARS-CoV-2 sequence repositories have declined by 95%,* substantially decreasing global capacity to monitor new variants. To fill gaps in global surveillance, CDC’s Traveler-based Genomic Surveillance (TGS) program was developed to provide early warning of new variants entering the United States by collecting samples from arriving international travelers (3).