Ice machines can harbor water-related organisms, and the use of ice or tap water for clinical care activities has been associated with infections in health care settings. During 2021-2022, a total of 23 cases of infection by Burkholderia multivorans (sequence type ST659) were reported at two southern California hospitals and linked to contaminated ice and water from ice machines. In addition to these 23 cases, this report also includes 23 previously unreported cases of B. multivorans ST659 infections that occurred during 2020-2024: 13 at a northern California hospital, eight at a hospital in Colorado, and two additional cases at one of the southern California hospitals. The same brand of ice machine and brands of filters, descaling, and sanitizing products were used by all four hospitals; B. multivorans was isolated from samples collected from ice machines in two of the hospitals. Whole genome sequencing indicated that all clinical and ice machine isolates were highly genetically similar (0-14 single nucleotide variant differences across 81% of the selected reference genome). Recommendations from public health officials to halt the outbreak included avoiding ice and tap water during clinical care activities. An investigation is ongoing to determine possible sources of ice machine contamination. During outbreaks of water-related organisms in health care facilities, health care personnel should consider avoiding the use of tap water, including ice and water from ice machines, for patient care.

Outbreaks of healthcare-associated infections, particularly invasive mold infections, have been linked to environmental contamination of laundered healthcare textiles. Contamination may occur at the laundry or healthcare facility. This report highlights underrecognized hazards, control points, and actions that infection preventionists can take to help decrease the potential for patient exposure to contaminated healthcare textiles. Infection preventionists can use the checklists included in this report to assess laundry and healthcare facility management of laundered healthcare textiles.

Nontuberculous mycobacteria (NTMs) are among species that considered to be opportunistic pathogens of premise plumbing (OPPP) [1, 2]. In healthcare settings, direct and indirect tap water exposures have been associated with outbreaks of healthcare-associated infections and even deaths [3–9]. Therefore, water management programs are an essential part of both facility management and infection control programs [2].

Patient care and public health require timely, reliable laboratory testing. However, clinical laboratory professionals rarely know whether patient specimens contain infectious agents, making ensuring biosafety while performing testing procedures challenging. The importance of biosafety in clinical laboratories was highlighted during the 2014 Ebola outbreak, where concerns about biosafety resulted in delayed diagnoses and contributed to patient deaths. This review is a collaboration between subject matter experts from large and small laboratories and the federal government to evaluate the capability of clinical laboratories to manage biosafety risks and safely test patient specimens. We discuss the complexity of clinical laboratories, including anatomic pathology, and describe how applying current biosafety guidance may be difficult as these guidelines, largely based on practices in research laboratories, do not always correspond to the unique clinical laboratory environments and their specialized equipment and processes. We retrospectively describe the biosafety gaps and opportunities for improvement in the areas of risk assessment and management; automated and manual laboratory disciplines; specimen collection, processing, and storage; test utilization; equipment and instrumentation safety; disinfection practices; personal protective equipment; waste management; laboratory personnel training and competency assessment; accreditation processes; and ethical guidance. Also addressed are the unique biosafety challenges successfully handled by a Texas community hospital clinical laboratory that performed testing for patients with Ebola without a formal biocontainment unit. The gaps in knowledge and practices identified in previous and ongoing outbreaks demonstrate the need for collaborative, comprehensive solutions to improve clinical laboratory biosafety and to better combat future emerging infectious disease outbreaks.

Flexible endoscopes require cleaning, high-level disinfection, and sterilization between each patient use to reduce risk of transmitting pathogens. Public health investigations have identified concerns, including endoscope damage, mishandling, and reprocessing deficiencies, placing patients at risk for transmission of bacterial, viral, and other pathogens. Findings from outbreak investigations and other studies have led to innovations in endoscope design, use, and reprocessing, yet infection risks related to contaminated or damaged endoscopes remain. Strict adherence to infection control guidelines and manufacturer instructions for use, utilization of supplemental guidance, and training and oversight of reprocessing personnel, reduce risk of pathogen transmission by flexible endoscopes.

OBJECTIVE: Water exposures in healthcare settings and during healthcare delivery can place patients at risk for infection with water-related organisms and can potentially lead to outbreaks. We aimed to describe Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) consultations involving water-related organisms leading to healthcare-associated infections (HAIs). DESIGN: Retrospective observational study. METHODS: We reviewed internal CDC records from January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2017, using water-related terms and organisms, excluding Legionella, to identify consultations that involved potential or confirmed transmission of water-related organisms in healthcare. We determined plausible exposure pathways and routes of transmission when possible. RESULTS: Of 620 consultations during the study period, we identified 134 consultations (21.6%), with 1,380 patients, that involved the investigation of potential water-related HAIs or infection control lapses with the potential for water-related HAIs. Nontuberculous mycobacteria were involved in the greatest number of investigations (n = 40, 29.9%). Most frequently, investigations involved medical products (n = 48, 35.8%), and most of these products were medical devices (n = 40, 83.3%). We identified a variety of plausible water-exposure pathways, including medication preparation near water splash zones and water contamination at the manufacturing sites of medications and medical devices. CONCLUSIONS: Water-related investigations represent a substantial proportion of CDC HAI consultations and likely represent only a fraction of all water-related HAI investigations and outbreaks occurring in US healthcare facilities. Water-related HAI investigations should consider all potential pathways of water exposure. Finally, healthcare facilities should develop and implement water management programs to limit the growth and spread of water-related organisms.

Outbreaks associated with exposure to treated recreational water can be caused by pathogens or chemicals in venues such as pools, hot tubs/spas, and interactive water play venues (i.e., water playgrounds). During 2000-2014, public health officials from 46 states and Puerto Rico reported 493 outbreaks associated with treated recreational water. These outbreaks resulted in at least 27,219 cases and eight deaths. Among the 363 outbreaks with a confirmed infectious etiology, 212 (58%) were caused by Cryptosporidium (which causes predominantly gastrointestinal illness), 57 (16%) by Legionella (which causes Legionnaires' disease, a severe pneumonia, and Pontiac fever, a milder illness with flu-like symptoms), and 47 (13%) by Pseudomonas (which causes folliculitis ["hot tub rash"] and otitis externa ["swimmers' ear"]). Investigations of the 363 outbreaks identified 24,453 cases; 21,766 (89%) were caused by Cryptosporidium, 920 (4%) by Pseudomonas, and 624 (3%) by Legionella. At least six of the eight reported deaths occurred in persons affected by outbreaks caused by Legionella. Hotels were the leading setting, associated with 157 (32%) of the 493 outbreaks. Overall, the outbreaks had a bimodal temporal distribution: 275 (56%) outbreaks started during June-August and 46 (9%) in March. Assessment of trends in the annual counts of outbreaks caused by Cryptosporidium, Legionella, or Pseudomonas indicate mixed progress in preventing transmission. Pathogens able to evade chlorine inactivation have become leading outbreak etiologies. The consequent outbreak and case counts and mortality underscore the utility of CDC's Model Aquatic Health Code (https://www.cdc.gov/mahc) to prevent outbreaks associated with treated recreational water.

BACKGROUND: Legionnaires' disease, a severe pneumonia, is typically acquired through inhalation of aerosolized water containing Legionella bacteria. Legionella can grow in the complex water systems of buildings, including health care facilities. Effective water management programs could prevent the growth of Legionella in building water systems. METHODS: Using national surveillance data, Legionnaires' disease cases were characterized from the 21 jurisdictions (20 U.S. states and one large metropolitan area) that reported exposure information for ≥90% of 2015 Legionella infections. An assessment of whether cases were health care-associated was completed; definite health care association was defined as hospitalization or long-term care facility residence for the entire 10 days preceding symptom onset, and possible association was defined as any exposure to a health care facility for a portion of the 10 days preceding symptom onset. All other Legionnaires' disease cases were considered unrelated to health care. RESULTS: A total of 2,809 confirmed Legionnaires' disease cases were reported from the 21 jurisdictions, including 85 (3%) definite and 468 (17%) possible health care-associated cases. Among the 21 jurisdictions, 16 (76%) reported 1-21 definite health care-associated cases per jurisdiction. Among definite health care-associated cases, the majority (75, 88%) occurred in persons aged ≥60 years, and exposures occurred at 72 facilities (15 hospitals and 57 long-term care facilities). The case fatality rate was 25% for definite and 10% for possible health care-associated Legionnaires' disease. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE: Exposure to Legionella from health care facility water systems can result in Legionnaires' disease. The high case fatality rate of health care-associated Legionnaires' disease highlights the importance of case prevention and response activities, including implementation of effective water management programs and timely case identification.

OBJECTIVE To investigate an outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections and colonization in a neonatal intensive care unit. DESIGN Infection control assessment, environmental evaluation, and case-control study. SETTING Newly built community-based hospital, 28-bed neonatal intensive care unit. PATIENTS Neonatal intensive care unit patients receiving care between June 1, 2013, and September 30, 2014. METHODS Case finding was performed through microbiology record review. Infection control observations, interviews, and environmental assessment were performed. A matched case-control study was conducted to identify risk factors for P. aeruginosa infection. Patient and environmental isolates were collected for pulsed-field gel electrophoresis to determine strain relatedness. RESULTS In total, 31 cases were identified. Case clusters were temporally associated with absence of point-of-use filters on faucets in patient rooms. After adjusting for gestational age, case patients were more likely to have been in a room without a point-of-use filter (odds ratio [OR], 37.55; 95% confidence interval [CI], 7.16-infinity). Case patients had higher odds of exposure to peripherally inserted central catheters (OR, 7.20; 95% CI, 1.75-37.30) and invasive ventilation (OR, 5.79; 95% CI, 1.39-30.62). Of 42 environmental samples, 28 (67%) grew P. aeruginosa. Isolates from the 2 most recent case patients were indistinguishable by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis from water-related samples obtained from these case-patient rooms. CONCLUSIONS This outbreak was attributed to contaminated water. Interruption of the outbreak with point-of-use filters provided a short-term solution; however, eradication of P. aeruginosa in water and fixtures was necessary to protect patients. This outbreak highlights the importance of understanding the risks of stagnant water in healthcare facilities. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2017;1-8.

OBJECTIVE To determine the typical microbial bioburden (overall bacterial and multidrug-resistant organisms [MDROs]) on high-touch healthcare environmental surfaces after routine or terminal cleaning. DESIGN Prospective 2.5-year microbiological survey of large surface areas (>1,000 cm2). SETTING MDRO contact-precaution rooms from 9 acute-care hospitals and 2 long-term care facilities in 4 states. PARTICIPANTS Samples from 166 rooms (113 routine cleaned and 53 terminal cleaned rooms). METHODS Using a standard sponge-wipe sampling protocol, 2 composite samples were collected from each room; a third sample was collected from each Clostridium difficile room. Composite 1 included the TV remote, telephone, call button, and bed rails. Composite 2 included the room door handle, IV pole, and overbed table. Composite 3 included toileting surfaces. Total bacteria and MDROs (ie, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, vancomycin-resistant enterococci [VRE], Acinetobacter baumannii, Klebsiella pneumoniae, and C. difficile) were quantified, confirmed, and tested for drug resistance. RESULTS The mean microbial bioburden and range from routine cleaned room composites were higher (2,700 colony-forming units [CFU]/100 cm2; ≤1-130,000 CFU/100 cm2) than from terminal cleaned room composites (353 CFU/100 cm2; ≤1-4,300 CFU/100 cm2). MDROs were recovered from 34% of routine cleaned room composites (range ≤1-13,000 CFU/100 cm2) and 17% of terminal cleaned room composites (≤1-524 CFU/100 cm2). MDROs were recovered from 40% of rooms; VRE was the most common (19%). CONCLUSIONS This multicenter bioburden summary provides a first step to determining microbial bioburden on healthcare surfaces, which may help provide a basis for developing standards to evaluate cleaning and disinfection as well as a framework for studies using an evidentiary hierarchy for environmental infection control. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2016;1-7.

In response to the 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa, CDC prepared for the potential introduction of Ebola into the United States. The immediate goals were to rapidly identify and isolate any cases of Ebola, prevent transmission, and promote timely treatment of affected patients. CDC's technical expertise and the collaboration of multiple partners in state, local, and municipal public health departments; health care facilities; emergency medical services; and U.S. government agencies were essential to the domestic preparedness and response to the Ebola epidemic and relied on longstanding partnerships. CDC established a comprehensive response that included two new strategies: 1) active monitoring of travelers arriving from countries affected by Ebola and other persons at risk for Ebola and 2) a tiered system of hospital facility preparedness that enabled prioritization of training. CDC rapidly deployed a diagnostic assay for Ebola virus (EBOV) to public health laboratories. Guidance was developed to assist in evaluation of patients possibly infected with EBOV, for appropriate infection control, to support emergency responders, and for handling of infectious waste. CDC rapid response teams were formed to provide assistance within 24 hours to a health care facility managing a patient with Ebola. As a result of the collaborations to rapidly identify, isolate, and manage Ebola patients and the extensive preparations to prevent spread of EBOV, the United States is now better prepared to address the next global infectious disease threat.The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html).

On September 17, 2015, the Pennsylvania Department of Health (PADOH) notified CDC of a cluster of three potentially health care-associated mucormycete infections that occurred among solid organ transplant recipients during a 12-month period at hospital A. On September 18, hospital B reported that it had identified an additional transplant recipient with mucormycosis. Hospitals A and B are part of the same health care system and are connected by a pedestrian bridge. PADOH requested CDC's assistance with an on-site investigation, which started on September 22, to identify possible sources of infection and prevent additional infections.

BACKGROUND: In November and December 2012, 6 patients at a hemodialysis clinic were given a diagnosis of new hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection. OBJECTIVE: To investigate the outbreak to identify risk factors for transmission. METHODS: A case patient was defined as a patient who was HCV-antibody negative on clinic admission but subsequently was found to be HCV-antibody positive from January 1, 2008, through April 30, 2013. Patient charts were reviewed to identify and describe case patients. The hypervariable region 1 of HCV from infected patients was tested to assess viral genetic relatedness. Infection control practices were evaluated via observations. A forensic chemiluminescent agent was used to identify blood contamination on environmental surfaces after cleaning. RESULTS: Eighteen case patients were identified at the clinic from January 1, 2008, through April 30, 2013, resulting in an estimated 16.7% attack rate. Analysis of HCV quasispecies identified 4 separate clusters of transmission involving 11 case patients. The case patients and previously infected patients in each cluster were treated in neighboring dialysis stations during the same shift, or at the same dialysis station on 2 consecutive shifts. Lapses in infection control were identified. Visible and invisible blood was identified on multiple surfaces at the clinic. CONCLUSIONS: Epidemiologic and laboratory data confirmed transmission of HCV among numerous patients at the dialysis clinic over 6 years. Infection control breaches were likely responsible. This outbreak highlights the importance of rigorous adherence to recommended infection control practices in dialysis settings.

BACKGROUND: Legionella pneumophila, Mycobacterium avium, and Pseudomonas aeruginosa are opportunistic premise plumbing pathogens (OPPPs) that persist and grow in household plumbing, habitats they share with humans. Infections caused by these OPPPs involve individuals with preexisting risk factors and frequently require hospitalization. OBJECTIVES: The objectives of this report are to alert professionals of the impact of OPPPs, the fact that 30% of the population may be exposed to OPPPs, and the need to develop means to reduce OPPP exposure. We herein present a review of the epidemiology and ecology of these three bacterial OPPPs, specifically to identify common and unique features. METHODS: A Water Research Foundation-sponsored workshop gathered experts from across the United States to review the characteristics of OPPPs, identify problems, and develop a list of research priorities to address critical knowledge gaps with respect to increasing OPPP-associated disease. DISCUSSION: OPPPs share the common characteristics of disinfectant resistance and growth in biofilms in water distribution systems or premise plumbing. Thus, they share a number of habitats with humans (e.g., showers) that can lead to exposure and infection. The frequency of OPPP-infected individuals is rising and will likely continue to rise as the number of at-risk individuals is increasing. Improved reporting of OPPP disease and increased understanding of the genetic, physiologic, and structural characteristics governing the persistence and growth of OPPPs in drinking water distribution systems and premise plumbing is needed. CONCLUSIONS: Because broadly effective community-level engineering interventions for the control of OPPPs have yet to be identified, and because the number of at-risk individuals will continue to rise, it is likely that OPPP-related infections will continue to increase. However, it is possible that individuals can take measures (e.g., raise hot water heater temperatures and filter water) to reduce home exposures.

The effect of packaging, shipping temperatures and storage times on recovery of Bacillus anthracis. Sterne spores from swabs was investigated. Macrofoam swabs were pre-moistened, inoculated with Bacillus anthracis spores, and packaged in primary containment or secondary containment before storage at -15°C, 5°C, 21°C, or 35°C for 0-7 days. Swabs were processed according to validated Centers for Disease Control/Laboratory Response Network culture protocols, and the percent recovery relative to a reference sample (T(0)) was determined for each variable. No differences were observed in recovery between swabs held at -15° and 5°C, (p ≥ 0.23). These two temperatures provided significantly better recovery than swabs held at 21°C or 35°C (all 7 days pooled, p ≤ 0.04). The percent recovery at 5°C was not significantly different if processed on days 1, 2 or 4, but was significantly lower on day 7 (day 2 vs. 7, 5°C, 10(2), p=0.03). Secondary containment provided significantly better percent recovery than primary containment, regardless of storage time (5°C data, p ≤ 0.008). The integrity of environmental swab samples containing Bacillus anthracis spores shipped in secondary containment was maintained when stored at -15°C or 5°C and processed within 4 days to yield the optimum percent recovery of spores.

Over 383,900 individuals in the U.S. undergo maintenance hemodialysis that exposes them to water, primarily in the form of dialysate. The quality of water and associated dialysis solutions have been implicated in adverse patient outcomes and is therefore critical. The Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation has published both standards and recommended practices that address both water and the dialyzing solutions. Some of these recommendations have been adopted into Federal Regulations by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services as part of the Conditions for Coverage, which includes limits on specific contaminants within water used for dialysis, dialysate, and substitution fluids. Chemical, bacterial, and endotoxin contaminants are health threats to dialysis patients, as shown by the continued episodic nature of outbreaks since the 1960s causing at least 592 cases and 16 deaths in the U.S. The importance of the dialysis water distribution system, current standards and recommendations, acceptable monitoring methods, a review of chemical, bacterial, and endotoxin outbreaks, and infection control programs are discussed.

In the United States, the prevalence of hepatitis C virus infection among patients treated in hemodialysis facilities is five times higher than among the general population. This study investigated eight new hepatitis C virus infections among patients treated at an outpatient hemodialysis facility. Epidemiologic investigation and viral sequencingdemonstrated that transmission likely occurred between patients typically treated during the same or consecutive shifts at the same or a nearby station. Several infection control breaches were observed, including lapses involving the preparation, handling, and administration of parenteral medications. Improved infection control education and training for all hemodialysis facility staff is an important component of assuring adherence to appropriate procedures and preventing future outbreaks.

Several bacterial species that are natural inhabitants of potable water distribution system biofilms are opportunistic pathogens important to sensitive patients in healthcare facilities. Waterborne healthcare-associated infections (HAI) may occur during the many uses of potable water in the healthcare environment. Prevention of infection is made more challenging by lack of data on infection rate and gaps in understanding of the ecology, virulence, and infectious dose of these opportunistic pathogens. Some healthcare facilities have been successful in reducing infections by following current water safety guidelines. This review describes several infections, and remediation steps that have been implemented to reduce waterborne HAIs.

In 2007 the Maryland Medical Examiner noted a potential cluster of fatal vascular access hemorrhages among hemodialysis patients, many of whom died outside of a health-care setting. To examine the epidemiology of fatal vascular access hemorrhages, we conducted a retrospective case review in District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia from January 2000 to July 2007 and a case-control study. Records from the Medical Examiner and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services were reviewed, from which 88 patients were identified as fatal vascular access hemorrhage cases. To assess risk factors, a subset of 20 cases from Maryland was compared to 38 controls randomly selected among hemodialysis patients who died from non-vascular access hemorrhage causes at the same Maryland facilities. Of the 88 confirmed cases, 55% hemorrhaged from arteriovenous grafts, 24% from arteriovenous fistulas, and 21% from central venous catheters. Of 82 case-patients with known location of hemorrhage, 78% occurred at home or in a nursing home. In the case-control analysis, statistically significant risk factors included the presence of an arteriovenous graft, access-related complications within 6 months of death, and hypertension; presence of a central venous catheter was significantly protective. Psychosocial factors and anticoagulant medications were not significant risk factors. Effective strategies to control vascular access hemorrhage in the home and further delineation of warning signs are needed. (Kidney International advance online publication, 13 June 2012; doi:10.1038/ki.2012.185.)

BACKGROUND: Healthcare-associated outbreaks and pseudo-outbreaks of rapidly growing mycobacteria (RGM) are frequently associated with contaminated tap water. A pseudo-outbreak of Mycobacterium chelonae-M. abscessus in patients undergoing bronchoscopy was identified by 2 acute care hospitals. RGM was identified in bronchoscopy specimens of 28 patients, 25 of whom resided in the same skilled nursing facility (SNF). An investigation ruled out bronchoscopy procedures, specimen collection, and scope reprocessing at the hospitals as sources of transmission. OBJECTIVE: To identify the reservoir for RGM within the SNF and evaluate 2 water system treatments, hyperchlorination and point-of-use (POU) membrane filters, to reduce RGM. DESIGN: A comparative in situ study of 2 water system treatments to prevent RGM transmission. SETTING: An SNF specializing in care of patients requiring ventilator support. METHODS: RGM and heterotrophic plate count (HPC) bacteria were examined in facility water before and after hyperchlorination and in a subsequent 24-week assessment of filtered water by colony enumeration on Middlebrook and R2A media. RESULTS: Mycobacterium chelonae was consistently isolated from the SNF water supply. Hyperchlorination reduced RGM by 1.5 log(10) initially, but the population returned to original levels within 90 days. Concentration of HPC bacteria also decreased temporarily. RGM were reduced below detection level in filtered water, a 3-log(10) reduction. HPC bacteria were not recovered from newly installed filters, although low quantities were found in water from 2-week-old filters. CONCLUSION: POU membrane filters may be a feasible prevention measure for healthcare facilities to limit exposure of sensitive individuals to RGM in potable water systems.

We investigated a cluster of Burkholderia cepacia complex colonization in ventilated pediatric patients. Isolates from 15 patients, 2 sink drains, and several ventilator components were found to belong to a single B cenocepacia clone. Hospital tap water used during oral and tracheostomy care was identified as the most likely mechanism for transmission.

AIMS: To evaluate the efficacy of chlorine dioxide (ClO(2) ) against seven species of bacterial threat (BT) agents in water. METHODS AND RESULTS: Two strains of Bacillus anthracis spores, Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis, Burkholderia pseudomallei, Burkholderia mallei, and Brucella species were each inoculated into a ClO(2) solution with an initial concentration of 2.0 mg l(-1) (spores only) and 0.25 mg l(-1) (all other bacteria) at pH 7 or 8, 5 degrees C or 25 degrees C. At 0.25 mg l(-1) in potable water, six species were inactivated by at least 3 orders of magnitude within 10 min. B. anthracis spores required up to 7 h at 5 degrees C for the same inactivation with 2.0 mg l(-1) ClO(2) . CONCLUSIONS: Typical ClO(2) doses used in water treatment facilities would be effective against all bacteria tested except B. anthracis spores which would require up to 7 h with the largest allowable dose of 2 mg l(-1) ClO(2) . Other water treatment processes may be required in addition to ClO(2) disinfection for effective spore removal or inactivation. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT OF STUDY: The data obtained from this study provides valuable information for water treatment facilities and public health officials in the event that a potable water supply is contaminated with these BT agents.

AIMS: To determine the range of free available chlorine (FAC) required for disinfection of the live vaccine strain (LVS) and wild-type strains of Francisella tularensis. METHODS AND RESULTS: Seven strains of planktonic F. tularensis were exposed to 0.5 mg.l(-1) FAC for two pH values, 7 and 8, at 5 and 25 degrees C. LVS was inactivated 2 to 4 times more quickly than any of the wild-type F. tularensis strains at pH 8 and 5 degrees C. CONCLUSIONS: Free available chlorine residual concentrations routinely maintained in drinking water distribution systems would require up to two hours to reduce all F. tularensis strains by 4 log10. LVS was inactivated most quickly of the tested strains. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT OF THE STUDY: This work provides contact time (CT) values that are useful for drinking water risk assessment and also suggests that LVS may not be a good surrogate in disinfection studies.

Hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection is the most common chronic blood-borne infection in the United States; the prevalence in maintenance hemodialysis patients substantially exceeds that in the general population. In hemodialysis patients, HCV infection has been associated with increased occurrence of cirrhosis and hepatocellular carcinoma and increased mortality. Injection drug use and receipt of blood transfusions before 1992 has accounted for most prevalent HCV infections in the United States. However, HCV transmission among patients undergoing hemodialysis has been documented frequently. Outbreak investigations have implicated lapses in infection control practices as the cause of HCV infections. Preventing these infections is an emerging priority for renal care providers, public health agencies, and regulators. Adherence to recommended infection control practices is effective in preventing HCV transmission in hemodialysis facilities. In addition, adoption of routine screening to facilitate the detection of incident HCV infections and hemodialysis-related transmission is an essential component of patient safety and infection prevention efforts. This article describes the current epidemiology of HCV infection in US maintenance hemodialysis patients and prevention practices to decrease its incidence and transmission.

Infections cause significant morbidity and mortality in patients undergoing hemodialysis. Bloodstream infections (BSIs) are particularly problematic, accounting for a substantial number of hospitalizations in these patients. Hospitalizations for BSI and other vascular access infections appear to have increased dramatically in hemodialysis patients since 1993. These infections frequently are related to central venous catheter (CVC) use for dialysis access. Regional initiatives that have shown successful decreases in catheter-related BSIs in hospitalized patients have generated interest in replicating this success in outpatient hemodialysis populations. Several interventions have been effective in preventing BSIs in the hemodialysis setting. Avoiding the use of CVCs in favor of access types with lower associated BSI risk is among the most important. When CVCs are used, adherence to evidence-based catheter insertion and maintenance practices can positively influence BSI rates. In addition, facility-level surveillance to detect BSIs and stimulate examination of vascular access use and care practices is essential to a comprehensive approach to prevention. This article describes the current epidemiology of BSIs in hemodialysis patients and effective prevention strategies to decrease the incidence of these devastating infections.

Infections continue to be a major cause of morbidity and mortality in patients with end-stage renal disease. While rates of all-cause hospitalization of prevalent end-stage renal disease patients receiving hemodialysis reported by the United States Renal Data System fell from 1993 to 2007, rates of hospitalization for infections rose by 26%. Developing a better understanding of the reasons for this rise and employing strategies to reverse it have become a priority for patients, providers and regulatory agencies in the USA. In addition, recent episodes of transmission of bloodborne hepatitis viruses in outpatient healthcare facilities, including hemodialysis centers, related to suboptimal infection control and injection safety practices, have raised concerns about patient safety. In this article, we review many of the current infection control challenges facing outpatient dialysis centers and discuss recommended infection control policies and practices aimed at combating these challenges.

Twelve Laboratory Response Network (LRN) affiliated laboratories participated in a validation study of a macrofoam swab protocol for the recovery, detection, and quantification of viable B. anthracis (BA) Sterne spores from steel surfaces. CDC personnel inoculated steel coupons (26cm(2)) with 1-4 log(10) BA spores and recovered them by sampling with pre-moistened macrofoam swabs. Phase 1 (P1) of the study evaluated swabs containing BA only, while dust and background organisms were added to swabs in Phase 2 (P2) to mimic environmental conditions. Laboratories processed swabs and enumerated spores by culturing eluted swab suspensions and counting colonies with morphology consistent with BA. Processed swabs were placed in enrichment broth, incubated 24h, and cultured by streaking for isolation. Real-time PCR was performed on selected colonies from P2 samples to confirm the identity of BA. Mean percent recovery (%R) of spores from the surface ranged from 15.8-31.0% (P1) and 27.9-55.0% (P2). The highest mean percent recovery was 31.0% (sd 10.9%) for P1 (4 log(10) inoculum) and 55.0% (sd 27.6%) for P2 (1 log(10) inoculum). The overall %R was higher for P2 (44.6%) than P1 (24.1%), but the overall reproducibility (between lab variability) was lower in P2 than in P1 (25.0 vs 16.5 %CV, respectively). The overall precision (within lab variability) was close to identical for P1 and P2 (44.0 and 44.1, respectively), but varied greatly between inoculum levels. The protocol demonstrated linearity in %R over the three inoculum levels and is able to detect between 26 and 5x10(6) spores/26cm(2). Sensitivity as determined by culture was >98.3% for both phases and all inocula, suggesting the culture method maintains sensitivity in the presence of contaminants. The enrichment broth method alone was less sensitive for sampled swabs (66.4%) during P2, suggesting that the presence of background organisms inhibited growth or isolation of BA from the broth. The addition of real-time PCR testing to the assay increased specificity from >85.4% to >95.0% in P2. Although the precision was low at the 1 log(10) inoculum level in both phases (59.0 and 50.2%), this swab processing protocol, was sensitive, specific, precise, and reproducible at 2-4 log(10) /26cm(2) spore concentrations.

Burkholderia pseudomallei is a select agent and the causative agent of melioidosis. Variations in previously reported chlorine and monochloramine concentration time (Ct) values for disinfection of this organism make decisions regarding the appropriate levels of chlorine in water treatment systems difficult. This study identified the variation in Ct values for 2-, 3-, and 4-log(10) reductions of eight environmental and clinical isolates of B. pseudomallei in phosphate-buffered water. The greatest calculated Ct values for a 4-log(10) inactivation were 7.8 mg.min/liter for free available chlorine (FAC) at pH 8 and 5 degrees C and 550 mg.min/liter for monochloramine at pH 8 and 5 degrees C. Ionic strength of test solutions, culture hold times in water, and cell washing were ruled out as sources of the differences in prior observations. Tolerance to FAC was correlated with the relative amount of extracellular material produced by each isolate. Solid-phase cytometry analysis using an esterase-cleaved fluorochrome assay detected a 2-log(10)-higher level of organisms based upon metabolic activity than did culture, which in some cases increased Ct values by fivefold. Despite strain-to-strain variations in Ct values of 17-fold for FAC and 2.5-fold for monochloramine, standard FAC disinfection practices utilized in the United States should disinfect planktonic populations of these B. pseudomallei strains by 4 orders of magnitude in less than 10 min at the tested temperatures and pH levels.

OBJECTIVE: We investigated a cluster of cases of bloodstream infection (BSI) due to the mold Phialemonium at a hemodialysis center in Illinois and conducted a cohort study to identify risk factors. DESIGN: Environmental assessment and cohort study. SETTING: A hemodialysis center in a tertiary care hospital. METHODS: A case patient was defined as a person who underwent dialysis at the center and had a blood sample that tested positive for Phialemonium curvatum on culture. We reviewed microbiology and medical records and tested water, surface, and dialysate samples by culture. Molds isolated from environmental and clinical specimens were identified by their morphological features and confirmed by sequencing DNA. RESULTS: We identified 2 case patients with BSI due to P. curvatum. Both became febrile and hypotensive while undergoing dialysis on the same machine at the same treatment station, although on different days. Dialysis machines were equipped with waste handling option ports that are used to discard dialyzer priming fluid. We isolated P. curvatum from the product water (ie, water used for dialysis purposes) at 2 of 19 treatment stations, one of which was the implicated station. CONCLUSION: The source of P. curvatum was likely the water distribution system. To our knowledge, this is the first report of patients acquiring a mold BSI from contaminated product water. The route of exposure in these cases of BSI due to P. curvatum may be related to the malfunction and improper maintenance of the waste handling option ports. Waste handling option ports have been previously implicated as the source of bacterial BSI due to the backflow of waste fluid into a patient's blood line. No additional cases of infection were noted after remediation of the water distribution system and after discontinuing use of waste handling option ports at the facility.

After the 2001 anthrax incidents, surface sampling techniques for biological agents were found to be inadequately validated, especially at low surface loadings. We aerosolized Bacillus anthracis Sterne spores within a chamber to achieve very low surface loading (ca. 3, 30, and 200 CFU per 100 cm(2)). Steel and carpet coupons seeded in the chamber were sampled with swab (103 cm(2)) or wipe or vacuum (929 cm(2)) surface sampling methods and analyzed at three laboratories. Agar settle plates (60 cm(2)) were the reference for determining recovery efficiency (RE). The minimum estimated surface concentrations to achieve a 95% response rate based on probit regression were 190, 15, and 44 CFU/100 cm(2) for sampling steel surfaces and 40, 9.2, and 28 CFU/100 cm(2) for sampling carpet surfaces with swab, wipe, and vacuum methods, respectively; however, these results should be cautiously interpreted because of high observed variability. Mean REs at the highest surface loading were 5.0%, 18%, and 3.7% on steel and 12%, 23%, and 4.7% on carpet for the swab, wipe, and vacuum methods, respectively. Precision (coefficient of variation) was poor at the lower surface concentrations but improved with increasing surface concentration. The best precision was obtained with wipe samples on carpet, achieving 38% at the highest surface concentration. The wipe sampling method detected B. anthracis at lower estimated surface concentrations and had higher RE and better precision than the other methods. These results may guide investigators to more meaningfully conduct environmental sampling, quantify contamination levels, and conduct risk assessment for humans.