OBJECTIVES: Historically, the most frequent cause of death reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) among travelers on conveyances has been cardiovascular disease, mirroring all-cause mortality in the US population. Infectious disease transmission, particularly during large-scale outbreaks, also poses a risk to travelers. To determine leading causes of death on conveyances and whether they were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, we describe causes of death on conveyances reported to CDC from 2008 through 2022. METHODS: We queried CDC's Port Health Activity Reporting System for traveler deaths on, or immediately after disembarking from, an aircraft or maritime vessel or during land-border crossings reported to CDC from July 1, 2008, through December 31, 2022. We examined data on cause of death, age, travel mode, and traveler type (passenger vs crew). We also calculated crude annual mortality rates for each conveyance type. To assess factors associated with deaths due to infectious diseases (vs deaths due to noninfectious conditions), we performed logistic regression. RESULTS: During the analysis period, 2910 deaths on conveyances were reported. Across all conveyances, the most common causes were cardiovascular- or pulmonary-related conditions (2116 of 2910; 73%) for each year except 2020, when COVID-19 was the most common. Crew (vs passengers) had significant associations with death due to infectious causes (vs noninfectious causes; adjusted odds ratio = 2.12; 95% CI, 1.32-3.40). CONCLUSIONS: Travelers with cardiovascular- or pulmonary-related conditions should consult their health care providers prior to international travel. All travelers should check travel recommendations such as those currently available on CDC travel pages. Public health authorities should consider population-based mitigation measures aimed at transmission risk reduction to limit morbidity and mortality during infectious disease outbreaks.

Differentiating between acute febrile illnesses (AFIs) caused by arboviruses like dengue virus (DENV) and other pathogens is challenging, particularly in the case of coinfections, which often require comprehensive diagnostic testing for accurate identification. Recognizing DENV coinfections is important because they may contribute to increased disease severity, and their identification can aid in patient management decisions. Using data from the Sentinel Enhanced Dengue Surveillance System in Puerto Rico (2012-2024), we compared patients with DENV monoinfection to those coinfected with DENV and another pathogen. All pathogens were identified via nucleic acid detection by using real-time, reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction or serology. We examined demographic and clinical features linked to coinfection using Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon, χ2, or Fisher's exact tests. Among 50,189 participants tested for DENV, 1,218 (2.4%) had DENV infections, with 1,172 (96.2%) monoinfections and 46 (3.8%) coinfections. The most frequent coinfecting pathogens were adenovirus (17.4%), influenza A (15.2%), human metapneumovirus (15.2%), and respiratory syncytial virus (10.9%). Dengue virus coinfections were associated with younger age (median: 13 versus 16 years; P = 0.011) and symptoms of rhinorrhea (52.2% versus 27.3%; P <0.001) and cough (60.9% versus 36.4%; P = 0.001). Among 549 hospitalized dengue patients, 20 (3.6%) had coinfections. Five of seven participants with DENV/influenza A coinfection were hospitalized. Hospitalization, intensive care unit admission, the administration of blood products, and severe dengue indicators (plasma leakage, severe bleeding, and organ involvement) were not significantly associated with DENV coinfection. Overall, DENV coinfections were uncommon in AFI cases in Puerto Rico, and they primarily involved respiratory viruses. Overlapping symptoms may complicate clinical management, emphasizing the importance of comprehensive pathogen testing in settings where arboviruses and respiratory viruses cocirculate.

BACKGROUND: There is limited knowledge on the extent of antimicrobial stewardship program (ASP) implementation in health care facilities (HCFs) in Latin America. METHODS: We performed an evaluation of ASPs in Latin American HCFs from March 2022 to February 2023 using a structured self-assessment survey associated with a scoring system that evaluated leadership support and accountability, resources, antibiotic stewardship actions, education, and antibiotic use (AU) monitoring and reporting. Additionally, we collected monthly AU data (antibiotic consumption and point prevalence surveys) and number of multidrug-resistant infections in medical-surgical intensive care units. Self-assessment scores were correlated with AU through multivariable regression models adjusting for bed size, country of HCF, and incidence of infections (when appropriate). RESULTS: Of the 39 HCFs recruited for the study, all completed the self-assessment, 36 performed the point prevalence survey, and 29 collected antibiotic consumption data. The overall median self-assessment score was 252.5 (IQR, 212.5-285) for a maximum possible score of 335. A high self-assessment score (top quartile) was associated with higher guideline-compliant AU (odds ratio [OR], 8.63; 95% CI, 3.03-24.6; P < .001), higher use of directed therapy (OR, 2.11; 95% CI, 1.41-3.1; P < .001), and less consumption of anti-methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus agents (OR, -8.59; SE = 4.12; P = .037) after adjusting for bed size, country, and incidence of methicillin-resistant S aureus infections. CONCLUSIONS: Higher-level ASP implementation in Latin American HCFs correlated with better compliance with AU guidelines and decreased the use of vancomycin in the intensive care unit, supporting the need to improve resources for ASPs.

During the global clade II mpox outbreak, cases have disproportionately affected gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (MSM). Cruise ship travel-associated mpox infections have not been previously described. During January 25-April 18, 2024, CDC was notified of eight mpox cases among cruise travelers on four ships: four among crew members and four among passengers. Seven cases were laboratory-confirmed as clade II Monkeypox virus. All exposure histories indicated male-to-male sexual contact. No patients were hospitalized, and none died. Crew members with mpox received their diagnoses on board and were isolated while infectious. Contacts were identified, monitored, and assessed for mpox postexposure prophylaxis (mpox vaccination). No crew members with mpox had been vaccinated against mpox. Passengers with mpox received their diagnoses after cruising on voyages marketed to gay and bisexual men, with symptom onset dates suggesting voyage exposures. For one cruise ship, two of the three reports of mpox among passengers were received after health departments were notified of potential cruise-associated exposures, and letters were sent to other passengers. Three of the four passengers with mpox had received 2 doses of JYNNEOS vaccine in 2022. Cruise lines should consider educating crew members on symptoms, risks, and preventive measures related to mpox and working with medical personnel to facilitate mpox vaccination as preexposure prophylaxis for eligible crew members. Cruise passengers who are eligible, predominantly MSM, should receive mpox vaccine before cruise travel. For cruise voyages marketed to gay and bisexual men, having mpox vaccine available on board would facilitate timely postexposure prophylaxis, if indicated; mpox prevention messaging and education before and during a voyage are also recommended.

CONTEXT: Federal public health travel restrictions (FPHTR) in the United States are implemented for persons who meet specific criteria to prevent spread of communicable diseases of public health concern. FPHTR can mitigate the risk of disease transmission during air travel and mitigating disease translocation between geographic areas. OBJECTIVE: To characterize and determine the extent of FPHTR implementation during the COVID-19 pandemic. DESIGN: Secondary data analysis. SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: This report reviewed the U.S. public health response for 3010 persons traveling within, into, and out of, the U.S. who were placed on federal public health travel restrictions during the COVID-19 outbreak from January 1, 2020 to April 6, 2022. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Total number and characteristics of persons with SARS-CoV-2 infection or high-risk exposure added to FPHTR. RESULTS: During this period, FPHTR were implemented for 3010/5460 (55%) persons who were reported to CDC as having tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, or being identified as close contacts of a person with COVID-19, with intention to travel. Of those added to FPHTR lists, 2023/3010 (67%) had confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection, 975/3010 (32%) were close contacts, and 12/3010 (0.4%) were reasonably believed to have COVID-19 but later confirmed to have another diagnosis and removed. Twenty-six percent (793/3010) of SARS-CoV-2-related FPHTR were for persons reported to CDC after testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 at a testing site located within a U.S. airport. CONCLUSIONS: The extensive application of FPHTR for more than 3000 persons over a period of 29 months during the COVID-19 pandemic was unprecedented. The additional use of FPHTR required extraordinary effort and collaboration among CDC staff and local/state public health agencies for case investigation, reporting, exchange of information, and communication with travelers for case management. Use of this tool should be considered within the context current transmission risk and disease severity.

BACKGROUND: On 20 September 2022, the Ugandan Ministry of Health declared an outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Sudan ebolavirus. METHODS: From 6 October 2022 to 10 January 2023, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) staff conducted public health assessments at five US ports of entry for travellers identified as having been in Uganda in the past 21 days. CDC also recommended that state, local and territorial health departments ('health departments') conduct post-arrival monitoring of these travellers. CDC provided traveller contact information, daily to 58 health departments, and collected health department data regarding monitoring outcomes. RESULTS: Among 11 583 travellers screened, 132 (1%) required additional assessment due to potential exposures or symptoms of concern. Fifty-three (91%) health departments reported receiving traveller data from CDC for 10 114 (87%) travellers, of whom 8499 (84%) were contacted for monitoring, 1547 (15%) could not be contacted and 68 (1%) had no reported outcomes. No travellers with high-risk exposures or Ebola disease were identified. CONCLUSION: Entry risk assessment and post-arrival monitoring of travellers are resource-intensive activities that had low demonstrated yield during this and previous outbreaks. The efficiency of future responses could be improved by incorporating an assessment of risk of importation of disease, accounting for individual travellers' potential for exposure, and expanded use of methods that reduce burden to federal agencies, health departments, and travellers.

In 2021, the US government undertook Operation Allies Welcome, in which evacuees from Afghanistan arrived at 2 US ports of entry in Virginia and Pennsylvania. Because of the rapid evacuation process, the US government granted evacuees an exemption to a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) requirement in place at that time-namely, that air passengers present a negative SARS-CoV-2 viral test result or documentation of recovery from COVID-19 before they boarded international flights bound for the United States. This study describes cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection detected among 65 068 evacuees who arrived at the 2 ports of entry in August and September 2021. Because evacuees were a population at increased risk for infection with diseases of public health concern, CDC staff helped coordinate on-site and on-arrival testing, visually observed evacuees for signs and symptoms of communicable disease, and referred evacuees for further evaluation and treatment as needed. CDC staff used antigen or nucleic acid amplification tests at the ports of entry to evaluate evacuees aged ≥2 years without documentation of recent SARS-CoV-2 infection. CDC staff isolated evacuees with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection and quarantined their close contacts, consistent with CDC guidance at the time, before evacuees rejoined the repatriation process. Of 65 068 evacuees, 214 (0.3%) were confirmed as having SARS-CoV-2 infection after port-of-entry testing. Cases of measles, varicella, pertussis, tuberculosis, hepatitis A, malaria, leishmaniasis, and diarrheal illness were also identified. Although the percentage of SARS-CoV-2 infection was low in this evacuated population, communicable disease detection at US ports of entry, along with vaccination efforts, was an important part of a multilayered approach to mitigate the transmission of disease in congregate housing facilities and into US communities.

Monkeypox virus (MPXV) can spread among humans through direct contact with lesions, scabs, or saliva; via respiratory secretions; and indirectly from fomites; via percutaneous injuries; and by crossing the placenta to the fetus during pregnancy. Since 2022, most patients with mpox in the United States have experienced painful skin lesions, and some have had severe illness. During 2021-2022, CDC initiated aircraft contact investigations after receiving reports of travelers on commercial flights with probable or confirmed mpox during their infectious period. Data were collected 1) during 2021, when two isolated clade II mpox cases not linked to an outbreak were imported into the United States by international travelers and 2) for flights arriving in or traveling within the United States during April 30-August 2, 2022, after a global clade II mpox outbreak was detected in May 2022. A total of 113 persons (100 passengers and 13 crew members) traveled on 221 flights while they were infectious with mpox. CDC developed definitions for aircraft contacts based on proximity to mpox cases and flight duration, sent information about these contacts to U.S. health departments, and received outcome information for 1,046 (68%) of 1,538 contacts. No traveler was found to have acquired mpox via a U.S. flight exposure. For persons with mpox and their contacts who had departed from the United States, CDC forwarded contact information as well as details about the exposure event to destination countries to facilitate their own public health investigations. Findings from these aircraft contact investigations suggest that traveling on a flight with a person with mpox does not appear to constitute an exposure risk or warrant routine contact tracing activities. Nonetheless, CDC recommends that persons with mpox isolate and delay travel until they are no longer infectious.

PROBLEM/CONDITION: Dengue is the most prevalent mosquitoborne viral illness worldwide and is endemic in Puerto Rico. Dengue's clinical spectrum can range from mild, undifferentiated febrile illness to hemorrhagic manifestations, shock, multiorgan failure, and death in severe cases. The disease presentation is nonspecific; therefore, various other illnesses (e.g., arboviral and respiratory pathogens) can cause similar clinical symptoms. Enhanced surveillance is necessary to determine disease prevalence, to characterize the epidemiology of severe disease, and to evaluate diagnostic and treatment practices to improve patient outcomes. The Sentinel Enhanced Dengue Surveillance System (SEDSS) was established to monitor trends of dengue and dengue-like acute febrile illnesses (AFIs), characterize the clinical course of disease, and serve as an early warning system for viral infections with epidemic potential. REPORTING PERIOD: May 2012-December 2022. DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM: SEDSS conducts enhanced surveillance for dengue and other relevant AFIs in Puerto Rico. This report includes aggregated data collected from May 2012 through December 2022. SEDSS was launched in May 2012 with patients with AFIs from five health care facilities enrolled. The facilities included two emergency departments in tertiary acute care hospitals in the San Juan-Caguas-Guaynabo metropolitan area and Ponce, two secondary acute care hospitals in Carolina and Guayama, and one outpatient acute care clinic in Ponce. Patients arriving at any SEDSS site were eligible for enrollment if they reported having fever within the past 7 days. During the Zika epidemic (June 2016-June 2018), patients were eligible for enrollment if they had either rash and conjunctivitis, rash and arthralgia, or fever. Eligibility was expanded in April 2020 to include reported cough or shortness of breath within the past 14 days. Blood, urine, nasopharyngeal, and oropharyngeal specimens were collected at enrollment from all participants who consented. Diagnostic testing for dengue virus (DENV) serotypes 1-4, chikungunya virus, Zika virus, influenza A and B viruses, SARS-CoV-2, and five other respiratory viruses was performed by the CDC laboratory in San Juan. RESULTS: During May 2012-December 2022, a total of 43,608 participants with diagnosed AFI were enrolled in SEDSS; a majority of participants (45.0%) were from Ponce. During the surveillance period, there were 1,432 confirmed or probable cases of dengue, 2,293 confirmed or probable cases of chikungunya, and 1,918 confirmed or probable cases of Zika. The epidemic curves of the three arboviruses indicate dengue is endemic; outbreaks of chikungunya and Zika were sporadic, with case counts peaking in late 2014 and 2016, respectively. The majority of commonly identified respiratory pathogens were influenza A virus (3,756), SARS-CoV-2 (1,586), human adenovirus (1,550), respiratory syncytial virus (1,489), influenza B virus (1,430), and human parainfluenza virus type 1 or 3 (1,401). A total of 5,502 participants had confirmed or probable arbovirus infection, 11,922 had confirmed respiratory virus infection, and 26,503 had AFI without any of the arboviruses or respiratory viruses examined. INTERPRETATION: Dengue is endemic in Puerto Rico; however, incidence rates varied widely during the reporting period, with the last notable outbreak occurring during 2012-2013. DENV-1 was the predominant virus during the surveillance period; sporadic cases of DENV-4 also were reported. Puerto Rico experienced large outbreaks of chikungunya that peaked in 2014 and of Zika that peaked in 2016; few cases of both viruses have been reported since. Influenza A and respiratory syncytial virus seasonality patterns are distinct, with respiratory syncytial virus incidence typically reaching its annual peak a few weeks before influenza A. The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 led to a reduction in the circulation of other acute respiratory viruses. PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION: SEDSS is the only site-based enhanced surveillance system designed to gather information on AFI cases in Puerto Rico. This report illustrates that SEDSS can be adapted to detect dengue, Zika, chikungunya, COVID-19, and influenza outbreaks, along with other seasonal acute respiratory viruses, underscoring the importance of recognizing signs and symptoms of relevant diseases and understanding transmission dynamics among these viruses. This report also describes fluctuations in disease incidence, highlighting the value of active surveillance, testing for a panel of acute respiratory viruses, and the importance of flexible and responsive surveillance systems in addressing evolving public health challenges. Various vector control strategies and vaccines are being considered or implemented in Puerto Rico, and data from ongoing trials and SEDSS might be integrated to better understand epidemiologic factors underlying transmission and risk mitigation approaches. Data from SEDSS might guide sampling strategies and implementation of future trials to prevent arbovirus transmission, particularly during the expansion of SEDSS throughout the island to improve geographic representation.

Hypervirulent Klebsiella pneumoniae (hvKp) is a concerning pathogen that can cause life-threatening infections in otherwise healthy individuals. Importantly, although strains of hvKp have been acquiring antimicrobial resistance, the effect on virulence is unclear. Therefore, it is of critical importance to determine whether a given antimicrobial resistant K. pneumoniae isolate is hypervirulent. This report determined which combination of genotypic and phenotypic markers could most accurately identify hvKp strains with acquired resistance. Both logistic regression and a machine-learning prediction model demonstrated that biomarker count alone was the strongest predictor. The presence of all five of the biomarkers iucA, iroB, peg-344, rmpA, and rmpA2 was most accurate (94%); the presence of ≥4 of these biomarkers was most sensitive (100%). Accurately identifying hvKp is vital for surveillance and research, and the availability of biomarker data could alert the clinician that hvKp is a consideration, which, in turn, would assist in optimizing patient care.

A universal screening research study was conducted in six hospitals to identify the clinical sensitivity of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing on newborn dried blood spots (DBSs) versus saliva specimens for the diagnosis of congenital cytomegalovirus (cCMV). CMV DNA positive results from DBSs or saliva were confirmed with urine testing. Findings of several false-positive (FP) saliva PCR results prompted an examination of a possible association with donor milk. Documentation of the frequency of positive saliva results, including both true-positive (TP) and FP status from clinical confirmation, occurred. The frequency of donor milk use was compared for TP and FP cases. Of 22,079 participants tested between 2016 and 2022, 96 had positive saliva results, 15 were determined to be FP, 79 TP, and 2 were excluded for incomplete clinical evaluation. Newborn donor milk use was identified for 18 (19.14%) of all the positive saliva screens. Among the 15 FPs, 11 (73.33%) consumed donor milk compared to 7 of the 79 TPs (8.8%) (OR 28.29, 95% CI 7.10-112.73, p < 0.001). While milk bank Holder pasteurization inactivates CMV infectivity, CMV DNA may still be detectable. Due to this possible association, screening programs that undertake testing saliva for CMV DNA may benefit from documenting donor milk use as a potential increased risk for FP results.

Balancing the control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission with the resumption of travel is a global priority. Current recommendations include mitigation measures before, during, and after travel. Pre- and post-travel strategies including symptom monitoring, testing, and quarantine can be combined in multiple ways considering different trade-offs in feasibility, adherence, effectiveness, cost and adverse consequences. Here we use a mathematical model to analyze the expected effectiveness of symptom monitoring, testing, and quarantine under different estimates of the infectious period, test-positivity relative to time of infection, and test sensitivity to reduce the risk of transmission from infected travelers during and after travel. If infection occurs 0-7 days prior to travel, immediate isolation following symptom onset prior to or during travel reduces risk of transmission while traveling by 26-30%. Pre-departure testing can further reduce risk if testing is close to the time of departure. For example, testing on the day of departure can reduce risk while traveling by 37-61%. For transmission risk after travel with infection time up to 7 days prior to arrival at the destination, isolation based on symptom monitoring reduced introduction risk at the destination by 42-56%. A 14-day quarantine after arrival, without symptom monitoring or testing, can reduce risk by 97-100% on its own. However, a shorter quarantine of 7 days combined with symptom monitoring and a test on day 3-4 after arrival is also effective (95-99%) at reducing introduction risk and is less burdensome, which may improve adherence. To reduce the risk of introduction without quarantine, optimal test timing after arrival is close to the time of arrival; with effective quarantine after arrival, testing a few days later optimizes sensitivity to detect those infected immediately before or while traveling. These measures can complement recommendations such as social distancing, using masks, and hand hygiene, to further reduce risk during and after travel.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.Funding StatementNo external funding supported this research.Author DeclarationsI confirm all relevant ethical guidelines have been followed, and any necessary IRB and/or ethics committee approvals have been obtained.YesThe details of the IRB/oversight body that provided approval or exemption for the research described are given below:Centers for Disease Control and PreventionAll necessary patient/participant consent has been obtained and the appropriate institutional forms have been archived.YesI understand that all clinical trials and any other prospective interventional studies must be registered with an ICMJE-approved registry, such as ClinicalTrials.gov. I confirm that any such study reported in the manuscript has been registered and the trial registration ID is provided (note: if posting a prospective study registered retrospectively, please provide a statement in the trial ID field explaining why the study was not registered in advance).YesI have followed all appropriate research reporting guidelines and uploaded the relevant EQUATOR Network research reporting checklist(s) and other pertinent material as supplementary files, if applicable.YesOnly publicly available data informed this research.

Coccidioides posadasii is a pathogenic fungus that causes coccidioidomycosis in many arid regions of the Americas. One of these regions is bordered by the Caribbean Sea, and the surrounding landscape may play an important role in the dispersion of C. posadasii across South America through southeastern Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and Venezuela. Comparative phylogenomic analyses of C. posadasii reveal that clinical strains from Venezuela are genetically distinct from the North American populations found in Arizona (AZ), Texas, Mexico, and the rest of South America (TX/MX/SA). We find evidence for admixture between the Venezuela and the North American populations of C. posadasii in Central America. As expected, the proportion of Venezuelan alleles in the admixed population decreases as latitude (and distance from Venezuela) increases. Our results indicate that the population in Venezuela may have been subjected to a recent bottleneck, and shows strong population structure. This analysis provides insight into potential for Coccidioides spp. to invade new regions.

Background: We estimated SARS-CoV-2 Delta and Omicron-specific effectiveness of 2 and 3 mRNA COVID-19 vaccine doses in adults against symptomatic illness in US outpatient settings. Method(s): Between October 1, 2021, and February 12, 2022, research staff consented and enrolled eligible participants who had fever, cough, or loss of taste or smell and sought outpatient medical care or clinical SARS-CoV-2 testing within 10 days of illness onset. Using the test-negative design, we compared the odds of receiving 2 or 3 mRNA COVID-19 vaccine doses among SARS-CoV-2 cases versus controls using logistic regression. Regression models were adjusted for study site, age, onset week, and prior SARS-CoV-2 infection. Vaccine effectiveness (VE) was calculated as (1 - adjusted odds ratio) x 100%. Result(s): Among 3847 participants included for analysis, 574 (32%) of 1775 tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 during the Delta predominant period and 1006 (56%) of 1794 participants tested positive during the Omicron predominant period. When Delta predominated, VE against symptomatic illness in outpatient settings was 63% (95% CI: 51% to 72%) among mRNA 2-dose recipients and 96% (95% CI: 93% to 98%) for 3-dose recipients. When Omicron predominated, VE was 21% (95% CI: -6% to 41%) among 2-dose recipients and 62% (95% CI: 48% to 72%) among 3-dose recipients. Conclusion(s): In this adult population, 3 mRNA COVID-19 vaccine doses provided substantial protection against symptomatic illness in outpatient settings when the Omicron variant became the predominant cause of COVID-19 in the U.S. These findings support the recommendation for a 3rd mRNA COVID-19 vaccine dose. Copyright The copyright holder for this preprint is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. This article is a US Government work. It is not subject to copyright under 17 USC 105 and is also made available for use under a CC0 license.

Monkeypox is a zoonotic disease endemic in Central and West Africa. In May 2022, an outbreak of monkeypox characterized by human-to-human transmission was detected in multiple non-endemic countries. We estimated the incubation period for monkeypox using information from 22 probable (N = 1) and confirmed (N = 21) monkeypox cases in patients reported in the United States through June 6, 2022. We pooled U.S. patient data with the data from 18 confirmed cases in patients reported from the Netherlands through May 31, 2022. The mean incubation period from exposure to first symptom onset was 7.6 days (95% credible interval: 6.2 - 9.7), and the 95th percentile was 17.1 days (95% CrI: 12.7-24.3). These findings align with current CDC recommendations for monitoring close contacts of people with monkeypox for 21 days after their last exposure. Copyright The copyright holder for this preprint is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. This article is a US Government work. It is not subject to copyright under 17 USC 105 and is also made available for use under a CC0 license.

Objectives. To describe trends in the number of air travelers categorized as infectious with SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; the virus that causes COVID-19) in the context of total US COVID-19 vaccinations administered, and overall case counts of SARS-CoV-2 in the United States. Methods. We searched the Quarantine Activity Reporting System (QARS) database for travelers with inbound international or domestic air travel, a positive SARS-CoV-2 lab result, and a surveillance categorization of SARS-CoV-2 infection reported during January 2020 to December 2021. Travelers were categorized as infectious during travel if they had arrival dates from 2 days before to 10 days after symptom onset or a positive viral test. Results. We identified 80 715 persons meeting our inclusion criteria; 67 445 persons (83.6%) had at least 1 symptom reported. Of 67 445 symptomatic passengers, 43 884 (65.1%) reported an initial symptom onset date after their flight arrival date. The number of infectious travelers mirrored the overall number of US SARS-CoV-2 cases. Conclusions. Most travelers in the study were asymptomatic during travel, and therefore unknowingly traveled while infectious. During periods of high community transmission, it is important for travelers to stay up to date with COVID-19 vaccinations and consider wearing a high-quality mask to decrease the risk of transmission. (Am J Public Health. Published online ahead of print June 15, 2023:e1-e5. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2023.307325).

On May 17, 2022, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory confirmed the presence of orthopoxvirus DNA via real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from lesion swabs obtained from a Massachusetts resident. Orthopoxviruses include Monkeypox virus, the causative agent of monkeypox. Subsequent real-time PCR testing at CDC on May 18 confirmed that the patient was infected with the West African clade of Monkeypox virus. Since then, confirmed cases* have been reported by nine states. In addition, 28 countries and territories,(†) none of which has endemic monkeypox, have reported laboratory-confirmed cases. On May 17, CDC, in coordination with state and local jurisdictions, initiated an emergency response to identify, monitor, and investigate additional monkeypox cases in the United States. This response has included releasing a Health Alert Network (HAN) Health Advisory, developing interim public health and clinical recommendations, releasing guidance for LRN testing, hosting clinician and public health partner outreach calls, disseminating health communication messages to the public, developing protocols for use and release of medical countermeasures, and facilitating delivery of vaccine postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) and antivirals that have been stockpiled by the U.S. government for preparedness and response purposes. On May 19, a call center was established to provide guidance to states for the evaluation of possible cases of monkeypox, including recommendations for clinical diagnosis and orthopoxvirus testing. The call center also gathers information about possible cases to identify interjurisdictional linkages. As of May 31, this investigation has identified 17(§) cases in the United States; most cases (16) were diagnosed in persons who identify as gay, bisexual, or men who have sex with men (MSM). Ongoing investigation suggests person-to-person community transmission, and CDC urges health departments, clinicians, and the public to remain vigilant, institute appropriate infection prevention and control measures, and notify public health authorities of suspected cases to reduce disease spread. Public health authorities are identifying cases and conducting investigations to determine possible sources and prevent further spread. This activity was reviewed by CDC and conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy.(¶).

BACKGROUND: We evaluated clinical and laboratory findings among patients with non-severe or severe dengue in Puerto Rico to examine whether clinical manifestations vary by age. METHODS: During 2012-2014, we enrolled patients who arrived at the emergency department with fever or history of fever within 7 days of presentation. Serum samples were tested for dengue virus (DENV) by RT-PCR and IgM ELISA. Severe dengue was defined as severe plasma leakage or shock, severe bleeding, or organ involvement at presentation, during hospitalization, or follow-up. RESULTS: Of 1089 dengue patients identified, 281 (26%) were severe. Compared to those with non-severe dengue, patients with severe dengue were more often aged 10-19 years (55% vs. 40%, p < 0.001) and hospitalized (87% vs. 30%, p < 0.001). Severe plasma leakage or shock was more common among children aged 0-9 (59%) or 10-19 years (86%) than adults (49%) (p < 0.01). Severe bleeding was less common among 10-19 year-olds (24%) compared to 0-9 year-olds (45%) and adults (52%; p < 0.01). CONCLUSIONS: Severe plasma leakage was the most common presentation among children, highlighting important differences with adults. Vaccination against dengue could help prevent severe dengue among children in Puerto Rico.

On August 29, 2021, the United States government oversaw the emergent establishment of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), led by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and implemented by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Department of State (DoS), to safely resettle U.S. citizens and Afghan nationals from Afghanistan to the United States. Evacuees were temporarily housed at several overseas locations in Europe and Asia* before being transported via military and charter flights through two U.S. international airports, and onward to eight U.S. military bases,(†) with hotel A used for isolation and quarantine of persons with or exposed to certain infectious diseases.(§) On August 30, CDC issued an Epi-X notice encouraging public health officials to maintain vigilance for measles among Afghan evacuees because of an ongoing measles outbreak in Afghanistan (25,988 clinical cases reported nationwide during January-November 2021) (1) and low routine measles vaccination coverage (66% and 43% for the first and second doses, respectively, in 2020) (2).

INTRODUCTION: Impacts of COVID-19 mitigation measures on seasonal respiratory viruses is unknown in sub-tropical climates. METHODS: We compared weekly testing and test-positivity of respiratory infections in the 2019-2020 respiratory season to the 2012-2018 seasons in southern Puerto Rico using Wilcoxon signed rank tests. RESULTS: Compared to the average for the 2012-2018 seasons, test-positivity was significantly lower for Influenza A (p<0.001) & B (p<0.001), respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) (p<0.01), respiratory adenovirus (AdV) (p<0.05), and other respiratory viruses (p<0.001) following March 2020 COVID-19 stay at home orders. CONCLUSIONS: Mitigation measures and behavioral social distancing choices may have reduced respiratory viral spread in southern Puerto Rico.

OBJECTIVES: The success of National Public Health Institutes (NPHIs) in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) is critical to countries' ability to deliver public health services to their populations and effectively respond to public health emergencies. However, empirical data are limited on factors that promote or are barriers to the sustainability of NPHIs. This evaluation explored stakeholders' perceptions about enabling factors and barriers to the success and sustainability of NPHIs in seven countries where the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has supported NPHI development and strengthening. DESIGN: Qualitative study. SETTING: Cambodia, Colombia, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda and Zambia. PARTICIPANTS: NPHI staff, non-NPHI government staff, and non-governmental and international organisation staff. METHODS: We conducted semistructured, in-person interviews at a location chosen by the participants in the seven countries. We analysed data using a directed content analysis approach. RESULTS: We interviewed 43 NPHI staff, 29 non-NPHI government staff and 24 staff from non-governmental and international organisations. Participants identified five enabling factors critical to the success and sustainability of NPHIs: (1) strong leadership, (2) financial autonomy, (3) political commitment and country ownership, (4) strengthening capacity of NPHI staff and (5) forming strategic partnerships. Three themes emerged related to major barriers or threats to the sustainability of NPHIs: (1) reliance on partner funding to maintain key activities, (2) changes in NPHI leadership and (3) staff attrition and turnover. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings contribute to the scant literature on sustainability of NPHIs in LMICs by identifying essential components of sustainability and types of support needed from various stakeholders. Integrating these components into each step of NPHI development and ensuring sufficient support will be critical to strengthening public health systems and safeguarding their continuity. Our findings offer potential approaches for country leadership to direct efforts to strengthen and sustain NPHIs.

Serological cross-reactivity has proved to be a challenge to diagnose Zika virus (ZIKV) infections in dengue virus (DENV) endemic countries. Confirmatory testing of ZIKV IgM positive results by plaque reduction neutralization tests (PRNTs) provides clarification in only a minority of cases because most individuals infected with ZIKV were previously exposed to DENV. The goal of this study was to evaluate the performance of a ZIKV/DENV DUO IgM antibody capture ELISA (MAC-ELISA) for discriminating between DENV and ZIKV infections in endemic regions. Our performance evaluation included acute and convalescent specimens from patients with real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)-confirmed DENV or ZIKV from the Sentinel Enhanced Dengue Surveillance System in Ponce, Puerto Rico. The ZIKV/DENV DUO MAC-ELISA specificity was 100% for DENV (N = 127) and 98.4% for ZIKV (N = 275) when specimens were tested during the optimal testing window (days post-onset of illness [DPO] 6-120). The ZIKV/DENV DUO MAC-ELISA sensitivity of RT-PCR confirmed specimens reached 100% for DENV by DPO 6 and for ZIKV by DPO 9. Our new ZIKV/DENV DUO MAC-ELISA was also able to distinguish ZIKV and DENV regardless of previous DENV exposure. We conclude this novel serologic diagnostic assay can accurately discriminate ZIKV and DENV infections. This can potentially be useful considering that the more labor-intensive and expensive PRNT assay may not be an option for confirmatory diagnosis in areas that lack PRNT capacity, but experience circulation of both DENV and ZIKV.

Hispanics are the majority ethnic population in Puerto Rico where we reviewed charts of 109 hospitalized COVID-19 patients to better understand demographic and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 and determine risk factors for poor outcomes. Eligible medical records of hospitalized patients with confirmed COVID-19 illnesses were reviewed at four participating hospitals in population centers across Puerto Rico and data were abstracted that described the clinical course, interventions, and outcomes. We found hospitalized patients had a median of 3 underlying conditions with obesity and diabetes as the most frequently reported conditions. Intensive care unit (ICU) admission occurred among 28% of patients and 18% of patients died during the hospitalization. Patients 65 or older or with immune deficiencies had a higher risk for death. Common symptoms included cough, dyspnea, and fatigue; less than half of patients in the study reported fever which was less frequent than reported elsewhere in the literature. It is important for interventions within Hispanic communities to protect high-risk groups.

Multiplex assays for malaria antigen detection can gather data from large sample sets, but considerations for the consistency and quality assurance (QA) of mass testing lack evaluation. We present a QA framework for a study occurring November 2019 to March 2020 involving 504 assay plates detecting four Plasmodium antigens: pan-Plasmodium aldolase and lactate dehydrogenase (LDH), histidine-rich protein 2 (HRP2), P. vivax LDH (PvLDH). Controls on each plate included buffer blank, antigen negative blood, and 4-point positive dilution curve. The blank and negative blood provided consistently low signal for all targets except for pAldolase, which showed variability. Positive curve signals decreased throughout the 5-month study duration but retained a coefficient of variation (CV) of < 5%, with the exception of HRP2 in month 5 (CV of 11%). Regression fittings for inter-plate control signals provided mean and standard deviations (SDs), and of 504 assay plates, 6 (1.2%) violated the acceptable deviation limits and were repeated. For the 40,272 human blood samples assayed in this study, of 161,088 potential data points (each sample × 4 antigens), 160,641 (99.7%) successfully passed quality checks. The QA framework presented here can be utilized to ensure quality of laboratory antigen detection for large sample sets.

BACKGROUND: Balancing the control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission with the resumption of travel is a global priority. Current recommendations include mitigation measures before, during, and after travel. Pre- and post-travel strategies including symptom monitoring, antigen or nucleic acid amplification testing, and quarantine can be combined in multiple ways considering different trade-offs in feasibility, adherence, effectiveness, cost, and adverse consequences. METHODS: We used a mathematical model to analyze the expected effectiveness of symptom monitoring, testing, and quarantine under different estimates of the infectious period, test-positivity relative to time of infection, and test sensitivity to reduce the risk of transmission from infected travelers during and after travel. RESULTS: If infection occurs 0-7 days prior to travel, immediate isolation following symptom onset prior to or during travel reduces risk of transmission while traveling by 30-35%. Pre-departure testing can further reduce risk, with testing closer to the time of travel being optimal even if test sensitivity is lower than an earlier test. For example, testing on the day of departure can reduce risk while traveling by 44-72%. For transmission risk after travel with infection time up to 7 days prior to arrival at the destination, isolation based on symptom monitoring reduced introduction risk at the destination by 42-56%. A 14-day quarantine after arrival, without symptom monitoring or testing, can reduce post-travel risk by 96-100% on its own. However, a shorter quarantine of 7 days combined with symptom monitoring and a test on day 5-6 after arrival is also effective (97--100%) at reducing introduction risk and is less burdensome, which may improve adherence. CONCLUSIONS: Quarantine is an effective measure to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk from travelers and can be enhanced by the addition of symptom monitoring and testing. Optimal test timing depends on the effectiveness of quarantine: with low adherence or no quarantine, optimal test timing is close to the time of arrival; with effective quarantine, testing a few days later optimizes sensitivity to detect those infected immediately before or while traveling. These measures can complement recommendations such as social distancing, using masks, and hand hygiene, to further reduce risk during and after travel.

BACKGROUND: Acute febrile illness (AFI) is an important cause for seeking health care among children. Knowledge of the most common etiologic agents of AFI and its seasonality is limited in most tropical regions. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: To describe the viral etiology of AFI in pediatric patients (≤18 years) recruited through a sentinel enhanced dengue surveillance system (SEDSS) in Southern Puerto Rico, we analyzed data for patients enrolled from 2012 to May 2018. To identify seasonal patterns, we applied time-series analyses to monthly arboviral and respiratory infection case data. We calculated coherence and phase differences for paired time-series to quantify the association between each time series. A viral pathogen was found in 47% of the 14,738 patients. Influenza A virus was the most common pathogen detected (26%). The incidence of Zika and dengue virus etiologies increased with age. Arboviral infections peaked between June and September throughout the times-series. Respiratory infections have seasonal peaks occurring in the fall and winter months of each year, though patterns vary by individual respiratory pathogen. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: Distinct seasonal patterns and differences in relative frequency by age groups seen in this study can guide clinical and laboratory assessment in pediatric patients with AFI in Puerto Rico.

IMPORTANCE: The sensitivity of dried blood spots (DBS) to identify newborns with congenital cytomegalovirus (cCMV) infection has not been evaluated in screening studies using the current, higher-sensitivity methods for DBS processing. OBJECTIVE: To assess the sensitivity of DBS polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for newborn screening for cCMV infection using saliva as the reference standard for screening, followed by collection of a urine sample for confirmation of congenital infection. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: This population-based cohort study took place at 5 newborn nurseries and 3 neonatal intensive care units in the Minneapolis/Saint Paul area in Minnesota from April 2016 to June 2019. Newborns enrolled with parental consent were screened for cCMV using DBS obtained for routine newborn screening and saliva collected 1 to 2 days after birth. Dried blood spots were tested for CMV DNA by PCR at both the University of Minnesota (UMN) and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Saliva swabs were tested by CMV DNA PCR at the UMN laboratory only. Newborns who screened positive by saliva or DBS had a diagnostic urine sample obtained by primary care professionals, tested by PCR within 3 weeks of birth. Analysis began July 2019. EXPOSURES: Detection of CMV from a saliva swab using a PCR assay. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Number of children with urine-confirmed cCMV and the proportion of them who were CMV positive through DBS screening. RESULTS: Of 1 554 individuals enrolled through June 2019 (of 25 000 projected enrollment), 56 newborns were confirmed to have cCMV (4.5 per 1000 [95% CI, 3.3-5.7]). Combined DBS results from either UMN or CDC had a sensitivity of 85.7% (48 of 56; 95% CI, 74.3%-92.6%), specificity of 100.0% (95% CI, 100.0%-100.0%), positive predictive value (PPV) of 98.0% (95% CI, 89.3%-99.6%), and negative predictive value (NPV) of 99.9% (95% CI, 99.9%-100.0%). Dried blood spot results from UMN had a sensitivity of 73.2% (95% CI, 60.4%-83.0%), specificity of 100.0% (100.0%-100.0%), PPV of 100.0% (95% CI, 91.4%-100.0%), and NPV of 99.9% (95% CI, 99.8%-99.9%). Dried blood spot results from CDC had a sensitivity of 76.8% (95% CI, 64.2%-85.9%), specificity of 100.0% (95% CI, 100.0%-100.0%), PPV of 97.7% (95% CI, 88.2%-99.6%), and NPV of 99.9% (95% CI, 99.8%-99.9%). Saliva swab results had a sensitivity of 92.9% (52 of 56; 95% CI, 83.0%-97.2%), specificity of 99.9% (95% CI, 99.9%-100.0%), PPV of 86.7% (95% CI, 75.8%-93.1%), and NPV of 100.0% (95% CI, 99.9%-100.0%). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: This study demonstrates relatively high analytical sensitivity for DBS compared with previous studies that performed population-based screening. As more sensitive DNA extraction and PCR methods continue to emerge, DBS-based testing should remain under investigation as a potential low-cost, high-throughput option for cCMV screening.

BACKGROUND: The pathogen Candida auris is rapidly gaining clinical importance because of its resistance to antifungal treatments and its persistence in hospital environments. Early and accurate diagnosis of C. auris infections is crucial, however, the fungus has often been misidentified by commercial systems. OBJECTIVES: To develop conventional and real-time PCR methods for accurate and rapid identification of C. auris and its discrimination from closely related species by exploiting the uniqueness of certain glycosylphosphatidylinositol-modified protein-encoding genes. METHODS: Species-specific primers for two unique putative GPI protein-encoding genes per species were designed for C. auris, C. haemulonii, C. pseudohaemulonii, C. duobushaemulonii, C. lusitaniae, and C. albicans. Primers were blind tested for their specificity and efficiency in conventional and real-time multiplex PCR set-up. RESULTS: All primers combinations showed excellent species specificity. In multiplex mode, correct identification was aided by different sized amplicons for each species. Efficiency of the C. auris primers was validated using a panel of 155 C. auris isolates, including all known genetically diverse clades. In real-time multiplex PCR, different melting points of the amplicons allowed the distinction of C. auris from four related species. C. auris limit of detection was 5 CFU/reaction with a threshold value of 32. The method was also able to detect C. auris in spiked blood and serum. CONCLUSIONS: PCR identification based on unique GPI protein-encoding genes allows for accurate and rapid species identification of C. auris and related species without need for expensive equipment when applied in conventional PCR set-up.

In January 2020, with support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CDC instituted an enhanced entry risk assessment and management (screening) program for air passengers arriving from certain countries with widespread, sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The objectives of the screening program were to reduce the importation of COVID-19 cases into the United States and slow subsequent spread within states. Screening aimed to identify travelers with COVID-19-like illness or who had a known exposure to a person with COVID-19 and separate them from others. Screening also aimed to inform all screened travelers about self-monitoring and other recommendations to prevent disease spread and obtain their contact information to share with public health authorities in destination states. CDC delegated postarrival management of crew members to airline occupational health programs by issuing joint guidance with the Federal Aviation Administration.* During January 17-September 13, 2020, a total of 766,044 travelers were screened, 298 (0.04%) of whom met criteria for public health assessment; 35 (0.005%) were tested for SARS-CoV-2, and nine (0.001%) had a positive test result. CDC shared contact information with states for approximately 68% of screened travelers because of data collection challenges and some states' opting out of receiving data. The low case detection rate of this resource-intensive program highlighted the need for fundamental change in the U.S. border health strategy. Because SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission can occur in the absence of symptoms and because the symptoms of COVID-19 are nonspecific, symptom-based screening programs are ineffective for case detection. Since the screening program ended on September 14, 2020, efforts to reduce COVID-19 importation have focused on enhancing communications with travelers to promote recommended preventive measures, reinforcing mechanisms to refer overtly ill travelers to CDC, and enhancing public health response capacity at ports of entry. More efficient collection of contact information for international air passengers before arrival and real-time transfer of data to U.S. health departments would facilitate timely postarrival public health management, including contact tracing, when indicated. Incorporating health attestations, predeparture and postarrival testing, and a period of limited movement after higher-risk travel, might reduce risk for transmission during travel and translocation of SARS-CoV-2 between geographic areas and help guide more individualized postarrival recommendations.